CopyCited 22 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 18, 2011 | 288 Ga. 865, 2011 Fulton County D. Rep. 791
...The Court of Appeals did not address any Sixth Amendment concerns in rejecting appellant's argument that his constitutional right to a public trial was violated because his trial was conducted in the county jail courtroom rather than the county courtroom. Instead, it relied exclusively upon the discussion of OCGA §
15-6-18(a) [6] in Drake v. State,
231 Ga.App. 776(4),
501 S.E.2d 14 (1998). That case, in turn, relied on the application of OCGA §
15-6-18(a) in Pittman v....
...State,
196 Ga.App. 864,
397 S.E.2d 302 (1990), along with cases that are even older than Pittman. However, neither in Drake, an arson case out of Crisp County, nor in the instant case out of Berrien County did the Court of Appeals recognize that it is OCGA §
15-6-18(c), enacted in 1994, [7] not OCGA §
15-6-18(a), that is the pertinent subsection here. OCGA §
15-6-18(c) pertains "[n]otwithstanding the provisions of subsections (a) and (b) of this Code section," id., to counties like Berrien and Crisp "having a population of not more than 50,000 according to the United States decennial census." Id....
...The holding in Pittman, having been rendered in 1990, has thus been superseded by statute as it pertains to counties with a population of less than 50,000, and the Court of Appeals' reliance on that case in Drake and the instant case was misplaced. As to those counties that come within its population limits, OCGA §
15-6-18(c)(1) [8] provides that if for any cause it shall or may be impractical to hold any session or sitting of any superior or state court at the courthouse or other place provided by law therefore....
...(Emphasis supplied.) As reflected in defense counsel's testimony and appellant's objections made on motion for new trial, no consent was obtained from appellant for the conducting of his criminal jury trial in the courtroom located inside the county jail, i.e., an alternate or additional facility under OCGA §
15-6-18(c)(1). [9] Hence, rather than supporting the Court of Appeals' holding, OCGA §
15-6-18 expressly establishes that its holding was in error....
...Appellant thus raised the issue at the proper time in his motion for new trial. Moreover, as the United States Supreme Court stated in Presley v. Georgia, supra,
130 S.Ct. at 724-725, "[t]he public has a right to be present whether or not any party has asserted the right." [6] OCGA §
15-6-18(a) provides: If for any cause it shall or may be impracticable to hold any session or sitting of any superior or state court at the courthouse or other place provided by law therefor, it shall be lawful to hold court and any session or sit...
...ose, provided that . . . no session or sitting of any superior court may be held under this subsection at any place other than the county site of the county of such court. [7] See Ga. L.1994, p. 1052, § 2. [8] Ga. L.1998, p. 1159, § 2 amended OCGA §
15-6-18 to designate as subsection (c)(1) the language added as subsection (c) by Ga. L.1994, p. 1052, § 2. [9] Because OCGA §
15-6-18(c)(1) expressly states that "no criminal jury trial shall be conducted in such alternate or additional facility without the consent of the accused," the plain language of subsection (c)(1) requires that the accused's consent be obtained in order to conduct a criminal jury trial in an alternate or additional facility. Compare Cook v. State,
119 Ga. 108(3),
46 S.E. 64 (1903) (subsection (a) of OCGA §
15-6-18 requires no formal designation of alternate location for holding court). We therefore reject the State's argument that the mere absence of any objection by the accused to proceedings conducted in such alternate or additional facilities is sufficient to show compliance with OCGA §
15-6-18(c)(1). While nothing in OCGA §
15-6-18(c)(1) requires that the accused's consent be in writing, in order for our appellate courts to verify that the State has complied with this statutory mandate, an accused's consent to having his or her criminal jury trial conducted in an alternate or additional facility must be established by the record....
CopyCited 15 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 24, 2014 | 755 S.E.2d 174, 2014 Fulton County D. Rep. 399
...See Reaves, supra at 586-587.8
3. At the time of trial, the Telfair County courthouse was undergoing
renovation, the courtroom available therein was deemed inadequate, and
consequently Dubose’s trial was held in the Wheeler County courthouse.
OCGA §
15-6-18, as in effect at the time of trial, and specifically OCGA § 15-6-
18 (c) (1),9 required essentially two things for a criminal trial in a county the size
8
“[F]ollowing a Jackson v....
...Denno hearing, in ruling on Dubose’s motion, the trial court stated: “I find
no problems with Miranda warnings being given at the appropriate opportunity and the waiver forms
indicating that the defendant did not want a lawyer. There is no indication he ever asked for a
lawyer.”
9
Then OCGA §
15-6-18 read:
(a) If for any cause it shall or may be impracticable to hold any session or
7
sitting of any superior or state court at the courthouse or other place provided by...
...the county, and the consent of the accused. Although the record shows that
Dubose consented to the move, nothing in the record on appeal shows a proper
resolution by the County Board of Commissioners authorizing the action.
However, a failure to show full compliance with then-OCGA §
15-6-18 (c) (1)
does not establish reversible error; harm from the irregularity must also be
shown....
CopyCited 15 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 6, 2013 | 742 S.E.2d 719, 2013 Fulton County D. Rep. 1720
...Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).
2. At the time of trial, the Morgan County courthouse was under renovation, so Goodman’s trial could not be held there; it was held at the former Morgan County Senior Center. OCGA §
15-6-18, as in effect at the time of trial, and specifically OCGA §
15-6-18 (c) (l),3 required essentially two things for a criminal trial in a county the size *82of Morgan County to be held in a location other than the county courthouse: provision for such a location by the proper governing authority of the county, and the consent of the accused....
...did the *83trial court, or the parties, address any question of Goodman’s consent to conducting the trial in the designated location.
Holding the trial at a location other than the county courthouse without Goodman’s consent violated then OCGA §
15-6-18 (c) (1). Purvis v. State,
288 Ga. 865, 869-870 (2) (708 SE2d 283) (2011). The mere absence of objection is insufficient to show proper compliance with then OCGA §
15-6-18 (c) (1); “an accused’s consent to having his or her criminal jury trial conducted in an alternate or additional facility must be established by the record.” Id....
...“In order to have reversible error, there must be harm as well as error. [Cit.]” Inman v. State,
281 Ga. 67, 73 (5) (635 SE2d 125) (2006). And, Goodman fails to allege harm, or attempt to support a finding of such by evidence. Accordingly, the failure to complywith thenOCGA §
15-6-18 (c) (1) does not constitute reversible error....
...iolated, and the decision of the Court of Appeals was therefore reversed with the direction that the case be remanded to the trial court for a new trial. Id. at 865-869 (1). Thus, Purvis addressed the additional issue of the application of then OCGA §
15-6-18 (c) (1) because the opinion of the Court of Appeals was in error on that point, and the error could recur on retrial. Id. at 869-870 (2). See CSX Transp., Inc. v. Smith,
289 Ga. 903, 907 (2) (717 SE2d 209) (2011). However, this posture meant that Purvis did not need to address the implication of the found error under then OCGA §
15-6-18 (c) (1), and thus Purvis made no pronouncement about the applicability of harmless error analysis to such an error.
3....
...eclined to testify about specifics as to what occurred during the killing of Dressler’s husband. Nonetheless, she also testified that she “can’t really say that me and Ms. Goodman necessarily had anything to do with that murder.”
Then OCGA §
15-6-18 read:
(a) If for any cause it shall or may be impracticable to hold any session or sitting of any superior or state court at the courthouse or other place provided by law therefor, it shall be lawful to hold court and any session or sitti...
