O.C.G.A. § 17-10-32 (2019)
Sentencing of person indicted for capital offense to life imprisonment or other punishment upon plea of guilty
Any person who has been indicted for an offense punishable by death may enter a plea of guilty at any time after his indictment, and the judge of the superior court having jurisdiction may, in his discretion, sentence the person to life imprisonment or to any other punishment authorized by law for the offense named in the indictment; provided, however, that the judge must find one of the statutory aggravating circumstances provided in Code Section 17-10-30 before imposing the death penalty, except in cases of treason or aircraft hijacking.
History
Ga. L. 1956, p. 737, § 1; Ga. L. 1973, p. 159, § 8.
Annotations
Law reviews. - For annual survey of
death penalty decisions, see 57 Mercer L. Rev. 139 (2005); 58 Mercer L. Rev. 111 (2006).
JUDICIAL DECISIONS Duty to inform as to who will impose sentence prior to entry of guilty plea. - Trial court has discretion, after accepting a guilty plea in a death penalty case, to impose sentence or to have a jury do so; however, the defendant should be informed of the trial court’s decision regarding who will impose sentence before the defendant enters a guilty plea. Browner v. State, 357 Ga. 321, 357 S.E.2d 559 (1987).
Second sentence of former Code 1933, § 27-704 (see O.C.G.A. § 17-7-70) relates to guilty pleas upon accusations as well as after indictment. Garmon v. Johnson, 243 Ga. 855, 257 S.E.2d 276 (1979). Judge not required to impose life sentence or less upon plea of guilty. - This section cannot be construed to mean that, upon entry of plea of guilty, the trial judge must sentence the defendant to life
imprisonment or a lesser punishment. The trial judge is merely authorized, in the exercise of judicial discretion, but is not required by the provision of that section to impose such sentence. Massey v. State, 220 Ga. 883, 142 S.E.2d 832 (1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 36, 87 S. Ct. 241, 17 L. Ed. 2d 36 (1966). Assertion on habeas corpus of refusal to accept guilty plea. - Defendant sentenced to death in jury trial may not assert on habeas corpus that the trial judge refused to accept the defendant’s guilty plea and required the defendant to plead not guilty and stand trial by jury as
the defendant’s denial of a motion for new trial had been affirmed by the Supreme Court. Golden v. Balkcom, 214 Ga. 15, 102 S.E.2d 578 (1958). Cited in Golden v. State, 213 Ga. 481, 99 S.E.2d 882 (1957); Smith v. State, 214 Ga. 314, 104 S.E.2d 444 (1958); McCrary v. State, 215 Ga. 887, 114 S.E.2d 133 (1960); Johnson v. Caldwell, 228 Ga. 776, 187 S.E.2d 844 (1972); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 49 L. Ed. 2d 859 (1976); Fair v. State, 245 Ga. 868, 268 S.E.2d 316 (1980); Gilreath v. State, 247 Ga. 814, 279 S.E.2d 650 (1981); Moore v. Balkcom, 716 F.2d 1511 (11th Cir. 1983).
RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 21 Am. Jur. 2d, Criminal Law, §§ 622 et seq., 718 et seq. C.J.S. - 24 C.J.S., Criminal Procedure and Rights of the Accused, § 2183 et seq. ALR. - Effect of abolition of capital
punishment on procedural rules governing crimes punishable by death - post-Furman decisions, 71 A.L.R.3d 453. Loss of jurisdiction by delay in imposing sentence, 98 A.L.R.3d 605.