O.C.G.A. § 17-6-11 (2019)
Display of driver’s license for violation of certain traffic related laws; notice of failure to appear; suspension of license; arrest; seizure of license
(a)(1) When an individual is apprehended by an officer for the violation of the laws of this state or ordinances relating to the offenses listed in paragraph (2) of this subsection, he or she may display his or her driver’s license and be issued a uniform traffic citation in lieu of being: (A) Brought before the proper magistrate or other judicial officer; (B) Incarcerated; (C) Ordered to post a bond; or (D) Ordered a recognizance for his or her appearance for trial. (2) This subsection shall apply to any violation: (A) Of Title 40 except any offense: (i) For which a driver’s license may be suspended for a first offense by the commissioner of driver services; (ii) Covered under Code Section 40-5-54; or (iii) Covered under Article 15 of Chapter 6 of Title 40; (B) Involving the width, height, and length of vehicles and loads; (C) Involving motor common carriers and motor contract carriers; (D) Involving hazardous materials transportation; or (E) Involving road taxes on motor carriers as provided in Article 2 of Chapter 9 of Title 48. (3) The apprehending officer shall include the individual’s driver’s license number on the uniform traffic citation. The uniform traffic citation, duly served as provided in this Code section, shall give the judicial officer jurisdiction to dispose of the matter. (4) Upon display of the driver’s license, the apprehending officer shall release the individual so charged for his or her further appearance before the proper judicial officer as required by the uniform traffic citation. (b)(1) When a uniform traffic citation is issued and if the accused fails to appear for court or otherwise dispose of his or her charges before his or her scheduled court appearance as stated on the uniform traffic citation, prior to the court issuing a bench warrant, the clerk of
court shall notify the accused by first-class mail or by postcard at the address listed on the uniform traffic citation of his or her failure to appear. Such notice shall be dated and allow the accused 30 days from such date to dispose of his or her charges or waive arraignment and plead not guilty. If after the expiration of such 30 day period the accused fails to dispose of his or her charges or waive arraignment and plead not guilty, the clerk of court in which the charges are lodged shall, within five days of such date, forward to the Department of Driver Services the accused’s driver’s license number. The commissioner of driver services shall, upon receipt of such driver’s license number, suspend such accused’s driver’s license and driving privilege until notified by the clerk of court that the charge against the accused has been finally adjudicated. Such accused’s driver’s license shall be reinstated when he or she submits proof of the final adjudication and pays to the Department of Driver Services a restoration fee of $50.00 or $25.00 when such reinstatement is processed by mail. (2) This subsection shall not apply to any violation of Title 40: (A) For which a driver’s license may be suspended for a first offense by the commissioner of driver services; (B) Covered under Code Section 40-5-54; or (C) Covered under Article 15 of Chapter 6 of Title 40. (b.1) It shall be the duty of a law enforcement officer or emergency medical technician responding to the scene of any motor vehicle accident or other accident involving a fatal injury to examine immediately the driver’s license of the victim to determine the victim’s wishes concerning organ donation. If the victim has indicated that he or she wishes to be an organ donor, it shall be the duty of such law enforcement officer or emergency medical technician to take appropriate action to ensure, if possible, that the victim’s organs shall not be imperiled by delay in verification by the donor’s next of kin. (c) Nothing in this Code section bars any law enforcement officer from arresting or from seizing the driver’s license of any individual possessing a fraudulent license or a suspended license or operating a motor vehicle while his or her license is suspended, outside the scope of a driving permit, or without a license. (d) The commissioner of driver services shall be authorized to promulgate reasonable rules and regulations to carry out the purposes of this Code section and to establish agreements with other states whereby a valid license from that state may be accepted for purposes of this Code section.
History
Ga. L. 1973, p. 435, §§ 1, 2; Ga. L. 1976, p. 213, § 1; Ga. L. 1979, p.
759, § 1; Ga. L. 1982, p. 1136, §§ 3, 6; Ga. L. 1986, p. 1607, § 1; Ga. L. 1987, p. 542,
§ 3; Ga. L. 1990, p. 8, § 17; Ga. L. 1991, p. 94, § 17; Ga. L. 1991, p. 1776, § 1; Ga. L. 1996, p. 1624, §§ 2, 3; Ga. L. 2000, p. 951, § 12-1; Ga. L. 2005, p. 334, § 7-3/HB 501; Ga. L. 2011, p. 479, § 4/HB 112; Ga. L. 2017, p. 608, § 1/SB 176.
Annotations
Cross references. - Transportation of hazardous materials, § 40-1-20. Prosecution of traffic offenses generally, T. 40, C. 13. Search and notification for information identifying donor status, § 44-5-150.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS Notice provisions comport with due process. - This section is not violative of the due process clause of either the federal or state Constitutions for failure to provide a second notice when the license is forwarded to the Department of Public Safety for suspension. Jones v. State, 241 Ga. 178, 243 S.E.2d 872 (1978). Judge and court administrator protected from suit by judicial and quasi-judicial immunity. - When the appellee sued the appellants, a judge of the former recorder’s court and the court administrator, the appellate court’s opinion was reversed to the extent the opinion allowed the appellee’s suit to move forward against the appellants as the appellants were protected from suit by judicial and quasi-judicial immunity because, at the time, traffic offenses were adjudicated in the recorder’s court; the appellee was dealing with the recorder’s court as part of the court’s official function of adjudicating traffic offenses; the court was obligated to report to the Georgia Department of Driver Services the status of the traffic case; and the act of making the report was a function that was judicial in nature and
was protected by judicial immunity. Withers v. Schroeder, 304 Ga. 394, 819 S.E.2d 49 (2018). Court clerks protected from suit by judicial and quasi-judicial immunity. - Appellant’s suit against clerks of a city municipal court was properly dismissed because the clerks’ failure to perform their duties to withdraw a canceled arrest warrant from the state’s criminal database, which led to the appellant’s arrest and detention, were actions protected by quasi-judicial immunity as to the appellant’s claims of wrongful arrest. Spann v. Davis, No. A20A0202, 2020 Ga. App. LEXIS 368 ( June 22, 2020). Suspended Florida license could not be surrendered in lieu of bail. - Defendant, who was arrested for driving with a suspended Florida driver’s license, was not entitled to surrender that license in lieu of bail and thereby avoid impoundment of the defendant’s vehicle. Pierce v. State, 194 Ga. App. 481, 391 S.E.2d 3 (1990). Cited in Thomason v. Harper, 162 Ga. App. 441, 289 S.E.2d 773 (1982); Young v. City of Atlanta, 631 F. Supp. 1498 (N.D. Ga. 1986).
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Duties to facilitate organ donations under O.C.G.A. § 17-6-12(b.1) must be performed harmoniously with the coro-
ner’s duty to take charge of the body of a fatally injured individual under O.C.G.A. § 45-16-24. 1996 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 96-13.
RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 8A Am. Jur. 2d, Bail and Recognizance, § 81 et seq.