Scope and application.

- O.C.G.A. § 16-11-102 applies only where the victim is not placed in reasonable apprehension of immediate violent injury by the pointing of the firearm (e.g., when the victim is unaware a weapon has been pointed at the victim), since otherwise the act of pointing a firearm at a person comes within the definition of aggravated assault. Watson v. State, 199 Ga. App. 825, 406 S.E.2d 509 (1991).

Section applies to law enforcement officers.

- Even a marshal, policeman, or other arresting officer, who intentionally points a pistol at another when the use of a weapon is unnecessary to the discharge of the official's duties, is guilty of a violation of former Penal Code 1910, § 349 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-11-102). Reynolds v. State, 9 Ga. App. 227, 70 S.E. 969 (1911).

Probable cause for arrest after witnesses claimed to see pointed gun.

- When an arrestee was involved in an altercation with three men while leaving a bar and an officer obtained a warrant for the arrestee's arrest, the arrestee's Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim against the officer failed because the testimony of the three witnesses was sufficient to cause a person of reasonable caution to believe that the arrestee had pointed a gun at another without justification. Chancy v. Bruno, F.3d (11th Cir. Feb. 13, 2017)(Unpublished).

Road rage.

- Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of pointing a pistol at the victim in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-102 because, while driving slowly in heavy traffic, defendant became angry about the way the victim had been driving, and, after a brief exchange of words and gestures from inside their cars, defendant pulled a handgun from behind the passenger seat and pointed the gun at the victim, and the victim, who was unarmed, ducked the victim's head and turned into the victim's workplace as defendant continued along the road, and after a witness called the police and provided the police with defendant's license number, defendant was arrested. Taylor v. State, 276 Ga. App. 424, 623 S.E.2d 237 (2005).

Pointing must be intentional to constitute this offense. Herrington v. State, 121 Ga. 141, 48 S.E. 908 (1904); Edwards v. State, 4 Ga. App. 167, 60 S.E. 1033, later appeal, 4 Ga. App. 849, 62 S.E. 565 (1908); Leonard v. State, 133 Ga. 435, 66 S.E. 251 (1909); Hawkins v. State, 8 Ga. App. 705, 70 S.E. 53 (1911); Parsons v. State, 16 Ga. App. 212, 84 S.E. 974 (1915).

To aim a weapon at another is to point weapon intentionally. Livingston v. State, 6 Ga. App. 805, 65 S.E. 812 (1909).

Child may have necessary intent.

- Thirteen year old child intentionally aimed gun at another child without any legal justification and therefore violated O.C.G.A. § 16-11-102. A reasonable 13-year old should have anticipated that serious injury would result from intentionally aiming and firing a .38 revolver at or near a person's head and that a bullet wound is a foreseeable and expected result of pointing a loaded gun at another and pulling the trigger. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Dillard, 859 F. Supp. 1501 (M.D. Ga. 1994), aff'd, 70 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 1995).

Mentally retarded may have necessary intent.

- Defendant admitted to knowing that the defendant should not discharge a gun within the city limits, that the defendant was already in trouble for shooting a dog, and the defendant knew that the defendant was still holding the gun when the defendant pointed the gun at a person; thus, the defendant, even though mentally retarded, could be convicted of reckless conduct. Cox v. State, 216 Ga. App. 86, 453 S.E.2d 471 (1995).

Intention may be inferred from circumstances surrounding pointing. Hawkins v. State, 8 Ga. App. 705, 70 S.E. 53 (1911); Parsons v. State, 16 Ga. App. 212, 84 S.E. 974 (1915).

It is not essential that pointing be done with intention to shoot. Winkles v. State, 114 Ga. 449, 40 S.E. 259 (1901).

It is immaterial whether pointing be in fun or otherwise. Leonard v. State, 133 Ga. 435, 66 S.E. 251 (1909).

Playful pointing of gun.

- If the pointing of the pistol was done playfully or was accompanied by the declaration that there was no intention to shoot, and a disclaimer of any criminal intent, it would not amount to a criminal assault. Edwards v. State, 4 Ga. App. 167, 60 S.E. 1033, later appeal, 4 Ga. App. 849, 62 S.E. 565 (1908).

Former Penal Code 1895, § 343 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-11-102) did not apply to pointing of toy imitation pistol, which was not reasonably capable of being put to use for which corresponding weapon was intended. Mathews v. Caldwell, 5 Ga. App. 336, 63 S.E. 250 (1908).

Whether a pistol is in fact a toy or weapon is for jury determination. Mathews v. Caldwell, 5 Ga. App. 336, 63 S.E. 250 (1908).

Neither name of thing or purpose for which sold or used is controlling.

- Neither name by which thing is called nor purpose for which sold or used in a particular case is controlling in determining its character. Mathews v. Caldwell, 5 Ga. App. 336, 63 S.E. 250 (1908).

Opprobrious, insulting, or abusive language furnished no justifiable provocation under former Penal Code 1895, § 343 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-11-102). Skinner v. State, 98 Ga. 127, 26 S.E. 475 (1896); Winkles v. State, 114 Ga. 449, 40 S.E. 259 (1901).

Involuntary manslaughter.

- Accidental shooting, causing death, following intentional pointing of pistol at another, constitutes involuntary manslaughter. Leonard v. State, 133 Ga. 435, 66 S.E. 251 (1909); Irvin v. State, 9 Ga. App. 865, 72 S.E. 440 (1911).

Trial court's instruction on felony involuntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of felony murder was not improper when there was evidence that the defendant intentionally pointed a gun at the victim in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-102 just before the gun fired. Moore v. State, 286 Ga. App. 313, 649 S.E.2d 337 (2007).

Given evidence at trial that the defendant, age 15, was playing with a gun near the back of the defendant's father's head when the defendant shot the defendant's father, the trial court erred in refusing the defendant's request to charge on involuntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of malice murder, not just as a lesser included offense of felony murder, and appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to make this argument. The "unlawful act" required for involuntary manslaughter could have been reckless conduct under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-60. Seabolt v. Norris, 298 Ga. 583, 783 S.E.2d 913 (2016).

Offense of pointing a gun is a lesser included offense of aggravated assault.

- Simple assault under former Code 1933, § 26-1301 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20) and pointing a gun or pistol at another under former Code 1933, § 26-2908 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-11-102) are both misdemeanors and included in greater crime of aggravated assault with deadly weapon. Morrison v. State, 147 Ga. App. 410, 249 S.E.2d 131 (1978).

Indictment which specified the charge of "aggravated assault" but was described as making an assault with a handgun by pointing the weapon did not create an ambiguity which rendered the charges indistinguishable from the misdemeanor charge of pointing or aiming a gun or pistol at another; preparing a defense to the lesser included offense of pointing a pistol at another would be intrinsic to any preparation of a defense to the aggravated assault charge. Dobbs v. State, 204 Ga. App. 83, 418 S.E.2d 443 (1992).

Although pointing a firearm at another is an offense included in aggravated assault, it is not error to refuse a charge on it when the evidence does not reasonably raise the issue that defendant may be guilty of only the lesser crime. Head v. State, 233 Ga. App. 655, 504 S.E.2d 499 (1998); Stobbart v. State, 272 Ga. 608, 533 S.E.2d 379 (2000).

Not lesser included offense of attempted murder.

- Offense of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-102 was not a lesser included offense of attempted murder and aggravated assault on a police officer since the evidence showed that the latter crimes were completed. Thomas v. State, 226 Ga. App. 441, 487 S.E.2d 75 (1997).

Lesser included offense instruction inappropriate.

- When evidence showed that the defendant pointed a gun at a hijacking victim and ordered the victim to comply with the defendant's commands, the defendant was not entitled to a lesser included instruction under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-102, which applies only when the victim was not placed in reasonable apprehension of immediate violent injury by the pointing of the firearm. Collis v. State, 252 Ga. App. 659, 556 S.E.2d 221 (2001).

Offense may be established when greater offense which includes it is itself not proved. For example, under a charge of assault with intent to murder, there may be a conviction for pointing a gun at another. Jenkins v. State, 92 Ga. 470, 17 S.E. 693 (1893); Livingston v. State, 6 Ga. App. 208, 64 S.E. 709 (1909).

Indictment must charge intentional pointing, either expressly or by necessary implication. Herrington v. State, 121 Ga. 141, 48 S.E. 908 (1904); Livingston v. State, 6 Ga. App. 208, 64 S.E. 709 (1909); Parsons v. State, 16 Ga. App. 212, 84 S.E. 974 (1915); Edwards v. State, 28 Ga. App. 466, 111 S.E. 748 (1922).

In the homicide trial, the defendant's act was clearly the felony of aggravated assault, not the misdemeanor of pointing a weapon at another, when the testimony showed that the victim, as well as the three passengers in the victim's car, were aware of and understandably apprehensive of immediate violent injury, and defendant's own testimony ("I was showing the gun to him so he would leave me alone.") revealed that the defendant's purpose in pointing the weapon was to place the victim in apprehension of immediate violent injury, and the request for a charge on misdemeanor manslaughter was properly denied. Rhodes v. State, 257 Ga. 368, 359 S.E.2d 670 (1987); Rameau v. State, 267 Ga. 261, 477 S.E.2d 118 (1996).

Absence of justification as an element.

- Guilty verdict for aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a) was not necessarily inconsistent because an O.C.G.A. § 16-11-102 pointing a gun count (for which petitioner inmate was found not guilty) included the element of acting without justification, an element not involved in the aggravated assault charge; counsel was not ineffective for not requesting an instruction on the specific method of committing the aggravated assault charged. Leroy Banks v. Georgia, 517 Fed. Appx. 709 (11th Cir. 2013)(Unpublished).

Charge properly refused.

- Requested charges on involuntary manslaughter, pointing a firearm at another, and simple assault, were properly refused, where defendant's testimony (that defendant fired shots with the intention of frightening a group) established as a matter of law the offense of aggravated assault, and the testimony that members of the group were frightened and dropped to the ground was inconsistent with the requested charges. Hawkins v. State, 260 Ga. 138, 390 S.E.2d 836 (1990).

Trial court did not err by refusing to charge the jury regarding pointing or aiming a gun or pistol at another as a lesser included offense of aggravated assault. Rowe v. State, 266 Ga. 136, 464 S.E.2d 811 (1996).

Defendant was not entitled to a jury charge on the misdemeanors of pointing a gun at another, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-102, as a lesser included offense of the felony counts of aggravated assault because the victims were placed in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury when the defendant pointed a gun at the victims; the only testimony was that the weapon was pointed as a threat and perceived as such and, therefore, an assault. Dailey v. State, 313 Ga. App. 809, 723 S.E.2d 43 (2012), cert. denied, No. S12C0969, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 551 (Ga. 2012).

Conviction of licensed bondsman.

- Licensed bondsman was not justified in pointing gun at person other than the person specified in pickup order and arrest warrant and thus was properly convicted of pointing a pistol at another. Mease v. State, 165 Ga. App. 746, 302 S.E.2d 429 (1983).

Conviction upheld despite self-defense argument.

- Defendant was properly convicted of pointing or aiming a gun or pistol at another when the defendant pulled a gun on security personnel at a tavern after security took defendant's keys because of the defendant's intoxicated condition, notwithstanding the defendant's contention that the defendant acted in self-defense. Richardson v. State, 233 Ga. App. 890, 505 S.E.2d 57 (1998).

Cited in Kerbo v. State, 230 Ga. 241, 196 S.E.2d 424 (1973); Hardin v. State, 137 Ga. App. 391, 224 S.E.2d 82 (1976); Fleming v. State, 137 Ga. App. 805, 224 S.E.2d 792 (1976); Thomas v. State, 237 Ga. 690, 229 S.E.2d 458 (1976); Ramsey v. Mercer, 142 Ga. App. 827, 237 S.E.2d 450 (1977); Leach v. State, 143 Ga. App. 598, 239 S.E.2d 177 (1977); Mitchell v. State, 154 Ga. App. 399, 268 S.E.2d 360 (1980); Henderson v. State, 153 Ga. App. 801, 266 S.E.2d 522 (1980); Beckum v. State, 156 Ga. App. 484, 274 S.E.2d 829 (1980); Raines v. State, 247 Ga. 504, 277 S.E.2d 47 (1981); Nutt v. State, 159 Ga. App. 46, 282 S.E.2d 696 (1981); Smith v. State, 249 Ga. 801, 294 S.E.2d 525 (1982); Richardson v. State, 250 Ga. 506, 299 S.E.2d 715 (1983); Padgett v. State, 170 Ga. App. 98, 316 S.E.2d 523 (1984); Green v. State, 175 Ga. App. 92, 332 S.E.2d 385 (1985); Smith v. State, 186 Ga. App. 303, 367 S.E.2d 573 (1988); Vincent v. State, 203 Ga. App. 874, 418 S.E.2d 138 (1992); Pruitt v. State, 211 Ga. App. 654, 440 S.E.2d 248 (1994); Taylor v. State, 226 Ga. App. 254, 485 S.E.2d 830 (1997); In the Interest of C.A., 249 Ga. App. 280, 548 S.E.2d 37 (2001).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 6 Am. Jur. 2d, Assault and Battery, §§ 4, 32, 33, 35, 47, 49. 79 Am. Jur. 2d, Weapons and Firearms, § 32.

C.J.S.

- 94 C.J.S., Weapons, § 57 et seq.

ALR.

- Contributory negligence or assumption of risk of one injured by firearm or air gun discharged by another, 25 A.L.R.3d 518.

Fact that gun was broken, dismantled, or inoperable as affecting criminal responsibility under weapons statute, 81 A.L.R.4th 745.