O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 13-3-3 (2019)

When written acceptance of offer made by letter takes effect; acceptance of offer containing alternative propositions

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)

Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.

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If an offer is made by letter, an acceptance by written reply takes effect from the time it is sent and not from the time it is received; hence, withdrawal of the offer by the offeror after that time is ineffective. If an offer contains alternative propositions, the party receiving the offer may elect between the alternative propositions.

History

(Orig. Code 1863, § 2690; Code 1868, § 2686; Code 1873, § 2728; Code 1882, § 2728; Civil Code 1895, § 3646; Civil Code 1910, § 4231; Code 1933, § 20-114.)

Annotations

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Section applies only where proposition and reply are communicated in same way. W. & H.M. Goulding, Ltd. v. Hammond, 54 F. 639 (5th Cir. 1893), rev’g 49 F. 443 (S.D. Ga. 1892). Method for creating binding contract through correspondence. - Complete and binding contract may be made by means of epistolary correspondence, but this result is not accomplished until there has been a definite offer by one correspondent and an unequivocal acceptance of it by the other, without condition or variance of any kind. Parties must mutually assent to same thing in same sense. Robinson v. Weller, 81 Ga. 704, 8 S.E. 447 (1888); Harris v. Amoskeag Lumber Co., 97 Ga. 465, 25 S.E. 519 (1895). Offer by mail adopts mail as agency for acceptance unless specified otherwise. - Person who by mail sends to another an offer or proposal which requires only latter’s acceptance or confirmation to create valid contract, and who says nothing as to how answer of acceptance or confirmation shall be communicated, nor that it shall take effect only upon actual receipt of acceptance

by offerer, impliedly adopts mails as one’s agency, and authorizes its use in transmission to one of acceptance. Rowntree Bros. v. Bush, 28 Ga. App. 376, 111 S.E. 217 (1922). One making by mail an offer requiring only acceptance to create valid contract, without stating how acceptance shall be communicated, adopts the mails as one’s agency, and authorizes transmission of acceptance by mail. E. Frederics, Inc. v. Felton Beauty Supply Co., 58 Ga. App. 320, 198 S.E. 324 (1938). Contract for the construction of an underground piping system is ‘‘made’’ when the offer is accepted, because the acceptance, not delivery, constitutes the last act essential to the completion of the contract. General Tel. Co. v. Trimm, 706 F.2d 1117 (11th Cir. 1983). When mail is agency for acceptance, contract complete upon mailing acceptance, although acceptance never received. E. Frederics, Inc. v. Felton Beauty Supply Co., 58 Ga. App. 320, 198 S.E. 324 (1938). When offeree deposits the offeree’s acceptance in mail, in envelope properly stamped

and addressed to offerer, contract thereupon becomes complete and binding, without reference to whether or not acceptance actually reaches addressee. Rowntree Bros. v. Bush, 28 Ga. App. 376, 111 S.E. 217 (1922). Presumption of receipt of letter properly addressed, stamped, and mailed is rebuttable. - Rule that, where letter is written, properly addressed, stamped, and mailed, presumption arises that the letter was received by addressee, is merely prima facie, and may be successfully rebutted by uncontradicted evidence of addressee that addressee did not in fact receive the letter. Rowntree Bros. v. Bush, 28 Ga. App. 376, 111 S.E. 217 (1922).

Cited in Bryant v. Booze, 55 Ga. 438 (1875); Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. Smith, 83 Ga. 626, 10 S.E. 235 (1889); Home Ins. Co. v. Chattahoochee Lumber Co., 126 Ga. 334, 55 S.E. 11 (1906); City of Royston v. Littrell Eng’r Co., 87 Ga. App. 903, 75 S.E.2d 678 (1953); Borg-Warner Health Prods., Inc. v. May, 154 Ga. App. 482, 268 S.E.2d 770 (1980); Amwest Surety Ins. Co. v. RA-LIN & Assocs., 216 Ga. App. 526, 455 S.E.2d 106 (1995); Moore v. Emery (In re Am. Steel Prod., Inc.), 203 Bankr. 504 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1996).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 17 Am. Jur. 2d, Contracts, §§ 25, 29, 31, 35, 48 et seq., 57, 60, 67. C.J.S. - 17 C.J.S., Contracts, §§ 33, 36, 52, 57. 17A C.J.S., Contracts, §§ 356, 374, 580, 592, 597, 624. ALR. - Time and place of consummation of contract on acceptance by telegraph of offer, 47 ALR 159. Time when offer or proposition is mailed, or when it is received through mail as commencement of period allowed for acceptance, 72 ALR 1214. Withdrawal of, or right to withdraw, letter

from mail as affecting consummation of contract, 92 ALR 1062. Character and validity of written instrument as a contract for sale of goods as affected by election or option in respect of subject-mater, 105 ALR 1100. Attempted revocation of offer by letter mailed or telegram filed before, but not received until after, letter or telegram of acceptance was mailed or filed, 125 ALR 989. Applicability and application, in civil case, of presumption of addressee’s receipt of telegram, 24 ALR3d 1434.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 9 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1984–2021 · leading case: Herring v. Dunning, 446 S.E.2d 199 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994).

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Herring v. Dunning, 446 S.E.2d 199 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994). · cites it 4× “" OCGA § 13-3-3. Since plaintiff's offer contained no specified manner of acceptance, defendant's counsel was entitled to accept by mailing the insurer's promise to pay the policy limits in exchange for a full release of its insured, the defendant.”

Popham v. Landmark Am. Ins. Co. Et Al., 798 S.E.2d 257 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017). · cites it 2× “See OCGA § 13-3-3. We disagree that application of that rule is warranted by this case.”

Amwest Sur. Ins. v. Ra-Lin & Assocs., Inc., 455 S.E.2d 106 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995). · cites it 2× “See also OCGA § 13-3-3. “When parties to a [purported] contract, as in this case, know that they have different intents with respect to certain language before they enter into the contract, there can be no meeting of the minds upon the same subject matter and in the same sense…”

Mapei Corp. v. Prosser, 761 S.E.2d 500 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014). · cites it 2× “See OCGA § 13-3-3. Indeed, in its statement of undisputed material facts, MAPEI asserts that Prosser signed and entered the agreement containing the noncompete covenant on June 7, 2011, and signed the agreement omitting that covenant on June 14, 2011.”

Carterosa, Ltd. v. Gen. Star Indem. Co., 489 S.E.2d 83 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997). · cites it 2× “See also OCGA § 13-3-3. Pretermitting whether the mailbox rule applies when the offer is made by facsimile, rather than letter, it does not aid Carterosa.”

Pate v. Federated Mut. Ins., 325 S.E.2d 831 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984). · cites it 2× “See OCGA § 13-3-3. According to appellant, this “contract” would be enforceable against appellee notwithstanding any defense that it might otherwise have had to a claim for optional no-fault coverage under the policy pursuant to Flewellen .”

Enedina Trujillo De Paz v. Ana Alberto De Pineda (Ga. Ct. App. 2021). · cites it 4× “The defendant cites to the “mailbox rule” set forth in OCGA § 13-3-3, which provides that “[i]f an offer is made by letter, an acceptance by written reply takes effect from the time it is sent and not from the time it is received[.”

Sec. Life of Denver Ins. v. Shah, 906 F. Supp. 2d 1334 (S.D. Ga. 2012). · cites it 2× “” O.C.G.A. § 13-3-3. Further, the Georgia Supreme Court has held that to determine where a contract was made, the court must “determine where the last act essential to the completion of the contract was done.”

Mapei Corp. v. Stephen Prosser (Ga. Ct. App. 2014). · cites it 2× “Indeed, in its statement of undisputed material facts, MAPEI asserts that Prosser signed and entered the agreement containing the non-compete covenant on June 7, 2011, and signed the agreement omitting that covenant on June 14, 2011.”

Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.