Prohibited act is "peeping" with requisite wrongful purpose or intent.

- If act and intent are in concurrence, the crime is complete regardless of what or who may or may not be subject to perpetrator's unlawful gaze. Chance v. State, 154 Ga. App. 543, 268 S.E.2d 737 (1980).

Whether intended victims within view.

- Guilt or innocence not dependent on whether persons defendant sought to spy upon were actually in defendant's view. Butts v. State, 97 Ga. App. 465, 103 S.E.2d 450 (1958).

State is not required to show that a person is actually spied upon, the gravamen of the offense being that the spying took place regardless of whether the attempt to invade the privacy of another was successful. McBride v. State, 196 Ga. App. 398, 396 S.E.2d 78 (1990).

Peeping Tom Statute is sufficiently definite to apprise one of ordinary intelligence of conduct which statute forbids. Lemon v. State, 235 Ga. 74, 218 S.E.2d 818 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 906, 96 S. Ct. 1499, 47 L. Ed. 2d 757 (1976).

Publication or commercialization of information obtained.

- In offense of invasion of privacy of another, the gravamen or essence of the action is not publication or commercialization of the information obtained. There is nothing in the decided cases of this state which indicates any such limitation or qualification of the right, and a person's privacy is invaded even though the information obtained is restricted to immediate transgressor. Publication or commercialization may aggravate, but individual's right to privacy is invaded and violated nevertheless by original act of intrusion. McDaniel v. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 60 Ga. App. 92, 2 S.E.2d 810 (1939).

Introduction of similar transactions.

- In a trial for rape, burglary, assault and sodomy, where the evidence was such as to authorize the inference that the perpetrator had most likely been a "peeping Tom" before the perpetrator committed the instant burglaries and sexual offenses against the victims, the trial court did not err in allowing the state to introduce, as sufficiently similar transactions, evidence that, on two other occasions, defendant had been a "peeping Tom" without having committed the additional offenses of burglary and sexual assault. Muckle v. State, 202 Ga. App. 733, 415 S.E.2d 299, cert. denied, 202 Ga. App. 907, 415 S.E.2d 299 (1992).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting similar transaction evidence of defendant's involvement in a Peeping Tom incident where defendant was arrested for entering a women's restroom at another college and peering into an occupied stall with a hand mirror in defendant's trial for Peeping Tom and burglary with intent to commit rape as: (1) the state offered the testimony of the alleged victim in that Peeping Tom incident, a young, black, female student, as well as the testimony of the arresting police officer, for the appropriate purpose of showing defendant's bent of mind, course of conduct, and identity; (2) the alleged victim's testimony provided sufficient evidence that defendant peered into the bathroom stall while she was in it; and (3) the acts were sufficiently similar. Howard v. State, 266 Ga. App. 281, 596 S.E.2d 627 (2004).

Relevant evidence.

- Testimony of a person arrested for allegedly staring into the complainant's windows from the next-door driveway, explaining that the person went there to take an employee with the person on the person's daily visits to the person's institutionalized retarded child, was relevant. Rosenthal v. Hudson, 183 Ga. App. 712, 360 S.E.2d 15 (1987) (action for malicious prosecution).

Evidence regarding the defendant's behavior and interactions with the victims and other neighbors was admissible under O.C.G.A. § 24-4-404(b) because the prior relationship between the parties formed a basis for the allegation of peeping Tom and helped to explain why the offense occurred. Edge v. State, 345 Ga. App. 794, 815 S.E.2d 146 (2018).

Impact of multiple sclerosis on ability to commit offense should be investigated.

- Defendant, who was convicted of violating Georgia's Peeping Tom Statute, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-61, was entitled to a new trial since defendant's counsel failed to investigate the impact of defendant's multiple sclerosis, which might have been sufficient to create a reasonable doubt as to whether defendant acted with the purpose of spying on the victim. Fedak v. State, 304 Ga. App. 580, 696 S.E.2d 421 (2010).

When proof at variance with indictment.

- Allegation in the indictment as to the identity of the victim was mere surplusage, and the failure to prove the allegation was not a fatal variance requiring reversal of defendant's conviction. McBride v. State, 196 Ga. App. 398, 396 S.E.2d 78 (1990).

Evidence sufficient for conviction.

- See Banks v. State, 178 Ga. App. 54, 341 S.E.2d 859 (1986); In re J.G., 188 Ga. App. 856, 374 S.E.2d 796 (1988); Emerson v. State, 217 Ga. App. 284, 458 S.E.2d 657 (1995); Smith v. State, 238 Ga. App. 605, 520 S.E.2d 13 (1999); Brown v. State, 242 Ga. App. 858, 531 S.E.2d 409 (2000).

Juror misconduct in peeping Tom case.

- Trial court's denial of the defendant's motion for a new trial was reversed because the state failed to overcome the presumption of harm resulting from juror misconduct since the juror who successfully pulled up the information on the juror's mobile phone on the distances between the properties at issue during the defendant's trial on peeping Tom charges did not testify at the new trial hearing, thus, it was unknown whether the information affected the juror's decision to convict. Edge v. State, 345 Ga. App. 794, 815 S.E.2d 146 (2018).

Cited in Terrell v. State, 124 Ga. App. 117, 183 S.E.2d 24 (1971); State v. Birge, 240 Ga. 501, 241 S.E.2d 213 (1978); Drake v. State, 245 Ga. 798, 267 S.E.2d 237 (1980); Barron v. State, 158 Ga. App. 172, 279 S.E.2d 299 (1981); Lemon v. State, 161 Ga. App. 692, 289 S.E.2d 789 (1982); Elmore v. Atlantic Zayre, Inc., 178 Ga. App. 25, 341 S.E.2d 905 (1986); English v. State, 282 Ga. App. 552, 639 S.E.2d 551 (2006).

ALR.

- Investigations and surveillance, shadowing and trailing, as violation of right of privacy, 13 A.L.R.3d 1025.

Criminal prosecution of video or photographic voyeurism, 120 A.L.R.5th 337.