Constitutionality generally.

- This section was not unconstitutional because the statute was in conflict with Ga. Const. 1976, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. III (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. II) or Ga. Const. 1976, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XXV (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XXVIII) or with the due process clauses of the state and federal Constitutions; nor is the statute unconstitutional because the statute's provisions are arbitrary and unreasonable. Jackson v. Beavers, 156 Ga. 71, 118 S.E. 751 (1923).

Variance between title and subject matter of legislation.

- Georgia Laws 1921, p. 243, from which Ga. L. 1921, p. 243, § 3 (see O.C.G.A. § 17-6-52) was codified was not unconstitutional because the law violated Ga. Const. 1976, Art. III, Sec. VII, Para. IV (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. V, Para. III). If the body of the Act contained any matters different from what was expressed in the title, those matters can be rejected, as the remainder of the Act set forth a complete scheme, which was capable of enforcement. Jackson v. Beavers, 156 Ga. 71, 118 S.E. 751 (1923).

Construction.

- O.C.G.A. § 17-6-52, which prohibits professional bondsmen from loitering around jails or courts to solicit business, is a criminal statute and must be strictly construed in favor of a bondsman. The statute's underlying purpose is to regulate the business of professional bondsmen, which affords a peculiar opportunity for fraud and imposition upon the persons whom bondsmen serve. Pryor Org., Inc. v. Stewart, 274 Ga. 487, 554 S.E.2d 132 (2001).

Free market solicitation by bondsman not prohibited.

- Construing O.C.G.A. § 17-6-52 strictly, the statute is not intended to have such a far-reaching application as to prohibit a bondsman's free-market solicitation of the general public by means of a commercial filmed on location at a jail or court facility. Pryor Org., Inc. v. Stewart, 274 Ga. 487, 554 S.E.2d 132 (2001).

Clarity of language as to agency and soliciting business.

- This section was not void for lack of clearness and definiteness in that the statute failed to state what acts and things would constitute agency on the part of their employees, and to define the meaning of soliciting business by bondsmen. Jackson v. Beavers, 156 Ga. 71, 118 S.E. 751 (1923).

Cited in State v. Jackson, 188 Ga. App. 259, 372 S.E.2d 823 (1988).

ALR.

- Validity, construction, and application of loitering statutes and ordinances, 72 A.L.R.5th 1.