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Call Now: 904-383-7448All sheriffs, deputy sheriffs, coroners, jailers, constables, and other officers of court shall be liable to all actions and disabilities which they incur in respect of any matter or thing relating to or concerning their respective offices.
(Laws 1792, Cobb's 1851 Digest, p. 576; Code 1863, § 3852; Code 1868, § 3872; Code 1873, § 3948; Code 1882, § 3948; Civil Code 1895, § 4769; Civil Code 1910, § 5341; Code 1933, § 24-201.)
- Status of court-appointed receivers as officers of court, § 9-8-8.
- Deputy sheriff is not an employee of the sheriff, but rather of the county wherein the deputy serves, and is merely appointed by the sheriff, who is liable for the official acts (that is, acts virtute officii or colore officii) only of the deputy. Gay v. Healan, 88 Ga. App. 533, 77 S.E.2d 47 (1953); Johnson v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 93 Ga. App. 336, 91 S.E.2d 779 (1956); Chadwick v. Stewart, 94 Ga. App. 329, 94 S.E.2d 502 (1956).
Sheriff is not personally liable for deputy's negligent acts which acts are in no way connected with the performance of the deputy's official duties. Gay v. Healan, 88 Ga. App. 533, 77 S.E.2d 47 (1953); Johnson v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 93 Ga. App. 336, 91 S.E.2d 779 (1956).
- If one acts as a deputy sheriff with the consent, approval, and acquiescence of the sheriff, who holds the deputy out to the public as the sheriff's deputy, the deputy's acts as such deputy, although the deputy was not appointed in writing as required by law and did not take the oath of office required of a deputy sheriff and did not otherwise legally qualify as a deputy sheriff, are acts of a deputy sheriff de facto and possess the same legality as the acts of a legally appointed deputy sheriff who is an officer de jure, and this is true although such deputy violates a penal statute. Powell v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 45 Ga. App. 88, 163 S.E. 239 (1932).
- If it appeared that sheriff allowed prisoner to go at large within prison, knowing that there was a breach in the walls through which the prisoner might escape, the sheriff is liable for such escape in attachment. Craig v. Maltbie, 1 Ga. 544 (1846).
Constable cannot defend escape by showing that defendant was rescued by a mob. Abbott v. Holland, 20 Ga. 598 (1856).
- Levying officer is not bound to inquire into the validity of the proceedings on which the execution is based; if the process is from a court of competent jurisdiction, issued by the proper officer, regular on its face, and the officer has no notice, from the writ or papers attached thereto, of defects in the proceedings, or that the execution has been superseded, the officer is not liable for damages in levying the execution, even though the judgment on which the execution issued is void. Wilbur v. Stokes, 117 Ga. 545, 43 S.E. 856 (1903).
- Officer entrusted by law with possession of personal property is liable to the owner of that property for negligence in the performance of the officer's trust or duty, or for fraud or neglect in the execution of the office. Westberry v. Hand, 19 Ga. App. 529, 91 S.E. 930 (1917).
- There is no authority of law for sheriff or arresting officer to accept a cash bond or a deposit of money in lieu of bail from one charged with a criminal offense against the laws of this state; and, when an arresting officer requires or accepts a cash bond or a deposit of money in lieu of bail, the money remains the property of the person depositing the money with such officer, and the officer holds the money in trust for the depositor. Washburn v. Foster, 87 Ga. App. 132, 73 S.E.2d 240 (1952).
- If a person is charged with a misdemeanor the person is entitled as a matter of law to furnish bail in a reasonable amount with the sureties on the bond to be approved by a sheriff of this state, and there is no provision whereby a sheriff can require such sureties to deposit with the sheriff a cash bond or a deposit of money in addition to the bail required by law before the sheriff will accept the bail tendered the sheriff; if this is done, the money so deposited remains the property of the person depositing the money, and the sheriff holds the money as trustee for the depositor. Washburn v. Foster, 87 Ga. App. 132, 73 S.E.2d 240 (1952).
- Act of sheriff in illegally requiring and accepting a cash bond or a sum of money in lieu of or in addition to bail from a surety for one charged with an offense against the laws of this state is an act done colore officii and renders the sheriff and the sheriff's sureties liable on the sheriff's official bond to anyone aggrieved. Washburn v. Foster, 87 Ga. App. 132, 73 S.E.2d 240 (1952).
- If a deputy was transporting a prisoner who was injured due to the allegedly negligent acts of the deputy, clearly done colore officii, the petition set forth a cause of action against the deputy, and likewise against the sheriff who directed the deputy to transport the prisoner. Chadwick v. Stewart, 94 Ga. App. 329, 94 S.E.2d 502 (1956).
- When act creating city court makes the clerk thereof amenable to all the duties and liabilities attached to the office of clerk of the superior court, the clerk may be ruled against under former Code 1933, § 24-2722 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-6-83) upon the clerk's failure to account faithfully for money coming into the clerk's hands, and also under former Code 1933, §§ 24-206 and 24-207 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-13-3). Ivester v. Mozeley, 89 Ga. App. 578, 80 S.E.2d 197 (1954).
- Tax commissioner, who was an ex-officio sheriff under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-137 could be subject to a money rule petition filed by the holder of county tax executions for refusing to pay those executions from the excess proceeds of tax sales of property; the holder could collect on the holder's execution from any property in which the taxpayer had an interest, which included the excess proceeds from the tax sale, before any payments to the taxpayer, under O.C.G.A. § 48-2-56(a) and (b), so it was error for the commissioner to refuse to pay the holder's claims. Scott v. Vesta Holdings I, LLC, 275 Ga. App. 196, 620 S.E.2d 447 (2005).
- Twin public policies recognized by the requirement that bonds be obtained by sheriffs and their deputies are: (1) the county law enforcement officer should be held liable for tortious activity, even if connected with the officer's official duties; and (2) sheriffs and deputies should be required to obtain insurance lest the officer's liability should be rendered meaningless by the officer's poverty. Thompson v. Spikes, 663 F. Supp. 627 (S.D. Ga. 1987).
Cited in Meeks v. Douglas, 108 Ga. App. 424, 133 S.E.2d 768 (1963); Nations v. Winter, 165 Ga. App. 890, 303 S.E.2d 64 (1983); Live Oak Consulting, Inc. v. Dep't of Cmty. Health, 281 Ga. App. 791, 637 S.E.2d 455 (2006).
- 21 C.J.S., Courts, § 137 et seq.
- Liability for death of or injury to prisoner, 46 A.L.R. 94; 50 A.L.R. 268; 61 A.L.R. 569.
Exception as regards payments to officers of court to rule preventing recovery back of payments made under mistake of law, 111 A.L.R. 637.
Liability of police officer or his bond for injuries or death of third persons resulting from operation of motor vehicle by subordinate, 15 A.L.R.3d 1189.
Civil liability of judicial officer for malicious prosecution or abuse of process, 64 A.L.R.3d 1251.
No results found for Georgia Code 15-13-1.