CopyCited 44 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 2, 2014 | 759 S.E.2d 509, 2014 Fulton County D. Rep. 1425
...armed robbery and hijacking a motor
vehicle, and felony murder predicated on those offenses – require the use of a
firearm. See, e.g., OCGA §
16-5-21 (a) (2) (aggravated assault with a deadly
weapon); OCGA §
16-8-41 (a) (armed robbery); OCGA §
16-5-44.1 (b)
(hijacking a motor vehicle)....
CopyCited 38 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 23, 2009 | 286 Ga. 245, 2009 Fulton County D. Rep. 3663
...battery-powered mini-cars to mopeds, automobiles, trucks, trains, ships, and space shuttles. If an expansive phrase such as "a vehicle with a motor" were used in OCGA §
16-8-12(a)(5)(A), as occurs in a few other places in the Code, see, e.g., OCGA §
16-5-44.1(a)(2) ("`[m]otor vehicle' means any vehicle which is self-propelled"), this would be an easy case....
...ape in a stolen vehicle might otherwise reinforce the ordinary meaning of "motor vehicle," the General Assembly again found it necessary to expressly define the term to be broader and to convey the intent to cover all vehicles with a motor. See OCGA §
16-5-44.1(a)(2) ("As used in this Code section: ......
...This case involves the crime of theft. In the context of theft within Title 16 of the Georgia Code, the legislature has specifically *784 defined the term "motor vehicle" broadly enough to encompass a riding lawnmower. See OCGA §§
16-8-82(2) and
16-5-44.1(a)(2)....
...Henry County,
277 Ga. 743, 746(2),
594 S.E.2d 324 (2004) ("The judiciary has the duty to reject a construction of a statute which will result in unreasonable consequences or absurd results not contemplated by the legislature.") (citation omitted). *785 OCGA §
16-5-44.1 provides even more evidence that the majority's interpretation of the term "motor vehicle" runs directly contrary to the intent of the legislature. Indeed, when a person, "while in possession of a firearm or weapon obtains a motor vehicle from the person or presence of another by force and violence[,]" that person commits the offense of hijacking a "motor vehicle." OCGA §
16-5-44.1(b). "Motor vehicle" is broadly defined here as "any vehicle which is self-propelled." OCGA §
16-5-44.1(a)(2)....
CopyCited 29 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jul 12, 2010 | 287 Ga. 554, 2010 Fulton County D. Rep. 2323
...The offense of hijacking a motor vehicle is committed when a "person while in possession of a firearm or weapon obtains a motor vehicle from the person or presence of another by force and violence or intimidation or attempts or conspires to do so." OCGA §
16-5-44.1(b)....
...Heard further argues that the evidence is not sufficient to show that he possessed a firearm or weapon. "[T]he weapon requirement of the hijacking statute is similar to that of the armed robbery statute." Haugland v. State,
253 Ga.App. 423, 427(2),
560 S.E.2d 50 (2002). See also OCGA §§
16-5-44.1(a)(3),
16-8-41(a)....
CopyCited 28 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 11, 2000 | 272 Ga. 740, 2000 Fulton County D. Rep. 3587
...The relevant offenses are as follows: "A person commits the offense of hijacking a motor vehicle when such person while in possession of a firearm or weapon obtains a motor vehicle from the person or presence of another by force and violence or intimidation." OCGA §
16-5-44.1(b)....
CopyCited 21 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 25, 2008 | 284 Ga. 675, 2008 Fulton County D. Rep. 3868
...s. A mandatory life sentence is the minimum sentence that may be imposed for the crimes of murder (OCGA §
16-5-1(d)) and feticide (OCGA §
16-5-80(c)). Life imprisonment is the only punishment available for the crimes of hijacking an aircraft (OCGA §
16-5-44(c)) and kidnapping for ransom or kidnapping with bodily injury not resulting in death. OCGA §
16-5-40(b)(3, 4). A sentence of life imprisonment is mandated for lesser crimes when the defendant is sentenced as a recidivist after having committed a serious violent felony (see fn. 7, supra) or hijacking a motor vehicle (OCGA §
16-5-44.1), for being convicted for the second time of possessing or using certain firearms during the attempt to commit or the commission of certain crimes, or for wearing a bullet-proof vest during the attempt to commit or the commission of certain crimes....
CopyCited 17 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jul 1, 2020 | 309 Ga. 337
...turn our analysis to the crime of hijacking a motor vehicle, the other
crime of which Middleton was found guilty in this case. The version
of Georgia’s motor vehicle hijacking statute in effect at the time of
Middleton’s crimes, former OCGA §
16-5-44.1 (b), stated:
A person commits the offense of hijacking a motor
vehicle when such person while in possession of a firearm
or weapon obtains a motor vehicle from the person or
presence of another by force and vio...
CopyCited 12 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 4, 2019 | 305 Ga. 57
...See Malcolm v. State ,
263 Ga. 369, 371-372,
434 S.E.2d 479 (1993). The trial court then properly merged the aggravated assault verdict into the malice murder conviction, but erroneously merged the hijacking verdict into the armed robbery conviction. See OCGA §
16-5-44.1 (d) ("The offense of hijacking a motor vehicle in the first degree shall be considered a separate offense and shall not merge with any other offense.")....
CopyCited 11 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 2, 2001 | 273 Ga. 508
...Baker, Atty. Gen., for appellee. HINES, Justice. Antonio Lamont Mathis was convicted of armed robbery, hijacking a motor vehicle, and kidnapping. In a pretrial motion and in his amended motion for new trial, Mathis challenged the constitutionality of OCGA §
16-5-44.1(d), which provides that the offense of hijacking a motor vehicle is to be "considered a separate offense" not to "merge with any other offense" and that punishment for the offense is not to be "deferred, suspended, or probated." The trial court denied the challenge and Mathis's motion for new trial as amended. Mathis appeals the denial of his motion to declare OCGA §
16-5-44.1(d) unconstitutional and also alleges other errors by the lower court requiring a new trial....
...to "try and con her out of the car." He claimed that he offered to buy the Tahoe, then asked to use it for the day, and that he tricked Johnson into giving him the keys by telling her that he was going to check the gas. 1. Mathis contends that OCGA §
16-5-44.1(d) violates the prohibition against double jeopardy found in Art....
...and for hijacking a motor vehicle based on the same conduct. The Court of Appeals rejected the arguments and found no error in the punishment imposed based on its determination that the statutory bars against double jeopardy were superseded by OCGA §
16-5-44.1(d)....
...It does not prohibit additional punishment for a separate offense which the General Assembly has deemed to warrant separate sanction. Miller v. State,
250 Ga. 436,
298 S.E.2d 509 (1983); Wilson v. Zant, supra at 380(2),
290 S.E.2d 442. [4] And hijacking a motor vehicle in violation of OCGA §
16-5-44.1(b) is such an offense. OCGA §
16-5-44.1(d) expresses the clear legislative intent to impose double punishment for conduct which violates both OCGA §
16-5-44.1(b) and other criminal statutes....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 10, 2025
...“A person
commits the offense of hijacking a motor vehicle in the first degree
when such person while in possession of a firearm or weapon obtains
a motor vehicle from an individual or the presence of another
individual by force and violence or intimidation or attempts or
conspires to do so.” OCGA §
16-5-44.1 (b) (1) (emphasis supplied).
“[T]o withstand a general demurrer, an indictment must: (1) recite
the language of the statute that sets out all the elements of the
offense charged, or (2) allege the facts necessary to establish
violation of a criminal statute.” Jackson v. State,
301 Ga. 137, 141
(1) (800 SE2d 356) (2017). Here, Appellant argues that Count 10 was
subject to a general demurrer because the indictment allegedly
omitted an element of OCGA §
16-5-44.1 (b) (1), that Appellant
obtained Turner’s vehicle by “force and violence[.]” OCGA § 16-5-
44.1 (b) (1) (emphasis supplied)....
...26
indictment is insufficient because it does not allege the latter.
Appellant, however, ignores the statute’s plain language which
necessitates that the offense be committed by “force and violence or
intimidation.” OCGA §
16-5-44.1 (b) (1) (emphasis supplied)....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Aug 19, 2019
...to
the jury’s assessment of the weight and credibility of the evidence,
we find the evidence sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to
5 See OCGA §
16-5-1.
6 See OCGA §
16-8-41.
7 See OCGA §
16-7-60.
8 See OCGA §
16-5-44.1 (b).
9 See OCGA §
16-5-70 (b).
8
find Davis guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which
he was convicted....
...State,
275 Ga.
64, 66 (1) (561 SE2d 397) (2002) (“It is the jury’s role to resolve
conflicts in the evidence and determine the credibility of witnesses.”
(citation and punctuation omitted)).
In particular, as it pertains to the hijacking charge, OCGA §
16-5-44.1 (b) (1) provides:
A person commits the offense of hijacking a motor vehicle in
the first degree when such person while in possession of a
firearm or weapon obtains a motor vehicle from an individual
or the presence...
Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 4, 2019 | 321 Ga. 422
...See Malcolm v.
State,
263 Ga. 369, 371-372 (434 SE2d 479) (1993). The trial court then properly merged
the aggravated assault verdict into the malice murder conviction, but erroneously merged
the hijacking verdict into the armed robbery conviction. See OCGA §
16-5-44.1 (d) (“The
offense of hijacking a motor vehicle in the first degree shall be considered a separate
offense and shall not merge with any other offense.”)....
