O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 17-10-30.1 (2019)

Imprisonment for life without parole; finding of statutory aggravating circumstance required; duties of judge and jury

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)

Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.

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Repealed by Ga. L. 2009, p. 223, § 4/SB 13, effective April 29, 2009.

Annotations

Editor’s notes. - This Code section was based on Code 1981, § 17-10-30.1, enacted by Ga. L. 1993, p. 1654, § 4. Ga. L. 2009, p. 223, § 8/SB 13, not codified by the General Assembly, pro-

vides that: ‘‘Except as provided in this section, the provisions of this Act shall apply only to those offenses committed after the effective date of this Act. With express written consent of the state, an

accused whose offense was committed prior to the effective date of this Act may elect in writing to be sentenced under the provisions of this Act, provided that: (1) jeopardy for the offense charged has not attached or (2) the accused has been sentenced to death but the conviction or sentence has been reversed on appeal and the state is not barred from seeking prosecution after the remand.’’ This Act became effective April 29, 2009. Ga. L. 2009, p. 223, § 9/SB 13, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: ‘‘Except as provided in Section 8 of this Act, the amendment or repeal of a Code section by this Act shall not affect any sentence imposed by any court of this state prior to the effective date of this Act.’’ Ga. L. 2009, p. 223, § 10/SB 13, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: ‘‘A person may be sentenced to life without parole without the prosecutor seeking the death penalty under the laws

of this state.’’ Ga. L. 2011, p. 752, § 17(3)/HB 142 codified these provisions at Code Section 17-10-16.1. Ga. L. 2009, p. 223, § 11(a)/SB 13, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that the law as set forth in this Code section as it existed prior to April 29, 2009, shall apply to all offenses committed on and before April 29, 2009, and the amendments by this Act shall apply to all crimes committed on and after April 29, 2009. Ga. L. 2009, p. 223, § 11(b)/SB 13, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: ‘‘The provisions of this Act shall not affect or abate the status as a crime of any such act or omission which occurred prior to the effective date of the Act repealing, repealing and reenacting, or amending such law, nor shall the prosecution of such crime be abated as a result of such repeal, repeal and reenactment, or amendment.’’

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 11 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1995–2021 · leading case: State v. Ingram, 467 S.E.2d 523 (Ga. 1996).

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State v. Ingram, 467 S.E.2d 523 (Ga. 1996). · cites it 41× “Following the joint indictment, the State filed notices of intent pursuant to OCGA § 17-10-16 and OCGA § 17-10-30.1 to seek imprisonment for life without parole [1] but did not give notice of an intent to seek the death penalty.”

Henry v. State, 462 S.E.2d 737 (Ga. 1995). · cites it 4× “See OCGA § 17-10-30.1 (a). Henry was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for the murder, and to consecutive life sentences for the armed robbery and kidnapping.”

Jenkins v. State, 491 S.E.2d 54 (Ga. 1997). · cites it 4× “1 a jury cannot impose a sentence of life without parole without including a finding of at least one statutory aggravating circumstance as defined in OCGA § 17-10-30 (b), see OCGA § 17-10-30.1 (a), we reject appellant’s argument for the same reasons OCGA § 17-10-30 has been…”

State v. Velazquez, 657 S.E.2d 838 (Ga. 2008). · cites it 4× “because the murder statute, unlike OCGA § 16-6-1(b), does not provide expressly for life imprisonment without parole *842 as a possible sentence.”

Moore v. State, 814 S.E.2d 676 (Ga. 2018). · cites it 2× “On June 22, 2017, Moore, acting pro se, filed a motion for an out-of-time appeal in the Superior Court of McDuffie County, alleging that the sentence of life without the possibility of parole was void, that his sentence contravened public policy, and that counsel who represented…”

Moore v. State, 303 Ga. 743 (Ga. 2018). · cites it 2× “On June 18, 2002, Moore, assisted by counsel, pled guilty to rape and malice murder, and was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole under former OCGA § 17-10-30.1,1 the trial court finding aggravating circumstances to exist surrounding the murder,…”

Johnson v. State, 634 S.E.2d 134 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006). · cites it 2× “Article 2 of Chapter 10 of Title 17 of our Code is entitled “Death Penalty Generally” and OCGA § 17-10-30.1, governing imposition of sentences of imprisonment for life without parole, is found in that Article.”

Velazquez v. State, 643 S.E.2d 291 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007). · cites it 2× “Article 2 of Chapter 10 of Title 17 of our Code is entitled “Death Penalty Generally” and OCGA § 17-10-30.1, governing imposition of sentences of imprisonment for life without *864 parole, is found in that Article.”

Dalton v. State, 647 S.E.2d 580 (Ga. 2007). · cites it 2× “2 Under OCGA § 17-10-30.1 (a), imprisonment for life without parole may not be imposed unless there is found by the court or jury at least one statutory aggravating circumstance as defined by OCGA § 17-10-30.”

Estuardo Canales v. State (Ga. Ct. App. 2021). · cites it 10× “And a provision in the relevant statutory sentencing scheme that existed prior to April 2009, OCGA § 17-10-30.1, supports Canales’s claim that the trial court in this case was not authorized to impose a sentence of life without parole on his rape conviction.”

Lewis v. State, 614 S.E.2d 779 (Ga. 2005). · cites it 2× “” OCGA § 17-10-30.1 (a). As noted above, the trial court found as to both murders in this case the existence of the aggravating circumstance set out in OCGA § 17-10-30 (b) (7): “The offense of murder .”

— 17-10-30.1(a) — 3 cases

State v. Ingram, 467 S.E.2d 523 (Ga. 1996). “Following the joint indictment, the State filed notices of intent pursuant to OCGA § 17-10-16 and OCGA § 17-10-30.1 to seek imprisonment for life without parole [1] but did not give notice of an intent to seek the death penalty.”

Henry v. State, 462 S.E.2d 737 (Ga. 1995). “See OCGA § 17-10-30.1 (a). Henry was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for the murder, and to consecutive life sentences for the armed robbery and kidnapping.”

Jenkins v. State, 491 S.E.2d 54 (Ga. 1997). “1 a jury cannot impose a sentence of life without parole without including a finding of at least one statutory aggravating circumstance as defined in OCGA § 17-10-30 (b), see OCGA § 17-10-30.1 (a), we reject appellant’s argument for the same reasons OCGA § 17-10-30 has been…”

Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.