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Call Now: 904-383-7448Payment of money due to a creditor or his agent shall be sufficient to discharge the debtor upon the obligation; and, if such agent receives property other than currency in satisfaction of the obligation, the creditor is bound thereby.
(Orig. Code 1863, § 2805; Code 1868, § 2813; Code 1873, § 2864; Code 1882, § 2864; Civil Code 1895, § 3717; Civil Code 1910, § 4311; Code 1933, § 20-1001.)
Term payment, in term's legal import, means full satisfaction of debt by money, not by exchange or compromise, or accord and satisfaction, and it is only where words used in connection with it plainly manifest a different intention, that legal import of term can be rejected. Claflin & Co. v. Continental Jersey Works, 85 Ga. 27, 11 S.E. 721 (1890).
- Fact that the law allows an agent to take payment in property other than money, gives no support to contention that the agent can make payment in same way, without express authority to do so. This forms an exception to the well-settled rule that if an agent is given power in general terms to do an act, the agent is restricted in manner of performing it to that which is usual in course of business. Claflin & Co. v. Continental Jersey Works, 85 Ga. 27, 11 S.E. 721 (1890).
- If general agent to collect money receives in payment property other than money, creditor, so far as debtor is concerned, is bound thereby. Holmes v. Langston & Woodson, 110 Ga. 861, 36 S.E. 251 (1900); Armour Fertilizer Works v. Maddox, 168 Ga. 429, 148 S.E. 152 (1929); Star Furn. Co. v. Dubberly, 46 Ga. App. 178, 167 S.E. 207 (1932); Futch v. F.S. Royster Guano Co., 51 Ga. App. 305, 180 S.E. 368 (1935).
- Receipt by general agent to collect, of property in settlement of a debt, is as binding on principal as if it were paid in money. McLaughlin v. Blount, 61 Ga. 168 (1878).
Receipt by general agent to collect, of property in partial or full satisfaction of debt, is as binding on principal as if it were paid in money. Futch v. F.S. Royster Guano Co., 51 Ga. App. 305, 180 S.E. 368 (1935).
- When seller authorizes closing agent to receive payment of sales price and buyer, aware of that authorization, makes such payment to closing agent, seller must look to closing agent for satisfaction. Hayes v. Gordon, 240 Ga. 19, 239 S.E.2d 344 (1977).
- When principal has placed agent in such situation that person of ordinary prudence, conversant with business usages and nature of particular business is justified in assuming that such agent has authority to perform a particular act and deals with agent upon that assumption, principal is estopped as against such third person from denying the agent's authority; one will not be permitted to prove that agent's authority was, in fact, less extensive than that with which the agent apparently was clothed. General Acceptance Corp. v. Guintini, 115 Ga. App. 723, 155 S.E.2d 722 (1967).
One holding another out as agent is estopped to deny acts within apparent scope of authority and about one's principal's business; such authority may be established by proof of long course of dealing by such agent in similar manner for one's principal. Futch v. F.S. Royster Guano Co., 51 Ga. App. 305, 180 S.E. 368 (1935).
General principle is that payment to one of two joint creditors extinguishes joint debt; this principle seems to be based upon idea that joint creditors are mutual agents of each other, as to the debt. Long v. Cash, 54 Ga. App. 764, 189 S.E. 73 (1936).
If one of joint payees on note is dead, payment may be made to survivor. Long v. Cash, 54 Ga. App. 764, 189 S.E. 73 (1936).
Partnership claim not settled by conveyance of land to one partner individually. Rooks v. Stanaland, 33 Ga. App. 8, 124 S.E. 904 (1924).
Attorney cannot, without special authority, receive anything in discharge of client's claim but full amount in case. Patterson v. Childs, 9 Ga. App. 646, 72 S.E. 45 (1911).
Cited in Cooper v. King, 6 Ga. App. 76, 64 S.E. 288 (1909); Powell v. Bank of Manchester, 46 Ga. App. 264, 167 S.E. 343 (1933); Federal Land Bank v. Fulcher, 47 Ga. App. 602, 171 S.E. 152 (1933); Commercial Credit Corp. v. Noles, 85 Ga. App. 392, 69 S.E.2d 309 (1952); Barton & Ludwig, Inc. v. Thompson, 170 Ga. App. 187, 316 S.E.2d 786 (1984).
- 60 Am. Jur. 2d, Payment, §§ 48, 102.
- 70 C.J.S., Payment, §§ 3, 4.
- Request to remit as authorizing payment by post, 2 A.L.R. 1646.
Right of purchaser to opportunity to pay in cash where tender has been made in other medium, 11 A.L.R. 811; 23 A.L.R. 630; 46 A.L.R. 914.
Construction of contract or regulations regarding time of payment for public utility service, 97 A.L.R. 982.
Contract to pay when the financial condition of business permits, 99 A.L.R. 1523.
Implied or ostensible authority to receive payments of principal of one who has authority to receive payments of interest, 111 A.L.R. 578.
Conveyance or surrender of property as an accord and satisfaction of contract obligation, 59 A.L.R.5th 665.
Total Results: 1
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1996-04-08
Citation: 468 S.E.2d 359, 266 Ga. 532, 96 Fulton County D. Rep. 1306, 1996 Ga. LEXIS 130
Snippet: the payment in full to Modern Mortgage. OCGA § 13-4-40. Therefore, the superior court correctly determined