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2018 Georgia Code 13-6-14 | Car Wreck Lawyer

TITLE 13 CONTRACTS

Section 6. Damages and Costs Generally, 13-6-1 through 13-6-15.

ARTICLE 2 STATUTE OF FRAUDS

13-6-14. Number of actions for breach of contract.

If a contract is entire, only one action may be maintained for a breach thereof; but, if it is severable or if the breaches occur at successive periods in an entire contract, an action will lie for each breach; but all the breaches occurring up to the commencement of the action must be included therein.

(Orig. Code 1863, § 2880; Code 1868, § 2888; Code 1873, § 2939; Code 1882, § 2939; Civil Code 1895, § 3793; Civil Code 1910, § 4389; Code 1933, § 20-1401.)

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

General Consideration

Principle underlying section is that both law and equity abhor a multiplicity of suits. Seaboard Air-Line Ry. v. Hamilton, 16 Ga. App. 646, 85 S.E. 942 (1915).

Last clause of former Code 1868, § 2888 (see O.C.G.A. § 13-6-19) was based on doctrine of former recovery, in accordance with former Code 1868, §§ 2846, 2847 and 3426 (see O.C.G.A. § 9-2-44). Porter v. Lively & McElroy, 45 Ga. 159 (1872).

All rights of parties accruing under contract must be litigated and adjudicated in one action. Chappell v. F.A.D. Andrea, Inc., 47 Ga. App. 816, 171 S.E. 582 (1933).

There cannot be subsequent actions for breaches which have already occurred, though they were not included in the first suit. Willingham v. Buckeye Cotton Oil Co., 13 Ga. App. 253, 79 S.E. 496 (1913).

There cannot be subsequent actions for breaches occurring prior to commencement of first suit on a contract, though the breaches were not included in the first suit. Chappell v. F.A.D. Andrea, Inc., 47 Ga. App. 816, 171 S.E. 582 (1933).

All breaches up to commencement of first action are conclusively presumed included in such suit.

- All breaches of contract up to commencement of former action and amount due to plaintiff therefor are conclusively presumed to have been included in such suit. Evans v. Collier, 79 Ga. 319, 4 S.E. 266 (1887).

Judgment rendered in litigation arising under contract is conclusive of all accrued rights of parties arising under contract, whether those rights were actually inquired into or not; and such judgment may, in a subsequent suit between parties under same contract, be pleaded as res adjudicata. Missouri State Life Ins. Co. v. Pilcher, 179 Ga. 231, 175 S.E. 586 (1934); World Mut. Health & Accident Ins. Co. v. Thurmond, 112 Ga. App. 393, 145 S.E.2d 252 (1965).

Principal and interest must be recovered in same action.

- A single cause of action cannot be split up and tried by piecemeal so as to recover principal sum in one suit, and interest in another. Central Bank & Trust Corp. v. State, 139 Ga. 54, 76 S.E. 587 (1912).

Statute inapplicable when separate parties sue same defendant on same contract.

- Statute is inapplicable as a defense when two separate parties, each in that party's own right, bring actions against the same defendant on identical contract. A.R. Hudson Realty, Inc. v. Hood, 151 Ga. App. 778, 262 S.E.2d 189 (1979) (see O.C.G.A. § 13-6-14).

Cited in Wallace v. Tumlin & Stegall, 42 Ga. 462 (1871); Evans v. Collier, 79 Ga. 319, 4 S.E. 266 (1887); Timmons v. Citizens Bank, 11 Ga. App. 69, 74 S.E. 798 (1912); Central Bank & Trust Corp. v. State, 139 Ga. 54, 76 S.E. 587 (1912); Neill v. Hill, 32 Ga. App. 381, 123 S.E. 30 (1924); Oliver v. Hall County Mem. Hosp., 65 Ga. App. 59, 15 S.E.2d 257 (1941); Stanton v. Gailey, 72 Ga. App. 292, 33 S.E.2d 747 (1945); Waller v. Morris, 78 Ga. App. 821, 52 S.E.2d 583 (1949); Piedmont Life Ins. Co. v. Bell, 103 Ga. App. 225, 119 S.E.2d 63 (1961); Spindel v. National Homes Corp., 110 Ga. App. 12, 137 S.E.2d 724 (1964); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Grant, 116 Ga. App. 661, 158 S.E.2d 703 (1967); Williamson v. C & S Realty Co., 130 Ga. App. 592, 203 S.E.2d 906 (1974); Ragan v. Smith, 188 Ga. App. 770, 374 S.E.2d 559 (1988); Harvey v. J.H. Harvey Co., 256 Ga. App. 333, 568 S.E.2d 553 (2002).

Entire Contracts

What is an entire contract.

- An entire contract is one requiring full performance of promise by plaintiff as condition precedent to performance by defendant. Broxton v. Nelson, 103 Ga. 327, 30 S.E. 38, 68 Am. St. R. 97 (1898).

Contract requiring delivery of an entire amount of bottles by a certain date is an entire contract. Smith v. Harrison, 26 Ga. App. 325, 106 S.E. 191 (1921).

When notes are made by plaintiff, maturing at different dates, each constitutes a separate contract. Thomas v. Richards, 124 Ga. 942, 53 S.E. 400 (1906).

Contract to support for life is a continuing contract, recovery under which is based on expectancy. Lowe v. Slocum, 25 Ga. App. 464, 103 S.E. 719 (1920).

Application

Application to suits on running open accounts.

- See Gower v. Ozmer, 55 Ga. App. 81, 189 S.E. 540 (1936).

Section applicable when defendant pleads a matter in recoupment. Desvergers v. Willis, 58 Ga. 388 (1877).

Statute of limitations.

- When the court found that a disputed commissions agreement was a divisible installment contract, the six-year statute of limitations started when the first breach of the commissions agreement occurred. Baker v. Brannen/Goddard Co., 274 Ga. 745, 559 S.E.2d 450 (2002).

Trial court properly determined that the statute of limitations on a class of retirees' claims against the Teachers Retirement System of Georgia, alleging that the retirees did not receive the proper payments, accrued on a payment-by-payment basis because the System had a duty to calculate the retirees' benefits each month; all of the breaches that occurred between six years prior to the filing of the complaint and the commencement of the action had to be included pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 13-6-14. Teachers Ret. Sys. v. Plymel, 296 Ga. App. 839, 676 S.E.2d 234 (2009).

Both parties must consent before plaintiff may bring separate actions on an entire contract. Johnson v. Klassett, 9 Ga. App. 733, 72 S.E. 174 (1911).

Plaintiff cannot recover for installments falling due after filing of action. Whitley Constr. Co. v. Whitley, 134 Ga. App. 245, 213 S.E.2d 909 (1975).

Lacking a valid and enforceable acceleration clause in the lease, the lessor could not recover for installments falling due after the filing of the action. Richfield Capital Corp. v. Federal Sign Div. of Fed. Signal Corp., 222 Ga. App. 757, 476 S.E.2d 26 (1996).

Employee can sue for due and unpaid salary installments before expiration of employment contract.

- Regardless of whether employment contract payable in monthly installments was entire or severable, an employee can maintain action for due and unpaid installments before expiration of contract period. Sunshine v. Ben F. Levis, Inc., 86 Ga. App. 746, 72 S.E.2d 485 (1952).

Employee wrongfully discharged can recover.

- If a servant is employed for five months at a specified rate per month, payable monthly, and pending employment the servant is wrongfully discharged, the servant may, at the servant's option, sue at end of each month, and recovery for one month will be no bar to suit at end of next month. Isaacs v. Davies, 68 Ga. 169 (1881).

Allegation that creditor reserves right to bring second action for balance of entire contract is ineffective.

- Mere allegation in petition in action on part of an entire contract that creditor reserves right to bring a second action for the balance is a nullity. Atlanta Elevator Co. v. Fulton Bag & Cotton Mills, 106 Ga. 427, 32 S.E. 541 (1899).

Debtor's failure to pay full amount initially will not entitle creditor to bring second action. Atlanta Elevator Co. v. Fulton Bag & Cotton Mills, 106 Ga. 427, 32 S.E. 541 (1899).

Effect of voluntary dismissal of suit in reliance on settlement.

- Plaintiff is not concluded by settlement as to claims upon which action is predicated when first action did not proceed to judgment but was voluntarily dismissed by plaintiff in reliance on such settlement. World Mut. Health & Accident Ins. Co. v. Thurmond, 112 Ga. App. 393, 145 S.E.2d 252 (1965).

Failure to furnish shipping instructions amounts to breach. Battle v. Smith, 28 Ga. App. 760, 113 S.E. 235, cert. denied, 28 Ga. App. 819 (1922).

Pleadings and Practice

Pleadings need not be amended to recover installments falling due between filing and judgment.

- Although it would be feasible in some circumstances to amend the complaint so as to allow recovery of all installment payments due as of the date of judgment, there appears to be no reason to require amendment of pleadings to obtain recovery of installments which became due between filing date and final judgment. Whitley Constr. Co. v. Whitley, 134 Ga. App. 245, 213 S.E.2d 909 (1975).

Pleadings may be supplemented to seek installments.

- In an action by a landlord against a tenant who vacated property prior to expiration of the lease, the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in allowing the landlord to supplement the landlord's pleadings so as to seek rent falling due after suit was commenced. Thimble Square, Inc. v. Frost, 221 Ga. App. 379, 471 S.E.2d 305 (1996).

Former Civil Code 1895, § 3793 did not entitle creditor to split action on an entire contract into several, so that the creditor may sue in a justice court. Broxton v. Nelson, 103 Ga. 327, 30 S.E. 38, 68 Am. St. R. 97 (1898); Willingham v. Buckeye Cotton Oil Co., 13 Ga. App. 253, 79 S.E. 496 (1913).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 17 Am. Jur. 2d, Contracts, §§ 88 et seq., 351 et seq. 51 Am. Jur. 2d, Limitation of Actions, § 28.

C.J.S.

- 17A C.J.S., Contracts, § 608. 25 C.J.S., Damages, §§ 4, 5. 54 C.J.S., Limitations of Actions, §§ 86, 87.

ALR.

- Provision in land contract for pecuniary forfeiture or penalty upon default of the purchaser as affecting the vendor's right to maintain an action for the purchase price, 32 A.L.R. 617.

Different benefits or claims of benefit under a policy of insurance as constituting a single cause of action or separate causes, 69 A.L.R. 889; 159 A.L.R. 563.

Liability for procuring breach of contract, 84 A.L.R. 43; 26 A.L.R.2d 1227.

Employer's breach of agreement regarding discharge or restoration after layoff of employee not employed for a fixed term, as creating a single cause of action, or repeated causes of action, as regards statute of limitation or the right to bring successive actions, 142 A.L.R. 797.

Party who insisted that contract be performed notwithstanding total breach or repudiation by other party as entitled to change his position and decline to perform on his own part, where other party did not proceed with performance or otherwise alter his position in reliance on a supposition of performance, 143 A.L.R. 489.

Acceptance by building or construction contractor of payments under his contract as a waiver of right of action upon implied warranty as to conditions affecting cost, 173 A.L.R. 308.

Rights and remedies where broker or agent, employed to purchase personal property, buys it for himself, 20 A.L.R.2d 1140.

Building or construction contract providing for installment or "progress" payments as entire or divisible, 22 A.L.R.2d 1343.

Liability for procuring breach of contract, 26 A.L.R.2d 1227.

Measure or basis of attorney's recovery on express contract fixing noncontingent fees, where he is discharged without cause or fault on his part, 54 A.L.R.2d 604.

Effect of attempt to terminate employment or agency contract upon shorter notice than that stipulated in contract, 96 A.L.R.2d 272.

Liability for interference with invalid or unenforceable contract, 96 A.L.R.3d 1294.

Measure and elements of damages for breach of contract to lend money, 4 A.L.R.4th 682.

Recovery based on tort-feasor's profits in action for procuring breach of contract, 5 A.L.R.4th 1276.

Punitive damages for interference with contract or business relationship, 44 A.L.R.4th 1078.

Cases Citing Georgia Code 13-6-14 From Courtlistener.com

Total Results: 1

Baker v. Brannen/Goddard Co.

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2002-02-04

Citation: 559 S.E.2d 450, 274 Ga. 745, 2002 Fulton County D. Rep. 329, 2002 Ga. LEXIS 58

Snippet: of the action must be included therein.” OCGA § 13-6-14. Unlike a payee who accelerates the remaining indebtedness