O.C.G.A. § 16-14-2 (2019)
Findings and intent of General Assembly
(a) The General Assembly finds that a severe problem is posed in this state by the increasing sophistication of various criminal elements and the increasing extent to which the state and its citizens are harmed as a result of the activities of these elements. (b) The General Assembly declares that the intent of this chapter is to impose sanctions against those who violate this chapter and to provide compensation to persons injured or aggrieved by such violations. It is not the intent of the General Assembly that isolated incidents of misdemeanor conduct or acts of civil disobedience be prosecuted under this chapter. It is the intent of the General Assembly, however, that this chapter apply to an interrelated pattern of criminal activity motivated by or the effect of which is pecuniary gain or economic or physical threat or injury. This chapter shall be liberally construed to effectuate the remedial purposes embodied in its operative provisions.
History
Code 1933, § 26-3401, enacted by Ga. L. 1980, p. 405, § 1; Ga. L. 1997, p. 672, § 1; Ga. L. 2015, p. 693, § 2-25/HB 233.
Annotations
Editor’s notes. Ga. L. 1997, p. 672, § 2, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that the Act shall have retroactive application to
the fullest extent permitted by the Constitutions of Georgia and the United States. Ga. L. 2015, p. 693, § 4-1/HB 233, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: “This Act shall become effective on July 1, 2015, and shall apply to seizures of property for forfeiture that occur on or after that date. Any such seizure that occurs before July 1, 2015, shall be governed by the statute in effect at the time of such seizure.”
Law reviews. For article, “A Comprehensive Analysis of Georgia RICO,” see 9 Georgia St. U.L. Rev. 537 (1993). For article commenting on the 1997 amendment of this Code section, see 14 Georgia St. U.L. Rev. 90 (1997). For article on the 2015 amendment of this Code section, see 32 Georgia St. U.L. Rev. 1 (2015).
JUDICIAL DECISIONS Not element of civil cause of action. - Expression of legislative purpose in enacting O.C.G.A. § 16-14-1 et seq. is not an element of a civil cause of action under the Georgia RICO Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-14-1 et seq. State v. Shearson Lehman Bros., 188 Ga. App. 120, 372 S.E.2d 276, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 895 (1988). O.C.G.A. Ch. 14, T. 16 requires the plaintiff to allege an organized crime nexus. Georgia Gulf Corp. v. Ward, 701 F. Supp. 1556, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14352 (N.D. Ga. 1987). Allegations of enterprise and racketeering not necessary. - Plaintiff’s failure to separately allege that defendants were engaged in an “enterprise” as well as a pattern of racketeering did not preclude issuance of a preliminary injunction against the defendants. Cotton, Inc. v. Phil-Dan Trucking, Inc., 270 Ga. 95, 507 S.E.2d 730, 1998 Ga. LEXIS 1042 (1998). Nexus between organized crime and the economy. - Plaintiff’s failure to allege a nexus between organized crime and the economy is of no consequence. Cotton, Inc. v. Phil-Dan Trucking, Inc., 270 Ga. 95, 507 S.E.2d 730, 1998 Ga. LEXIS 1042 (1998). Securing debt. - Because the General Assembly did not intend to proscribe a bank’s attempts to secure payment of a debt through legal means, the trial court did not err in finding that the debtors failed to offer evidence of a pattern of racketeering to support a RICO claim. All Fleet Refinishing, Inc. v. W. Ga. Nat’l Bank, 280 Ga. App. 676, 634 S.E.2d 802, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 845 (2006).
Intent to cause harm. - Evidence sufficient to show a racketeer influenced and corrupt organization violation necessarily also demonstrates the “intent to cause harm” that removes the cap to a punitive damage award. Speir v. Krieger, 235 Ga. App. 392, 509 S.E.2d 684, 1998 Ga. App. LEXIS 1519 (1998). Credit company to which retail installment contract assigned. - Credit company to which automobile dealer assigned retail installment contract was not a member of the “organized criminal elements” at which the Georgia Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act is aimed. Doxie v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 603 F. Supp. 624, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22662 (S.D. Ga. 1984). Repeated sale of non-existent insurance. - While the illegal sale of insurance is not in and of itself a basis for a racketeer influenced and corrupt organization (RICO) action absent further evidence of fraud rising to the level of theft by deception, the repeated sale to unsuspecting consumers of non-existent insurance was the very essence of such fraud and was exactly the type of criminally fraudulent activity masquerading as “business” that RICO was designed to address. Speir v. Krieger, 235 Ga. App. 392, 509 S.E.2d 684, 1998 Ga. App. LEXIS 1519 (1998). Preponderance of evidence required. - In a civil action under the Georgia RICO Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-14-1 et seq., given the similarities in the purpose and language of the federal and Georgia RICO statutes, together with the General
Assembly’s mandate to liberally construe the Act to effectuate its remedial purposes, under O.C.G.A. § 16-14-2(b), the applicable standard of proof in state civil RICO actions was held to be a preponderance of the evidence; thus, the Supreme Court of Georgia overruled Simpson Consulting, Inc. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 227 Ga. App. 648 (490 SE2d
184) (1997), and those other cases holding to the contrary, specifically, Blanton v. Bank of America, 256 Ga. App. 103 (2002), In re Copelan, 250 Ga. App. 856 (2001), and Tronitec, Inc. v. Shealy, 249 Ga. App. 442 (2001). Williams Gen. Corp. v. Stone, 279 Ga. 428, 614 S.E.2d 758, 2005 Ga. LEXIS 445 (2005).