Constitutionality.

- Exclusion of murder from those crimes to which coercion is defense is constitutional, i.e., does not deny a defendant the right to equal protection of the law. Luther v. State, 255 Ga. 706, 342 S.E.2d 316 (1986).

"Duress" as employed in civil law is not synonymous with "coercion," as employed in criminal law. McCoy v. State, 78 Ga. 490, 3 S.E. 768 (1887); Montford v. State, 144 Ga. 582, 87 S.E. 797 (1916).

Defendant relying on defense of coercion admits elements of offense but affirmatively pleads legal justification. Cowart v. State, 136 Ga. App. 528, 221 S.E.2d 649 (1975), overruled on other grounds, 137 Ga. App. 735, 224 S.E.2d 856, aff'd, 237 Ga. 282, 227 S.E.2d 248 (1976).

In the defendant's trial for DUI, O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391, in which the defendant asserted the affirmative defense of justification by duress or necessity on the ground that the couple had "kept bringing him drink after drink," the trial court did not err in holding that the defendant would have to admit to the elements of less-safe DUI in order to receive a charge on justification. Danley v. State, 342 Ga. App. 61, 802 S.E.2d 851 (2017).

Coercion not a defense to murder.

- Defense of coercion may not be raised by party to or actual perpetrator of murder. Thomas v. State, 246 Ga. 484, 272 S.E.2d 68 (1980).

One cannot successfully defend murder charge on ground that one was coerced. Milton v. State, 248 Ga. 192, 282 S.E.2d 90 (1981).

In an action in which the defendant alleged that the defendant was wrongfully threatened by a drug dealer that if the defendant did not fatally shoot a victim, then the dealer would harm the defendant and the defendant's family members, and accordingly, the defendant shot the victim and then hid the victim's body in a shallow grave until such time as the defendant confessed to the crime 10 years later, the trial court properly refused to instruct the jury on justification pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-3-20(6), as the defendant's criminal acts were directed toward a non-aggressor victim and there was no evidence that the defendant or any family members were threatened with "imminent death or great bodily injury;" furthermore, a coercion defense under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-26 would not be applicable to a charge of murder. Gravitt v. State, 279 Ga. 33, 608 S.E.2d 202 (2005).

Defendant's counsel was not ineffective in adopting a coercion defense, although coercion was no defense to murder pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-3-26, because counsel was constrained by the defendant's statements to police that another forced the defendant to beat the victim at gunpoint. Moreover, the evidence of guilt was overwhelming, and the defendant offered no alternate theory of defense. Lambert v. State, 287 Ga. 774, 700 S.E.2d 354 (2010).

Trial court did not err in not charging the jury on the omnibus justification defense based on any claim that the defendant was under an immediate threat because that defense, like coercion, was not a defense to the victim's murder. Allen v. State, 296 Ga. 785, 770 S.E.2d 824 (2015).

Defense of coercion predicated on reasonable person standard.

- Trial court did not err in determining that the proffered evidence from a psychiatrist that the defendant was susceptible to being led into crime by another person to a greater extent than most people was irrelevant because the defense of coercion was predicated on the reasonable person standard, not the subjective situation of the defendant. Allen v. State, 296 Ga. 785, 770 S.E.2d 824 (2015).

Coercion defense was not available to defendant who never admitted participation.

- In a joint trial wherein a defendant and two codefendants were convicted of armed robbery, the trial court did not err by failing to instruct the jury on one defendant's sole defense of coercion and duress because the defendant never filed a written request for a charge on coercion or duress and a review of the defendant's trial testimony showed that the defendant never admitted participating in the armed robbery, thus, the defense was not available to the defendant. Mathis v. State, Ga. App. , S.E.2d (May 20, 2009).

Defendant not entitled to jury charge on coercion.

- Defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction on coercion and could not show that counsel's failure to request such a charge constituted ineffective assistance because the defendant denied any knowledge of or participation in the armed robbery and denied knowing the person who pointed a gun at the defendant and told the defendant to drive. Tran v. State, 340 Ga. App. 546, 798 S.E.2d 71 (2017).

Defendant who admitted being party to armed robbery entitled to instruction on defense of coercion.

- Defendant who admitted the elements of armed robbery as a party to the crime, O.C.G.A. § 16-2-21, and who testified that the defendant committed such acts because a codefendant pointed a gun at the defendant and threatened to shoot the defendant or defendant's family was entitled to a jury charge on coercion under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-26, and the trial court erred in failing to so instruct the jury even in the absence of a request by the defendant. Mathis v. State, 299 Ga. App. 831, 684 S.E.2d 6 (2009).

Requested instruction on justification constituted invited error.

- Because the trial court gave the second defendant's specifically requested charge on justification that covered the particular defense that the second defendant was justified in possessing a rifle as the second defendant reasonably believed that taking the rifle from the first defendant was the only way to prevent the second defendant's own imminent death or bodily injury, any alleged error by the trial court from the court's failure to include language on that defense beyond the language provided by the second defendant was invited error, which did not warrant reversal. Ballard v. State, 297 Ga. 248, 773 S.E.2d 254 (2015).

In a prosecution for felony murder the trial court did not commit reversible error by instructing the jury that coercion is not a defense to murder where defendant produced no evidence that defendant was coerced into committing the underlying felonies to the felony murder conviction. Kelly v. State, 266 Ga. 709, 469 S.E.2d 653 (1996).

Codefendant's trial should have been severed.

- Trial court erred in denying a codefendant's motion to sever the trial from the defendant's trial because the codefendant was not allowed to introduce the exculpatory portions of the statements that explained the excerpted admissions introduced by the state, which supported the codefendant's antagonistic defense that the codefendant was present at the robberies due to coercion by the defendant. To avoid potential Bruton issues, the state introduced only those portions of the codefendant's9-1-1 calls or custodial statements made establishing that the codefendant was at the scene of two robberies, that the codefendant's vehicles were used, and that the codefendant sent police to a motel room to investigate the robberies, but refused the additional portions of the statements that tended to support the codefendant's defense that the codefendant was coerced into participating in the crimes. Bowe v. State, 288 Ga. App. 376, 654 S.E.2d 196 (2007), cert. dismissed, sub. nom., State v. Baker, No. S08C0548, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 318 (Ga. 2008).

Person coerced by another to commit a crime is not an accomplice. Beal v. State, 72 Ga. 200 (1883); Henderson v. State, 5 Ga. App. 495, 63 S.E. 535 (1909).

One charged as accomplice to murder may assert defense of coercion.

- Witness may be found not to be an accomplice due to coercion so as to eliminate requirement of corroboration in murder trial even though such person, if charged with murder, could not successfully use coercion as a defense to the charges. Milton v. State, 248 Ga. 192, 282 S.E.2d 90 (1981).

Fear must be of present and immediate violence. Hill v. State, 135 Ga. App. 766, 219 S.E.2d 18 (1975).

Danger must not be one of future violence, but of present and immediate violence at time of commission of forbidden act. Williams v. State, 69 Ga. 11 (1882); Burns v. State, 89 Ga. 527, 15 S.E. 748 (1892); Chambers v. State, 154 Ga. App. 620, 269 S.E.2d 42 (1980); Stitt v. State, 190 Ga. App. 58, 378 S.E.2d 168 (1989).

Where none of the defendant's evidence related to present and immediate violence towards defendant at the time defendant procured cocaine for informants so as to justify defendant's criminal conduct, and there was no showing of a reasonable fear of immediate violence, the trial court did not err in refusing to give a requested charge under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-26. Holder v. State, 194 Ga. App. 790, 391 S.E.2d 808 (1990).

Fear of injury must be reasonable. Hill v. State, 135 Ga. App. 766, 219 S.E.2d 18 (1975).

In order for fear produced by threats or menaces to be a valid legal excuse for doing anything which would otherwise be criminal, the act must have been done under such threats or menaces as show that life or member was in danger, or that there was reasonable cause to believe that there was such danger. Chambers v. State, 154 Ga. App. 620, 269 S.E.2d 42 (1980).

Coercion defense requires that the fear of injury must be reasonable and the danger must not be one of future violence but of present and immediate violence at the time of the commission of the forbidden act. Gordon v. State, 234 Ga. App. 551, 507 S.E.2d 269 (1998).

Action necessitated by direct danger to life or of great bodily injury.

- Coercion involves involuntary performance of criminal act under fear of threats or menaces involving a direct danger to life or great bodily injury where danger is abated only by performance of criminal act. Chambers v. State, 154 Ga. App. 620, 269 S.E.2d 42 (1980); Stewart v. State, 177 Ga. App. 681, 340 S.E.2d 283 (1986).

Coercion involves the involuntary performance of a criminal act under fear of threats or menaces involving a direct danger to life or great bodily injury where the danger is abated only by the performance of the criminal act. The danger must not be one of future violence but of present and immediate violence at the time of the commission of the forbidden act. Slater v. State, 185 Ga. App. 889, 366 S.E.2d 240 (1988).

Exclusion of expert evidence regarding battered person's syndrome.

- There was no error in the refusal to admit expert testimony regarding the battered person syndrome to support the defendant's justification defense of coercion at the defendant's trial for various assault crimes committed against the defendant's nine-year-old daughter. Pickle v. State, 280 Ga. App. 821, 635 S.E.2d 197 (2006), cert. denied, No. S06C2150, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 110, 111 (Ga. 2007).

Coercion is no defense if the person has any reasonable way, other than committing the crime, to escape the threat of harm. Barnes v. State, 178 Ga. App. 205, 342 S.E.2d 388 (1986); Stitt v. State, 190 Ga. App. 58, 378 S.E.2d 168 (1989); Brinson v. State, 244 Ga. App. 40, 537 S.E.2d 370 (2000).

When defendant testified that the codefendant conceived of the robbery without defendant's knowledge or participation and that only the codefendant was armed, defendant did acknowledge pretending to have a gun, and giving orders to the store occupants, defendant gave no indication that acts were out of fear that codefendant would harm defendant if defendant refused to cooperate thus, defendant's own testimony was sufficient to authorize a conviction for armed robbery and aggravated assault, and insufficient to support a defense of coercion. House v. State, 203 Ga. App. 55, 416 S.E.2d 108, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 906, 416 S.E.2d 108 (1992).

In a bench trial for armed robbery and aggravated assault, the evidence authorized the trial court to conclude that the state had sufficiently disproved the defendant's defense that the defendant had been coerced by one of the defendant's companions into committing the crimes; the defendant had not mentioned coercion in either of the defendant's two statements to police, one in which the defendant had admitted to committing the crimes, and it was not until trial that the defendant claimed coercion. Edwards v. State, 285 Ga. App. 227, 645 S.E.2d 699 (2007).

Appellate court chose not to disturb the jury's determination that the defendant was not coerced into driving while intoxicated because the defendant admitted that the defendant was not coerced into driving a truck away from a restaurant; the defendant testified that an employee of the restaurant asked the defendant to leave; the defendant drove away to avoid a fight; the defendant had three or four beers before driving the truck; the defendant had a cell phone in the defendant's possession but the defendant did not attempt to call9-1-1, nor did the defendant ask the restaurant's employees to call a cab for the defendant; and the person who was trying to fight the defendant was in the parking lot but was not armed. Hines v. State, 308 Ga. App. 299, 707 S.E.2d 534 (2011).

Trial court did not err by refusing to charge the jury on the defense of coercion under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-26 because the threat of violence to the defendant from a co-defendant did not occur during the crimes but while they were driving to the scene of the robbery. Additionally, the co-defendant walked off for a period of time prior to the crimes and the defendant could have left the scene but did not. Calmes v. State, 312 Ga. App. 769, 719 S.E.2d 516 (2011), cert. denied, No. S12C0538, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 324 (Ga. 2012).

Failure to raise coercion defense not ineffective assistance of counsel.

- Defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel based on counsel's failure to present a coercion defense to armed robbery, aggravated assault, and kidnapping charges as the decision about what defense to present was a matter of strategy; there was no evidence that the codefendant threatened defendant during the offenses or forced the defendant to drive the getaway car and the defendant did not testify about any coercion by the codefendant until the police chase. Maxey v. State, 272 Ga. App. 800, 613 S.E.2d 236 (2005).

Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to put forward the affirmative defense of coercion as the defendant told police that the defendant had not participated in the crime and counsel made an informed decision not to pursue a defense that did not comport with the defendant's own version of events. Lopez v. State, 332 Ga. App. 763, 774 S.E.2d 802 (2015).

Charge properly refused when coercion subsequent to offense.

- Trial court properly refused to give a requested charge in regard to coercion when the events in question purportedly occurred subsequent to the events determinative of the defendant's guilt or innocence of the crime with which defendant is charged. McDaniel v. State, 169 Ga. App. 254, 312 S.E.2d 363 (1983).

Issues of present O.C.G.A. § 16-3-26 are questions for jury. Hill v. State, 135 Ga. App. 766, 219 S.E.2d 18 (1975).

It is for jury to determine whether there was coercion. Syck v. State, 130 Ga. App. 50, 202 S.E.2d 464 (1973).

Defendant's claim of duress and coercion, under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-26, did not require reversal of the defendant's convictions because the jury, being properly charged on this defense, was authorized to reject the defense. Bush v. State, 317 Ga. App. 439, 731 S.E.2d 121 (2012).

When specific instruction unnecessary.

- Court did not err in failing to specifically charge the jury on the law of justification and coercion when the charge and the evidence as a whole adequately and fairly presented the defendant's theories of the case, that is, that defendant was only incidentally involved in the commission of the crimes (armed robbery and kidnapping), and defendant's testimony was not that defendant was coerced into commission of the crime, but that the codefendant on the codefendant's own initiative had robbed the victim and forced the victim into the automobile, that the defendant was at all times attempting to talk the codefendant out of committing the crime, and that the defendant had nothing to do with either the robbery or the kidnapping. Mallory v. State, 166 Ga. App. 812, 305 S.E.2d 656 (1983).

Unless the danger of present and immediate violence coincides with the commission of the forbidden act, a trial court may refuse to give a charge on coercion. Gordon v. State, 234 Ga. App. 551, 507 S.E.2d 269 (1998).

An instruction on coercion was properly denied with regard to charges of kidnapping and murder where the defendant admitted only to simple battery. Hanifa v. State, 269 Ga. 797, 505 S.E.2d 731 (1998).

Defendant was not entitled to a charge on coercion as the defendant did not admit to participating in the crimes. Olarte v. State, 273 Ga. App. 96, 614 S.E.2d 213 (2005).

Absent evidence presented by the defendant showing an immediate or future threat of violence at the time of the commission of the crime, the defendant was properly denied a jury charge on coercion. Thomas v. State, 285 Ga. App. 290, 645 S.E.2d 713 (2007), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 610 (Ga. 2007).

Trial court was not required to give a sua sponte charge on coercion since it was not supported in the case because the defendant did not testify at trial or at the hearing, and there was no other admissible evidence showing that an accomplice threatened the defendant with violence or that the defendant feared the accomplice; a codefendant testified that the accomplice never pointed a gun at the codefendant or the defendant, the victim testified that the accomplice's gun was constantly pointed at the victim, and police officers testified that, although the defendant told the officers that the defendant was the driver who pushed the victim out of the car, the defendant never stated to the police that the defendant acted under gunpoint. Clausell v. State, 302 Ga. App. 472, 691 S.E.2d 312 (2010).

Trial court did not err in finding that trial counsel rendered effective assistance of counsel because trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to request a charge on coercion; there was no evidence of a threat of immediate violence at the time of the commission of the forbidden act, and the defendant failed to take advantage of the many opportunities the defendant had to walk away from the criminal enterprise. Clausell v. State, 302 Ga. App. 472, 691 S.E.2d 312 (2010).

Coercion defense a matter of trial strategy.

- Trial court did not err in concluding that the defendant failed to carry the defendant's burden of showing ineffective assistance; trial counsel's decision to pursue the coercion defense, O.C.G.A. § 16-3-26, for armed robbery rather than a mistaken identity defense, was clearly a strategic decision based upon the evidence. Lewis v. State, 270 Ga. App. 48, 606 S.E.2d 77 (2004).

Coercion is a jury issue.

- Defendant argued that given the conflicts in the evidence, the jury was not authorized to reject the defendant's coercion defense, however, the resolution of conflicts in the evidence is a matter for the jury and whether or not a defendant is coerced into acting is a question for the trier of fact; under the circumstances of this case including the defendant's youth, the jury certainly was authorized to conclude that the defendant was not coerced into robbing the victim. Treadwell v. State, 272 Ga. App. 508, 613 S.E.2d 3 (2005).

Evidence that the defendant and others approached two separate victims while the defendant brandished a shotgun, that the defendant threatened the victims with the gun, and that the defendant and the compatriots stole both of the victims' cars, sufficed to sustain the defendant's convictions of two counts of hijacking a motor vehicle, two counts of armed robbery, two counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony; the jury was free to disbelieve the defendant's testimony that the defendant was coerced into threatening the victims at gunpoint and participating in the car thefts, and was authorized to find the defendant guilty based on the evidence presented at trial. Martinez v. State, 278 Ga. App. 500, 629 S.E.2d 485 (2006).

Cited in Ivie v. State, 131 Ga. App. 201, 205 S.E.2d 529 (1974); Dobbs v. State, 132 Ga. App. 614, 208 S.E.2d 624 (1974); Orkin v. State, 236 Ga. 176, 223 S.E.2d 61 (1976); Mason v. Balcom, 531 F.2d 717 (5th Cir. 1976); Wilson v. State, 151 Ga. App. 501, 260 S.E.2d 527 (1979); Herring v. State, 152 Ga. App. 150, 262 S.E.2d 529 (1979); Jones v. State, 154 Ga. App. 806, 270 S.E.2d 201 (1980); Kennedy v. State, 156 Ga. App. 792, 275 S.E.2d 339 (1980); Coile v. State, 161 Ga. App. 51, 288 S.E.2d 859 (1982); Young v. State, 163 Ga. App. 507, 295 S.E.2d 175 (1982); Rivers v. State, 250 Ga. 288, 298 S.E.2d 10 (1982); Minton v. State, 167 Ga. App. 114, 305 S.E.2d 812 (1983); Head v. State, 191 Ga. App. 262, 381 S.E.2d 519 (1989); Rogers v. State, 191 Ga. App. 353, 381 S.E.2d 545 (1989); Aleman v. State, 227 Ga. App. 607, 489 S.E.2d 867 (1997); Norris v. State, 227 Ga. App. 616, 489 S.E.2d 875 (1997); Walsh v. State, 269 Ga. 427, 499 S.E.2d 332 (1998); Bailey v. State, 245 Ga. App. 852, 539 S.E.2d 191 (2000).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 21 Am. Jur. 2d, Criminal Law, § 142 et seq.

ALR.

- Effect of coverture upon the criminal responsibility of a woman, 4 A.L.R. 266; 71 A.L.R. 1116.

Coercion, compulsion, or duress as defense to criminal prosecution, 40 A.L.R.2d 908.

Coercion, compulsion, or duress as defense to charge of robbery, larceny, or related crime, 1 A.L.R.4th 481.

Coercion, compulsion, or duress as defense to charge of kidnapping, 69 A.L.R.4th 1005.

Defense of necessity, duress, or coercion in prosecution for violation of state narcotics laws, 1 A.L.R.5th 938.

Ineffective assistance of counsel: compulsion, duress, necessity, or "hostage syndrome" defense, 8 A.L.R.5th 713.

Duress, necessity, or conditions of confinement as justification for escape from prison, 54 A.L.R.5th 141.