When third party may intercept, record, and divulge a conversation.

- O.C.G.A. § 16-11-66 allows a third party to intercept, record, and divulge conversation, (1) when parties to conversation consent, or (2) when message is a crime or is directly in furtherance of a crime and one party to conversation consents. Mitchell v. State, 239 Ga. 3, 235 S.E.2d 509, on remand, 142 Ga. App. 802, 237 S.E.2d 243 (1977), for comment, see 29 Mercer L. Rev. 351 (1977).

Disclosure under former paragraph (b)(7) of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-64 was not required where consent of one party is received under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-66. Luck v. State, 163 Ga. App. 657, 295 S.E.2d 584 (1982).

Scope of statute.

- Motions for reconsideration were denied because the court did not err in the court's interpretation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-66 because rather than functioning as a limitation on some pre-existing parental right to consent on behalf of the child, the statute was more properly read as a narrow grant of authority for parents' consent to the recording of their child's conversations by a specific means (telephonic conversations) and in a specific location (the family home). Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys. v. S.F., F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. Nov. 23, 2010).

Applicability.

- Trial court erred in granting the defendants' general demurrer to unlawful surveillance counts, as the indictment did not fail based on O.C.G.A. § 16-11-66(a), as the one-party-consent rule did not apply to the video recording. State v. Cohen, 302 Ga. 616, 807 S.E.2d 861 (2017).

Vagueness not shown.

- Trial court erred in concluding that O.C.G.A. §§ 16-11-62(2) and16-11-66(a) were unconstitutionally vague as people of ordinary intelligence could understand that people could be found guilty if they used a device to secretly photograph or video record others in private places. State v. Cohen, 302 Ga. 616, 807 S.E.2d 861 (2017).

Children's telephone calls.

- O.C.G.A. § 16-11-66 does not allow parents to vicariously consent to interceptions of their children's telephone calls. Bishop v. State, 241 Ga. App. 517, 526 S.E.2d 917 (1999).

Child can not give consent to the recording of the child's phone calls either by implication or by subsequent ratification. Bishop v. State, 241 Ga. App. 517, 526 S.E.2d 917 (1999).

Finding of consent not erroneous when there is conflicting evidence.

- Denial of defendants' motion to suppress the admission of the two tape recordings of their conversations with an informant made on the ground that the informant did not consent to the conversations being recorded is not clearly erroneous since the evidence on this issue was in conflict with several law officers testifying that the informant was fully aware of what the informant was doing and was not coerced into consenting to the conversations and the recording thereof and the informant's testimony, while somewhat equivocal, indicated the contrary. Ramsey v. State, 165 Ga. App. 854, 303 S.E.2d 32 (1983).

Former Code 1933, § 26-3006 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-11-66) dealt solely with interception and acts following interception. Mitchell v. State, 239 Ga. 3, 235 S.E.2d 509, on remand, 142 Ga. App. 802, 237 S.E.2d 243 (1977), for comment, see 29 Mercer L. Rev. 351 (1977).

Former Code 1933, § 26-3006 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-11-66) did not prohibit actual parties to conversation from recording or divulging it. Mitchell v. State, 239 Ga. 3, 235 S.E.2d 509, on remand, 142 Ga. App. 802, 237 S.E.2d 243 (1977), for comment, see 29 Mercer L. Rev. 351 (1977); Fetty v. State, 268 Ga. 365, 489 S.E.2d 813 (1997);.

Involvement in divorce action is not equivalent of implied consent to have one's telephone line tapped. Kendrick v. State, 123 Ga. App. 785, 182 S.E.2d 525 (1971).

Telephone calls from jail.

- Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress recordings of an appellant's telephone calls while the appellant was in jail because while O.C.G.A. § 16-11-62(4) prohibited any person from intentionally and secretly intercepting a telephone call by use of any device, instrument, or apparatus, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-66(a) provided an exception to this rule when one of the parties to the communication had given prior consent and that consent was implied based on the statements during the recording that all jail phone calls were recorded or monitored. Boykins-White v. State, 305 Ga. App. 827, 701 S.E.2d 221 (2010).

Because none of the types of communication encompassed by O.C.G.A. § 16-11-66(a) were at issue, because the parties stipulated that the video recordings the victim made between the victim and defendant without defendant's consent were in a private place, and because the participant's exception in § 16-11-66(a) applied to O.C.G.A. § 16-11-62 in its entirety, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-11-67, the trial court properly excluded the recordings. State v. Madison, 311 Ga. App. 31, 714 S.E.2d 714 (2011).

Cited in Farmer v. State, 228 Ga. 225, 184 S.E.2d 647 (1971); Ansley v. State, 124 Ga. App. 670, 185 S.E.2d 562 (1971); Cauley v. State, 130 Ga. App. 278, 203 S.E.2d 239 (1973); Adams v. State, 130 Ga. App. 362, 203 S.E.2d 314 (1973); Cross v. State, 233 Ga. 960, 214 S.E.2d 374 (1975); Cross v. State, 136 Ga. App. 400, 221 S.E.2d 615 (1975); United States v. Ransom, 515 F.2d 885 (5th Cir. 1975); Connally v. State, 237 Ga. 203, 227 S.E.2d 352 (1976); Williams v. State, 142 Ga. App. 764, 236 S.E.2d 893 (1977); Mitchell v. State, 142 Ga. App. 802, 237 S.E.2d 243 (1977); State v. Birge, 240 Ga. 501, 241 S.E.2d 213 (1978); O'Dillon v. State, 245 Ga. 342, 265 S.E.2d 18 (1980); Drake v. State, 245 Ga. 798, 267 S.E.2d 237 (1980); Ford v. State, 160 Ga. App. 707, 288 S.E.2d 39 (1981); Green v. State, 250 Ga. 610, 299 S.E.2d 544 (1983); Stephenson v. State, 171 Ga. App. 938, 321 S.E.2d 433 (1984); Peugh v. State, 175 Ga. App. 90, 332 S.E.2d 384 (1985); Norris v. State, 176 Ga. App. 164, 335 S.E.2d 611 (1985); Hall v. State, 176 Ga. App. 428, 336 S.E.2d 291 (1985); Duren v. State, 177 Ga. App. 421, 339 S.E.2d 394 (1986); Martin v. State, 179 Ga. App. 551, 347 S.E.2d 247 (1986); Reeves v. State, 192 Ga. App. 12, 383 S.E.2d 613 (1989); Lawrence v. State, 195 Ga. App. 320, 393 S.E.2d 475 (1990); Kemp v. State, 201 Ga. App. 629, 411 S.E.2d 880 (1991); Gavin v. State, 292 Ga. App. 402, 664 S.E.2d 797 (2008).

One-party consent requirement renders exception constitutional.

- Requirement of consent of one party ensures that overhearing by third parties is by divulgence of one party to conversation, which is constitutionally permissible, and not by surreptitious interception unbeknownst to any party to conversation, which is constitutionally impermissible. Goodwin v. State, 154 Ga. App. 46, 267 S.E.2d 488 (1980).

Applicability to face-to-face oral communication.

- One-party consent provision of former Code 1933, § 26-3006 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-11-66) was applicable to face-to-face oral communication. Orkin v. State, 236 Ga. 176, 223 S.E.2d 61 (1976); Brooks v. State, 141 Ga. App. 725, 234 S.E.2d 541 (1977).

Face-to-face communications are included in the consent exceptions to the electronic surveillance prohibitions of former Code 1933, § 26-3006 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-11-66). Thornton v. State, 139 Ga. App. 483, 228 S.E.2d 919 (1976).

Face-to-face conversations were intended by legislature to be included in consent exceptions contained in former Code 1933, § 26-3006 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-11-66). Humphrey v. State, 231 Ga. 855, 204 S.E.2d 603, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 839, 95 S. Ct. 68, 42 L. Ed. 2d 66 (1974).

Scope of section.

- Legislature intended former Code 1933, § 26-3006 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-11-66) to govern specifically conversations or communications arranged or anticipated by one of the parties for purpose of interception, recording, and divulging. Goodwin v. State, 154 Ga. App. 46, 267 S.E.2d 488 (1980).

One-party consent may be given to law enforcement officers.

- Former Code 1933, § 26-3006 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-11-66) allowed law enforcement officers to intercept, record, and divulge a conversation, where at least one party thereto consents, and where conversation is a crime or is in furtherance of a crime. Goodwin v. State, 154 Ga. App. 46, 267 S.E.2d 488 (1980).

Section applicable where consenting party is a police officer.

- Former Code 1933, § 26-3006 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-11-66) was intended to cover situations in which conversation was between two private parties, one of whom consented to interception by some third party, most likely a law enforcement agency. This does not mean that if one party to conversation was a police officer who had consented that the section cannot apply. Cross v. State, 128 Ga. App. 837, 198 S.E.2d 338 (1973).

Mere fact that one party to conversation records it does not vitiate its evidentiary value.

- Anyone who makes a statement to another knows that person to whom it was made may repeat it to others who may use it against the person; mere fact that person to whom statement was directed made a recording without knowledge of person recorded does not vitiate its evidentiary value. Quaid v. State, 132 Ga. App. 478, 208 S.E.2d 336 (1974).

Divulging conversation by means of radio transmitting equipment.

- State agent may divulge contents of conversations with accused by carrying radio equipment which simultaneously transmits conversations to other agents monitoring transmission frequency, and police officers who are simultaneously listening to conversation through electronic amplification of conversation may testify as to what they have heard. Goodwin v. State, 154 Ga. App. 46, 267 S.E.2d 488 (1980).

Taped testimony of incestuous-rape victim's initiated conversation with assailant found admissible. See Legg v. State, 207 Ga. App. 399, 428 S.E.2d 87 (1993); Cofield v. State, 216 Ga. App. 623, 455 S.E.2d 342 (1995), overruled by Drinkard v. Walker, 281 Ga. 211, 636 S.E.2d 530 (2006).

ALR.

- Opening, search, and seizure of mail, 61 A.L.R.2d 1282.

What constitutes an "interception" of a telephone or similar communication forbidden by the Federal Communications Act (47 U.S.C. § 605) or similar state statutes, 9 A.L.R.3d 423.

Permissible surveillance, under state communications interception statute, by person other than state or local law enforcement officer or one acting in concert with officer, 24 A.L.R.4th 1208.