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O.C.G.A.Title 17Chapter 4

O.C.G.A. § 17-4-26 (2020)

Duty to bring persons arrested before judicial officer within 72 hours; notice to accused of time and place of commitment hearing; effect of failure to notify

Edition and currency
O.C.G.A. 2020 print volume: Georgia laws through the 2020 session at the latest. The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations for this section are from the 2020 print volume of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). Georgia Acts after that are not in this text. The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
Other sources
CURRENTO.C.G.A. 2020 print volume: Georgia laws through the 2020 session at the latest cited 1984–2025 25citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 25 opinions since 1984, 3 of them in the last five years.

Every law enforcement officer arresting under a warrant shall exercise reasonable diligence in bringing the person arrested before the judicial officer authorized to examine, commit, or receive bail and in any event to present the person arrested before a committing judicial officer within 72 hours after arrest. The accused shall be notified as to when and where the commitment hearing is to be held. An arrested person who is not notified before the hearing of the time and place of the commitment hearing shall be released.

History

Orig. Code 1863, § 4606; Code 1868, § 4629; Code 1873, § 4726; Code 1882, § 4726; Penal Code 1895, § 899; Penal Code 1910, § 920; Code 1933, § 27-210; Ga. L. 1956, p. 796, § 1; Ga. L. 1995, p. 932, § 1.

Annotations

Cross references. - Delivery of mentally ill persons, alcoholics, and others to emergency receiving facilities upon apprehension by peace officer, §§ 37-3-41, 37-3-42, 37-7-41, 37-7-42. Bail in magistrate court felony cases, Uniform Rules for the Magistrate Courts, Rule 23.2. Initial appearance hearing in magistrate court,

Uniform Rules for the Magistrate Courts, Rule 13.

Law reviews. - For article discussing preliminary hearings in felony cases as necessary to satisfy due process requirements, see 12 Ga. St. B.J. 207 (1976). For note, ‘‘Bail in Georgia: Elimination of ‘Double Bonding’ - A Partially Solved Problem,’’ see 8 Ga. St. B.J. 220 (1971). For note, ‘‘A ‘Critical’ Question of State Law: Georgia’s Ambiguous Treatment of Initial Appearance Hearings and the Implications of Bail Reform,’’ see 54 Ga. L. Rev. 363 (2019).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS ANALYSIS GENERAL CONSIDERATION LIMITATIONS ON RELEASE FOR DELAY General Consideration Person who is arrested and released within the time prescribed by law on an appearance bond is not entitled to a commitment hearing. Watts v. Pitts, 253 Ga. 501, 322 S.E.2d 252 (1984). Time for holding commitment hearing. - O.C.G.A. § 17-4-26 requires that a person arrested be brought before a committing judicial officer within 72 hours after arrest, but the statute does not require a commitment hearing within that time; to the extent that the language in footnote 3 of Boyd v. St. Lawrence, 281 Ga. 300 n. 3 (2006), conflicts with this holding, it is hereby disapproved. Tidwell v. Paxton, 282 Ga. 641, 651 S.E.2d 714 (2007).

Failure to hold commitment hearing. - There was no constitutional error after a magistrate failed to hold a commitment hearing when an accused was brought before the magistrate within 72 hours of arrest. State v. Godfrey, 204 Ga. App. 58, 418 S.E.2d 383, cert. denied, 204 Ga. App. 922, 418 S.E.2d 383 (1992). Sanction for violating O.C.G.A. § 17-4-62 is that the defendant shall be released and does not require suppression of evidence gathered in the interim. Chisholm v. State, 231 Ga. App. 835, 500 S.E.2d 14 (1998). Duty of custodians. - Although the plain language of O.C.G.A. §§ 17-4-21 and 17-4-26 directs the ‘‘arresting’’ officer to bring the detainee before a judicial officer, but omits any similar directive for

General Consideration (Cont’d) custodians or third party entities entrusted with incarcerating the arrestee, the court was unwilling to allow Burke County, Georgia, to hide behind a technicality. However, whether the county’s inaction amounted to a constitutional violation could not be resolved until the facts surrounding the agreement between the City of Midville and Burke County and the relationship between the Midville Police Department and the Burke County Sheriff ’s Department were more fully developed. Bunyon v. Burke County, 306 F. Supp. 2d 1240 (S.D. Ga. 2004). Cited in Johnson v. Plunkett, 215 Ga. 353, 110 S.E.2d 745 (1959); McCranie v. Mullis, 221 Ga. 617, 146 S.E.2d 723 (1966); Jackson v. State, 225 Ga. 39, 165 S.E.2d 711 (1968); Blair v. State, 230 Ga. 409, 197 S.E.2d 362 (1973); Gill v. Decatur County, 129 Ga. App. 697, 201 S.E.2d 21 (1973); Thomas v. State, 233 Ga. 237, 210 S.E.2d 675 (1974); State v. Houston, 234 Ga. 721, 218 S.E.2d 13 (1975); Tarpkin v. State, 236 Ga. 67, 222 S.E.2d 364 (1976); Lewis v. State, 246 Ga. 101, 268 S.E.2d 915 (1980); Lang v. Baker, 248 Ga. 431, 286 S.E.2d 433 (1982); Tucker v. State, 249 Ga. 323, 290 S.E.2d 97 (1982); Jones v. State, 252 Ga. 385, 313 S.E.2d 103 (1984). Limitations on Release for Delay It was not the intent of this section to require a useless act. Johnson v. State, 215 Ga. 839, 114 S.E.2d 35 (1960), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 849, 82 S. Ct. 81, 7 L. Ed. 2d 47 (1961). Indictment of defendant in capital case within three days. - After a defendant was indicted in a capital case within 72 hours after the defendant’s arrest, the incarceration was by reason of the indictment and not the warrant; this section could have no application since a committal court would have no jurisdiction to determine whether or not there was probable cause for indictment after the indictment had already been returned. Johnson v. State, 215 Ga. 839, 114 S.E.2d 35 (1960), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 849, 82 S. Ct. 81, 7 L. Ed. 2d 47 (1961). Failure to bring defendant to magistrate not unconstitutional. - Though this section required that an offi-

cer arresting under a warrant bring the person arrested before a committing officer within 72 hours after arrest, failure to take an arrestee before a magistrate was not a federal constitutional issue. Stephenson v. Gaskins, 539 F.2d 1066 (5th Cir. 1976). Requirement for hearing within three days. - Defendant arrested on a warrant must be taken before the committing magistrate within 72 hours after the defendant’s arrest but this means that the defendant must be presented to the committing magistrate and notified as to when and where the committal hearing is to be held, not that the hearing itself must be within the 72-hour period. Whitfield v. State, 115 Ga. App. 231, 154 S.E.2d 294 (1967). Release not required if hearing not within three days. - First sentence of this section imposed no penalty if the arresting officer failed to take the accused before a committing officer within 72 hours, nor was there any provision that the offender was to be released if no committal hearing was held within 72 hours. Pennaman v. Walton, 220 Ga. 295, 138 S.E.2d 571 (1964). Detention illegal without hearing in three days. - When the facts show that the arresting officers did bring the defendant before the magistrate within 72 hours after the arrest, the fact that the magistrate set the committal hearing more than 72 hours after the arrest does not make the defendant’s detention illegal. Dodson v. Grimes, 220 Ga. 269, 138 S.E.2d 311 (1964). There is no requirement for a hearing within 72 hours after the arrest and the fact that one is not set until more than 72 hours after such arrest would not make the prisoner’s detention illegal. Beavers v. State, 132 Ga. App. 94, 207 S.E.2d 550 (1974). Denial of hearing ground for preindictment habeas corpus. - Although not ground for post-conviction habeas corpus due to mootness, denial of a commitment hearing would be ground for a preindictment habeas corpus. McClure v. Hopper, 234 Ga. 45, 214 S.E.2d 503 (1975).

Failure to conduct commitment hearing moot after grand jury indictment. - Issue of whether the defendant was entitled to habeas relief on the ground that the defendant was denied the defendant’s right to a commitment hearing prior to the indictment was moot after the defendant had been indicted by the grand jury. Spears v. Johnson, 256 Ga. 518, 350 S.E.2d 468 (1986). Court still has jurisdiction despite illegal detention. - Although an arresting officer may be liable in damages for false arrest and imprisonment when the officer detains the defendant in an illegal manner, this is ordinarily immaterial so far as the jurisdiction of the court over the defendant is concerned after jurisdiction has been acquired by accusation or indictment, and appearance and pleading by

the defendant, in a criminal case. French v. State, 99 Ga. App. 149, 107 S.E.2d 890 (1959). Delay does not invalidate trial and judgment. - Delay in the holding of the commitment hearing within the requirements of this section in no way vitiated the indictment, trial, verdict, and judgment of conviction and sentence. Heard v. State, 126 Ga. App. 62, 189 S.E.2d 895 (1972); Robinson v. State, 182 Ga. App. 423, 356 S.E.2d 55 (1987). Arrestee misbehavior may justify delay. - What is reasonable diligence depends upon the peculiar facts of each case; the conduct of the prisoner may excuse the delay. Blocker v. Clark, 126 Ga. 484, 54 S.E. 1022, 7 L.R.A. (n. s.) 268, 8 Ann. Cas. 31 (1906).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Probation violators. - O.C.G.A. § 17-4-26 applies equally to probation violators who are arrested under warrants secured at the instance of probation supervisors. 1988 Op. Att’y Gen. No. U88-14. Magistrate court may, sua sponte, order the release of arrestees who have been arrested without a warrant and when no warrant has been procured as required by O.C.G.A. § 17-4-26, and also when an individual has been arrested with a warrant, but has not been afforded

a first appearance hearing within 72 hours of arrest as required by that section. 1988 Op. Att’y Gen. No. U88-14. Waiver. - While it is possible for an individual to waive the individual’s statutory right to a ‘‘first appearance,’’ in writing, it would be necessary in every instance for a court to ensure that such a waiver is intelligently and competently made, and that the court’s findings be made a part of the record of the case. 1988 Op. Att’y Gen. No. U88-14.

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 5 Am. Jur. 2d, Arrest, § 75 et seq. C.J.S. - 22 C.J.S., Criminal Procedure and Rights of the Accused, § 21 et seq. ALR. - Civil liability of officer making arrest under warrant as affected by his failure to exhibit warrant, or to state fact

of, or substance of, warrant, 100 A.L.R. 188. Liability of governmental unit or its officers for injury to innocent pedestrian or occupant of parked vehicle, or for damage to such vehicle, as result of police chase, 100 A.L.R.3d 815.

The 20 cases that cite O.C.G.A. § 17-4-26 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENBunyon v. Burke Cnty., 285 F. Supp. 2d 1310 (S.D. Ga. 2003).
cites § 17-4-26 11×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 17-4-26
“) Georgia law, O.C.G.A. § 17-4-26, does not obviate the need to take an arrestee before a committing officer because a schedule of bails has been established.”
2
GREENSmith v. Nichols, 512 S.E.2d 279 (Ga. 1999).
cites § 17-4-26 6×cited by 20 cases
Where it cites § 17-4-26
“7 (b) Appellant complains that, contrary to the provisions of OCGA §§ 17-4-26 8 and 42-8-38 (arrest of probationer for violation of probationary terms), he never received a preliminary hearing on the probation revocation warrant within 72 hours of his arrest.”
Later courts cite it for
“to appeal directly the denial of a petition for habeas corpus relief.” · 2 citing courts
3
GREENRothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 554 U.S. 191 (2008).
cites § 17-4-26 1×cited by 427 cases
Where it cites § 17-4-26
“111 (West 2007); (8) Georgia: see Ga. Code Ann. §§ 17-4-26 (2004), 17-12-23 (Supp.”
The case’s holding
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches at an Article 15.17 magistration hearing (the obligation to appoint counsel follows the attachment of this right).
Later courts cite it for
“a criminal defendant's initial appearance before a judicial officer, where he learns the charge against him and his liberty is subject to restriction, marks the start of adversary judicial proceedings that trigger attachment of the sixth amendment right to counsel.” · 36 citing courts
4
GREENMaurice Walker v. City of Calhoun, GA, 901 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 2018).
cites § 17-4-26 1×cited by 55 cases
Where it cites § 17-4-26
“See Ga. Code Ann. § 17-4-26 . Whether such lengths of delay are permissible is not a question before us.”
The case’s holding
A plaintiff seeking a prompt pretrial determination of a distinct issue that does not interfere with subsequent prosecution does not require the court to abstain from jurisdiction.
Later courts cite it for
“merely asks for a prompt pretrial determination of a distinct issue, which will not interfere with subsequent prosecution” · 5 citing courts
5
GREENRoss v. State, 326 S.E.2d 194 (Ga. 1985).
cites § 17-4-26 2×cited by 95 cases
Where it cites § 17-4-26
“On September 4, Ross was brought before a DeKalb County magistrate for a “first appearance” (see OCGA §§ 17-4-26 and 17-4-62), at which a date was set for his committal hearing (see OCGA §§ 17-7-23 and 17-7-24).”
The case’s holding
In capital sentencing, the jury may consider evidence of uncharged crimes to make an individualized punishment determination after finding a statutory aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt.
Later courts cite it for
“making a unique, individualized judgment regarding the punishment that a particular person deserves.” · 1 citing court
6
GREENWatts v. Pitts, 322 S.E.2d 252 (Ga. 1984).
cites § 17-4-26 7×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 17-4-26
“They rely on OCGA § 17-4-26 which provides that an arrestee shall be brought before a judicial officer within 72 hours of an arrest under a warrant.”
Later courts cite it for
“direetive to the arresting officer to take the arrestee before a judicial officer within the prescribed time, or release the arrestee.” · 1 citing court
7
GREENSherrilyn Taylor v. Richard Taylor, 649 F. App'x 737 (11th Cir. 2016).
cites § 17-4-26 1×cited by 23 casesunpublished
Where it cites § 17-4-26
“Taylor also relied on O.C.G.A. § 17-4-26, which, like Rule 5, requires an arresting officer to take an arrestee before a committing judicial officer within 72 hours after arrest.”
Later courts cite it for
“the defense of qualified immunity aims to strike a balance between 'the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” · 4 citing courts
8
GREENChisholm v. State, 500 S.E.2d 14 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998).
cites § 17-4-26 4×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 17-4-26
“1; OCGA §§ 17-4-26; 17-4-62; County of Riverside v.”
9
GREENCapestany v. State, 656 S.E.2d 196 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007).
cites § 17-4-26 4×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 17-4-26
“9 Because OCGA § 17-6-1 (d) does not provide this or any other remedy for the failure to conduct a timely hearing, however, the appellants’ argument fails.”
10
GREENDylan Mitchell v. Eugene Doherty, 37 F.4th 1277 (7th Cir. 2022).
cites § 17-4-26 1×cited by 19 cases
Where it cites § 17-4-26
“”); Ga. Code Ann. § 17-4-26 (2021) (“Every law enforcement officer arresting under a war- rant shall exercise reasonable diligence in bringing the person arrested before the judicial officer authorized to examine, commit, or receive bail and in any event to present the person…”
Later courts cite it for
“states have a strong interest in promoting public safety, and the demands of federalism require flexibility and experimentation.” · 2 citing courts
11
GREENZiahonna Teagan v. City of McDonough, 949 F.3d 670 (11th Cir. 2020).
cites § 17-4-26 1×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 17-4-26
“See Ga. Code Ann. § 17-4-26 ; Ga. Unif. Mun. Ct.”
Later courts cite it for
“critical and threshold question is whether” · 3 citing courts
12
GREENRobinson v. State, 356 S.E.2d 55 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987).
cites § 17-4-26 3×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 17-4-26
“(The record shows warrants were obtained after defendant’s arrest in an abundance of caution by one of the arresting law enforcement officers.”
13
GREENSpears v. Johnson, 350 S.E.2d 468 (Ga. 1986).
cites § 17-4-26 4×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 17-4-26
“On September 3, 1986, Spears filed a petition for habeas corpus, maintaining he was entitled to be released because he had not received a commitment hearing to which he was entitled under OCGA § 17-4-26. A hearing on Spears’ habeas petition was held on September 5, 1986, at…”
14
GREENTidwell v. Paxton, 651 S.E.2d 714 (Ga. 2007).
cites § 17-4-26 8×cited by 1 case
Where it cites § 17-4-26
“839 ( 452 SE2d 109 ) (1995) (although OCGA § 17-4-26 2 provides that a defendant must *642 be released from custody if not provided a commitment hearing within 72 hours of his arrest pursuant to a warrant, a defendant’s indictment moots question of whether he should have been…”
15
GREENState v. Ruff, 335 S.E.2d 687 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985).
cites § 17-4-26 4×cited by 4 cases
Where it cites § 17-4-26
“323, 325 (2), supra, our Supreme Court affirmed the denial of a motion to quash the indictment where the defendant relied upon a failure to comply with the statutory 72-hour limit.”
16
GREENJenkins v. Chief Just. of the Dist. Court Dept., 619 N.E.2d 324 (Mass. 1993).
cites § 17-4-26 1×cited by 23 cases
Where it cites § 17-4-26
“[29] See Ga. Code Ann. § 17-4-26 (1990); La. Code Crim.”
The case’s holding
The state constitution requires a judicial determination of probable cause following a warrantless arrest, which must generally occur within twenty-four hours.
Later courts cite it for
“it is by now firmly established that, in some circumstances, art. 14 affords greater protection against arbitrary government action than do the cognate provisions of the fourth amendment.” · 2 citing courts
17
GREENBoyd v. St. Lawrence, 637 S.E.2d 687 (Ga. 2006).
cites § 17-4-26 2×cited by 1 case
Where it cites § 17-4-26
“839 ( 452 SE2d 109 ) (1995) (although OCGA § 17-4-26 provides that a defendant must be released from custody if not provided a commitment hearing within 72 hours of his arrest pursuant to a warrant, a defendant’s indictment moots question of whether he should have been brought…”
18
GREENPurvis v. City of Atlanta, 142 F. Supp. 3d 1337 (N.D. Ga. 2015).
cites § 17-4-26 2×cited by 1 case
Where it cites § 17-4-26
“§ 35-3-36 (describing reporting duties of criminal justice agencies); O.C.G.A. § 17-4-26 ("Every law enforcement officer arresting under a warrant shall exercise reasonable diligence in bringing the person arrested before the judicial officer authorized to examine, commit, or…”
19
GREENBunyon v. Burke Cnty., 306 F. Supp. 2d 1240 (S.D. Ga. 2004).
cites § 17-4-26 1×cited by 2 cases
Where it cites § 17-4-26
“§ 17-4-26 (emphasis added). Although the plain language of these statutes directs the “arresting” officer to bring the detainee before a judicial officer, but omits any similar directive for custodians or third party entities entrusted with incarcerating the arrestee, I am…”
20
GREENTroy Latrell Cooper v. State, 895 S.E.2d 522 (Ga. Ct. App. 2023).
cites § 17-4-26 12×cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 17-4-26
“Cooper claims that the trial court erred by failing to dismiss the revocation petition based on his post-arrest confinement for 44 days without a hearing, in violation of OCGA §§ 17-4-26 and 42-8-38. We conclude that dismissal was not warranted here.”

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
198420042025

One bar per year. Tallest: 2 cases in 1984. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Ga.7Ga. Ct. App.6S.D. Ga.411th Cir.3Mass.27th Cir.1N.D. Ga.1SCOTUS1
By subsection

Courts have not cited this section by subsection, so its cases are not split up here. The Leading cases tab lists the cases that cite it most heavily.

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Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: O.C.G.A. 2020 print volume: Georgia laws through the 2020 session at the latest. Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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