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2018 Georgia Code 17-16-8 | Car Wreck Lawyer

TITLE 17 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Section 16. Discovery, 17-16-1 through 17-16-23.

ARTICLE 1 DEFINITIONS; FELONY CASES

17-16-8. Lists of names and information concerning witnesses.

  1. The prosecuting attorney, not later than ten days before trial, and the defendant's attorney, within ten days after compliance by the prosecuting attorney but no later than five days prior to trial, or as otherwise ordered by the court, shall furnish to the opposing counsel as an officer of the court, in confidence, the names, current locations, dates of birth, and telephone numbers of that party's witnesses, unless for good cause the judge allows an exception to this requirement, in which event the counsel shall be afforded an opportunity to interview such witnesses prior to the witnesses being called to testify.
  2. Nothing in this Code section shall be construed to require the prosecuting attorney to furnish the home address, date of birth, or home telephone number of a witness who is a law enforcement officer. Instead, in such cases, the prosecuting attorney shall furnish to the defense attorney the law enforcement officer's current work location and work phone number.

(Code 1981, §17-16-8, enacted by Ga. L. 1994, p. 1895, § 4; Ga. L. 1995, p. 1250, § 2; Ga. L. 1996, p. 1624, § 4.)

Code Commission notes.

- Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1996, the existing provisions of this Code section were designated as subsection (a).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Failure to include coindictee's name on witness list was not reversible error since the defendant was notified a month before trial that the state was dropping charges against the coindictee in exchange for the coindictee's testimony against the defendant. Mize v. State, 269 Ga. 646, 501 S.E.2d 219 (1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1078, 119 S. Ct. 817, 142 L. Ed. 2d 676 (1999).

Even though a witness's name was not on the state's witness list, the state's formal disclosure of the witness as the confidential informant six weeks prior to trial, combined with: (i) the summary of the witness's testimony found in the search warrant affidavit given to the defendant; (ii) the defendant's admitted knowledge of the witness's identity prior to the formal disclosure; (iii) the defendant's own pretrial reference to the witness as a material witness; and (iv) the defendant's attempts to interview the witness prior to trial, fulfilled the purpose of the witness list rule. McLarty v. State, 238 Ga. App. 27, 516 S.E.2d 818 (1999).

No error occurred in permitting an unlisted witness, a police officer, to testify to facts contained in a police report regarding the defendant's arrest a decade earlier for rape as defense counsel was informed that the police officer would be called to testify if the victim of the attack a decade earlier could not be located, was notified during discovery that the police officer would have to testify, was given reports during discovery that contained the officer's name, and was allowed an opportunity to interview the officer. Rose v. State, 275 Ga. 214, 563 S.E.2d 865 (2002).

State was properly allowed to present a cab driver's testimony, even though the cab driver was not on the witness list, as the state established good cause for not having the cab driver on the witness list by demonstrating that the cab driver fled just before the trial commenced and as the defendant was given the opportunity to interview the cab driver prior to the cab driver testifying at trial. Puga-Cerantes v. State, 281 Ga. 78, 635 S.E.2d 118 (2006).

Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in allowing two witnesses to testify regarding damages done to a business's gate at the defendant's trial for armed robbery, theft of a motor vehicle, and other crimes, who were not identified on the prosecutor's witness list as the manager of the location from which the defendant stole the vehicle and damaged the gate suffered a severe back injury the day before testifying. The trial court properly allowed defense counsel to interview the repairman and the bookkeeper, who did testify as to the gate's damages, and the defendant never requested a continuance. Johnson v. State, 293 Ga. App. 32, 666 S.E.2d 452 (2008).

No request for recess to interview witness.

- O.C.G.A. § 17-16-8 was not violated since the state provided the defendants with a copy of the taped statement of a witness on the day it was taken, four days before trial, and with a transcript thereof the following morning, and since, at trial, neither the defendant sought a recess to interview the witness. Johnson v. State, 241 Ga. App. 448, 526 S.E.2d 903 (1999).

No surprise or prejudice.

- In a prosecution for armed robbery and furnishing a pistol to a minor, the trial court did not err in a motion in limine to exclude the testimony of a K-9 officer identified as a witness less than ten days before trial because the defendant was neither surprised nor prejudiced by the officer's testimony. Rollinson v. State, 276 Ga. App. 375, 623 S.E.2d 211 (2005).

With regard to the defendant's conviction for burglary, the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion by allowing a government witness to testify even though the state failed to include the witness on the state's witness list because the witness was not a "surprise" witness or unknown to the defendant; rather, the witness was a key element of the defendant's own explanation for the defendant's presence at the victims' home. Further, the trial court granted defense counsel an opportunity to interview the witness, and counsel asked for no additional relief following that interview, and the defendant did not argue or cite any evidence that the state's failure to list the witness as a witness resulted from bad faith. Luker v. State, 291 Ga. App. 434, 662 S.E.2d 240 (2008).

Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in allowing a new witness for the state to testify at trial even though the state failed to disclose the witness at least ten days before trial in violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-16-8(a) because the defendant did not contend that the state acted in bad faith, and the defendant acknowledged in the defendant's appellate brief that the defendant believed that the state's failure to provide the name of the witness was unintentional; the defendant did not seek an opportunity to interview the witness despite the state's invitation for the defendant to do so. Taylor v. State, 305 Ga. App. 748, 700 S.E.2d 841 (2010).

Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in denying the defendant's motion for a continuance and permitting the state's witnesses to testify because the defendant did not ask to interview the witnesses before the witnesses testified and did not contend that the defendant was surprised by the witnesses' testimony or prejudiced by not knowing earlier that the witnesses were going to testify; the defendant made no showing that the state acted in bad faith in failing to list the witnesses earlier. Powers v. State, 314 Ga. App. 733, 725 S.E.2d 848 (2012).

Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion by denying the defendant's request for a continuance when the court determined that the second similar transaction was admissible because the record showed months before trial, the state filed notice of the state's intent to introduce that similar transaction, listing the prior offense's case number, date of offense, county of offense, disposition, and victim's name, and defense counsel met with the victim prior to the testimony, but the victim refused to talk to counsel. Arbegast v. State, 332 Ga. App. 414, 773 S.E.2d 283 (2015).

Birth dates not timely provided to defendant.

- Because the defendant did not request a continuance upon denial of a motion to compel based on the state's failure to provide the birth date of a witness until shortly before trial, the defendant waived the right to argue that the trial court erred in allowing the witness to testify. Dickerson v. State, 241 Ga. App. 593, 526 S.E.2d 443 (1999).

Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion under O.C.G.A. § 17-16-6 in permitting witnesses to testify whose birth dates were not provided to the defendant at least ten days before the trial, as required under O.C.G.A. § 17-16-8, since: (1) the defendant did not request that the trial court exclude the witnesses' testimony; (2) the witnesses' birth dates were provided to the defense during trial; (3) the defense did not request a continuance to attempt to cure any prejudice from the failure to have the birth dates before trial; and (4) the defense had the opportunity to interview the witnesses before trial. Ehle v. State, 275 Ga. 560, 570 S.E.2d 284 (2002).

Failure to disclose birth date to state.

- Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in excluding a witness as the defendant did not disclose the witness's written statement to the state within ten days of trial; further, the defendant did not include the witness's birth date on the witness list and the state was unable to investigate the witness's criminal record, if any. Clark v. State, 271 Ga. App. 534, 610 S.E.2d 165 (2005).

Failure to provide information on witness harmless.

- While the state failed to provide the defense with the requisite information on a witness, the trial court found no harm since information as to the witness's criminal history appeared in a transcript provided to the defense. Hammond v. State, 255 Ga. App. 549, 565 S.E.2d 873 (2002).

Failure to provide victim's address harmless.

- Trial court properly dismissed the defendant's motion for a mistrial because the court did not abuse the court's discretion by concluding that the state did not act in bad faith by not furnishing the defendant with the victim's complete current address. Further, the defense counsel did not accept the offer to interview the victim under the condition that the victim imposed, and the defendant did not request a continuance. Shields v. State, 264 Ga. App. 232, 590 S.E.2d 217 (2003).

Incorrect contact information.

- Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion in limine to exclude the testimony of two witnesses since the state's witness list provided 17 days prior to trial failed to contain the name of either witness and the list provided ten days prior to trial contained only one name but had incorrect contact information for that witness. Defendant failed to show how the defendant was prejudiced by the late identification or that the outcome would have been different absent such; nor did the defendant request a continuance to cure any prejudice the defendant claimed may have arisen as a result of the state's failure to comply with O.C.G.A. § 17-16-8(a). Morris v. State, 268 Ga. App. 325, 601 S.E.2d 804 (2004).

DNA evidence admitted despite lateness.

- Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in refusing to exclude the DNA results from testing of a bloody knife and tee-shirt in the defendant's trial for murder, which the state sought to introduce three days into the state's case-in-chief, since the state had just received the results and the defense counsel acknowledged at the hearing on the defendant's motion for a new trial that there was no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct and it was undisputed that the defendant was afforded an opportunity to interview the witnesses. Cockrell v. State, 281 Ga. 536, 640 S.E.2d 262 (2007).

Affirmative duty of the producing party.

- Since the defendant made no showing that the defendant was prejudiced as a result of the state's failure to make a custodial statement available to the defendant prior to trial or that the state acted in bad faith in failing to list a witness, the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in permitting the witness to testify. Jones v. State, 243 Ga. App. 351, 532 S.E.2d 120 (2000).

A party charged with producing the statutorily charged information may not rest solely on the fact that the information is not within their possession because the statute imposes an affirmative duty on the producing party to attempt to acquire the information. State v. Dickerson, 273 Ga. 408, 542 S.E.2d 487 (2001).

State provided opportunity to testify.

- Although the name of the emergency medical technician (EMT) had not been provided to the state before trial in violation of subsection (a) of O.C.G.A. § 17-16-8, the EMT should have been allowed to testify after the state was afforded the opportunity to interview the EMT. Massey v. State, 272 Ga. 50, 525 S.E.2d 694 (2000).

Prosecution has no obligation to locate defense witnesses.

- Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's request for a continuance based on the state violating the state's discovery obligations and failing to disclose exculpatory evidence when the state failed to provide the defendant with the transporting officer's out-of-state address because the state, acting in the state's role as the prosecution, has no obligation to locate defense witnesses and the defendant failed to show that any alleged discovery violation caused the defendant harm. Lafavor v. State, 334 Ga. App. 125, 778 S.E.2d 377 (2015).

Deficient performance of counsel does not mandate finding of prejudice.

- When defense counsel did not provide the prosecutor with timely notice of the defendant's expert witness or timely provide a copy of the witness's report, as required by O.C.G.A. §§ 17-16-4(b)(2),17-16-7, and17-16-8(a), and the witness was excluded, the defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel; while counsel was deficient, it was not shown that the defendant was prejudiced as another expert testified to essentially the same facts and conclusions as the excluded witness, and referred to the excluded witness's findings, so the excluded witness's testimony would have been cumulative, and it was not shown that the outcome of the defendant's trial would have differed had counsel's performance not been deficient. Mann v. State, 276 Ga. App. 720, 624 S.E.2d 208 (2005).

Timeliness.

- One month before trial, the state filed a notice of the state's intent to present nonstatutory aggravating circumstances involving several incidents that occurred while the defendant was in jail awaiting trial; this notice and the supplement to the witness list were not untimely. Brannan v. State, 275 Ga. 70, 561 S.E.2d 414 (2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1021, 123 S. Ct. 541, 154 L. Ed. 2d 429 (2002).

With regard to a defendant's malice murder conviction arising from the suffocation death of the defendant's newborn daughter, the trial court did not err in excluding testimony from the defendant's proffered expert witness on police interrogation techniques and false confessions based on the state not being timely notified of that witness and because the area in which the expert would express an opinion had not reached a level of scientific reliability so as to allow the testimony. It was within the trial court's authority to exclude the expert's testimony for the defendant's failure to disclose the expert and there was no showing that the false confession theory and the interrogation method satisfied the evidentiary test in criminal cases set forth in case law. Wright v. State, 285 Ga. 428, 677 S.E.2d 82 (2009), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1123, 130 S. Ct. 1076, 175 L. Ed. 2d 903 (2010).

No prejudice from denial of continuance after untimely disclosure.

- Even if the trial court assigned an incorrect reason for denying the defendant a continuance after the state untimely revealed a confidential informant's identity under O.C.G.A. § 17-16-8(a), the defendant did not show prejudice; defense counsel interviewed the informant and cross-examined the informant extensively about the informant's criminal history. Ingram v. State, 286 Ga. App. 662, 650 S.E.2d 743 (2007).

Revelation of expert witnesses.

- In a capital murder case in which the defendant was granted ex parte orders for mental health experts to examine the defendant, the trial court erred in revealing to the state the identities of the experts, the experts' areas of practice, and the bases for the examinations; remand was required to assess the likelihood of prejudice and take curative measures. Putnal v. State, 303 Ga. 569, 814 S.E.2d 307 (2018).

Witness excluded.

- Trial court had the discretion under O.C.G.A. § 17-16-6 to exclude witnesses provided by the defendant on the day of trial in violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-16-8(a); bad faith was satisfied because nothing in the record indicated that the defendant did not know of the witnesses, or did not intend to call the witnesses, until the day of the trial, and prejudice was established because the state had no notice of the witnesses until the day of trial and had no opportunity to investigate the witnesses or their testimony. Acey v. State, 281 Ga. App. 197, 635 S.E.2d 814 (2006).

Excluding a witness's testimony on the ground that the defendants did not comply with proper discovery procedures, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-16-8(a), was harmless error, if error at all, in light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendants' guilt. Carter v. State, 285 Ga. 394, 677 S.E.2d 71 (2009).

Failure to make proffer.

- Claim that the trial court abused the court's discretion by excluding the testimony of the defendant's father provided no basis for reversal because the defendant failed to make an offer of proof as to the father's testimony. Clemens v. State, 318 Ga. App. 16, 733 S.E.2d 67 (2012).

Witnesses who never testified.

- Although the defendant had sought a mistrial after the prosecutor announced on the fourth day of trial that one disclosed witness had told the prosecutor of additional incriminatory testimony and that a previously undisclosed witness, who had not yet been found, might testify, neither witness ever testified; thus, the denial of the motion for mistrial was moot. Moreover, as required by O.C.G.A. § 17-16-8(a), the trial court allowed the defendant to interview the disclosed witness. Lankford v. State, 295 Ga. App. 590, 672 S.E.2d 534 (2009).

In a case in which the defendant argued that the trial court abused the court's discretion when the court denied the defendant's motion for a mistrial, arguing that the state violated O.C.G.A. § 17-16-8(a) by failing to disclose identifying information concerning a witness, the state did not violate § 17-16-8 since the state could not locate the witness and did not call the witness at trial. Manaois v. State, 300 Ga. App. 176, 684 S.E.2d 315 (2009).

Issue waived.

- Defendant waived the issue that the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion for a continuance and permitting the state's witnesses to testify because the defendant withdrew an objection when a substitute officer was called as a witness. Powers v. State, 314 Ga. App. 733, 725 S.E.2d 848 (2012).

Cited in Laney v. State, 271 Ga. 194, 515 S.E.2d 610 (1999); Sullivan v. State, 242 Ga. App. 839, 531 S.E.2d 367 (2000); Fairbanks v. State, 242 Ga. App. 830, 531 S.E.2d 381 (2000); Sweeder v. State, 246 Ga. App. 557, 541 S.E.2d 414 (2000); Wilbanks v. State, 251 Ga. App. 248, 554 S.E.2d 248 (2001); Hodges v. State, 260 Ga. App. 483, 580 S.E.2d 614 (2003); Grier v. State, 276 Ga. App. 655, 624 S.E.2d 149 (2005).

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 17-16-8

Total Results: 20  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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Keller v. State, 842 S.E.2d 22 (Ga. 2020).

Cited 58 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Apr 20, 2020 | 308 Ga. 492

...the basis that Keller did not disclose him as an expert witness in a timely fashion. [U]nder the reciprocal discovery rules, a defendant’s attorney must furnish opposing counsel with information on defense witnesses no later than five days prior to trial. OCGA § 17-16-8 (a)....
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Wright v. State, 677 S.E.2d 82 (Ga. 2009).

Cited 38 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Apr 28, 2009 | 285 Ga. 428, 2009 Fulton County D. Rep. 1505

...The defense attempted to call as an expert witness Hunter, who then worked as an investigator in defense counsel's office. The State objected and moved to exclude Hunter's testimony based on the defense's failure to provide timely notice, see OCGA § 17-16-8(a), [2] and to comply with OCGA § 17-16-4(b)(2)....
...ebruary 19, 2008. The motion for new trial, as amended, was denied on May 7, 2008. A notice of appeal was filed on June 6, 2008, and the case was docketed in this Court on November 10, 2008. The appeal was orally argued on February 9, 2009. [2] OCGA § 17-16-8(a) states: The prosecuting attorney, not later than ten days before trial, and the defendant's attorney, within ten days after compliance by the prosecuting attorney but no later than five days prior to trial, or as otherwise ordered by th...
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Muse v. The State (three Cases), 889 S.E.2d 885 (Ga. 2023).

Cited 25 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 21, 2023 | 316 Ga. 639

...that he wanted to make with that evidence through the use of other evidence and therefore “failed to establish that the delayed disclosure materially prejudiced him or deprived him of a fair trial”). 9. Darious contends that the State violated OCGA § 17-16-8 and his due process rights by failing to disclose McKenzie as a witness at least ten days before trial13 and that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to exclude McKenzie’s testimony. We disagree. (a) We have stated that the requirements of OCGA § 17-16-8 (a) are designed to prevent a defendant from being surprised at trial by a witness that the defendant has not had an 13 OCGA § 17-16-8 (a) provides: The prosecuting attorney, not later than ten days before trial, ....
...the State to provide defense counsel with a printout of McKenzie’s criminal history, which the State did. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing an exception to the requirements of OCGA § 17-16-8 (a). 15 In its order denying Darious’s motion for new trial, the trial court found that McKenzie’s name was not provided as a witness at least ten days before trial, but ruled against Darious’s claim that the court had erre...
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Murphy v. State, 299 Ga. 238 (Ga. 2016).

Cited 25 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 20, 2016 | 787 S.E.2d 721

...appeal only for abuse of discretion); State v. Dickerson, 273 Ga. 408, 411-412 (2) (542 SE2d 487) (applying harmless error analysis to trial court’s denial of request for continuance based on the State’s failure to disclose information in compliance with OCGA § 17-16-8 (a)). 14 number of photographs depicting the location of the victims’ bodies at the crime scene and post-autopsy photographs of the victims’ lungs....
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Devaughn v. State, 296 Ga. 475 (Ga. 2015).

Cited 24 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 2, 2015 | 769 S.E.2d 70

...36, 59 & n.9 (124 SCt 1354, 158 LE2d 177) (2004). Looking to the argument made in support of this enumeration, Appellant’s real complaint is that the State violated a criminal discovery statute by not informing the defense that Branch would testify until the first day of trial. OCGA § 17-16-8 (a) requires the prosecutor to disclose to defense counsel the names of and other information about the State’s witnesses not later than ten days before trial ....
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Wilkins v. State, 291 Ga. 483 (Ga. 2012).

Cited 24 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 10, 2012 | 731 S.E.2d 346, 2012 Fulton County D. Rep. 2780

...s witness list to testify at trial. Because appellant opted into reciprocal discovery pursuant to OCGA § 17-16-2 (a), the State was required to provide the defense with the State’s list of witnesses no later than ten days before trial. See OCGA § 17-16-8 (a). OCGA § 17-16-6 sets forth the remedies for a defendant upon the State’s failure to comply with OCGA § 17-16-8, providing that the court may order the state to permit the discovery or inspection, interview of the witness, grant a continuance, or, upon a showing of prejudice and bad faith, prohibit the state from introducing the evidence not disclos...
.... *487Thus, by it plain terms, “the severe sanction of exclusion of evidence applies only where there has been a showing of bad faith by the State and prejudice to the defense.” Cockrell v. State, 281 Ga. 536, 539 (640 SE2d 262) (2007). Even assuming the State violated the requirements of OCGA § 17-16-8, we find no abuse of the trial court’s broad discretion in fashioning its remedy....
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Carter v. State, 677 S.E.2d 71 (Ga. 2009).

Cited 23 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Apr 28, 2009 | 285 Ga. 394, 2009 Fulton County D. Rep. 1522

...to both a hearsay statement purportedly made by the victim days before her death and a prior inconsistent statement of a prosecution witness. The State objected on the ground that appellants did not comply with proper discovery procedures. See OCGA § 17-16-8(a)....
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Norris v. State, 709 S.E.2d 792 (Ga. 2011).

Cited 21 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Apr 26, 2011 | 289 Ga. 154, 2011 Fulton County D. Rep. 1345

...ten days before trial, . . . unless for good cause the judge allows an exception to this requirement, in which event [defense] counsel shall be afforded an opportunity to interview such witnesses prior to the witnesses being called to testify." OCGA § 17-16-8(a)....
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Armour v. State, 290 Ga. 553 (Ga. 2012).

Cited 20 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 27, 2012 | 722 S.E.2d 751, 2012 Fulton County D. Rep. 615

...793, 796 (716 SE2d 183) (2011). (b) Appellant claims that his trial counsel was not adequately prepared for trial based on an alleged failure to properly object when the State violated the discovery statute by disclosing 47 witnesses less than ten days before trial. See OCGA § 17-16-8 (a)....
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Hudson v. State, 669 S.E.2d 94 (Ga. 2008).

Cited 18 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 3, 2008 | 284 Ga. 595, 2008 Fulton County D. Rep. 3488

...ce the defense disclosed to the State on the third day of trial. However, under the reciprocal discovery rules, a defendant's attorney must furnish opposing counsel with information on defense witnesses "no later than five days prior to trial." OCGA § 17-16-8(a)....
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Reed v. State, 878 S.E.2d 217 (Ga. 2022).

Cited 12 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 7, 2022 | 314 Ga. 534

...continuance.”). “Without a clear showing of abuse of this broad discretion, this Court will not disturb a trial court’s decision to deny a motion for continuance.” Phoenix v. State, 304 Ga. 785, 788 (2) (822 SE2d 195) (2018). Under OCGA § 17-16-8 (a), not later than ten days before trial, the State is generally required to identify all its witnesses for trial and provide specific information about them to the defense, unless 37 the trial cour...
...otifying Reed’s counsel that the State was interviewing the witnesses on Prickett’s list and that it intended to call one of them (not Feggins) at trial and offering to provide the witness statements if Reed’s defense did not 17 OCGA § 17-16-8 (a) provides: The prosecuting attorney, not later than ten days before trial, ....
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Kimbro v. State, 317 Ga. 442 (Ga. 2023).

Cited 11 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 11, 2023

...543, 554 (883 SE2d 815) (2023), and as discussed above, the trial court’s remedy of allowing Kimbro time to interview witnesses before they testified was adequate. It is unclear whether Kimbro contends in his brief on appeal that the prosecutor violated certain discovery statutes. See OCGA §§ 17-16-8 (a) (requiring the prosecutor in a felony case to provide to the defense certain information regarding witnesses “not later than ten days before trial” or “as otherwise ordered by the court”) & 17-16-4 (a) (3) (A) (requiring the pr...
...d that the delay between the alleged crimes and the indictment violated his right to due process and explaining that “to prosecute a defendant following court did not abuse its discretion by employing the remedies discussed above. See OCGA §§ 17-16-8 (a) (stating that if a trial court, for good cause, allows the State to file required witness information late, the court shall permit the defense an opportunity to interview witnesses before they testify) & 17-16-6 (providing several reme...
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Gen. Motors, LLC v. Buchanan, 874 S.E.2d 52 (Ga. 2022).

Cited 11 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 1, 2022 | 313 Ga. 811

...supported by discovery responses); DeVaughn v. State, 296 Ga. 475, 478 (3) (769 SE2d 70) (2015) (trial court “did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the State had established good cause for allowing an exception to the ten-day rule” in OCGA § 17-16-8 (a) that requires disclosure of a witness at least ten days before trial where, after substantial efforts to find the witness, the State “was able to identify and speak with [him] for the first time as the jury was being selected”); Harris v....
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Sconyers v. State, 901 S.E.2d 170 (Ga. 2024).

Cited 8 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Apr 30, 2024 | 318 Ga. 855

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Holloway v. State, 911 S.E.2d 543 (Ga. 2025).

Cited 6 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jan 28, 2025 | 320 Ga. 653

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Hines v. State, 867 S.E.2d 85 (Ga. 2021).

Cited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Dec 14, 2021 | 313 Ga. 1

...Rican, yo, shut up talking to me, yo, you don’t know what I do to you, I’ll hurt you, yo, I’ll kill you, yo.” And, according to Johnson, Hines was using “the B word” to refer to Gaines.2 2. On appeal, Hines essentially contends that the State violated OCGA § 17-16-8 (a) by failing to disclose Johnson as a witness at least ten days before trial,3 and that the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to exclude her testimony pursuant to the 2 It is not clear from Johnson’s testimony on which days — or how long before the murder — she was in Gaines’s apartment and overheard Hines threaten to kill Gaines. 3 OCGA § 17-16-8 (a) provides: The prosecuting attorney, not later than ten days before trial, ....
... remedial provisions contained in OCGA § 17-16-6.4 In this regard, Hines asserts that Johnson was a “surprise witness” and that he received insufficient time to investigate her and prepare for her testimony. We disagree. To begin, we discern no violation of OCGA § 17-16-8 (a) with respect to Johnson....
...forward on the day of trial. Defense counsel did not dispute the prosecutor’s explanation, which the trial court accepted, finding that Johnson was “newly discovered.” Moreover, the transcript shows that the trial court complied with OCGA § 17-16-8 (a) by affording Hines “an opportunity to interview” Johnson before she was called to testify. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing an exception to the ten-day requirement under OCGA § 17-16-8 (a)....
...allowing an exception to the ten-day rule” where, after substantial efforts to find the witness, the State “was able to identify and speak 8 with [him] for the first time as the jury was being selected”). Because the requirements of OCGA § 17-16-8 (a) were satisfied with respect to Johnson, we need not decide whether the trial court also abused its discretion when it declined to exclude Johnson’s testimony under OCGA § 17-16-6, which provides certain remedies when the State ...
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Putnal v. State, 303 Ga. 569 (Ga. 2018).

Cited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 7, 2018

...nferences could give the State an advantage at trial. In particular, because Putnal has opted into reciprocal discovery, prior to trial the defense must disclose the names of any experts it intends to call at either phase of the trial. See OCGA §§ 17-16-8 (a) (governing the timing of the defendant’s disclosure to the State of information regarding the defendant’s intended trial witnesses); 17-16-4 (b) (3) (C) (same regarding the defendant’s sentencing phase witnesses)....
...While in that circumstance he would have a duty as a result of opting into reciprocal discovery to disclose the identities of these mental health experts to the State, that duty would arise only after the State had disclosed its witnesses’ identities to Putnal. See OCGA §§ 17-16-8 (a); 17-16-4 (b) (3) (C)....
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Putnal v. State, 814 S.E.2d 307 (Ga. 2018).

Cited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 7, 2018

...e inferences could give the State an advantage at trial. In particular, because Putnal has opted into reciprocal discovery, prior to trial the defense must disclose the names of any experts it intends to call at either phase of the trial. See OCGA §§ 17-16-8 (a) (governing the timing of the defendant's disclosure to the State of information regarding the defendant's intended trial witnesses); 17-16-4 (b) (3) (C) (same regarding the defendant's sentencing phase witnesses)....
...While in that circumstance he would have a duty as a result of opting into reciprocal discovery to disclose the identities of these mental health experts to the State, that duty would arise only after the State had disclosed its witnesses' identities to Putnal. See OCGA §§ 17-16-8 (a) ; 17-16-4 (b) (3) (C)....

Jester v. State (Ga. 2025).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 16, 2025

...Finally, Jester claims that the trial court erred by admitting testimony from an expert witness in latent print examination 19 because the State allegedly failed to include her on its witness list, see OCGA § 17-16-8(a), and failed to permit the defense to inspect and copy her scientific report, see OCGA § 17-16-4(a)(4)....
...for plain error because the appellant failed to make a specific objection at trial to the admission of the evidence on the grounds asserted on appeal). Even assuming that the State failed to comply with OCGA §§ 20 17-16-8(a) and 17-16-4(a)(4), Jester has not established that the trial court clearly and obviously erred by not excluding the expert’s testimony. OCGA § 17-16-6 provides that if the State does not follow the discovery procedures in OCGA §§ 17-16-8(a) and 17-16-4(a)(4), the trial court may elect to impose various remedies, including ordering the State to permit the discovery, allowing the defense to interview the witness who was not disclosed, granting a continuance, or “upon a showing of prejudice and bad faith, prohibit[ing] the state from ......

Devaughn v. State (Ga. 2015).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 2, 2015

... 1354, 158 LE2d 177) (2004). Looking to the argument made in support of this enumeration, Appellant’s real complaint is that the State violated a criminal discovery statute by not informing the defense that Branch would testify until the first day of trial. OCGA § 17-16-8 (a) requires the prosecutor to disclose to defense counsel the names of and other information about the State’s witnesses not later than ten days before trial ....
...ion to the ten-day rule. See Puga-Cerantes v. State, 281 Ga. 78, 80 (635 SE2d 118) (2006) (finding that good cause was shown where a witness fled prior to trial and was not located again until the first day of trial). The court complied with OCGA § 17-16-8 (a) by granting the defense a continuance until noon the following day to interview Branch and review his statement to the investigators; Appellant was also excused from the requirement of obtaining certified copies of Branch’s prior convictions for impeachment....