O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 17-10-31.1 (2019)

Requirement of jury finding of aggravating circumstance and recommendation of sentence of death or life without parole; duties of judge; jury instruction on meaning of ‘‘life without parole’’ and ‘‘life imprisonment.’’

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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Repealed by Ga. L. 2009, p. 223, § 6/SB 13, effective April 29, 2009.

Annotations

Editor’s notes. - This Code section was based on Code 1981, § 17-10-31.1, enacted by Ga. L. 1993, p. 1654, § 5. Ga. L. 2009, p. 223, § 8/SB 13, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: ‘‘Except as provided in this section, the provisions of this Act shall apply only to those offenses committed after the effective date of this Act. With express written consent of the state, an accused whose offense was committed

prior to the effective date of this Act may elect in writing to be sentenced under the provisions of this Act, provided that: (1) jeopardy for the offense charged has not attached or (2) the accused has been sentenced to death but the conviction or sentence has been reversed on appeal and the state is not barred from seeking prosecution after the remand.’’ This Act became effective April 29, 2009. Ga. L. 2009, p. 223, § 9/SB 13, not

codified by the General Assembly, provides that: ‘‘Except as provided in Section 8 of this Act, the amendment or repeal of a Code section by this Act shall not affect any sentence imposed by any court of this state prior to the effective date of this Act.’’ Ga. L. 2009, p. 223, § 10/SB 13, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: ‘‘A person may be sentenced to life without parole without the prosecutor seeking the death penalty under the laws of this state.’’ Ga. L. 2011, p. 752, § 17(3) codified these provisions at Code Section Ga. L. 2009, p. 223, § 11(a)/SB 13, not

codified by the General Assembly, provides, in part, that the law as set forth in Section 4 of this Act as it existed prior to April 29, 2009, shall apply to all offenses committed on and before April 29, 2009. Ga. L. 2009, p. 223, § 11(b)/SB 13, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: ‘‘The provisions of this Act shall not affect or abate the status as a crime of any such act or omission which occurred prior to the effective date of the Act repealing, repealing and reenacting, or amending such law, nor shall the prosecution of such crime be abated as a result of such repeal, repeal and reenactment, or amendment.’’

RESEARCH REFERENCES ALR. - Validity, construction, and application of pattern and nonpattern jury

instructions in state death penalty proceedings, 83 A.L.R.6th 255.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 47 cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1994–2024 · leading case: Humphreys v. State, 694 S.E.2d 316 (Ga. 2010).
Humphreys v. State, 694 S.E.2d 316 (Ga. 2010). · cites it 8× “See OCGA § 17-10-31.1 (c) (requiring the trial court to impose either a sentence of life or life without parole where a death penalty sentencing jury has unanimously agreed on at least one statutory aggravating circumstance but is unable to reach a unanimous verdict as to…”
Bishop v. State, 486 S.E.2d 887 (Ga. 1997). · cites it 12× “The trial court’s pre-voir dire charge included an instruction on the sentence of life without parole, which informed the prospective jurors, in accordance with OCGA § 17-10-31.1 (d) (1), that such a sentence would result in incarceration for the remainder of the defendant’s…”
State v. Ingram, 467 S.E.2d 523 (Ga. 1996). · cites it 20× “6 OCGA § 17-10-31.1 (a) creates three threshold requirements for imposition of a sentence of life without parole by a jury: (a) the defendant must be convicted of murder; 7 (b) the jury must include a finding of one statutory aggravating circumstance; and (c) the jury must…”
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). · cites it 2× “§ 53a—46a (2001); Ga. Code Ann. § 17-10-31.1 (Supp. 1996); Ill.”
Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994). · cites it 4× “See Ga. Code Ann. § 17-10-31.1 (a) (Supp. 1993); Ind.”
Burgess v. State, 450 S.E.2d 680 (Ga. 1994). · cites it 8× “Further, this court has repeatedly held that in cases, such as this, wherein OCGA § 17-10-31.1 (d) is inapplicable, the issue of a defendant's parole eligibility is an inappropriate matter for jury consideration.”
Lance v. State, 560 S.E.2d 663 (Ga. 2002). · cites it 4× “Likewise, because OCGA § 17-10-31.1 (d) authorizes the trial court to charge the jury on the meaning of life imprisonment without parole and life imprisonment, “the juror(s)’ beliefs regarding the meaning of those options (are) not a proper subject for voir dire.”
Jenkins v. State, 491 S.E.2d 54 (Ga. 1997). · cites it 8× “Appellant argues OCGA § 17-10-31.1 is unconstitutional because it fails to provide juries with appropriate guidance and thus allows the jury to act arbitrarily.”
Jenkins v. State, 458 S.E.2d 477 (Ga. 1995). · cites it 8× “OCGA § 17-10-31.1 (d), 2 by expressly authorizing argument to the jury on the issue of parole in the sentencing phase of death penalty trials, conflicts with OCGA § 17-8-76 (a), 3 which imposes an absolute bar on such argument.”
Henry v. State, 507 S.E.2d 419 (Ga. 1998). · cites it 6× “The trial court’s charge, which tracked the language of OCGA § 17-10-31.1 (d) (1), provided as follows: Life without parole means that the defendant will be incarcerated for the remainder of his natural life and shall not be eligible for parole unless he is…”
Johnson v. State, 519 S.E.2d 221 (Ga. 1999). · cites it 4× “OCGA § 17-10-31.1 (d); Jenkins v. State, 265 Ga.”
Henry v. State, 462 S.E.2d 737 (Ga. 1995). · cites it 4× “1 (d) (1): “life without parole” means that the defendant shall be incarcerated for the remainder of his or her natural life and shall not be eligible for parole unless such person is subsequently adjudicated to be innocent of the offense for which he or she was sentenced. Henry…”
— 17-10-31.1(a) — 1 case
State v. Ingram, 467 S.E.2d 523 (Ga. 1996). “6 OCGA § 17-10-31.1 (a) creates three threshold requirements for imposition of a sentence of life without parole by a jury: (a) the defendant must be convicted of murder; 7 (b) the jury must include a finding of one statutory aggravating circumstance; and (c) the jury must…”
— 17-10-31.1(c) — 3 cases
Humphreys v. State, 694 S.E.2d 316 (Ga. 2010). “See OCGA § 17-10-31.1 (c) (requiring the trial court to impose either a sentence of life or life without parole where a death penalty sentencing jury has unanimously agreed on at least one statutory aggravating circumstance but is unable to reach a unanimous verdict as to…”
State v. Ingram, 467 S.E.2d 523 (Ga. 1996). “6 OCGA § 17-10-31.1 (a) creates three threshold requirements for imposition of a sentence of life without parole by a jury: (a) the defendant must be convicted of murder; 7 (b) the jury must include a finding of one statutory aggravating circumstance; and (c) the jury must…”
Stacey Humphreys v. Warden GDP (11th Cir. 2024).
— 17-10-31.1(d) — 6 cases
Johnson v. State, 519 S.E.2d 221 (Ga. 1999). “OCGA § 17-10-31.1 (d); Jenkins v. State, 265 Ga.”
Bishop v. State, 486 S.E.2d 887 (Ga. 1997). “The trial court’s pre-voir dire charge included an instruction on the sentence of life without parole, which informed the prospective jurors, in accordance with OCGA § 17-10-31.1 (d) (1), that such a sentence would result in incarceration for the remainder of the defendant’s…”
Turner v. State, 486 S.E.2d 839 (Ga. 1997).
Jefferson v. Terry, 490 F. Supp. 2d 1261 (N.D. Ga. 2007).
Philpot v. State, 486 S.E.2d 158 (Ga. 1997).
— 17-10-31.1(d)(1) — 4 cases
Bishop v. State, 486 S.E.2d 887 (Ga. 1997). “The trial court’s pre-voir dire charge included an instruction on the sentence of life without parole, which informed the prospective jurors, in accordance with OCGA § 17-10-31.1 (d) (1), that such a sentence would result in incarceration for the remainder of the defendant’s…”
Henry v. State, 462 S.E.2d 737 (Ga. 1995). “1 (d) (1): “life without parole” means that the defendant shall be incarcerated for the remainder of his or her natural life and shall not be eligible for parole unless such person is subsequently adjudicated to be innocent of the offense for which he or she was sentenced. Henry…”
Henry v. State, 507 S.E.2d 419 (Ga. 1998). “The trial court’s charge, which tracked the language of OCGA § 17-10-31.1 (d) (1), provided as follows: Life without parole means that the defendant will be incarcerated for the remainder of his natural life and shall not be eligible for parole unless he is…”
State v. Ingram, 467 S.E.2d 523 (Ga. 1996). “6 OCGA § 17-10-31.1 (a) creates three threshold requirements for imposition of a sentence of life without parole by a jury: (a) the defendant must be convicted of murder; 7 (b) the jury must include a finding of one statutory aggravating circumstance; and (c) the jury must…”
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