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2018 Georgia Code 17-6-52 | Car Wreck Lawyer

TITLE 17 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Section 6. Bonds and Recognizances, 17-6-1 through 17-6-114.

ARTICLE 2 SURETIES

17-6-52. Soliciting business or loitering around jails or courts to solicit business; giving of advice by law enforcement officers as to services of professional bondsmen.

Professional bondsmen, their agents, or employees shall not solicit business as bondsmen or loiter about or around jails, places where prisoners are confined, or the courts for the purpose of engaging in or soliciting business as such bondsmen. No state or municipal law enforcement officer or keeper or employee of a penal institution may suggest to or give advice to, in any manner whatsoever, any prisoner regarding the services of a professional bondsman to write a criminal bond for the appearance of a prisoner in any court at any time.

(Ga. L. 1921, p. 243, § 3; Code 1933, § 27-504.)

Cross references.

- Prohibition against loitering near inmates generally, § 42-5-17.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Constitutionality generally.

- This section was not unconstitutional because the statute was in conflict with Ga. Const. 1976, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. III (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. II) or Ga. Const. 1976, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XXV (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XXVIII) or with the due process clauses of the state and federal Constitutions; nor is the statute unconstitutional because the statute's provisions are arbitrary and unreasonable. Jackson v. Beavers, 156 Ga. 71, 118 S.E. 751 (1923).

Variance between title and subject matter of legislation.

- Georgia Laws 1921, p. 243, from which Ga. L. 1921, p. 243, § 3 (see O.C.G.A. § 17-6-52) was codified was not unconstitutional because the law violated Ga. Const. 1976, Art. III, Sec. VII, Para. IV (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. V, Para. III). If the body of the Act contained any matters different from what was expressed in the title, those matters can be rejected, as the remainder of the Act set forth a complete scheme, which was capable of enforcement. Jackson v. Beavers, 156 Ga. 71, 118 S.E. 751 (1923).

Construction.

- O.C.G.A. § 17-6-52, which prohibits professional bondsmen from loitering around jails or courts to solicit business, is a criminal statute and must be strictly construed in favor of a bondsman. The statute's underlying purpose is to regulate the business of professional bondsmen, which affords a peculiar opportunity for fraud and imposition upon the persons whom bondsmen serve. Pryor Org., Inc. v. Stewart, 274 Ga. 487, 554 S.E.2d 132 (2001).

Free market solicitation by bondsman not prohibited.

- Construing O.C.G.A. § 17-6-52 strictly, the statute is not intended to have such a far-reaching application as to prohibit a bondsman's free-market solicitation of the general public by means of a commercial filmed on location at a jail or court facility. Pryor Org., Inc. v. Stewart, 274 Ga. 487, 554 S.E.2d 132 (2001).

Clarity of language as to agency and soliciting business.

- This section was not void for lack of clearness and definiteness in that the statute failed to state what acts and things would constitute agency on the part of their employees, and to define the meaning of soliciting business by bondsmen. Jackson v. Beavers, 156 Ga. 71, 118 S.E. 751 (1923).

Cited in State v. Jackson, 188 Ga. App. 259, 372 S.E.2d 823 (1988).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

- Validity, construction, and application of loitering statutes and ordinances, 72 A.L.R.5th 1.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 17-6-52

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Pryor Org., Inc. v. Stewart, 554 S.E.2d 132 (Ga. 2001).

Cited 14 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 1, 2001 | 274 Ga. 487, 2001 Fulton County D. Rep. 2934

...r in the lobby of the Spalding County Sheriff's Office some two years previously. Although the then-sheriff expressly approved the filming, the trial court found that Pryor's act of making the commercial supported the Sheriff's decision because OCGA § 17-6-52 prohibits bondsmen from soliciting or loitering about or around the jail for business purposes. The trial court found that the Sheriff did not abuse his discretion by relying upon OCGA § 17-6-52, and entered *134 a final order denying mandamus....
...Therefore, we must determine if the evidence demanded a finding that Pryor satisfied the requirements set forth in OCGA § 17-6-50 for approval as a "professional bondsperson." OCGA § 17-6-50(b)(4) provides that Pryor must remain "in good standing with respect to all applicable ... state ... laws...." OCGA § 17-6-52 is such a law, and by its terms, it prohibits professional bondsmen from either soliciting business or loitering "about or around jails, places where prisoners are confined, or the courts for the purpose of engaging in or soliciting busine...
...ng which houses county prisoners. Thus, the statute forbids solicitation of bail bond business about or around those premises, and we must decide whether the making of the film at that site constituted a proscribed act of solicitation by Pryor. OCGA § 17-6-52 is a criminal statute....
...ision. Thus, Pryor did not avail itself of any "peculiar opportunity" to commit fraud or to impose upon those whom it served. The advertisement was directed only at those who might need the services of a bondsman at some future time. Construing OCGA § 17-6-52 strictly, it is not intended to have such a far-reaching application as to prohibit a free-market solicitation of the general public by means of a commercial filmed on location at a jail or court facility. Thus, the Sheriff abused his discretion in citing the advertisement as justification for his decision, and the trial court erred in denying mandamus on the ground that Pryor violated OCGA § 17-6-52....