Strict construction.

- Former Code 1933, §§ 76-101 and 76-201 (see O.C.G.A. §§ 17-6-90 and17-6-110) were to be strictly construed in favor of the individual against whom the statutes are sought to be applied. Rhodes v. Pearce, 189 Ga. 623, 7 S.E.2d 251 (1940).

Standing to challenge statute.

- Plain language of Georgia's good behavior bond statute, O.C.G.A. § 17-6-90(a), controls two things: (1) the timing and circumstances under which a judicial officer may issue a notice to appear for a show cause hearing; and (2) what action that judicial officer may take following the show cause hearing, including what conditions may be placed on a peace bond. Parker v. Leeuwenburg, 300 Ga. 789, 797 S.E.2d 908 (2017).

In a declaratory judgment action facially challenging Georgia's good behavior bond statute, O.C.G.A. § 17-6-90, the trial court judgment granting summary judgment to appellees was vacated because § 17-6-90(a) did not regulate the appellants' conduct and, in the absence of current peace bonding proceedings or even an allegation that a judicial officer in the county would exercise such discretion, they failed to show nothing more than a hypothetical concern regarding § 17-6-90(a) and, therefore, lacked standing to challenge it. Parker v. Leeuwenburg, 300 Ga. 789, 797 S.E.2d 908 (2017).

Power of superior court judge to issue peace warrant for the arrest and jailing of a person.

- Judge of the superior court did not have power under former Code 1933, § 76-101 (see O.C.G.A. § 17-6-90) to issue a peace warrant for arrest and commitment to jail of a person upon grounds of that section; but the judge has such power under former Code 1933, § 76-201 (see O.C.G.A. § 17-6-110). Rhodes v. Pearce, 189 Ga. 623, 7 S.E.2d 251 (1940).

Jurisdiction of justices of the peace.

- Jurisdiction to issue peace warrants and to hear and determine the cases arising thereunder was expressly conferred upon justices of the peace by former Code 1933, §§ 76-101 and 76-201 (see O.C.G.A. §§ 17-6-90 and17-6-110). Young v. Fain, 121 Ga. 737, 49 S.E. 731 (1905).

Certiorari does not lie to these proceedings before a justice of the peace. Stephens v. Wallis, 75 Ga. 726 (1885).

Bar to investigation of case behind merits.

- Lawful process issued by a court of competent jurisdiction is a bar to any investigation of the merits of the case behind such process. Young v. Fain, 121 Ga. 737, 49 S.E. 731 (1905).

Magistrate has no authority to insert in the warrant directions to levy on property for costs. Stephens v. Wallis, 75 Ga. 726 (1885).

Cited in Britt v. Whitehall Income Fund, 891 F. Supp. 1578 (M.D. Ga. 1993).

Return to county of issuance.

- Peace warrant proceedings must be returned to the superior court of the county in which the warrant was issued. 1974 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U74-7.

Collection of costs in peace warrant proceeding.

- Collection of costs in a peace warrant proceeding which was never returned to the superior court for disposition would be a violation of former Code 1933, §§ 89-9909 and 89-9910 (see O.C.G.A. § 45-11-5) and a misdemeanor. 1974 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U74-7.

Purpose of provision for return to state court.

- Former Code 1933, §§ 76-101 and 76-201 (see O.C.G.A. §§ 17-6-90 and17-6-110) vested jurisdiction for the return of good behavior or peace bonds in the state court in counties in which such a court was established. That change in jurisdiction, not procedure, was the purpose of Ga. L. 1978, p. 1924. 1978 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U78-50.

Probate court jurisdiction.

- Because a probate court may hold a court of inquiry pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-7-20, the court may also issue warrants and require bond pursuant to either O.C.G.A. § 17-6-90 or O.C.G.A. § 17-6-110. 1995 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U95-1.