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O.C.G.A.Title 13Chapter 1

O.C.G.A. § 13-1-1 (2019)

Contract defined - Generally

Edition and currency
Release 73 of the O.C.G.A. (Aug. 21, 2019): Georgia laws through the 2019 session. The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations for this section are from Release 73 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Aug. 21, 2019) (Public.Resource.Org; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020), which replaced the older 2010 print volume for this title. Georgia Acts after that are not in this text. The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
Other sources
CURRENTRelease 73 of the O.C.G.A. (Aug. 21, 2019): Georgia laws through the 2019 session cited 1985–2026 40citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 40 opinions since 1985, 11 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (a)(2) (2 cases).

A contract is an agreement between two or more parties for the doing or not doing of some specified thing.

History

(Orig. Code 1863, § 2676; Code 1868, § 2672; Code 1873, § 2714; Code 1882, § 2714; Civil Code 1895, § 3631; Civil Code 1910, § 4216; Code 1933, § 20-101.)

Annotations

Law reviews. - For article discussing the anachronistic nature of the Georgia Contracts Code as dramatized by comparing the doctrine of consideration as it is formulated in the Restatements of Contracts and in Code 1933, Title 20 (now this title), and the interpretative approach Georgia courts have taken in dealing with such Code, see 13 Ga. L. Rev. 499 (1979). (But see amendments by Ga. L. 1981, p. 876.) For article surveying contract law in 1984-1985, see 37 Mercer L. Rev. 161 (1985).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Requisites of an explicit contract are a meeting of the minds of the parties, mutuality, and the clear expression of the terms of the agreement. Jackson v. Easters, 190 Ga. App. 713, 379 S.E.2d 610 (1989).

Consideration. - Where plaintiff patient sued defendant manufacturer of a surgically implanted medical device, alleging breach of contract, in that manufacturer's representative orally agreed to pay for patient's two prior surgeries, manufacturer's motion for summary judgment under O.C.G.A. §§ 13-1-1 and 13-1-5(b) was granted because while the patient submitted email correspondence patient received from representative requesting all bills for surgeries where representative stated a need for record of what it had cost the patient "out of pocket," there was no evidence that consideration was given for the promise. Trickett v. Advanced Neuromodulation Sys., 542 F. Supp. 2d 1338 (S.D. Ga. 2008).

Mere labels are not determinative of legal relationships, even as between parties to the contract. Stewart v. Midani, 525 F. Supp. 843 (N.D. Ga. 1981).

Evidence of an agreement or promise is required to support a claim under a theory of oral contract. Mooney v. Mooney, 245 Ga. App. 780, 538 S.E.2d 864 (2000).

Contract not void for uncertainty unless intention of parties cannot be fairly ascertained and effectuated. Pierson v. General Plywood Corp., 76 Ga. App. 853, 47 S.E.2d 605 (1948).

Parties must have distinct intention common to both and without doubt or difference; until all understand alike, there can be no assent, and, therefore, no contract. Weill v. Brown, 197 Ga. 328, 29 S.E.2d 54 (1944).

If the agreement was merely to reach an agreement, such was not enforceable. Overton Apparel, Inc. v. Russell Corp., 264 Ga. App. 306, 590 S.E.2d 260 (2003).

Agreement must be plainly expressed. - To be valid, an agreement must be expressed plainly and explicitly enough to show what the parties agreed upon, and an agreement expressed in incomplete or incomprehensive terms cannot be enforced. Patel v. Gingrey Assocs., 196 Ga. App. 203, 395 S.E.2d 595 (1990).

Terms of agreement must be such that neither party can reasonably misunderstand. - One seeking to establish a contract must establish by proof a contract that is certain, definite, clear, and so precise in its terms that neither party can reasonably misunderstand it, and such proof must establish existence of contract beyond reasonable doubt. Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Diamond, 229 Ga. 677, 194 S.E.2d 91 (1972).

Offer must be definite enough for court to fix legal liability of parties. - Where offer is in any case so indefinite as to make it impossible for court to decide just what it means, and to fix exactly the legal liability of parties, its acceptance cannot result in an enforceable agreement. Weill v. Brown, 197 Ga. 328, 29 S.E.2d 54 (1944).

If contract is substantially alleged some mere details may be implied, if implication is warranted by facts and circumstances of particular case. Pierson v. General Plywood Corp., 76 Ga. App. 853, 47 S.E.2d 605 (1948).

When no identification of subject matter, nor agreement upon price, there is no valid contract. North Ga. Lumber Co. v. Lawson, 40 Ga. App. 680, 150 S.E. 865 (1929).

Definition of option contract. - An option is a contract by which owner of property agrees with another that latter shall have right to buy former's property at fixed price within certain time upon agreed terms and conditions. Jones v. Vereen, 52 Ga. App. 157, 182 S.E. 627 (1935).

Before option contract is completed there must be agreement on terms and conditions. Jones v. Vereen, 52 Ga. App. 157, 182 S.E. 627 (1935).

Agreement to reach agreement is contradiction in terms and imposes no obligation on parties thereto. Wells v. H.W. Lay & Co., 78 Ga. App. 364, 50 S.E.2d 755 (1948).

Contract to enter contract in future ineffective unless all terms and conditions agreed upon. - Unless all terms and conditions are agreed on, and nothing is left to future negotiations, a contract to enter into a contract in future is of no effect. Wells v. H.W. Lay & Co., 78 Ga. App. 364, 50 S.E.2d 755 (1948).

An agreement merely not to be "unreasonable" in the future is so uncertain, indefinite, and vague that it cannot be an enforceable contract. Patel v. Gingrey Assocs., 196 Ga. App. 203, 395 S.E.2d 595 (1990).

Executive warrant authorizing state treasury to pay money pursuant to appropriation, not a contract. - Executive warrant upon treasury of state, authorizing payment of money in pursuance of appropriation made by law, is not a contract or in nature of a contract. Fletcher v. Renfroe, 56 Ga. 674 (1876).

Contingency fee contract not found. - Since it was clear that the parties had not arrived at a meeting of the minds regarding expenses as set forth in a contingency fees provision, no binding contract existed with regard to the parties and the trial court therefore properly entered judgment in favor of withholding defendant. Donohue v. Green, 209 Ga. App. 381, 433 S.E.2d 431 (1993).

Party asserting existence of contract has burden of proving contract's existence and terms. Carter v. Kim, 157 Ga. App. 418, 277 S.E.2d 776 (1981).

One seeking recovery under contract must show all essentials of valid contract are met. - Burden to show that there had been a contract between itself and defendants as a basis of indebtedness is on plaintiff, and to carry this burden, it is necessary for plaintiff to show, by preponderance of evidence, every necessary essential of a valid contract, which on facts, included acceptance of policies of insurance by defendants after the defendants had unconditionally assented to all terms of contracts. Associated Muts., Inc. v. Pope Lumber Co., 200 Ga. 487, 37 S.E.2d 393 (1946).

Contract unenforceable when parties and scope unclear. - In a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding, the debtor had a valid objection to an allowance of a claim arising from pending state court litigation; an alleged contract was not sufficiently definite to be enforceable because the parties and the scope of the contract were both unclear. In re LJL Truck Ctr., Inc., 299 Bankr. 663 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2003).

Estoppel from claiming contract too indefinite to enforce. - Fact that the creditor bank's promise to forbear setoff lacks term of duration does not render contract too indefinite to enforce, where creditor-bank promised another creditor not to exercise setoff against account of mutual debtor, and then for its benefit breached its promise at first opportunity by exercising setoff after the promisee-creditor had relied on the bank's promise to its detriment. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 248 Ga. 114, 281 S.E.2d 579 (1981).

No burden of disproving any essentials of a valid contract rests on defendant. Associated Muts., Inc. v. Pope Lumber Co., 200 Ga. 487, 37 S.E.2d 393 (1946).

Contract may give rise to duties which exceed contract's bounds. - It is possible for a contractual relationship to give rise to a duty which exceeds the bounds of the contract itself. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 519 F. Supp. 60 (S.D. Ga. 1981).

Partnership's exercise of right of first refusal on establishing a second airport motel created a contract. Bouy, Hall & Howard & Assocs. v. Savannah Airport Comm'n, 256 Ga. 181, 345 S.E.2d 349 (1986).

Seller's proposal accepted by buyer was contract. - Proposal for the furnishing of a model home that specified the parties, the work to be performed, the consideration, the place of performance, and the type of furnishings to be installed, which was accepted by the buyer, constituted a contract under O.C.G.A. § 13-1-1, but questions remained as to whether the contract was breached by the buyer, making summary judgment for the seller improper. Hampton Island Club, LLC v. B2 Creative, Inc., 300 Ga. App. 258, 685 S.E.2d 751 (2009).

Lack of maturity date or interest rate for a loan was not fatal. - Trial court erred in granting summary judgment to a brother on his sister's claim for repayment of $132,700 she allegedly lent him, with no interest rate or time for repayment specified, following her sale of her business that employed him. The lack of an interest rate and time for repayment was not fatal to the claim. Thomas v. Chance, 325 Ga. App. 716, 754 S.E.2d 669 (2014).

Judgment rendered in action for a tort, growing out of the wrongful conversion of personal property, is not a contract. McAfee v. Covington, 71 Ga. 272, 51 Am. R. 263 (1883).

Cited in Helmer v. Helmer, 159 Ga. 376, 125 S.E. 849 (1924); Friedlander v. Schloss Bros. & Co., 43 Ga. App. 646, 159 S.E. 870 (1931); Smith v. Gholstin, 45 Ga. App. 287, 164 S.E. 217 (1932); Aero Constr. Co. v. Grizzard, 76 Ga. App. 749, 46 S.E.2d 767 (1948); Russell v. Smith, 77 Ga. App. 70, 47 S.E.2d 772 (1948); Gray v. Aiken, 205 Ga. 649, 54 S.E.2d 587 (1949); Reid v. Hemphill, 82 Ga. App. 391, 61 S.E.2d 201 (1950); Flatauer v. Goodman, 84 Ga. App. 881, 67 S.E.2d 794 (1951); Bregman v. Rosenthal, 212 Ga. 95, 90 S.E.2d 561 (1955); Weiss v. Johnson & Johnson Constr. Co., 98 Ga. App. 858, 107 S.E.2d 708 (1959); Peachtree Medical Bldg., Inc. v. Keel, 107 Ga. App. 438, 130 S.E.2d 530 (1963); Weikert v. Logue, 121 Ga. App. 171, 173 S.E.2d 268 (1970); Dowis v. Lindgren, 132 Ga. App. 793, 209 S.E.2d 233 (1974); Fender v. Colonial Stores, Inc., 138 Ga. App. 31, 225 S.E.2d 691 (1976); CCE Fed. Credit Union v. Chesser, 150 Ga. App. 328, 258 S.E.2d 2 (1979); Citicorp Indus. Credit, Inc. v. Rountree, 185 Ga. App. 417, 364 S.E.2d 65 (1987); Poulos v. Home Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 192 Ga. App. 501, 385 S.E.2d 135 (1989); Jackson v. Williams, 209 Ga. App. 640, 434 S.E.2d 98 (1993); Sanders v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 226 Ga. App. 119, 485 S.E.2d 264 (1997); Mooney v. Mooney, 235 Ga. App. 117, 508 S.E.2d 766 (1998); Baldwin Rental Ctrs., Inc. v. Case Credit Corp. (In re Baldwin Rental Ctrs., Inc.), 277 Bankr. 152 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2000).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 17 Am. Jur. 2d, Contracts, §§ 1 et seq., 5 et seq.

C.J.S. - 17 C.J.S., Contracts, § 1.

ALR. - Contract to refrain from contesting will, 55 A.L.R. 811.

Requisites as to definiteness of agreement to pay employee share of profits, 18 A.L.R.2d 211.

Hospital's liability for negligence in connection with preparation, storage, or dispensing of drug or medicine, 9 A.L.R.3d 579.

Requirements as to certainty and completeness of terms of lease in agreement to lease, 85 A.L.R.3d 414.

Duty of publisher with regard to distribution and promotion of book, 43 A.L.R.4th 1182.

The 20 cases that cite O.C.G.A. § 13-1-1 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENState of Georgia v. Fed. Def. Prog., Inc., 882 S.E.2d 257 (Ga. 2022).
cites § 13-1-1 4×cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 13-1-1
“at § 1:2 (quoting OCGA § 13-1-1 (emphasis supplied)). 57 of forbearance); Antoskow & Assoc.”
The case’s holding
An email exchange constitutes a written contract sufficient to waive sovereign immunity if the parties' conduct demonstrates an agreement to conduct the transaction by electronic means.
Later courts cite it for
“because sovereign immunity is jurisdictional, it requires the plaintiff to prove any waiver thereto and is properly raised as a defense under ocga 9-11-12 (b) (1).” · 2 citing courts
2
GREENPatel v. Gingrey Assocs., 395 S.E.2d 595 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990).
cites § 13-1-1 4×cited by 15 cases
Where it cites § 13-1-1
“The agreement provides no definition of its terms and provides *206 no standards of reasonableness or qualification, either subjective or objective, that Mr.”
Later courts cite it for
“allow a future sale of the stock of the motel and or the property ... to a qualified buyer if the purchaser is first approved by him, and to not unreasonably withhold his approval.” · 2 citing courts
3
GREENS. Prestige Homes, Inc. v. Moscoso, 532 S.E.2d 122 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000).
cites § 13-1-1 4×cited by 15 cases
Where it cites § 13-1-1
“, by letter of its counsel to counsel for Plaintiff and that Plaintiff is, therefore, entitled to the return of the $25,000 held by defendant, Southern Prestige Homes, Inc., on the theory of rescission.”
Later courts cite it for
“plainly indicated that the subject of rescission was under negotiation.” · 2 citing courts
4
GREENOverton Apparel, Inc. v. Russell Corp., 590 S.E.2d 260 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003).
cites § 13-1-1 2×cited by 23 cases
Where it cites § 13-1-1
““A contract is an agreement between two or more parties for the doing or not doing of some specified thing,” OCGA § 13-1-1, and the party asserting the existence of a contract has the burden of proving its existence and its terms.”
Later courts cite it for
“an agreement to reach a final agreement is unenforceable.” · 1 citing court
5
GREENBudget Rent-A-Car of Atlanta, Inc. v. Webb, 469 S.E.2d 712 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996).
cites § 13-1-1 2×cited by 40 cases
Where it cites § 13-1-1
“in that the undisputed evidence showed that Webb had breached the rental agreement and was personally liable for such breach.”
The case’s holding
Recovery for breach of contract requires proof of the breach and the resultant damages to the party with the right to complain about the breach.
Later courts cite it for
“the elements of a right to recover for a breach of contract are the breach and the resultant damages to the party who has the right to complain about the contract being broken.” · 15 citing courts
6
GREENJackson v. Easters, 379 S.E.2d 610 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989).
cites § 13-1-1 2×cited by 39 cases
Where it cites § 13-1-1
“on the plaintiff’s part [in order to prevent his recovery] as opposed to an issue of no agreement or an agreement.”
The case’s holding
Unless all terms and conditions are agreed upon and nothing is left to further negotiations, a contract to enter into a contract in the future is of no effect.
Later courts cite it for
“unless all the terms and conditions are agreed on, and nothing is left to further negotiations, a contract to enter into a contract in the future is of no effect. an agreement to reach an agreement is a contradiction in terms and imposes no obligation on the parties thereto.” · 3 citing courts
7
GREENMooney v. Mooney, 538 S.E.2d 864 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000).
cites § 13-1-1 2×cited by 32 cases
Where it cites § 13-1-1
“Barclays Bank PLC 4 (a promise is an essential element of a claim for promissory estoppel); OCGA § 13-1-1 — Sanders v. Commercial Cas.”
The case’s holding
A promise must be communicated with sufficient particularity to be enforceable under a claim of promissory estoppel.
Later courts cite it for
“while the promise need not meet the formal requirements of a contract, it must, nonetheless, have been communicated with sufficient particularity to enforce the commitment.” · 5 citing courts
8
GREENNewton's Crest Homeowners' Ass'n v. Camp, 702 S.E.2d 41 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010).
cites § 13-1-1 2×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 13-1-1
“Specifically, the NCHA contends that the indemnification provision of the agreement is void under former OCGA § 13-8-2 (b), because it excuses Kennedy from liability for damages resulting from its sole negligence.”
Later courts cite it for
“although indemnitor did not actually construct any buildings on the subdivision property, its work on the property consisted of, among other things, clear-cutting and grading the land, installing utility lines, and putting in streets” · 2 citing courts
9
GREENTelescripps Cable Co. v. Welsh, 542 S.E.2d 640 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000).
cites § 13-1-1 2×cited by 24 cases
Where it cites § 13-1-1
“537, 540 ( 536 SE2d 194 ) (2000) (OCGA § 13-1-1 does not bar recovery under a balancing of the equities where parties laboring under a mutual mistake of fact).”
The case’s holding
The voluntary payment doctrine bars recovery of late fees paid with knowledge of the facts where the payer alleges no fraud, deception, or urgent necessity and claims only ignorance of the law.
10
GREENMooney v. Mooney, 508 S.E.2d 766 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998).
cites § 13-1-1 2×cited by 20 cases
Where it cites § 13-1-1
“” OCGA § 13-1-1. See also OCGA §§ 13-1-5; 13-1-6.”
Later courts cite it for
“in deciding a motion to dismiss, all pleadings are to be construed most favorably to the party who filed them, and all doubts regarding such pleadings must be resolved in the filing party's favor.” · 1 citing court
11
GREENSanders v. Com. Cas. Ins., 485 S.E.2d 264 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997).
cites § 13-1-1 2×cited by 16 cases
Where it cites § 13-1-1
“” OCGA § 13-1-1. To be enforceable, it must be set forth with “such certainty and completeness that either party may have a right of action upon it.”
Later courts cite it for
“because the determination of whether a contract contains the requisite certainty must be made at the time enforcement is sought, an objection of indefiniteness may be obviated by performance on the part of one party and the acceptance of the performance by the other” · 2 citing courts
12
GREENCiticorp Indus. Credit, Inc. v. Rountree, 364 S.E.2d 65 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987).
cites § 13-1-1 2×cited by 16 cases
Where it cites § 13-1-1
“However, by signing the subsequent lease agreement with appellant, appellees, in effect, agreed to the rescission of their original agreement to buy the equipment from Shell and Shell, in apparent reliance thereon, then sold the equipment to appellant. Appellant never assented…”
Later courts cite it for
“the fact that appellees deemed themselves too busy to read the . . . agreements prior to signing them will not authorize them to avoid their obligations” · 1 citing court
13
GREENChristensen v. Roberds of Atlanta, Inc., 375 S.E.2d 267 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988).
cites § 13-1-1 2×cited by 15 cases
Where it cites § 13-1-1
“” OCGA § 13-1-1. Appellant’s deposition indicates that, rather than making a promise to bind itself, appellee only represented that its employees’ insurance plan would cover the expenses of the pregnancy.”
Later courts cite it for
“formula or method for determining the exact amount of the bonus. cits.” · 2 citing courts
14
GREENHumar Props., LLLP v. Prior Tire Enter., Inc., 605 S.E.2d 926 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004).
cites § 13-1-1 2×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 13-1-1
“OCGA § 13-1-1. No transcript of either the arbitration hearing or the hearing on the Application to Vacate the Award has been provided to this Court.”
15
GREENIn re LJL Truck Ctr., Inc., 299 B.R. 663 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2003).
cites § 13-1-1 2×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 13-1-1
“Contract Claim The Creditors have not proven an enforceable contract claim because they have failed to prove the elements of a contract.”
16
GREENTrickett v. Advanced Neuromodulation Sys., Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 1338 (S.D. Ga. 2008).
cites § 13-1-1 2×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 13-1-1
“Finally, Defendant contends that, as an evi-dentiary matter, the September Letter is inadmissible because it is an offer of assistance, or “an expression made on the impulse of benevolence in response to numerous attempts to assist a patient.”
Later courts cite it for
“the device did not operate as intended and this was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries.” · 2 citing courts
17
GREENMcBride v. Life Ins. Co. of Virginia, 190 F. Supp. 2d 1366 (M.D. Ga. 2002).
cites § 13-1-1 2×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 13-1-1
“2d 712, 713 (1996)(citing O.C.G.A. § 13-1-1). “An action at law lies for breach of a contract and .”
Later courts cite it for
“mann also allegedly represented that he understood the life of virginia policy to remain in force as long as the monthly 151 premium was paid.” · 1 citing court
18
GREENPoulos v. Home Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 385 S.E.2d 135 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989).
cites § 13-1-1 2×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 13-1-1
“) OCGA § 13-1-1. “ ‘Specify’ means, ‘to mention or name in a specific or explicit manner; to tell or state precisely or in detail.”
Later courts cite it for
“agreement to reach an agreement is a contradiction in terms and imposes no obligation on the parties thereto” · 2 citing courts
19
GREENJackson v. Williams, 434 S.E.2d 98 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993).
cites § 13-1-1 2×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 13-1-1
“We conclude that the trial court’s determination that the contract was unenforceable because of its indefiniteness was proper.”
20
GREENColeman v. H2S Holdings, LLC, 230 F. Supp. 3d 1313 (N.D. Ga. 2017).
cites § 13-1-1 2×cited by 2 cases
Where it cites § 13-1-1
“O.C.G.A. § 13-1-1. In response to Oasis’ breach of contract arguments, Plaintiff insists that Georgia and Florida law, as well as the Employee Acknowledgment, created an “at will” employment contract/relationship with Oasis; that termination of the Agreement did not end that…”

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
198520052026

One bar per year. Tallest: 5 cases in 2000. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Ga. Ct. App.26M.D. Ga.5S.D. Ga.211th Cir.1D.D.C.1Ga.1Bankr. M.D. Ga.1N.D. Ga.1

The 8 courts with the most citing cases, of 10 courts in all.

By subsection
(a)(2)2 cases
Hdda LLC v. Sangha Hosp. LLC, No. 5:22-cv-00021 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 26, 2023).
Southstate Bank NA v. F-5 Ventures Inc, No. 5:24-cv-00194 (M.D. Ga. Oct. 30, 2024).

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Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: Release 73 of the O.C.G.A. (Aug. 21, 2019): Georgia laws through the 2019 session. Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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