O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 15-9-47 (2019)

(For effective date, see note.) Default judgments; governing provisions

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)

Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.

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(a) If in any case pending before the probate court an answer, caveat, or other responsive pleading has not been filed within the time required by law or by lawful order of the court, the case shall automatically become in default unless the time for filing the answer, caveat, or other responsive pleading has been extended as provided by law. The petitioner at any time thereafter shall be entitled to verdict and judgment by default, in open court or in chambers, as if every item and paragraph of the petition or other pleadings filed in the matter were supported by proper evidence. At any time before final judgment, the court, in its discretion, upon payment of costs, may allow the default to open for providential cause preventing the filing of required pleadings or for excusable neglect or where the judge, from all the facts, shall determine that a proper case has been made for the default to open, on terms to be fixed by the court. In order for the default to be thus opened, the showing shall be made under oath, shall set up a meritorious defense,

shall offer to plead instanter, and shall announce ready to proceed with the hearing in the matter. (b) The provisions of this Code section shall govern in proceedings pertaining to defaults in the probate court, and the provisions of Code Section 9-11-55 shall not be applicable to such proceedings.

History

Code 1981, § 15-9-47, enacted by Ga. L. 1992, p. 2479, § 1; Ga. L. 2020, p. 377, § 2-16/HB 865. Delayed effective date. - This Code section, as set out above, becomes effective January 1, 2021. For version of this Code section in effect until January 1, 2021, see the 2020 amendment note. The 2020 amendment, effective January 1, 2021, designated the existing pro-

visions as subsection (a), substituted ‘‘If ’’ for ‘‘Notwithstanding any provisions of Chapter 11 of Title 9, if ’’ at the beginning of subsection (a), and added subsection (b).

Annotations

Law reviews. - For survey article on wills, trusts, guardianships, and fiduciary administration, see 60 Mercer L. Rev. 417 (2008).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Timely objection to amendment of year’s support order. - In a probate matter, a trial court erred by dismissing an executor’s objection to the setting aside of certain real property as year’s support in favor of an estate as the executor had filed an objection within 15 days of the default order amending the year’s support order, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-55(a), and by paying costs. The provisions of § 9-11-55(a) relating to the opening of default judgments as a matter of right within 15 days of default applied to a year’s support proceedings in probate

court. In re Estate of Ehlers, 289 Ga. App. 14, 656 S.E.2d 169 (2007). Waiver of right to default. - Because the executrix took the decedent’s son’s deposition and opposed the son’s requests for a continuance, and did not seek to dismiss the son’s caveat until 15 months after the caveat was untimely filed, the conduct of the executrix was inconsistent with an intent to raise or rely upon a default judgment and it resulted in a waiver of the right to default. In re Estate of Hill, 340 Ga. App. 39, 795 S.E.2d 748 (2016).

ARTICLE 3 COSTS AND COMPENSATION Law reviews. - For article, ‘‘Courts: Juvenile Justice Reform,’’ see 30 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 63 (2013).

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 6 cases (2 in the last 5 years), 2007–2025 · leading case: Simmons v. Harms, 695 S.E.2d 38 (Ga. 2010).

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Simmons v. Harms, 695 S.E.2d 38 (Ga. 2010). · cites it 2× “The probate court exercised its discretion under OCGA § 15-9-47 and granted the motions to open default, thereby allowing the caveats.”

In Re Est. of James Lynn Hill, 796 S.E.2d 748 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016). · cites it 4× “See OCGA § 15-9-47 (entry of default judgment in probate court for failure to timely file an answer or caveat) ; 2 OCGA § 53-11-10 (a) (time for filing an objection in probate court).”

In Re Est. of Loyd, 761 S.E.2d 833 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014). · cites it 10× “Charles moved to dismiss the untimely caveat, and Jack responded with a motion to open default pursuant to OCGA §§ 15-9-47 and 9-11-55 (b). The trial court granted Charles’s motion to dismiss, and Jack appeals, contending that the trial court erred in dismissing *288 his caveat…”

In re Est. of Ehlers, 656 S.E.2d 169 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007). · cites it 4× “It follows that written objection to the amended petition was required to be filed in the probate court no later than ten days from November 7, 2005 — therefore no later than November 17, 2005.”

In Re Est. of Russell John Blake (Ga. Ct. App. 2025). · cites it 22× “Caveator argues that the probate court erred in dismissing the caveat without making a “proper examination” of his objection to the petition for year’s support pursuant to OCGA § 15-9-47. We find no error. Under Georgia law, “[t]he surviving spouse and minor children of a…”

In Re: Est. of Roland A. Barras (Ga. Ct. App. 2025). · cites it 4× “Default under OCGA § 9-11-55 (a) In her first enumeration of error, Barras argues that the probate court exceeded its authority by requiring her to show that the will had not been revoked because the case was in default under OCGA § 9-11-55 (a).”

Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.