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2018 Georgia Code 16-2-22 | Car Wreck Lawyer

TITLE 16 CRIMES AND OFFENSES

Section 2. Criminal Liability, 16-2-1 through 16-2-22.

ARTICLE 2 PARTIES TO CRIMES

16-2-22. Criminal responsibility of corporations.

  1. A corporation may be prosecuted for the act or omission constituting a crime only if:
    1. The crime is defined by a statute which clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose liability on a corporation, and an agent of the corporation performs the conduct which is an element of the crime while acting within the scope of his office or employment and in behalf of the corporation; or
    2. The commission of the crime is authorized, requested, commanded, performed, or recklessly tolerated by the board of directors or by a managerial official who is acting within the scope of his employment in behalf of the corporation.
  2. For the purposes of this Code section, the term:
    1. "Agent" means any director, officer, servant, employee, or other person who is authorized to act in behalf of the corporation.
    2. "Managerial official" means an officer of the corporation or any other agent who has a position of comparable authority for the formulation of corporate policy or the supervision of subordinate employees.

(Code 1933, § 26-803, enacted by Ga. L. 1968, p. 1249, § 1.)

Cross references.

- Service of notice of filing of indictment, special presentment, or accusation against corporation, § 17-7-92.

Law reviews.

- For survey article on business associations, see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 13 (1982). For annual survey of cases concerning business associations, see 39 Mercer L. Rev. 53 (1987).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Only "top" management is intended to be covered by O.C.G.A. § 16-2-22; not every corporate agent is a "managerial official". Military Circle Pet Ctr. No. 94, Inc. v. State, 181 Ga. App. 657, 353 S.E.2d 555, rev'd on other grounds, 257 Ga. 388, 360 S.E.2d 248 (1987).

Deceptive business practices.

- Although O.C.G.A. § 16-9-50, defining the crime of deceptive business practices, does not contain in the statutory definition any indication of a legislative purpose to impose liability on a corporation, the state is not required to allege the provisions of O.C.G.A. § 16-2-22 in accusations under § 16-9-50, but only to prove that defendant corporation or managerial agent authorized deceptive practices. State v. Military Circle Pet Ctr. No. 94, Inc., 257 Ga. 388, 360 S.E.2d 248 (1987).

While a corporation may not be imprisoned, it may be fined, and the fine enforced by levy on its property. State v. Shepherd Constr. Co., 248 Ga. 1, 281 S.E.2d 151, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1055, 102 S. Ct. 601, 70 L. Ed. 2d 591, appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 1074, 102 S. Ct. 626, 70 L. Ed. 2d 609 (1981).

Court may give suspended sentence to and impose fine upon corporation.

- Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-2-22(a), a corporation can be prosecuted for violating the law, and a court may sentence a corporation to serve a term for years (even though such sentence is incapable of enforcement) and may suspend that sentence and impose a fine. State v. Shepherd Constr. Co., 248 Ga. 1, 281 S.E.2d 151, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1055, 102 S. Ct. 601, 70 L. Ed. 2d 591, appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 1074, 102 S. Ct. 626, 70 L. Ed. 2d 609 (1981).

Corporation's liability under RICO for acts of employees.

- A corporation could be held liable in a civil action for RICO predicate acts performed by its employees within the scope of their employment. Cobb County v. Jones Group, 218 Ga. App. 149, 460 S.E.2d 516 (1995).

In an action in which an interexchange carrier asserted that it was not obligated to pay fees to a local carrier for misrepresented toll-free cell calls, an amendment to add claims alleging violations of under the Georgia RICO Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-14-1 et seq., was granted as corporate officers had actively presented the plan for payments not allowed under the tariff and there was substantial evidence that the local carrier misrepresented the origination of calls for which it charged. ITC Deltacom Communs. v. US LEC Corp., F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. Mar. 15, 2004).

On remand from the U.S. Supreme Court, a federal appeals court held that legal workers employed by a Georgia rug manufacturer were entitled to sue their employer for state RICO violations because the corporation was a "person" for purposes of O.C.G.A. § 16-14-4; the court relied on the Supreme Court of Georgia's decision that O.C.G.A. § 16-2-22, which placed limits on corporate criminal liability, did not pertain to civil suits brought under the Georgia civil RICO Act. Williams v. Mohawk Indus., 465 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, mot. denied, 549 U.S. 1260, 127 S. Ct. 1381, 167 L. Ed. 2d 174 (2007).

Liability for theft.

- Corporation could only be criminally liable for theft in Georgia pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-2-22(a)(2) for crimes by an officer or official who was acting within the scope of his employment on behalf of the corporation, as the applicable theft statutes did not contain language that clearly indicated a legislative purpose to impose liability on a corporation. Schroerlucke v. United States, 100 Fed. Cl. 584 (Fed. Cl. 2011).

Theft by taking.

- Evidence was sufficient to support defendant corporation's conviction for theft by taking based upon the conduct of its principals while acting on behalf of the corporation. Davis v. State, 225 Ga. App. 564, 484 S.E.2d 284 (1997).

Cited in First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. State, 141 Ga. App. 471, 233 S.E.2d 861 (1977); Classic Art Corp. v. State, 245 Ga. 448, 265 S.E.2d 577 (1980).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

When corporations are criminally responsible for violations of Surface Mining Act.

- Corporations will be criminally responsible for acts or omissions constituting violations of O.C.G.A. Part 3, Art. 2, Ch. 4, T. 12 (Surface Mining Act) if, but only if, activities constituting crime were authorized, requested, commanded, performed, or recklessly tolerated by either the board of directors or by an officer or other agent of comparable authority acting within scope of that person's authority in behalf of corporation. 1970 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 70-155.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 16 Am. Jur. 2d, Conspiracy, § 17. 18B Am. Jur. 2d, Corporations, §§ 1620 et seq., 1820 et seq., 40A Am. Jur. 2d, Homicide, § 4.

ALR.

- Individual criminal responsibility of officer or employee for larceny or embezzlement, through corporate act, of property of third person, 33 A.L.R. 787.

Criminal liability of corporation for extortion, false pretenses, or similar offenses, 49 A.L.R.3d 820.

Acquittal of principal, or his conviction of lesser degree of offense, as affecting prosecution of accessory, or aider and abettor, 9 A.L.R.4th 972.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 16-2-22

Total Results: 5  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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Anthony v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., Inc., 697 S.E.2d 166 (Ga. 2010).

Cited 62 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 28, 2010 | 287 Ga. 448, 2010 Fulton County D. Rep. 2051

...[7] Under the current version of OCGA § 45-17-20(a), a first or second conviction for performing a notarial service in violation of the statute is a misdemeanor and any subsequent conviction is a felony. A corporation may only be prosecuted for a crime under certain circumstances. See OCGA § 16-2-22(a)(2)....
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Clark v. Sec. Life Ins. Co. of Am., 509 S.E.2d 602 (Ga. 1998).

Cited 29 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 26, 1998 | 270 Ga. 165

...590, 593, 37 S.E.2d 774 (1946) ("voluntary" in OCGA § 51-2-2 "will cover any or all motives or purposes of the wrongdoer, acting in the scope of his employment"). [9] OCGA § 51-2-2. [10] Ford v. Mitchell, 50 Ga.App. 617(1), 179 S.E. 215 (1935). [11] OCGA § 16-2-22(a)(2). A corporation may also face prosecution under OCGA § 16-2-22(a)(1) for a crime if the statute defining the crime clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose liability on a corporation....
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Kemp v. Simpson, 603 S.E.2d 267 (Ga. 2004).

Cited 19 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 27, 2004 | 278 Ga. 439, 2004 Fulton County D. Rep. 3140

...When Simpson pled guilty, he admitted these facts, and because these facts constitute the crime of incest, Simpson's plea to that crime is not void. Accordingly, we reverse the habeas court's ruling to the contrary. Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur. NOTES [1] In this regard, OCGA § 16-2-22(a)(6) provides that "[a] person commits the offense of incest when he engages in sexual intercourse with a person to whom he knows he is related either by blood or by marriage as follows: ......
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State v. Military Circle Pet Ctr. No. 94, Inc., 360 S.E.2d 248 (Ga. 1987).

Cited 14 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 10, 1987 | 257 Ga. 388

...Clayton, Barbara M. Lassiter, Assistant Solicitors, for appellant. Webb & Daniel, Phillip S. Coe, Laurie Webb Daniel, for appellee. HUNT, Justice. We granted certiorari in this case to determine whether the state was required to allege the provisions of OCGA § 16-2-22 (a) (2) in the accusations against the corporate defendant, Military Circle Pet Center No....
...iness practices under OCGA § 16-9-50. Military Circle Pet Center v. State, 181 Ga. App. 657 (353 SE2d 555) (1987). The Court of Appeals held that the accusations were insufficient because of the state's failure to allege the provisions *389 of OCGA § 16-2-22 (a) (2) and reversed the trial court's order denying Docktor Pet's motion to quash those accusations....
...sick animals, identified in the accusations, while representing those animals as being healthy, Docktor Pet argued and the Court of Appeals held that the accusations against Docktor Pet failed to allege the essential elements of a crime because OCGA § 16-2-22 (a) limits criminal liability of corporations to two instances, neither of which was alleged in the accusations. OCGA § 16-2-22 provides, in pertinent part: "(a) A corporation may be prosecuted for the act or omission constituting a crime only if: (1) The crime is defined by a statute which clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose liability on a corporatio...
...ices, does not contain in its definition any indication of a legislative purpose to impose liability on a corporation. It is also undisputed that the accusations against Docktor Pet under this code section do not allege any of the provisions of OCGA § 16-2-22 (2). We agree with the state that it was not required to allege the provisions of OCGA § 16-2-22 in the accusations in question. OCGA § 16-2-22 falls within Article 2, the parties to a crime subsection, of Chapter 2, entitled "Criminal Liability," of the Official Code of Georgia. Article 2 consists of three sections, OCGA §§ 16-2-20, 16-2-21, and 16-2-22, each of which outlines the ways in which a person or entity may become criminally liable as a party to a crime, e.g., by directly committing the crime, or by aiding or abetting in the commission of a crime (OCGA §§ 16-2-20; 16-2-21), or, in the case of a corporation, by certain acts of its agents where legislative intent clearly imposes criminal liability (OCGA § 16-2-22 (1)) or by certain acts of its directors or managerial officials (OCGA § 16-2-22 (2))....
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Williams Gen. Corp. v. Stone, 632 S.E.2d 376 (Ga. 2006).

Cited 12 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 12, 2006 | 280 Ga. 631, 2006 Fulton County D. Rep. 1837

...ure, as "the purpose of the RICO Act is to provide compensation to private persons injured or aggrieved by reason of any RICO violation." Williams General Corp. v. Stone, supra, 279 Ga. at 429, 614 S.E.2d 758. Appellees argue for application of OCGA § 16-2-22 which addresses criminal responsibility for corporations. Specifically, OCGA § 16-2-22(a)(1) allows for the prosecution of corporate defendants only if "[t]he crime is defined by a statute which clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose liability on a corporation. . . ." Appellees contend that the Georgia RICO Act fails this test. However, to construe the statute in the manner proposed by appellees would mandate that OCGA § 16-2-22 and other criminal statutes that limit imposition of corporate criminal liability would now be applied to civil suits which stem from criminal law violations. We have not previously applied OCGA § 16-2-22 or any other criminal statutes to civil suits brought by individuals, [1] and we decline to do so here. Because OCGA § 16-2-22 does not pertain to civil suits brought under the Georgia civil RICO Act, we need not go so far as to answer the question of whether the Act would meet the requirements of OCGA § 16-2-22(a)....
...Furthermore, in reaching its conclusion, the Court of Appeals relied heavily on language contained in footnote (11) of Clark v. Security Life Insurance Co., 270 Ga. 165(2), (n.11), 509 S.E.2d 602 (1998) that: A corporation may also face prosecution under OCGA § 16-2-22(a)(1) ....