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2018 Georgia Code 16-10-1 | Car Wreck Lawyer

TITLE 16 CRIMES AND OFFENSES

Section 10. Offenses Against Public Administration, 16-10-1 through 16-10-98.

ARTICLE 1 ABUSE OF GOVERNMENTAL OFFICE

16-10-1. Violation of oath by public officer.

Any public officer who willfully and intentionally violates the terms of his oath as prescribed by law shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than five years.

(Code 1933, § 26-2302, enacted by Ga. L. 1968, p. 1249, § 1.)

Cross references.

- Official oaths generally, § 45-3-1 et seq.

Law reviews.

- For article discussing statute preceding present criminal Code section restricting municipal purchasing from city officials, see 5 Ga. St. B.J. 309 (1969).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Not unconstitutionally vague.

- O.C.G.A. § 16-10-1 was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to a police officer who pawned a confiscated handgun to finance the officer's personal water bill, since such conduct was so far outside the realm of acceptable police behavior that defendant had adequate notice of the potential for prosecution for that conduct. Poole v. State, 262 Ga. 718, 425 S.E.2d 655 (1993).

What public officers included.

- Former Code 1933, § 26-2302 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-10-1) plainly applies to any public officer, and includes public officers of a municipality. Beckman v. State, 229 Ga. 327, 190 S.E.2d 906 (1972).

Misdemeanor committed by public officer.

- Police officer's act of taking a candy bar from a convenience store without paying for it was not the offense of violation of oath by a public officer. State v. Tullis, 213 Ga. App. 581, 445 S.E.2d 282 (1994).

Proving terms of oath of office.

- Violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-1 was not established where the state failed to prove the terms of the oath of office administered to defendant were as averred in the charge. Jowers v. State, 225 Ga. App. 809, 484 S.E.2d 803 (1997).

It is not necessary that the conduct prohibited by O.C.G.A. § 16-10-1 take place while the officer is on duty. Barnes v. State, 230 Ga. App. 884, 497 S.E.2d 594 (1998).

Lesser included offense of bribery.

- The offense of violation of oath by a public officer is a lesser included offense of bribery. Nave v. State, 171 Ga. App. 165, 318 S.E.2d 753 (1984).

Proof of the alleged bribery of an assistant district attorney as a factual matter would include the facts necessary to establish a violation of oath, and thus the latter is embraced within the charge of bribery and constitutes a lesser included offense of that crime. Nave v. Helms, 845 F.2d 963 (11th Cir. 1988).

Indictment of county clerk for violating the clerk's oath as a public officer for failure to collect costs, fines, and forfeitures was sufficient to withstand defendant's special demurrer where all of the elements of the offense of "violation of oath by public officer" were included in the indictment, and there was a clear exposition of the facts alleged as the basis for the charge set forth in the body of the indictment in such a plain manner as to be easily understood by the jury and the defendant. State v. Greene, 171 Ga. App. 329, 320 S.E.2d 183 (1984).

County jailer.

- Motion for general demurrer by defendant, a county jailer, was properly denied on defendant's indictment on a charge of violating defendant's oath of office for receiving marijuana as payment for delivering a pack of cigarettes to an inmate because it could not be said that defendant had "well and truly" performed defendant's duties. Murkerson v. State, 264 Ga. App. 701, 592 S.E.2d 184 (2003).

Prison guard.

- There was sufficient evidence to support the conviction of the defendant, a corrections officer, of violating the defendant's oath of office when the defendant was found bringing drugs into the prison where the defendant was employed. The terms of the oath the defendant signed were set out in an exhibit exactly as averred in the indictment, and the oath was prescribed by law. Bradley v. State, 292 Ga. App. 737, 665 S.E.2d 428 (2008).

Evidence that a corrections officer threatened an inmate that if the inmate did not give the officer $2,000, the officer would have the inmate charged with marijuana possession was insufficient for a jury to find that the officer attempted to improperly influence official action by another officer in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-5, but was sufficient to support the officer's conviction of violation of an oath by a public officer in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-1. Beard v. State, 300 Ga. App. 146, 684 S.E.2d 306 (2009).

Coerced statement.

- In a prosecution under both O.C.G.A. §§ 16-6-5.1 and16-10-1, the trial court properly suppressed the oral and written statements made by the defendant, a public employee, during an internal investigation interview conducted by the Georgia Department of Corrections, and after the defendant was forbidden to seek the advice of counsel, as the defendant had an objective belief that a failure to cooperate with the investigation by taking part in the interview and signing a written document entitled "Notice of Interfering with On-Going Internal Investigation" would result in a loss of employment; thus, the defendant's right against self-incrimination was violated. State v. Aiken, 281 Ga. App. 415, 636 S.E.2d 156 (2006).

Failure to charge jury on issue of character of defendant was reversible error, where defendant's character was an issue in the trial of the case. Chastain v. State, 177 Ga. App. 236, 339 S.E.2d 298 (1985).

Notice of charges.

- Defendant's special demurrer was properly denied because the indictment accusing the defendant of "threatening to arrest (the victim) if she did not meet with him at a separate location and comply with his demands for sex, by lying to officials with the Georgia Bureau of Investigation during a criminal investigation, and by committing crimes against the State while on duty," sufficiently apprised defendant of the charge. Wiggins v. State, 272 Ga. App. 414, 612 S.E.2d 598 (2005), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 280 Ga. 268, 626 S.E.2d 118 (2006).

Evidence sufficient for conviction.

- Trial court properly denied defendant's demurrer to two counts alleging violation of defendant's oath of office (as a police officer) as defendant made various admissions in judicio and there was a sufficient connection between defendant's taking possession of the weapons from an impounded car and defendant's duties as a police officer to support one charge for violating the oath of office. Further, the indictment sufficiently alleged that defendant failed to turn over the contraband taken, which indicated that defendant wilfully and intentionally violated the oath to faithfully administer and discharge the duties of defendant's office by intentionally failing to turn in the weapons to authorities. Brandeburg v. State, 292 Ga. App. 191, 663 S.E.2d 844 (2008), cert. denied, No. S08C1796, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 921 (Ga. 2008).

Evidence supported the defendant's conviction for violation of oath of office as the jury was authorized to find that the defendant, a police officer, obtained the victim's taxpayer identification number without authorization by using the police database with personal information in the database. Gaskins v. State, 318 Ga. App. 8, 733 S.E.2d 338 (2012).

Cited in In re Nave, 254 Ga. 107, 326 S.E.2d 769 (1985); Tesler v. State, 295 Ga. App. 569, 672 S.E.2d 522 (2009).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 63C Am. Jur. 2d, Public Officers and Employees, § 369 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 67 C.J.S., Officers and Public Employees, § 360 et seq.

ALR.

- Criminal offense of bribery as affected by lack of legal qualification of person assuming or alleged to be an officer, 115 A.L.R. 1263.

Personal liability of policeman, sheriff, or similar peace officer or his bond, for injury suffered as a result of failure to enforce law or arrest lawbreaker, 41 A.L.R.3d 700.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 16-10-1

Total Results: 6  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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Lathrop v. Deal, 301 Ga. 408 (Ga. 2017).

Cited 109 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 19, 2017 | 801 S.E.2d 867

...This provision likewise indicates that the second sentence is not to be taken in its broadest possible sense. If “judgment” were taken in its broadest sense, it arguably would mean that criminal prosecutions of public officers for misfeasance in office, see, e.g., OCGA § 16-10-1 (violation of oath of office), would be barred by the Constitution of 1983 as amended....
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Wiggins v. State, 626 S.E.2d 118 (Ga. 2006).

Cited 20 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jan 30, 2006 | 280 Ga. 268, 2006 Fulton County D. Rep. 286

...ment was filed against the defendant without proper notice pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-52 where the defendant, a peace officer, was charged with the crimes of false writings and statements, OCGA § 16-10-20, and violation of oath of public office, OCGA § 16-10-1? We answer our inquiry in the affirmative....
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Poole v. State, 425 S.E.2d 655 (Ga. 1993).

Cited 12 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 8, 1993 | 262 Ga. 718, 93 Fulton County D. Rep. 490

...Wilson, District Attorney, Nancy B. Allstrom, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee. HUNT, Presiding Justice. Willington Poole, a Lithonia police officer, appeals his conviction, following a jury trial, of the felony of violating his oath as a public officer, OCGA § 16-10-1....
...t I will faithfully enforce the charter and ordinances of said City of Lithonia to the best of my ability, without fear or favor, and will in all my actions as Police Officer act as I believe for the best interests of said city, so help me God. OCGA § 16-10-1 provides: Any public officer who willfully and intentionally violates the *719 terms of his oath as prescribed by law shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than five years. Poole contends that, as applied to him, OCGA § 16-10-1, read in conjunction with his oath, is unconstitutionally void for vagueness....
...notice that he could be prosecuted for *720 that conduct. Byrd v. City of Atlanta, supra. He could not reasonably have been surprised that his conduct violated his sworn duty as a police officer. Id. Thus, we need not reach the question whether OCGA § 16-10-1, read with the oath, might be vague as to some conduct since it is clear it is not vague in light of Poole's conduct....
...733, 756 (94 SC 2547, 41 LE2d 439) (1974) ("One to whose conduct a statute clearly applies may not successfully challenge it for vagueness."); Ritter v. State, 258 Ga. 551 (2) (372 SE2d 230) (1988); Sustakovitch v. State, 249 Ga. 273, 274-275 (1) (290 SE2d 77) (1982). For the foregoing reasons, OCGA § 16-10-1 is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Poole, and his conviction is affirmed. Judgment affirmed. Clarke, C. J., Benham, Sears-Collins and Hunstein, JJ., concur; Fletcher, J., dissents. FLETCHER, Justice, dissenting. I do find merit in Poole's contention that, as applied to him, OCGA § 16-10-1, when read in conjunction with his oath of office, is unconstitutionally void for vagueness....
...[3] There are, no doubt, numerous instances in which reasonable persons might differ regarding whether certain conduct violates an officer's oath to "truly demean" himself as a police officer, or act "for the best interests of" the city. The fact that OCGA § 16-10-1, read with the oath, might be unconstitutionally vague in other instances, does not give Poole a right to challenge that statute as applied to him....
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In the Matter of Thomas E. Nave, 326 S.E.2d 769 (Ga. 1985).

Cited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 15, 1985 | 254 Ga. 107

...Smith III, General Counsel State Bar, George E. Hibbs, Assistant General Counsel State Bar, for State Bar of Georgia. PER CURIAM. Thomas E. Nave, an assistant district attorney, was convicted of the offense of violation of oath by a public officer, OCGA § 16-10-1, an offense punishable by imprisonment for not less than one nor more *108 than five years....
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Powell v. The State (two Cases), 901 S.E.2d 182 (Ga. 2024).

Cited 5 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Apr 30, 2024 | 318 Ga. 875

...THE STATE. LAGRUA, Justice. In these appeals — which have been consolidated for purposes of issuing an opinion — we decide whether an indictment charging two former police officers with violations of their oaths of office under OCGA § 16-10-1 by failing to conduct investigations of other police officers in purported violation of Brady v....
...follow, we conclude that the indictment at issue is not sufficient to withstand the general demurrers and violates federal constitutional due process, and thus, the trial court’s order denying the general demurrers to the indictment should be reversed. 1 OCGA § 16-10-1 provides that “[a]ny public officer who willfully and intentionally violates the terms of his oath as prescribed by law shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than five years.” 1....
...I will faithfully discharge my duties fairly and impartially as a police officer of Glynn County, so help me God. . . . 2 and intentionally” violating the terms of their oaths of office under OCGA § 16-10-1 in that they did fail to uphold the Constitution of the United States, which provides in Article VII, Amendment V, that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process, as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Brady v....
...fail[ing] to promptly investigate said allegations and fail[ing] to timely conduct an Internal Affairs investigation of said allegations. . . . In Count 2 of the indictment, Powell was individually charged with “willfully and intentionally” violating the terms of his oath of office under OCGA § 16-10-1 in that he did fail to uphold the Constitution of the United States, which provides in Article VII, Amendment V, that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process, as interpreted by the U.S....
...administrative action in regard to the GBNET personnel involved in Camden County. . . . In Count 3 of the indictment, Powell was individually charged with “willfully and intentionally” violating the terms of his oath of office under OCGA § 16-10-1 in that he did fail to uphold the Constitution of the United States, which provides in Article VII, Amendment V, that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process, as interpreted by the U.S....
...personnel involved in said traffic stop. . . . 4 In Count 4 of the indictment, Powell was individually charged with “willfully and intentionally” violating the terms of his oath of office under OCGA § 16-10-1 in that he did fail to uphold the Constitution of the United States, which provides in Article VII, Amendment V, that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process, as interpreted by the U.S....
...“fails to set forth any description of the way the alleged conduct of the accused . . . violates the United States Constitution as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Brady v. Maryland.” Powell and Scott also asserted that the oath-of-office statute, OCGA § 16-10-1, was “unconstitutionally vague” as applied to the facts of this case. At the hearing on the general demurrers, Powell and Scott argued that the indictment should be dismissed because they could Powell and Scott filed motions...
...are legally sufficient.” State v. Mondor, 306 Ga. 338, 341 (1) (830 SE2d 206) (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted). Having done 4 Citing Poole v. State, 262 Ga. 718, 719 (425 SE2d 655) (1993), the trial court also concluded that OCGA § 16-10-1 was “not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Powell and Scott” and denied their general demurrers on this additional ground. Powell and Scott appealed the trial court’s ruling — including the trial court’s conclusion that OCGA § 16-10-1 was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to the facts of this case — to the Court of Appeals....
...” Mondor, 306 Ga. at 341 (1) (citing Jackson v. State, 301 Ga. 137, 141 (1) (800 SE2d 356) (2017)). Here, the indictment lays out the elements of the statutorily- defined crime of violation of oath of office by a public officer. See OCGA § 16-10-1 (“[a]ny public officer who willfully and intentionally violates the terms of his oath as prescribed by law shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than five years”)....
...at 881 (2) (citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied).5 Applying those principles here, the indictment at issue charges Powell and Scott with “willfully and intentionally” violating the terms of their oath of office under OCGA § 16-10-1 by failing to uphold the due process clause of the United States Constitution as interpreted by Brady....
...418, 425 (4) (c) (888 SE2d 546) (2023) 13 (citation and punctuation omitted). As explained above, to withstand a general demurrer in this case, the State was not required to allege any additional facts in the indictment beyond the statutory elements of OCGA § 16-10-1, but the State generally must allege additional facts to survive a special demurrer....
...question if the decision in the appeal can be made upon other grounds.”) (citing Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 171 (1) n.7 (751 SE2d 337) (2013)). 17 Decided April 30, 2024. OCGA § 16-10-1; constitutional question....

State v. Phillips (Ga. 2025).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Dec 9, 2025 | 318 Ga. 875

...did cause the death of Fernando Rodriguez, a human being, by asphyxiating him, contrary to the laws of said State, the peace, good order, and dignity thereof. Counts 5-9, charging the officers with violation of their respective oaths under OCGA § 16-10-1,1 alleged that the officers: being [ ] public officer[s] … who swore to protect and serve the citizens … in a courteous and professional manner and to support the Constitution of the United States and the State of Georgia, did willfully and intentionally violate the terms of [their] oath as prescribed by law, by 1 The version of OCGA § 16-10-1 in effect at the time the officers were indicted provided in full: “Any public officer who willfully and intentionally violates the terms of his oath as prescribed by law shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than five years.” OCGA § 16-10-1 was amended, effective July 1, 2025, and now provides in full: (a) Any public officer who willfully and intentionally violates the terms of his or her oath as prescribed by law shall, upon conviction th...
...8, 2025) (Peterson, P.J., dissenting). 5 appeal contain such an order. 3 The substantive part of the order granting the general demurrer to Count 3 reads in full: In support of its ruling, the Court considered that the law does not provide that OCGA § 16-10-1, Violation of Oath by a Public Officer, is an “inherently dangerous felony.” OCGA § 16-10-1, therefore, cannot serve as the predicate felony to support a charge of Felony Murder (OCGA § 16-5-1)....
...l court erred in granting the officers’ general demurrer to Count 3. But, as the majority points out, the officers also brought general demurrers to Counts 5 through 9, which charge the officers with violating their respective oaths under OCGA § 16-10-1....
...e indictment, and in the officers’ oaths, which requires officers “to protect and serve the citizens … in a courteous and professional manner,” may prove problematic, as it is not clear that language is “prescribed by law” under OCGA § 16-10-1. Counts 5 through 9 alleged that the officers: being [ ] public officer[s] with the [Hampton or Henry County] Police Department … who swore to protect and serve the citizens … in a courteous and professional...
...a prone position, while he was handcuffed and shackled, holding him down and applying pressure to his body, contrary to the laws of said State, the peace, good order, and dignity thereof. Relevant to the charges here, OCGA § 16-10-1 makes it a felony for a public officer to “willfully and intentionally violate[] the terms of his oath as prescribed by law[.]” OCGA § 16-10-1 (emphasis added).9 The plain language of the statute thus provides that for a violation of the terms of an oath to support criminal liability under the statute, those terms must be prescribed by law....
...evidence that the defendant violated the terms of the oath actually administered and that those terms were from an oath ‘prescribed by law,’ that is, one that the ‘legislature’ required of a public officer 9 As the majority notes, this part of OCGA § 16-10-1 was in effect at the time the officers were indicted, but the statute was amended in 2025 to add subparts. 21 ‘before entering the duties of [his or her] office.’” Id....
...State, 371 Ga. App. 12, 15–18 (2024). 22 bothered to respond to that argument. 11 If that language in the officers’ oaths is not prescribed by law, it cannot form the basis for a violation of OCGA § 16-10-1....