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2018 Georgia Code 16-1-4 | Car Wreck Lawyer

TITLE 16 CRIMES AND OFFENSES

Section 1. General Provisions, 16-1-1 through 16-1-12.

16-1-4. When conduct constitutes a crime; power of court to punish contempt or enforce orders, civil judgments, and decrees.

No conduct constitutes a crime unless it is described as a crime in this title or in another statute of this state. However, this Code section does not affect the power of a court to punish for contempt or to employ any sanction authorized by law for the enforcement of an order, civil judgment, or decree.

(Code 1933, § 26-201, enacted by Ga. L. 1968, p. 1249, § 1.)

Cross references.

- Exercise of contempt power generally, § 15-1-4.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the issues involved, decisions rendered prior to codification of this principle of law by Ga. L. 1968, p. 1249, § 1 are included in the annotations for this Code section.

Since 1833 we have had only statutory offenses. Kilpatrick v. State, 72 Ga. App. 669, 34 S.E.2d 719 (1945) (decided under former Code 1933).

Violation of public law.

- Our law recognizes no crimes save such as consist of violation of a public law, and there are in this state no common-law offenses save such as have been especially recognized by statutory enactment. Moore v. State, 94 Ga. App. 210, 94 S.E.2d 80 (1956) (decided under former Code 1933).

Defendant was improperly convicted of criminal contempt as defendant ended defendant's cross-examination when defendant was told that the time was up, and defendant might have desired to ask additional questions; that the trial court felt that some areas had not been adequately covered or covered only at the end was of no consequence; and the order to reorganize a cross-examination was too vague to be enforceable as the manner in which the cross-examination was organized was more properly left to defendant's discretion, and the exercise of that discretion in a manner different from what the trial court would have exercised was not grounds for finding that defendant willfully violated a trial court order. In re Butterfield, 265 Ga. App. 745, 595 S.E.2d 588 (2004).

Court without authority to enforce 2010 order.

- Trial court erred in upholding the decision of a recorder's court finding the defendant in contempt of the 2010 order from an unrelated case because the uncontroverted evidence showed that the 2010 case against the defendant had been dismissed; thus, the recorder's court was divested of jurisdiction to consider the contempt motion as part of the 2013 enforcement action and lacked authority to enforce the 2010 order, which was no longer in effect. Lewis v. City of Savannah, 336 Ga. App. 126, 784 S.E.2d 1 (2016).

Criminal contempt conviction reversed.

- Defendant's criminal contempt conviction was reversed as the trial court relied on another court's ex parte immunity grant in ordering the defendant to testify and neither court made a finding that the defendant's testimony was "necessary to the public interest" as required by former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-28 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-5-507); the state had to grant a valid immunity as broad in scope as the privilege it replaced and to show the applicability of that state immunity to the witness. In re Long, 276 Ga. App. 306, 623 S.E.2d 181 (2005).

Appeal from conviction not rendered moot.

- The Court of Appeals of Georgia rejected the state's claim that an attorney's appeal from a criminal contempt conviction was moot, based on the possible continuing adverse collateral consequences that the attorney could suffer as a result of that conviction. In re Hatfield, 290 Ga. App. 134, 658 S.E.2d 871 (2008).

Although a judge informed an attorney of the conduct found to be criminally contemptuous, because the judge not only refused to afford that attorney an opportunity to be heard, but also became involved in the controversy, the criminal contempt finding entered against the attorney had to be reversed. In re Hatfield, 290 Ga. App. 134, 658 S.E.2d 871 (2008).

Cited in Gunn v. Balkcom, 228 Ga. 802, 188 S.E.2d 500 (1972); Johnson v. State, 135 Ga. App. 360, 217 S.E.2d 618 (1975); Wiggins v. State, 139 Ga. App. 98, 227 S.E.2d 895 (1976); State v. Burroughs, 149 Ga. App. 183, 254 S.E.2d 144 (1979); Boss v. State, 152 Ga. App. 169, 262 S.E.2d 527 (1979); Rushin v. State, 154 Ga. App. 41, 267 S.E.2d 473 (1980); Billingsley v. State, 183 Ga. App. 850, 360 S.E.2d 451 (1987); Cotton v. State, 263 Ga. App. 843, 589 S.E.2d 610 (2003).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 21 Am. Jur. 2d, Criminal Law, §§ 1, 11 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law, §§ 3, 29, 30.

ALR.

- Degree of proof necessary in contempt proceedings, 49 A.L.R. 975.

What courts or officers have power to punish for contempt, 54 A.L.R. 318; 73 A.L.R. 1185.

Assault as contempt of court, 55 A.L.R. 1230.

Assaulting, threatening, or intimidating witness as contempt of court, 52 A.L.R.2d 1297.

Who may institute civil contempt proceedings, 61 A.L.R.2d 1083.

Acquittal of criminal charges other than contempt as precluding contempt proceedings relating to same transaction, 88 A.L.R.3d 1089.

Contempt finding as precluding substantive criminal charges relating to same transaction, 26 A.L.R.4th 950.

Oral communications insulting to particular state judge, made to third party out of judge's physical presence, as criminal contempt, 30 A.L.R.4th 155.

Failure to rise in state courtroom as constituting criminal contempt, 38 A.L.R.4th 563.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 16-1-4

Total Results: 7  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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Coates v. State, 818 S.E.2d 622 (Ga. 2018).

Cited 30 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Aug 27, 2018 | 304 Ga. 329

...efine offenses. "Whether a particular course of conduct involves one or more distinct 'offenses' under the statute depends on this [legislative] choice." Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 70, 98 S.Ct. 2170, 57 L.Ed.2d 43 (1978) ; see also OCGA § 16-1-4 ("No conduct constitutes a crime unless it is described as a crime in this title or in another statute of this state.")....
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Wetzel v. State, 298 Ga. 20 (Ga. 2015).

Cited 23 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 2, 2015 | 779 S.E.2d 263

...which is defined as “not authorized by law; illegal.” Id. And to leave no doubt, the General Assembly has said directly, “No conduct constitutes a crime unless it is described as a crime in this title or in another statute of this state.” OCGA § 16-1-4....
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State v. Cross, 401 S.E.2d 510 (Ga. 1991).

Cited 15 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 27, 1991 | 260 Ga. 845

...In 1968, the General Assembly adopted a new criminal code, the 1968 Criminal Code of Georgia. Ga. L. 1968, pp. 1249, 1261. The new code provided that "[n]o conduct constitutes a crime unless it is described as a crime in this Title or in another statute of this State." Code Ann. § 26-201; OCGA § 16-1-4....
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In the Interest of T.b., a Child, 313 Ga. 846 (Ga. 2022).

Cited 13 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 1, 2022

...Power Co., 297 Ga. 237, 241 (1) (773 SE2d 236) (2015). This is so because OCGA § 15-11-2 (19) (A) references “the laws of this state” addressing “crime,” and such laws are primarily found in the Criminal Code, rather than the Juvenile Code. See OCGA § 16-1-4 (“No conduct constitutes a crime unless it is described as a crime in this title [Title 16 (the Criminal Code)] or in another statute of this state.”).7 Second, “where a term is specifically defined in a law, we 7 The...
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Daddario v. State, 307 Ga. 179 (Ga. 2019).

Cited 11 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 31, 2019

...endure childbirth can “physically injure[ ]” her. OCGA § 16-6-4 (c). Both claims lack merit, as they erroneously conflate a statutory element of aggravated child molestation with specific mechanisms of injury. (a) In Georgia, all crimes are defined by statute, see OCGA § 16-1-4, and every crime has as elements an actus reus and a mens rea, see OCGA § 16-2-1 (a) (“A ‘crime’ is a violation of a statute of this state in which there is a joint operation of an act or omission to act and intention or criminal negligence.”)....
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Taylor v. Chitwood, 471 S.E.2d 511 (Ga. 1996).

Cited 10 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 17, 1996 | 266 Ga. 793, 96 Fulton County D. Rep. 2178

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Coates v. State, 304 Ga. 329 (Ga. 2018).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Aug 27, 2018

...define offenses. “Whether a particular course of conduct involves one or more distinct ‘offenses’ under the statute depends on this [legislative] choice.” Sanabria v. United States, 437 U. S. 54, 70 (98 SCt 2170, 57 LE2d 43) (1978); see also OCGA § 16-1-4 (“No conduct constitutes a crime unless it is described as a crime in this title or in another statute of this state.”)....