O.C.G.A. homeSearch Georgia
O.C.G.A.Title 16Chapter 2

O.C.G.A. § 16-2-22 (2019)

Criminal responsibility of corporations

Edition and currency
O.C.G.A. 2019 print volume: Georgia laws through the 2019 session at the latest. The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations for this section are from the 2019 print volume of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). Georgia Acts after that are not in this text. The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
Other sources
CURRENTO.C.G.A. 2019 print volume: Georgia laws through the 2019 session at the latest cited 1987–2016 18citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 18 opinions since 1987. The most litigated part is subsection (a)(2) (8 cases).

(a) A corporation may be prosecuted for the act or omission constituting a crime only if:

(1) The crime is defined by a statute which clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose liability on a corporation, and an agent of the corporation performs the conduct which is an element of the crime while acting within the scope of his office or employment and in behalf of the corporation; or

(2) The commission of the crime is authorized, requested, commanded, performed, or recklessly tolerated by the board of directors or by a managerial official who is acting within the scope of his employment in behalf of the corporation.

(b) For the purposes of this Code section, the term:

(1) ‘‘Agent’’ means any director, officer, servant, employee, or other person who is authorized to act in behalf of the corporation.

(2) ‘‘Managerial official’’ means an officer of the corporation or any other agent who has a position of comparable authority for the formulation of corporate policy or the supervision of subordinate employees.

History

Code 1933, § 26-803, enacted by Ga. L. 1968, p. 1249, § 1.

Annotations

Cross references. - Service of notice of filing of indictment, special presentment, or accusation against corporation, § 17-7-92.

Law reviews. - For survey article on

business associations, see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 13 (1982). For annual survey of cases concerning business associations, see 39 Mercer L. Rev. 53 (1987). For article, ‘‘Individual Accountability for Corporate Crime,’’ see 34 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 335 (2018).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Only ‘‘top’’ management is intended to be covered by O.C.G.A. § 16-2-22; not every corporate agent is a ‘‘managerial official’’. Military Circle Pet Ctr. No. 94, Inc. v. State, 181 Ga. App. 657, 353 S.E.2d 555, rev’d on other grounds, 257 Ga. 388, 360 S.E.2d 248 (1987). Deceptive business practices. - Although O.C.G.A. § 16-9-50, defining the crime of deceptive business practices, does not contain in the statutory definition any indication of a legislative purpose to impose liability on a corporation, the state is not required to allege the provisions of O.C.G.A. § 16-2-22 in accusations under § 16-9-50, but only to prove that defendant corporation or managerial agent authorized deceptive practices. State v. Military Circle Pet Ctr. No. 94, Inc., 257 Ga. 388, 360 S.E.2d 248 (1987). While a corporation may not be imprisoned, it may be fined, and the fine enforced by levy on its property. State v.

Shepherd Constr. Co., 248 Ga. 1, 281 S.E.2d 151, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1055, 102 S. Ct. 601, 70 L. Ed. 2d 591, appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 1074, 102 S. Ct. 626, 70 L. Ed. 2d 609 (1981). Court may give suspended sentence to and impose fine upon corporation. - Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-2-22(a), a corporation can be prosecuted for violating the law, and a court may sentence a corporation to serve a term for years (even though such sentence is incapable of enforcement) and may suspend that sentence and impose a fine. State v. Shepherd Constr. Co., 248 Ga. 1, 281 S.E.2d 151, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1055, 102 S. Ct. 601, 70 L. Ed. 2d 591, appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 1074, 102 S. Ct. 626, 70 L. Ed. 2d 609 (1981). Corporation’s liability under RICO for acts of employees. - A corporation could be held liable in a civil action for RICO predicate acts performed by its em-

ployees within the scope of their employment. Cobb County v. Jones Group, 218 Ga. App. 149, 460 S.E.2d 516 (1995). In an action in which an interexchange carrier asserted that it was not obligated to pay fees to a local carrier for misrepresented toll-free cell calls, an amendment to add claims alleging violations of under the Georgia RICO Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-14-1 et seq., was granted as corporate officers had actively presented the plan for payments not allowed under the tariff and there was substantial evidence that the local carrier misrepresented the origination of calls for which it charged. ITC Deltacom Communs. v. US LEC Corp., No. 3:02-CV-116-JTC, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27557 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 15, 2004). On remand from the U.S. Supreme Court, a federal appeals court held that legal workers employed by a Georgia rug manufacturer were entitled to sue their employer for state RICO violations because the corporation was a ‘‘person’’ for purposes of O.C.G.A. § 16-14-4; the court relied on the Supreme Court of Georgia’s decision that O.C.G.A. § 16-2-22, which placed limits on corporate criminal liabil-

ity, did not pertain to civil suits brought under the Georgia civil RICO Act. Williams v. Mohawk Indus., 465 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, mot. denied, 549 U.S. 1260, 127 S. Ct. 1381, 167 L. Ed. 2d 174 (2007). Liability for theft. - Corporation could only be criminally liable for theft in Georgia pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-2-22(a)(2) for crimes by an officer or official who was acting within the scope of the office’s employment on behalf of the corporation as the applicable theft statutes did not contain language that clearly indicated a legislative purpose to impose liability on a corporation. Schroerlucke v. United States, 100 Fed. Cl. 584 (Fed. Cl. 2011). Theft by taking. - Evidence was sufficient to support defendant corporation’s conviction for theft by taking based upon the conduct of its principals while acting on behalf of the corporation. Davis v. State, 225 Ga. App. 564, 484 S.E.2d 284 (1997). Cited in First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. State, 141 Ga. App. 471, 233 S.E.2d 861 (1977); Classic Art Corp. v. State, 245 Ga. 448, 265 S.E.2d 577 (1980).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL When corporations are criminally responsible for violations of Surface Mining Act. - Corporations will be criminally responsible for acts or omissions constituting violations of the Surface Mining Act (see now O.C.G.A. § 12-4-70 et seq.) if, but only if, activities constituting

crime were authorized, requested, commanded, performed, or recklessly tolerated by either the board of directors or by an officer or other agent of comparable authority acting within scope of that person’s authority in behalf of corporation. 1970 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 70-155.

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 16 Am. Jur. 2d, Conspiracy, § 17. 18B Am. Jur. 2d, Corporations, §§ 1620 et seq., 1820 et seq. 40A Am. Jur. 2d, Homicide, § 4. ALR. - Individual criminal responsibility of officer or employee for larceny or embezzlement, through corporate act, of property of third person, 33 A.L.R. 787.

Criminal liability of corporation for extortion, false pretenses, or similar offenses, 49 A.L.R.3d 820. Acquittal of principal, or his conviction of lesser degree of offense, as affecting prosecution of accessory, or aider and abettor, 9 A.L.R.4th 972.

CHAPTER 3 DEFENSES TO CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS Sec.

Article 1 Responsibility Sec.

Minimum age. Mental capacity; insanity. Delusional compulsion. Intoxication. Mistake of fact. Affirmative defenses to certain sexual crimes. Article 2 Justification and Excuse

Justification. Use of force in defense of self or others; evidence of belief that force was necessary in murder or manslaughter prosecution.

The 18 cases that cite O.C.G.A. § 16-2-22 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENState v. Military Circle Pet Ctr. No. 94, Inc., 360 S.E.2d 248 (Ga. 1987).
cites § 16-2-22 18×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 16-2-22
“We granted certiorari in this case to determine whether the state was required to allege the provisions of OCGA § 16-2-22 (a) (2) in the accusations against the corporate defendant, Military Circle Pet Center No.”
Later courts cite it for
“although the state must prove the applicable provisions of 16-2-22(a)(2) at trial against a criminal defendant, it is not necessary that the state allege these provisions in the accusation.” · 2 citing courts
2
GREENWilliams Gen. Corp. v. Stone, 632 S.E.2d 376 (Ga. 2006).
cites § 16-2-22 12×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 16-2-22
“Appellees argue for application of OCGA § 16-2-22 which addresses criminal responsibility for corporations.”
The case’s holding
A corporation is a "person" under the Georgia civil RICO Act and may be held directly liable for conspiring with its officers to commit racketeering violations.
Later courts cite it for
“the definition section of the entire georgia code notes that 'person' includes a corporation,” · 2 citing courts
3
GREENAnthony v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., Inc., 697 S.E.2d 166 (Ga. 2010).
cites § 16-2-22 4×subsections: (a)(2) 2×cited by 62 cases
Where it cites § 16-2-22
“See OCGA § 16-2-22 (a) (2). The appointing superior court clerk may revoke the commission or deny the reappointment of a notary public who violates any provision of the notary statute.”
The case’s holding
The four-year statute of limitations for fraud claims involving economic loss applies, and tolling does not occur if the misrepresentations could have been discovered through a simple reference to the state code.
Later courts cite it for
“the public policy advanced by a penal statute, no matter how strong, cannot support the implication of a private civil cause of action that is not based on the actual provisions of the relevant statute.” · 4 citing courts
4
GREENCobb Cnty. v. Jones Grp. P.L.C., 460 S.E.2d 516 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995).
cites § 16-2-22 8×subsections: (a)(2) 2×cited by 35 cases
Where it cites § 16-2-22
“Our review of the record convinces us that the trial court appropriately addressed these issues.”
The case’s holding
A plaintiff must show a defendant committed predicate offenses at least twice to establish racketeering activity under the RICO Act.
Later courts cite it for
“to establish that a defendant engaged in racketeering activity, a plaintiff must show that the defendant committed predicate offenses (set forth in o.c.g.a. 16-14-3(9)) at least twice.” · 4 citing courts
5
GREENWilliams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 314 F. Supp. 2d 1333 (N.D. Ga. 2004).
cites § 16-2-22 13×subsections: (a)(2) 4× (a)(1) 2×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 16-2-22
“Because RICO predicate acts are actually criminal offenses, O.C.G.A. § 16-2-22, entitled “Criminal responsibility of corporations,” applies when determining whether a corporation is vicariously liable for the actions of its employees.”
6
GREENWilliams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 465 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2006).
cites § 16-2-22 2×cited by 115 cases
Where it cites § 16-2-22
“The Georgia Supreme Court in Williams also expressly rejected the argument, which Mohawk makes here, that O.C.G.A. § 16-2-22, which places limits on corporate criminal liability, should apply to civil suits which stem from criminal law violations.”
The case’s holding
RICO proximate cause requires a sufficiently direct relation between the alleged injury and the injurious conduct.
Later courts cite it for
“implicates two concepts: (1) a sufficiently direct injury so that a plaintiff has standing to sue; and (2) proximate cause,” · 4 citing courts
7
GREENClark v. Sec. Life Ins. Co. of Am., 509 S.E.2d 602 (Ga. 1998).
cites § 16-2-22 4×cited by 29 cases
Where it cites § 16-2-22
“11 OCGA § 16-2-22 (a) (2). A corporation may also face prosecution under OCGA § 16-2-22 (a) (1) for a crime if the statute defining the crime clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose liability on a corporation.”
The case’s holding
Vicarious liability under the RICO Act is established using criminal liability standards rather than tort principles.
Later courts cite it for
“security life recklessly tolerated the forgery by not investigating the charge of forgery and by pressing its rescission claim long after learning that fipps forged the application,” · 2 citing courts
8
REDMilitary Circle Pet Ctr. No. 94, Inc. v. State, 353 S.E.2d 555 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987).
cites § 16-2-22 6×cited by 8 cases
Reversed by State v. Military Circle Pet Center No. 94, Inc. (1987): the Supreme Court of Georgia's own opinion in this case.
Where it cites § 16-2-22
“Appellant Docktor Pet contends that the accusations against it fail to allege the essential elements of a crime because OCGA § 16-2-22 limits criminal liability of corporations to two instances, neither of which was alleged here.”
9
GREENDavis v. State, 484 S.E.2d 284 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997).
cites § 16-2-22 4×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 16-2-22
“OCGA § 16-2-22 (a) (1), (2). With regard to these counts, the evidence demonstrated that appellants Ronald Davis and Danny Davis, owners of Ronald Davis Logging, knew from which tract they were cutting while in the performance of their business and kept a logbook in which they…”
Later courts cite it for
“venue in a conspiracy prosecution is properly laid either in the jurisdiction where the conspiracy was formed or in any jurisdiction wherein a conspirator committed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.” · 1 citing court
10
GREENShirley Williams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 411 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2005).
cites § 16-2-22 4×subsections: (a)(1) (a)(2)cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 16-2-22
“Therefore, in order to determine whether a corporation may be held liable under RICO, Georgia courts look to O.C.G.A. § 16-2-22. See Cobb County, 460 S.”
11
GREENSchroerlucke v. United States, 100 Fed. Cl. 584 (Fed. Cl. 2011).
cites § 16-2-22 3×subsections: (a)(1) (a)(2)cited by 4 cases
Where it cites § 16-2-22
“Ga.Code Ann. § 16-2-22 (West 2011). The applicable Georgia theft statutes do not contain language which “clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose liability on a corporation,” OCGA § 16-2-22(a)(l).”
12
GREENMedia Gen. Operations, Inc. v. St. Lawrence, 787 S.E.2d 778 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016).
cites § 16-2-22 2×cited by 2 cases
Where it cites § 16-2-22
“, OCGA § 16-2-22 (a) (1), (a) (2) (a corporation can be criminally prosecuted; also, distinguishing between actions of an “agent” and a “managerial official” in connection with criminal prosecution of a corporation); OCGA § 50-18-70 (b) (1) (defining “agency” under Open Records…”
Later courts cite it for
“the requested records will absolutely be subject to disclosure when the criminal prosecutions of the three defendants are no longer pending” · 1 citing court
13
GREENPlanned Parenthood Ass'n of the Atlanta Area v. Harris, 670 F. Supp. 971 (N.D. Ga. 1987).
cites § 16-2-22 1×subsections: (a)(2)cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 16-2-22
“§ 16-2-22(a)(2). The Georgia Parental Notification Act does not confine liability to physicians.”
Later courts cite it for
“(1) the verification procedures of the act are unconstitutionally burdensome and fail to provide adequate alternative means of verification; (2) the newly promulgated juvenile court rules requiring the inclusion on certain court documents of the minor's name and social security number fail to guarantee that minor constitutionally adequate anonymity in seeking judicial waiver by not requiring that the juvenile court record be sealed.” · 2 citing courts
14
NO FLAGShirley Williams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 411 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2006).
cites § 16-2-22 2×cited by 2 cases
Where it cites § 16-2-22
“Instead, the Georgia Supreme Court expressly held that “O.”
15
GREENGrace v. Thomason Nissan, 76 F. Supp. 2d 1083 (D. Or. 1999).
cites § 16-2-22 1×cited by 1 case
Where it cites § 16-2-22
“11 § 281(2); Ga. Code Ann. § 16-2-22 (a)(2); Haw.Rev.Stat Ann.”
16
GREENMedia Gen. Operations, Inc. v. Al St. Lawrence, No. A16A0280 (Ga. Ct. App. June 15, 2016).
cites § 16-2-22 2×cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 16-2-22
“, OCGA §§ 16-2-22 (a) (1), (a) (2) (a corporation can be criminally prosecuted; also, distinguishing between actions of an “agent” and a “managerial official” in connection with criminal prosecution of a corporation); OCGA § 50-18-70 (b) (1) (defining “agency” under Open Records…”
17
REDMichael T. Byrne v. Camran Nezhat, 261 F.3d 1075 (11th Cir. 2001).
cites § 16-2-22 1×subsections: (a)(2)cited by 0 cases
Abrogated by Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co. on other grounds: 48 citing opinions limit it to other grounds.
Where it cites § 16-2-22
“O.C.G.A. § 16-2-22(a)(2); Cobb County v. Jones Group, 218 Ga.”
The case’s holding
Shotgun pleadings wreak havoc on the judicial system and consume an inordinate amount of court time (stating).
Later courts cite it for
“adverse rulings alone do not provide a party with a basis for holding that the court's impartiality is in doubt.” · 20 citing courts
18
REDMichael T. Byrne v. Camran Nezhat, 261 F.3d 1075 (11th Cir. 2001).
cites § 16-2-22 1×subsections: (a)(2)cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 16-2-22
“O.C.G.A. § 16-2-22(a)(2); Cobb County v. Jones Group, 460 S.”

The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
198720012016

One bar per year. Tallest: 3 cases in 1987. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
11th Cir.5Ga. Ct. App.5Ga.4N.D. Ga.2D. Or.1Fed. Cl.1
By subsection
(a)(1)3 cases
Williams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 314 F. Supp. 2d 1333 (N.D. Ga. 2004).“Because RICO predicate acts are actually criminal offenses, O.C.G.A. § 16-2-22, entitled “Criminal responsibility of corporations,” applies when determining whether a corporation is vicariously liable for the actions of its employees.”
Shirley Williams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 411 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2005).“Therefore, in order to determine whether a corporation may be held liable under RICO, Georgia courts look to O.C.G.A. § 16-2-22. See Cobb County, 460 S.”
Schroerlucke v. United States, 100 Fed. Cl. 584 (Fed. Cl. 2011).“Ga.Code Ann. § 16-2-22 (West 2011). The applicable Georgia theft statutes do not contain language which “clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose liability on a corporation,” OCGA § 16-2-22(a)(l).”
(a)(2)8 cases
Anthony v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., Inc., 697 S.E.2d 166 (Ga. 2010).“See OCGA § 16-2-22 (a) (2). The appointing superior court clerk may revoke the commission or deny the reappointment of a notary public who violates any provision of the notary statute.”
Williams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 314 F. Supp. 2d 1333 (N.D. Ga. 2004).
Cobb Cnty. v. Jones Grp. P.L.C., 460 S.E.2d 516 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995).“Our review of the record convinces us that the trial court appropriately addressed these issues.”
Planned Parenthood Ass'n of the Atlanta Area v. Harris, 670 F. Supp. 971 (N.D. Ga. 1987).“§ 16-2-22(a)(2). The Georgia Parental Notification Act does not confine liability to physicians.”
Shirley Williams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 411 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2005).
Showing the top 5 of 8. More in the list view →
Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: O.C.G.A. 2019 print volume: Georgia laws through the 2019 session at the latest. Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

O.C.G.A. Home  |  Search Georgia  |  Search cases for this section  |  syfert.com