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Call Now: 904-383-7448Any person who has been indicted for an offense punishable by death may enter a plea of guilty at any time after his indictment, and the judge of the superior court having jurisdiction may, in his discretion, sentence the person to life imprisonment or to any other punishment authorized by law for the offense named in the indictment; provided, however, that the judge must find one of the statutory aggravating circumstances provided in Code Section 17-10-30 before imposing the death penalty, except in cases of treason or aircraft hijacking.
(Ga. L. 1956, p. 737, § 1; Ga. L. 1973, p. 159, § 8.)
- For annual survey of death penalty decisions, see 57 Mercer L. Rev. 139 (2005); 58 Mercer L. Rev. 111 (2006).
- Trial court has discretion, after accepting a guilty plea in a death penalty case, to impose sentence or to have a jury do so; however, the defendant should be informed of the trial court's decision regarding who will impose sentence before the defendant enters a guilty plea. Browner v. State, 357 Ga. 321, 357 S.E.2d 559 (1987).
Second sentence of former Code 1933, § 27-704 (see O.C.G.A. § 17-7-70) relates to guilty pleas upon accusations as well as after indictment. Garmon v. Johnson, 243 Ga. 855, 257 S.E.2d 276 (1979).
- This section cannot be construed to mean that, upon entry of plea of guilty, the trial judge must sentence the defendant to life imprisonment or a lesser punishment. The trial judge is merely authorized, in the exercise of judicial discretion, but is not required by the provision of that section to impose such sentence. Massey v. State, 220 Ga. 883, 142 S.E.2d 832 (1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 36, 87 S. Ct. 241, 17 L. Ed. 2d 36 (1966).
- Defendant sentenced to death in jury trial may not assert on habeas corpus that the trial judge refused to accept the defendant's guilty plea and required the defendant to plead not guilty and stand trial by jury as the defendant's denial of a motion for new trial had been affirmed by the Supreme Court. Golden v. Balkcom, 214 Ga. 15, 102 S.E.2d 578 (1958).
Cited in Golden v. State, 213 Ga. 481, 99 S.E.2d 882 (1957); Smith v. State, 214 Ga. 314, 104 S.E.2d 444 (1958); McCrary v. State, 215 Ga. 887, 114 S.E.2d 133 (1960); Johnson v. Caldwell, 228 Ga. 776, 187 S.E.2d 844 (1972); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 49 L. Ed. 2d 859 (1976); Fair v. State, 245 Ga. 868, 268 S.E.2d 316 (1980); Gilreath v. State, 247 Ga. 814, 279 S.E.2d 650 (1981); Moore v. Balkcom, 716 F.2d 1511 (11th Cir. 1983).
- 21 Am. Jur. 2d, Criminal Law, §§ 647 et seq., 750.
- 24 C.J.S., Criminal Law, §§ 2012, 2014, 2063, 2110 et seq., 2128 et seq.
- Effect of abolition of capital punishment on procedural rules governing crimes punishable by death - post-Furman decisions, 71 A.L.R.3d 453.
Loss of jurisdiction by delay in imposing sentence, 98 A.L.R.3d 605.
Total Results: 20
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2021-03-15
Snippet: Velazquez majority reasoned that under OCGA § 17- 10-32.1 and other law in effect at that time, an LWOP
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2019-04-29
Citation: 827 S.E.2d 669, 305 Ga. 712
Snippet: The bill also repealed OCGA §§ 17-10-31.1 and 17-10-32.1, thereby removing requirements that a jury find
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2017-10-02
Citation: 302 Ga. 142, 805 S.E.2d 881
Snippet: then-applicable sentencing scheme. See former OCGA § 17-10-32.1 (b) (“Unless the district attorney has given
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2017-08-14
Citation: 301 Ga. 759, 804 S.E.2d 82, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 612, 2017 WL 3468536
Snippet: The bill also repealed OCGA§§ 17-10-31.1 and 17-10-32.1, thereby removing requirements that a jury find
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2017-06-19
Citation: 301 Ga. 528, 801 S.E.2d 830, 2017 WL 2625455, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 535
Snippet: possibility of parole is void under former OCGA § 17-10-32.1,2 because the sentencing court failed to comply
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2017-02-06
Citation: 300 Ga. 516, 796 S.E.2d 694, 2017 WL 473936, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 48
Snippet: OCGA §§ 17-10-16 (a), 17-10-30.1, 17-10-31.1, and 17-10-32.1, the legislature intended the sentence of life
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2016-02-22
Citation: 298 Ga. 536, 783 S.E.2d 130, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 168
Snippet: false. At the time of Hudson’s crimes, OCGA § 17-10-32.1 (b) 1 provided that, in cases where
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2015-04-20
Snippet: aggravating circumstance required by O.C.G.A. § 17-10-32.1 (b) authorizing imposition of a life sentence
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2015-04-20
Citation: 297 Ga. 26, 771 S.E.2d 884, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 239
Snippet: aggravating circumstance required by O.C.G.A. § 17-10-32.1 (b) authorizing imposition of a life sentence
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2015-02-16
Snippet: The bill also repealed OCGA §§ 17-10-31.1 and 17-10-32.1, thereby removing requirements that a jury find
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2015-02-16
Citation: 296 Ga. 549, 769 S.E.2d 381, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 126
Snippet: The bill also repealed OCGA §§ 17-10-31.1 and 17-10-32.1, thereby removing requirements that a jury find
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2014-03-03
Citation: 294 Ga. 842, 755 S.E.2d 732, 2014 Fulton County D. Rep. 382, 2014 WL 819502, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 181
Snippet: of sentencing as required under former OCGA § 17-10-32.1. See Pierce v. State, 289 Ga. 893
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2013-10-07
Citation: 293 Ga. 705, 749 S.E.2d 660, 2013 Fulton County D. Rep. 3095, 2013 WL 5508540, 2013 Ga. LEXIS 783
Snippet: At the time Moore was sentenced in 2001, OCGA § 17-10-32.1 provided that a defendant who enters a plea
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2013-09-09
Citation: 293 Ga. 506, 748 S.E.2d 459, 2013 Fulton County D. Rep. 2822, 2013 WL 4788144, 2013 Ga. LEXIS 632
Snippet: circumstance as required by then-effective OCGA § 17-10-32.1 (b),2 and that the sentence of life without
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2013-03-28
Citation: 292 Ga. 771, 743 S.E.2d 12, 2013 Fulton County D. Rep. 1344, 2013 WL 1442294, 2013 Ga. LEXIS 292
Snippet: of the 2009 Act repealed OCGA §§ 17-10-31.1 and 17-10-32.1, which required the finding of a statutory aggravating
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2012-04-24
Citation: 727 S.E.2d 95, 291 Ga. 19, 2012 Fulton County D. Rep. 1540, 2012 WL 1392601, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 368
Snippet: The bill also repealed OCGA §§ 17-10-31.1 and 17-10-32.1, thereby removing requirements that a jury find
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2011-10-17
Citation: 717 S.E.2d 202, 289 Ga. 893, 2011 Fulton County D. Rep. 3203, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 817
Snippet: parole, the trial court violated former OCGA § 17-10-32.1 by failing to make a specific, express finding
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2010-03-15
Citation: 690 S.E.2d 835, 286 Ga. 650, 2010 Fulton County D. Rep. 754, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 221
Snippet: based on the language of OCGA §§ 17-10-16 and 17-10-32.1 that life without parole cannot be a punishment
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2008-02-25
Citation: 657 S.E.2d 838, 283 Ga. 206, 2008 Fulton County D. Rep. 580, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 188, 2008 WL 480078
Snippet: pled guilty, his situation is governed by OCGA § 17-10-32.1. That statute reads: (a) Subject to the provisions
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2006-06-12
Citation: 631 S.E.2d 344, 280 Ga. 780, 2006 Fulton County D. Rep. 1859, 2006 Ga. LEXIS 395
Snippet: Sanders's pleas. Sanders also points to OCGA § 17-10-32.1[4] as providing a statutory right to plead guilty