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2018 Georgia Code 16-6-23 | Car Wreck Lawyer

TITLE 16 CRIMES AND OFFENSES

Section 6. Sexual Offenses, 16-6-1 through 16-6-25.

ARTICLE 9 NOTICE OF CONVICTION AND RELEASE FROM CONFINEMENT OF SEX OFFENDERS

16-6-23. Publication of name or identity of female raped or assaulted with intent to commit rape.

  1. It shall be unlawful for any news media or any other person to print and publish, broadcast, televise, or disseminate through any other medium of public dissemination or cause to be printed and published, broadcast, televised, or disseminated in any newspaper, magazine, periodical, or other publication published in this state or through any radio or television broadcast originating in the state the name or identity of any female who may have been raped or upon whom an assault with intent to commit the offense of rape may have been made.
  2. This Code section does not apply to truthful information disclosed in public court documents open to public inspection.
  3. Any person or corporation violating this Code section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.

(Ga. L. 1911, p. 179, §§ 1, 2; Code 1933, § 26-2105; Code 1933, § 26-9901, enacted by Ga. L. 1968, p. 1249, § 1.)

Cross references.

- Constitutional guarantee of free speech and press, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. V.

Law reviews.

- For article, "The Supreme Court on Privacy and the Press," see 12 Ga. L. Rev. 215 (1978). For comment on Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 95 S. Ct. 1029, 43 L. Ed. 2d 328 (1975), holding a state may not impose sanctions on accurate publication of name of rape victim obtained from official court records, see 24 Emory L.J. 1205 (1975); see 9 Ga. L. Rev. 963 (1975).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Limited application.

- O.C.G.A. § 16-6-23 protects only the name and identity of a victim of rape or sexual assault with intent to rape and it does so only up to the point where the name or identity appears in an open court record. Doe v. Board of Regents, 215 Ga. App. 684, 452 S.E.2d 776 (1994).

Publication of an article containing a rape victim's name, age, and street address, and stating, not that she was raped, but that she was "assaulted and robbed," was not a violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-6-23. State v. Brannan, 267 Ga. 315, 477 S.E.2d 575 (1996).

Right to privacy outweighed by legitimate public interest.

- Victim of a sexual assault could not recover damages from a newspaper for invasion of privacy since, when the victim shot and killed the perpetrator of the assault, the victim became the object of legitimate public interest and the newspaper had the right under the United States and Georgia Constitutions to accurately report facts regarding the incident, including the victim's name. Macon Tel. Publishing Co. v. Tatum, 263 Ga. 677, 436 S.E.2d 655 (1993).

O.C.G.A. § 16-6-23 contravened the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Dye v. Wallace, 274 Ga. 257, 553 S.E.2d 561 (2001).

Construction of O.C.G.A. § 16-6-23 is not to be rendered meaningless but must be construed so as to achieve the humane and crime-reporting purposes which prompted its passage. Doe v. Board of Regents, 215 Ga. App. 684, 452 S.E.2d 776 (1994).

Legislative intent.

- By passing the Rape Shield Statute, the legislature has stated as a matter of public policy that, where the crime involved is rape, sexual assault, or attempted sexual assault, the legitimate public interest in the identity of the victim does not outweigh the victim's privacy interest. Macon Tel. Publishing Co. v. Tatum, 208 Ga. App. 111, 430 S.E.2d 18 (1993).

State has a legitimate interest in protecting the privacy of a sexual assault victim. Doe v. Board of Regents, 215 Ga. App. 684, 452 S.E.2d 776 (1994).

Establishment of truth of rape charge not required.

- Since a victim's claim that she was raped was a part of university police reports concerning the incident, the fact that she had initially misrepresented the circumstances of the attack did not alter the assertion of rape which must be accepted as true for purposes of O.C.G.A. § 16-6-23. It was not required that the matter be established as true in order for the identity of the victim to be protected and she was entitled to an injunction against disclosure of her name and identity. Doe v. Board of Regents, 215 Ga. App. 684, 452 S.E.2d 776 (1994).

Truthful information in public court documents excepted.

- States may not impose sanctions on publication of truthful information contained in official court records open to public inspection. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 95 S. Ct. 1029, 43 L. Ed. 2d 328 (1975), for comment, see 24 Emory L.J. 1205 (1975).

Applicability of Open Records Act.

- Pursuant to the Open Records Act, a campus newspaper was entitled to university police reports concerning an incident of alleged rape, but, in accordance with the rape victim confidentiality statute, with the victim's name and identifying information redacted. Doe v. Board of Regents, 215 Ga. App. 684, 452 S.E.2d 776 (1994).

Imposition of civil liability based on a newspaper's publication of a rape victim's name, in violation of a criminal Rape Shield Statute, was permissible under the holding of Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 109 S. Ct. 2603, 105 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1989). Macon Tel. Publishing Co. v. Tatum, 208 Ga. App. 111, 430 S.E.2d 18 (1993).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 62A Am. Jur. 2d, Privacy, § 116.

C.J.S.

- 77 C.J.S., Right of Privacy and Publicity, §§ 2, 7, 21 et seq.

ALR.

- Propriety of publishing identity of sexual assault victim, 40 A.L.R.5th 787.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 16-6-23

Total Results: 3  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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State v. Brannan, 477 S.E.2d 575 (Ga. 1996).

Cited 16 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 12, 1996 | 267 Ga. 315, 96 Fulton County D. Rep. 3992, 25 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1222

...H. Lamar Cole, District Attorney, Valdosta, Mark E. Mitchell, Assistant District Attorney, Thomasville, for State. Walter E. Van Heiningen, Thomasville, for Brannan. SEARS, Justice. In this case, we rule that the trial court unnecessarily found OCGA § 16-6-23 (prohibiting the publication of a rape victim's name or identity) to be unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article One of the Georgia Constitution, because appellant Mark Allan...
...The article published by Brannan did not state that the victim was raped; rather, it stated that she was "assaulted and robbed." Upon learning of the publication of her identity, the victim applied for an arrest warrant against Brannan for violating OCGA § 16-6-23. Thereafter, the District Attorney brought criminal charges against Brannan for publishing the name of a rape victim in violation of that statute. Brannan moved *576 to dismiss the indictment on grounds that section 16-6-23 violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States and Article I, § 1, Paragraph V of the Georgia Constitution. On May 22, 1996, relying upon the opinion in Florida Star v. B.J.F., [1] the trial court "reluctantly" ruled that section 16-6-23 is overbroad and thus facially unconstitutional, and dismissed the charges pending against Brannan. The State appeals from that ruling. 1. OCGA § 16-6-23 states that: It shall be unlawful for any news media or any other person to print and publish, broadcast, televise, or disseminate through any other medium of public dissemination or cause to be printed and published, broadcast, televised,...
...broadcast originating in the state the name or identity of any female who may have been raped or upon whom an assault with intent to commit the offense of rape may have been made. The State argues on appeal that the trial court erred in ruling that section 16-6-23 is unconstitutionally overbroad because the statute promotes the recognized public policy of protecting the privacy rights of rape victims, and because in reaching its ruling, the trial court misinterpreted the United States Supreme Court's decision in Florida Star. Upon reviewing the record, however, we conclude that we need not address these arguments because the trial court needlessly reached the question of whether section 16-6-23 can withstand constitutional muster. As made clear by the plain language of the statute set forth above, section 16-6-23 prohibits the dissemination of the identity of any female who may have been raped or upon whom an assault with intent to commit rape may have been made....
...ped or subjected to an assault with the intent to commit rape. Rather, the report stated only that she had been "assaulted and robbed." Hence, there can be no dispute that the facts alleged in support of the charge against Brannan for violating OCGA § 16-6-23 were insufficient, and there was no need for the trial court to rule on the statute's constitutionality before dismissing the indictment....
...[3] In this case, the trial court should have granted Brannan's motion to dismiss on grounds that the facts alleged against him altogether failed to support the charge, thereby obviating the need to address the constitutionality of the statute. [4] Accordingly, the trial court's order declaring OCGA § 16-6-23 unconstitutional is vacated, and the trial court is instructed to dismiss the indictment against Brannan for failure to state an offense....
...[4] The record shows that prior to the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the parties stipulated in writing as to the contents of Brannan's publication, and at oral argument the State raised no objection when Brannan argued that those stipulated facts did not constitute an offense under section 16-6-23....
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MacOn Tel. Publ'g Co. v. Tatum, 436 S.E.2d 655 (Ga. 1993).

Cited 5 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Dec 2, 1993 | 263 Ga. 678

...Demetry, C. Amanda Martin, amici curiae. FLETCHER, Justice. This court granted the writ of certiorari to consider whether the First Amendment prohibits a newspaper from being punished for publishing the name of a sexual assault victim in violation of OCGA § 16-6-23....
...of rape may have been made. (b) This Code section does not apply to truthful information disclosed in public court documents open to public inspection. (c) Any person or corporation violating this Code section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. OCGA § 16-6-23....
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Dye v. Wallace, 553 S.E.2d 561 (Ga. 2001).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 1, 2001 | 274 Ga. 257, 2001 Fulton County D. Rep. 2928, 29 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2534

...written by Wallace and printed in the newspaper reporting the statutory rape and child molestation of Licklider by Bromekis Hudson at a business owned and operated by Dye. The trial court granted appellees' motion for summary judgment declaring OCGA § 16-6-23, the Rape Confidentiality statute, to be unconstitutional. Because OCGA § 16-6-23 is indistinguishable from the Florida statute struck down as violative of the First Amendment by the United States Supreme Court in Florida Star v....
...and made available to the public. It is further uncontroverted that the published article accurately reflected the information contained in the police report. Nevertheless, appellant seeks to impose civil liability on appellees pursuant *562 to OCGA § 16-6-23(a)....
...Macon Telegraph, supra, at 679(2), 436 S.E.2d 655, but we were not called upon in that case to apply it to Georgia's Rape Confidentiality statute. That issue now being before us, we find that the rationale in Florida Star is fully applicable to OCGA § 16-6-23 and we hold that the statute contravenes the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Appellants contends that OCGA § 16-6-23 does not unconstitutionally impose liability on appellees because the statute serves "a need to further a state interest of the highest order." Florida Star, supra, 491 U.S....
...Because it is uncontroverted that appellees here lawfully obtained the police report of Licklider's assault, we do not consider the interpretation given the Open Records Act by the Court of Appeals in Doe v. Bd. of Regents, 215 Ga.App. 684(3), 452 S.E.2d 776 (1994) or the effect that our holding OCGA § 16-6-23 to be unconstitutional has on the ruling in Doe that OCGA § 16-6-23 qualifies as an exemption from the Act under § 50-18-70(b).