Authority to excuse juror from panel.

- O.C.G.A. § 15-12-172 implicitly authorizes the trial court to exercise the court's discretion with regard to excusing a juror from the panel. Baptiste v. State, 190 Ga. App. 451, 379 S.E.2d 165 (1989); Remine v. State, 203 Ga. App. 30, 416 S.E.2d 326, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 907, 416 S.E.2d 326 (1992); Pinkins v. State, 243 Ga. App. 737, 534 S.E.2d 192 (2000).

Trial court was given discretion to remove a juror and replace that juror with an alternate; there was no abuse of discretion if the juror's failure to respond truthfully during voir dire and the juror's actions during jury deliberations constituted legal cause for removal. Wooten v. State, 250 Ga. App. 686, 552 S.E.2d 878 (2001), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 819, 123 S. Ct. 96, 154 L. Ed. 2d 26 (2002).

Juror's refusal to decide the case on the evidence under the law as charged by the court provided legal cause for that juror's removal; when problems stemming from the juror's refusal seemed to be continuing and hindering the jury's deliberations, the trial court was well within the court's province to bring out said juror to determine whether the juror's removal would be legally necessary. Mayfield v. State, 276 Ga. 324, 578 S.E.2d 438 (2003).

Since the trial court concluded under the totality of the circumstances that a juror's testimony that out-of-court communication did not affect the juror was not credible, this ruling had a sound basis in that the ruling served the legally relevant purpose of preserving public respect for the integrity of the judicial process, and it followed that the trial court properly exercised the court's broad discretion in excusing the juror. Murray v. State, 276 Ga. 396, 578 S.E.2d 853 (2003).

Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-12-172, the trial judge was authorized in the exercise of the court's discretion to replace a juror with an alternate when the judge was convinced that the removed juror's ability to perform the duties of a juror was impaired. Payne v. State, 290 Ga. App. 589, 660 S.E.2d 405 (2008).

Habeas court did not err in rejecting the inmate's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, based on trial counsel's failure to object to the trial court's excusing of a juror who could not make of the juror's mind, because, even if counsel objected, the trial judge still had the discretion to remove the juror and replace the juror with an alternate based on the judge's finding that the juror could not fulfill the juror's duties. Compton v. Jackson, 295 Ga. 777, 764 S.E.2d 142 (2014).

Replacement of juror before commencement of trial.

- Defendant's conviction was affirmed because the defendant waived any objection to the trial court's replacement of absent jurors with the alternates when the trial counsel did not object on the day of trial and stated that counsel was ready to proceed; furthermore, the trial court acted within the court's discretion in replacing the jurors pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-12-172, and the defendant was not prejudiced by the trial court's actions because the trial had not yet begun. Scott v. State, 272 Ga. App. 32, 611 S.E.2d 712 (2005).

Improper conduct on the part of a juror is not required for the court to dismiss the juror and replace the juror with an alternate. Darden v. State, 212 Ga. App. 345, 441 S.E.2d 816 (1994).

No abuse of discretion in removing juror who knew defense witness.

- Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion for removing Juror No. 10 after the close of evidence because the witness had acknowledged that the witness recognized the defendant's mother from church and had discussed the matter with the other jurors. Gilmer v. State, 339 Ga. App. 593, 794 S.E.2d 653 (2016).

Court may recall alternate juror after jury retires.

- Trial court did not err by recalling an alternate juror to replace a disqualified juror after the jury had retired to deliberate and the alternate had gone home. Perry v. State, 255 Ga. 490, 339 S.E.2d 922 (1986), overruled on other grounds, Character v. State, 285 Ga. 112, 674 S.E.2d 280 (2009).

Replacement after commencement of trial.

- Because a juror did not become aware of the grounds for disqualification until after the trial had commenced and the juror acknowledged that because of an acquaintance with the members of defendant's family it would be difficult for the juror to return a guilty verdict, the trial court did not err in replacing the juror with an alternate. Reynolds v. State, 271 Ga. 174, 517 S.E.2d 51 (1999).

Trial court's removal of a juror who realized after the trial began that the victim was known by the juror was not error since the juror repeatedly stated an inability to fairly decide the case which supported the court's finding of bias, particularly since the juror began to equivocate only after continued questioning. Ganas v. State, 245 Ga. App. 645, 537 S.E.2d 758 (2000).

Trial court did not err under O.C.G.A. § 15-12-172 by removing a juror during the criminal trial, when, during the trial, the trial court learned for the first time that the juror knew the defendant from the night club they both attended and the defendant did not claim that the alternate was not qualified to serve. Clark v. State, 282 Ga. App. 248, 638 S.E.2d 397 (2006).

With regard to defendant's trial for rape, the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion by replacing a juror with an alternate as a result of the juror having fallen asleep during the proceeding and indicating that additional material to keep the juror apprised of what was missed would be necessary due to the juror's sleeping problem. Freeman v. State, 291 Ga. App. 651, 662 S.E.2d 750 (2008).

Even assuming that the defendant's argument that the trial court should have reconsidered the court's decision to substitute an alternate juror for the dismissed juror was properly before the appellate court, there was no basis for reversal because the record provided no indication that, in dismissing that juror, the trial court gave the dismissed juror any instruction that the usual strictures on jurors in active service still applied, and the prospect of reinstating a juror who had been free from the constraints of juror service overnight was fraught with pitfalls; and the dismissed juror had a telephone conversation with defense counsel, which itself could have been a basis for the juror's dismissal. Wallace v. State, 303 Ga. 34, 810 S.E.2d 93 (2018).

Replacement of juror unnecessary.

- Issue regarding juror bias and the failure to remove a juror from the case was not preserved for purposes of appeal; even if it was preserved, the error lacked merit because, when questioned, the juror clearly stated that the prior duty of the juror's husband as a grand juror would have no effect on the juror's deliberations. Robinson v. State, 299 Ga. 648, 791 S.E.2d 13 (2016).

Trial judge's personal examination of juror was sufficient since the juror was excused before the jury was sworn; the judge was not under an obligation to consult with a doctor to confirm the need for excusal. Hill v. State, 263 Ga. 37, 427 S.E.2d 770, reh'g denied, 510 U.S. 1066, 114 S. Ct. 745, 126 L. Ed. 2d 708(1994); habeas corpus proceeding, remanded, Turpin v. Hill, 269 Ga. 302, 498 S.E.2d 52 (1998), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 950, 114 S. Ct. 396, 126 L. Ed. 2d 344 (1993).

Cited in Tanner v. State, 242 Ga. 437, 249 S.E.2d 238 (1978); Neal v. State, 160 Ga. App. 834, 288 S.E.2d 241 (1982); Graham v. State, 171 Ga. App. 242, 319 S.E.2d 484 (1984); Simmons v. State, 251 Ga. App. 682, 555 S.E.2d 59 (2001); McConnell v. State, 263 Ga. App. 686, 589 S.E.2d 271 (2003); Inman v. State, 281 Ga. 67, 635 S.E.2d 125 (2006); Jones v. State, 282 Ga. 47, 644 S.E.2d 853 (2007); Rivera v. State, 282 Ga. 355, 647 S.E.2d 70 (2007); Freeman v. State, 291 Ga. App. 651, 662 S.E.2d 750 (2008).

No error if defendant moved to proceed with eleven jurors.

- Appellant's enumeration of error alleging juror misconduct is not valid if a juror was excused for illness and the appellant moved to allow the jury to continue the jury's deliberations with eleven members. Hack v. State, 168 Ga. App. 927, 311 S.E.2d 211 (1983).

Full panel of qualified jurors chosen by defendant.

- Since the case proceeded to trial before a full panel of qualified jurors of the defendant's own choosing, the defendant was not harmed by the court's decision to excuse two jurors on grounds of hardship. Remine v. State, 203 Ga. App. 30, 416 S.E.2d 326, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 907, 416 S.E.2d 326 (1992).

Availability of unused peremptory strikes after jury selected.

- After the trial court refused to strike the first alternate juror for cause and the defendant argued that the defendant was unduly prejudiced when the jury had already been selected, as defendant was deprived of the right to exercise a peremptory strike, which would in the ordinary selection process have been available to defendant when a challenge for cause was refused, it was held that there is no binding or persuasive authority for the proposition that unused peremptory strikes should be available under these circumstances after the jury has been selected and sworn. McDaniel v. State, 257 Ga. 345, 359 S.E.2d 642 (1987).

Improper excusal of lone juror holding out for acquittal.

- Trial judge's failure to make a reliable determination of whether, in the final moments of jury deliberations, the lone juror to reserve a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt, who was reported by the jury foreman to be "extremely nervous," was actually incapacitated, the judge's failure to ensure that the juror understood the right to adhere to the juror's view that the defendant should be acquitted, and the judge's failure, upon excusing that juror and replacing the juror with an alternate juror, to instruct the reconstituted jury to begin anew deprived the defendant of defendant's constitutional right to a trial by a fair and impartial jury and deprived the defendant of defendant's due process right to a fair trial. Peek v. Kemp, 746 F.2d 672 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 939, 107 S. Ct. 421, 93 L. Ed. 2d 371 (1986).

Fact that a juror reached a conclusion different from that of the other jurors did not render the juror incapacitated and, therefore, the trial court erred in replacing a lone juror voting in favor of defendant with an alternate juror. Mason v. State, 244 Ga. App. 247, 535 S.E.2d 497 (2000).

Trial court abused the court's discretion by replacing a holdout juror in a rape trial without further investigation because, even though the foreman stated that the holdout juror would not look at all of the evidence, the juror stated that the juror had considered all of the evidence and did not believe that the defendant was guilty. Semega v. State, 302 Ga. App. 879, 691 S.E.2d 923 (2010).

Replacement of jurors prejudicial.

- If two jurors could not or would not make a decision because the jurors felt that there was not enough evidence, there was no showing that the jurors were in any way incapacitated or unable to fulfill their duties and no other legal cause was shown, and the court made no attempt to inquire into the jurors' reasons for not voting, replacement of the two jurors with alternate jurors was in error and prejudicial to the defendant. Stokes v. State, 204 Ga. App. 141, 418 S.E.2d 419 (1992).

Trial court's replacement of ill juror with alternate did not prejudice defendant's right to a fair trial and jury selection, even though the ill juror had falsified the juror's physical ailments during voir dire. Norman v. State, 255 Ga. 313, 338 S.E.2d 249 (1986).

Although the erroneous replacement of a juror may under some circumstances deprive a defendant of the right to have defendant's trial completed by a particular tribunal, defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a fair, impartial, and representative jury, and defendant's due process rights grounded in the entitlement to procedures mandated by state law, the defendant was not denied any such rights as a result of the replacement of a juror who, the record showed, was too ill to continue in the deliberations. Peek v. Kemp, 784 F.2d 1479 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 939, 107 S. Ct. 421, 93 L. Ed. 2d 371 (1987).

Because a juror had a scheduled surgery and obvious apprehension about the juror's medical condition, the court did not err in replacing the juror with an alternate. Cleveland v. State, 218 Ga. App. 661, 463 S.E.2d 36 (1995).

Trial court committed reversible error when the court replaced a juror who was reported to be ill without consulting the defendant. Scott v. State, 219 Ga. App. 798, 466 S.E.2d 678 (1996).

Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion by dismissing a juror and replacing the juror with an alternate after "significant deliberations" had occurred because the trial court conducted an independent investigation into the juror's illness, discovering that the juror was in the hospital and had the flu, and developed some factual support for the court's decision to remove the juror for legally relevant reasons. Bryant v. State, 320 Ga. App. 504, 740 S.E.2d 247 (2013).

Sleeping juror.

- Trial court properly denied a defendant's motion to replace a juror who was dozing. When it appeared that the juror had dozed off, the trial court addressed that juror individually and initiated changes to accommodate the juror's efforts to stay alert, and there was no indication that the single confirmed act of dozing was anything other than momentary. Smith v. State, 284 Ga. 17, 663 S.E.2d 142 (2008).

Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in refusing to discharge and replace a juror who fell asleep for only about 30 seconds between direct and cross-examination of a witness because the chairs were comfortable, and the juror assured the trial court that it would not happen again. Kollie v. State, 301 Ga. App. 534, 687 S.E.2d 869 (2009).

Trial court abused the court's discretion under O.C.G.A. § 15-12-172 in dismissing a juror because there was nothing in the trial transcript to show that at any time prior to announcing that the court had dismissed the juror, the trial judge made any statements in open court or in the defendant's presence or otherwise indicated that the trial judge had personally observed the juror sleeping during the trial; the record also did not show that when the trial judge believed that the juror was actually sleeping the trial judge took any steps to wake the juror or that the trial judge questioned the juror in the presence of the defendant and defense counsel before dismissing the juror. Dunn v. State, 308 Ga. App. 103, 706 S.E.2d 596 (2011).

Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in removing a juror after concluding that the juror slept through the presentation portions of the evidence because the trial court conducted an investigation into the juror's inability to perform the required duties, and the court developed a factual basis for the court's decision to remove the juror for a legally relevant purpose; because the juror's incapacity was obvious to both parties, no additional inquiry by the trial court was required. Gibson v. State, 290 Ga. 6, 717 S.E.2d 447 (2011).

There was no abuse of discretion by the trial court in concluding the court's immediate remedial action, instituting a "buddy system" between jurors to have the jurors help each other stay awake, were sufficient after a juror was allegedly sleeping, and trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to request further inquiry after there were no further incidents. Mathis v. State, 293 Ga. 837, 750 S.E.2d 308 (2013).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to replace a sleeping juror as the incident was brief and the court took prompt action by reminding jurors of the importance of staying awake and instructing the jurors to assist each other. Armstrong v. State, 325 Ga. App. 33, 752 S.E.2d 120 (2013).

Replacement of juror who could not appear on time because of vehicular mechanical difficulties was not an abuse of discretion. Herring v. State, 224 Ga. App. 809, 481 S.E.2d 842 (1997).

Dismissing juror for body odor.

- Trial court abused the court's discretion under O.C.G.A. § 15-12-172 in dismissing a juror because even though the trial judge was lacking in any personal knowledge of the juror's alleged bodily odor problem, the trial judge relied upon information obtained outside the defendant's presence from unidentified sources of untested reliability in concluding that a problem existed; upon reaching that conclusion, the trial judge failed to make any effort to solve the problem in order to avoid dismissing the juror. Dunn v. State, 308 Ga. App. 103, 706 S.E.2d 596 (2011).

Replacement of juror whom defense counsel previously represented.

- Discharge of juror whom defense counsel had previously, albeit briefly, represented, and replacement with an alternate juror was not reversible error. Payne v. State, 195 Ga. App. 523, 394 S.E.2d 781 (1990).

Out-of-court contact between juror and defense counsel.

- Replacing a juror with an alternate juror after an out-of-court contact between the juror and defense counsel did not violate a murder defendant's constitutional rights to due process and trial by an impartial jury since the trial court had a sound basis for exercising the court's discretion to discharge the juror. Miller v. State, 261 Ga. 679, 410 S.E.2d 101 (1991).

Replacement of juror who was contacted by another person during an overnight break was not an abuse of discretion. Gurr v. State, 238 Ga. App. 1, 516 S.E.2d 553 (1999).

Replacement of juror who was acquainted with defendants was within the discretion of the trial court. Darden v. State, 212 Ga. App. 345, 441 S.E.2d 816 (1994).

Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion by excusing a juror from service and placing an alternate juror on the jury with regard to a defendant's trial for malice murder, kidnapping with bodily injury, and concealing the death of another since after the jury began deliberating the juror informed the jury foreman that the juror had prepared a tax return for a sibling of the defendant and had realized the conflict only after seeing the sibling in the courtroom during the trial. The trial court was authorized to find that, at the very least, the juror did not promptly inform the trial court when it became clear that the juror's voir dire representation that the juror did not know any of the defendant's relatives was incorrect. Carr v. State, 282 Ga. 698, 653 S.E.2d 472 (2007).

Facebook connection.

- Despite the defendant's claim that there was no evidence that a juror connected to the defendant on Facebook actually knew the defendant or would be biased in the defendant's favor, the trial court did not err in dismissing the juror and replacing the juror with an alternate after the juror failed to disclose the connection. Smith v. State, 335 Ga. App. 497, 782 S.E.2d 305 (2016).

Detention officer stated ability to be fair.

- Detention officer/juror stated that the officer's prior encounters with the defendant did not result in the officer's formation of an opinion about the case and did not affect the officer's ability to be fair and impartial based on the evidence presented at trial. The trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in retaining the juror. Prince v. State, 277 Ga. 230, 587 S.E.2d 637 (2003).

Religious beliefs justified replacement after trial commenced.

- Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in dismissing a juror after the submission of the case to the jury since, after proper examination by the court and the parties, the juror stated that the juror could not deliberate because the juror's religious beliefs prevented the juror from judging another person. Williams v. State, 272 Ga. 828, 537 S.E.2d 39 (2000).

Trial court made a proper and thorough inquiry into the juror's inability to make a decision based on the juror's moral beliefs and did not abuse the court's discretion in removing the juror because the juror did not want to form an opinion about the case; the juror stated that the juror was actually incapable of making a decision in the case as the juror could not "play God" and the juror's moral beliefs precluded the juror from making a decision in the case. Allen v. State, 297 Ga. 702, 777 S.E.2d 680 (2015).

Juror who was observed standing with and engaged in conversation with defendant was properly dismissed. Worthy v. State, 223 Ga. App. 612, 478 S.E.2d 421 (1996).

Statement of ability to lay aside negative opinion of defense.

- If the first alternate juror, when called, expressed reservations about sitting on the jury both because the juror had something else to do and "because I feel that the way that the jury appeared to be selected seems unfair or lopsided and therefore I might be biased against the defense," but the juror unequivocally stated that the juror could consider the evidence presented and the law as charged by the court and lay aside the juror's opinion of the defense lawyer in determining the outcome of the case, and no evidence was produced to show that this juror was incapable of rendering an impartial verdict, the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in refusing to excuse the juror for cause. McDaniel v. State, 257 Ga. 345, 359 S.E.2d 642 (1987).

Juror's failure to decide case solely on evidence as grounds for removal.

- Trial judge did not abuse the judge's discretion in concluding that the failure of a juror to adhere to the judge's instructions to decide the case solely on the basis of the evidence introduced at trial, combined with the juror's subsequent conduct in attempting to influence the other jurors to do likewise, constituted "legal cause" for the judge's removal. McGuire v. State, 200 Ga. App. 509, 408 S.E.2d 506 (1991).

Argument that juror's discussion of case with employer was cause for removal not preserved for review.

- Murder defendant failed to preserve the argument that a juror should have been removed for talking about the case with the juror's employer under O.C.G.A. § 15-12-172 because defendant did not request the juror's removal or any other remedial action at the time of the incident. Ensley v. State, 294 Ga. 200, 751 S.E.2d 396 (2013).

Since the trial court asked a juror why the juror could not serve and took the juror at the juror's word, accepting that the juror was upset about the juror's inability to judge the defendant, it was not an abuse of discretion to replace that juror with an alternate on the basis of an informed finding of incapacity. Cloud v. State, 235 Ga. App. 721, 510 S.E.2d 370 (1998).

Juror's inability to get along with other jurors.

- Trial court properly removed a juror after the juror made it clear that the juror would not participate in any discussions with fellow jurors and kept repeating that the juror wanted "off" the jury; the juror never stated that the juror believed the defendants were innocent, but rather described problems dealing with the fellow jurors and participating in deliberations. Alford v. State, 243 Ga. App. 212, 534 S.E.2d 81 (2000).

Juror with child care issues.

- Trial court's denial of a juror's request to be excused because the juror's child was missing therapy sessions did not lead to a coerced verdict as the juror's reason for wanting to be removed and the juror's answers to the trial court's questions gave no indication that the juror's ability to perform the juror's duties would be impaired if the juror were not excused. Murphy v. State, 299 Ga. 238, 787 S.E.2d 721 (2016).

Legal cause for removal found.

- Juror's failure to respond truthfully during voir dire, coupled with actions during deliberations showing bias, constituted legal cause for removal. Norris v. State, 230 Ga. App. 492, 496 S.E.2d 781 (1998).

Trial court did not err in excusing a juror from the jury panel, even though the juror appeared to be the lone holdout for acquittal of the defendant being tried on drug charges as the totality of the circumstances suggested that the juror was involved with an alternate juror and other people in an ongoing attempt to subvert the jury, and, thus, the trial court's action in removing the juror was not an abuse of discretion. Thompson v. State, 260 Ga. App. 253, 581 S.E.2d 596 (2003).

Foreman's array of disruptive behavior, which went beyond the mere use of curse words, provided a sound legal basis for the foreman's removal pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-12-172; the foreman criticized the impartiality of the trial court, told the other jurors to "go to hell," and actively humiliated the fellow jurors through the use of vindictive personal attacks wholly unrelated to the issues being considered by the jury. State v. Arnold, 280 Ga. 487, 629 S.E.2d 807 (2006).

Trial court properly dismissed a juror during deliberations under O.C.G.A. § 15-12-172. The juror's failure to respond truthfully during voir dire when asked whether the juror had been arrested for a felony constituted legal cause to remove the juror as the trial court was faced with a juror whose veracity was clearly in question. Green v. State, 298 Ga. App. 301, 680 S.E.2d 156 (2009).

Trial court, after conducting a proper and thorough inquiry, had ample factual and legal support for the court's decision to remove a juror and thus did not abuse the court's discretion. The court found that: (1) the juror knew more of the prosecution's witnesses than the juror conveyed during voir dire; (2) the juror repeatedly referred to other jurors of the juror's knowledge of the defendants' and the victim's families; (3) the person whom the juror was dating associated with many people involved in the case; (4) the juror indicated that the juror felt that the juror was in a difficult position by having to make a decision whether to find the defendants guilty and then return to the juror's community; and (5) the juror made extra-judicial comments, such as referring to one of the witnesses as a drug dealer, although no evidence of this claim was presented. Moon v. State, 288 Ga. 508, 705 S.E.2d 649 (2011).

It was proper to remove a juror because the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in concluding that the opinion of a juror, combined with the juror's violation of the trial court's instructions by attempting to influence other jurors with that opinion prior to deliberations, constituted "legal cause" for the juror's removal; the fact that the juror eventually stated that the juror could be impartial did not require the trial court to ignore the numerous times the juror equivocated or the other jurors' testimony showing that the juror expressed a fixed and definite opinion and did not make the trial court's credibility decision to strike the juror error. Butler v. State, 290 Ga. 412, 721 S.E.2d 876 (2012).

Trial court had two sound reasons for the court's decision to remove the juror: (1) the juror violated the trial court's instruction not to conduct independent research on the parties, which the juror did by looking up the defendant's lawyer in the juror's company's files to verify that the lawyer was a customer; and (2) the trial court did not believe that the juror could remain impartial as the juror twice approached a deputy with concerns about the juror's business relationship with the defendant's lawyer, and the juror gave numerous equivocal responses about putting the relationship with the defendant's lawyer out of the juror's mind. Smith v. State, 298 Ga. 357, 782 S.E.2d 26 (2016).

Replacement of juror held proper.

- In a rape and sexual molestation trial, the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in removing a juror for cause under O.C.G.A. § 15-12-172 as her husband had been arrested for sexual molestation in the same county, and she worried about the impact her vote on a verdict might have on her husband's case. Weathersby v. State, 263 Ga. App. 341, 587 S.E.2d 836 (2003).

Trial court did not err in replacing a juror who stated that the juror's daughter and niece were acquainted with both the murder victim and the defendant, and that the juror's niece and the victim "actually had more than like a friendly relationship," that, although the juror had not received any specific threats, the juror felt pressure to find the defendant not guilty "out of fear," and stated that the juror's feelings would prevent the juror from being fair and impartial in deliberating on the case. Cummings v. State, 280 Ga. 831, 632 S.E.2d 152 (2006).

Two defendants' attorneys were not ineffective under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I. Para. XIV and U.S. Const., amend. 6 for failing to object to the trial court's decision to replace a juror who was late to court with one of the alternate jurors who was fully qualified to sit on the jury under O.C.G.A. § 15-12-169; the juror's tardiness was a sound basis for dismissal under O.C.G.A. § 15-12-172. Brooks v. State, 281 Ga. 14, 635 S.E.2d 723 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1215, 127 S. Ct. 1266, 167 L. Ed. 2d 91 (2007).

Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to a juror's release pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-12-172 because the trial judge exercised informed and sound discretion to remove the juror and seat an alternate after receiving reliable information that the juror's child was suffering from a medical condition that required an emergency admission to the hospital. Taylor v. State, 285 Ga. App. 697, 647 S.E.2d 381 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1515, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 655 (Ga. 2007).

Defendant's convictions for armed robbery and aggravated assault were proper because the dismissal of juror two and the replacement of that juror with an alternate juror was an adequate remedy authorized by O.C.G.A. § 15-12-172 and did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial. Tolbert v. State, 300 Ga. App. 51, 684 S.E.2d 120 (2009), cert. denied, No. S10C0168, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 196 (Ga. 2010).

Discharge of a juror during a defendant's trial served the legally relevant purpose of preserving public respect for the integrity of the judicial process after counsel and the judge suspected that the juror had acted deliberately in approaching a member of the victim's family so that the juror would be excused from the trial, and since the juror disobeyed the trial court's instructions and was tardy to court. White v. State, 287 Ga. 713, 699 S.E.2d 291 (2010).

Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion under O.C.G.A. § 15-12-172 by removing a juror and replacing the juror with an alternate juror during jury deliberations because communications between the juror and the bailiff regarding the juror's opinion on the defendant's guilt on vehicular homicide charges may have improperly influenced the juror's consideration of the case. Brown v. State, 310 Ga. App. 285, 712 S.E.2d 521 (2011).

Trial court did not err in dismissing a juror and seating an alternate in place of the juror because it was not an abuse of discretion to remove a juror who failed during voir dire to provide accurate information that the state had a legitimate right to know. Johnson v. State, 289 Ga. 498, 713 S.E.2d 376 (2011).

Trial court was within the court's discretion to excuse a juror based on the totality of the circumstances because the trial court believed that the juror's acquaintance with a witness and with the school where the defendant, various witnesses, and the juror's son had attended classes, made the juror very uncomfortable and would affect the juror's ability to deliberate. Pate v. State, 315 Ga. App. 205, 726 S.E.2d 691 (2012), cert. denied, No. S12C1308, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 1027 (Ga. 2012).

Trial court's decision to proceed with 11 jurors and an alternate after it was discovered that only 11 jurors and the alternate had been in the jury box during the oath and instructions, instead of the 12 jurors that were selected, was not improper; replacing the missing juror had no more effect of denying the defendant a qualified jury than if the juror had become ill or died. Crowley v. State, 315 Ga. App. 755, 728 S.E.2d 282 (2012).

Replacing the juror who committed misconduct by sharing with a state's witness the juror's thoughts on the case and then individually polling the remaining jurors to ascertain that the jurors could remain fair and impartial was an adequate remedy and did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial. Sallee v. State, 329 Ga. App. 612, 765 S.E.2d 758 (2014), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 199, 193 L. Ed. 2d 128 (U.S. 2015).

Trial court did not err in dismissing a juror over the defendant's objection and in replacing the juror with an alternate because the juror failed to reveal in response to voir dire questioning that the juror knew the defendant's father; and, during a break in the trial proceedings, the juror had been seen speaking with the defendant's father in a parking lot. Jackson v. State, 336 Ga. App. 70, 783 S.E.2d 672 (2016).

Counsel not ineffective for allowing replacement with alternate.

- Trial court did not err by excusing a juror for cause after deliberations began under O.C.G.A. § 15-12-172 because the trial court's main concern was that the juror was visibly upset and had reached a fixed and definite opinion so soon after the deliberation began without fully vetting the evidence with the other jurors; there was evidence showing that, very early on, the juror had ceased deliberating with the other members of the jury and "wanted out" of the process; and, despite excusing the juror, the trial court carefully considered avoiding excusing the juror simply because the juror might be in the minority or a potential holdout. Bethea v. State, 337 Ga. App. 217, 786 S.E.2d 891 (2016).

Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in replacing a juror who had a medical appointment, which the parties and the court knew about prior to accepting the juror, after determining that replacing the juror would be best because the trial court did not want to delay deliberations a day when the case was fresh on the jurors' minds. Lamb v. State, 337 Ga. App. 62, 785 S.E.2d 898 (2016).

Trial counsel was not ineffective for allowing the trial court to remove a juror and replace the juror with an alternate as the defense's initially-voiced reason for striking the juror, the nature of the juror's employment and thereby possible implicit bias against an employer like the defendant, was race neutral and, at the post-trial hearing counsel was never asked why counsel acquiesced to the dismissal of the juror during the trial. Capps v. State, 300 Ga. 6, 792 S.E.2d 665 (2016).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 47 Am. Jur. 2d, Jury, § 129.

C.J.S.

- 50A C.J.S., Juries, § 114.

ALR.

- Substitution of juror after completion of panel as sustaining plea of former jeopardy, 33 A.L.R. 142.

Misconduct of juror which will authorize or require withdrawal of juror, 86 A.L.R. 928.

Plea of former jeopardy where jury is discharged because of illness or insanity of juror, 125 A.L.R. 694.

Constitutionality and construction of statute or court rule relating to alternate or additional jurors or substitution of jurors during trial, 84 A.L.R.2d 1288; 15 A.L.R.4th 1127; 88 A.L.R.4th 711; 10 A.L.R. Fed. 185; 115 A.L.R. Fed. 381; 119 A.L.R. Fed. 589.

Inattention of juror from sleepiness or other cause as ground for reversal or new trial, 88 A.L.R.2d 1275, 59 A.L.R.5th 1.

Substitution, under Rule 24c of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, of alternate juror for regular juror before jury retires to consider verdict in federal criminal case, 115 A.L.R. Fed. 381.