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- Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1988, the hyphen in "subsurface" was deleted in the first sentence of subsection (a).
- For article examining approach to water pollution control established by the Georgia Water Quality Control Act and other regulations in light of alternative approaches, see 23 Mercer L. Rev. 603 (1972). For note, "Regulation of Artificial Lakes and Recreational Subdivisions in Georgia," recommending methods for future regulation, see 8 Ga. St. B.J. 580 (1972).
- Issuance of a permit to a city for a wastewater treatment facility was reversed because the administrative law judge's interpretation that the antidegradation rule was inapplicable was plain error as the rule was not limited in application to point source discharges and required that the substantive requirements be met before a permit degrading the high quality of water could be granted. Barrow v. Dunn, 344 Ga. App. 747, 812 S.E.2d 63 (2018).
Wholesale water quality degradation was held justifiable to provide necessary social or economic development, and a permit to allow the county to discharge 40 million gallons of treated wastewater into a lake on a daily basis did not require the highest and best level of treatment practicable under existing technology because: (1) the projected population growth in the county would require additional wastewater capacity by the year 2005, and continued growth would require the level of capacity provided by the permit sometime between 2010 and 2015; (2) sufficient land was not available for land application of wastewater; and (3) there was a need to return water to the water system from which the county draws the county's water supply, and the cycling of treated wastewater taken from the Chattahoochee River system and returned to that system would aid negotiations concerning an interstate compact regarding these waters. Hughey v. Gwinnett County, 278 Ga. 740, 609 S.E.2d 324 (2004).
- Georgia Department of Natural Resources Environmental Protection Division's (EPD's) interpretation of the narrative standard was entitled to deference as it was proper for the EPD to interpret the narrative standard as not intended to convert the designated use of a water body to a more protected use as the plain language of the narrative standard does not specify the degree of interference with legitimate water uses that would constitute a violation of the rule. Altamaha Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Rayonier Performance Fibers, LLC, 346 Ga. App. 269, 816 S.E.2d 125 (2018).
Cited in Franklin County v. Fieldale Farms Corp., 270 Ga. 272, 507 S.E.2d 460 (1998).
- 61B Am. Jur. 2d, Pollution Control, §§ 3, 4, 5.
- 39A C.J.S., Health and Environment, §§ 101, 102, 105, 133, 136, 142, 145, 148, 172.
- Constitutionality and construction of statutes and ordinances for protection of municipal water supply, 72 A.L.R. 673.
Total Results: 2
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2004-11-23
Citation: 609 S.E.2d 324, 278 Ga. 740, 2004 Fulton County D. Rep. 3757, 59 ERC (BNA) 1507, 2004 Ga. LEXIS 1045
Snippet: integrity of the Nation’s waters”). OCGA § 12-5-21 (a) (“the water resources of the state shall be
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1998-11-23
Citation: 507 S.E.2d 460, 270 Ga. 272, 98 Fulton County D. Rep. 3939, 47 ERC (BNA) 1866, 1998 Ga. LEXIS 1157
Snippet: 12-5-20 to § 12-5-53 (1996). [20] See OCGA § 12-5-21. [21] See Cotton States, 251 Ga. at 312, 304 S