O.C.G.A.
O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 17-7-22 (2019)

Powers of presiding officer in court of a municipal corporation to bind over or commit criminal offenders to jail

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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Any mayor, recorder, or other proper officer presiding in any court of a municipal corporation shall have authority to bind over or commit to jail offenders against any criminal law whenever, in the course of an investigation before such officer, a proper case therefor is made out by the evidence.

History

Ga. L. 1880-81, p. 176, § 2; Code 1882, § 786c; Penal Code 1895, § 927; Penal Code 1910, § 952; Code 1933, § 27-423.

Annotations

Law reviews. - For note, ‘‘Bail in Georgia: Elimination of ‘Double Bonding’ - A Partially Solved Problem,’’ see 8 Ga. St. B.J. 220 (1971).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Procedure when violations of state law and municipal ordinance are both charged. - When a motorist is charged with a state offense and with violation of a municipal ordinance, both charges based on a single act, and the motorist appears before a municipal court judge, that judge is a judicial officer of the municipality of which the judge is a public servant, and it is within the judge’s power to determine whether the act alleged to have been committed by the motorist constitutes a state offense for which the judge should be bound over to the grand jury, in the judge’s capacity as committing magistrate of this state, or whether such act

constituted a violation of an ordinance of the city, in the capacity as judge of the municipal court. The single act cannot be both. When the municipal court judge finds that there is probable cause to believe that the state offense of involuntary manslaughter has been committed and binds the motorist over to the grand jury, the judge loses jurisdiction of the case. Trowbridge v. Dominy, 92 Ga. App. 177, 88 S.E.2d 161 (1955). Municipal judge does not lose absolute judicial immunity, for purposes of a federal civil rights action, by directing the entry of criminal charges against a witness appearing before the judge in a

pending case, based upon evidence before the judge. Harris v. Deveaux, 780 F.2d 911 (11th Cir. 1986). Waiver of investigation established probable cause. - Waiver of a preliminary hearing by the defendant in a criminal prosecution for shoplifting was tantamount to a finding by the magistrate that there was a sufficient cause to believe the defendant guilty, thereby giving rise to a

prima facie establishment of probable cause for defendant’s arrest and prosecution, voiding the defendant’s suit for malicious prosecution and false imprisonment. Garmon v. Warehouse Groceries Food Ctr., Inc., 207 Ga. App. 89, 427 S.E.2d 308 (1993). Cited in Manor v. Donahoo, 117 Ga. 304, 43 S.E. 719 (1903); Webb v. Ethridge, 849 F.2d 546 (11th Cir. 1988).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Limits on authority. - Mayors and recorders have only commitment jurisdiction as to violations of state statutes, such as that prohibiting possession of liquor on

which taxes have not been paid. Mayors and recorders have no jurisdiction to levy fines or otherwise punish such violations. 1970 Op. Att’y Gen. No. U70-124.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 6 cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1984–2025 · leading case: Garmon v. Warehouse Groceries Food Ctr., Inc., 427 S.E.2d 308 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993).
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Garmon v. Warehouse Groceries Food Ctr., Inc., 427 S.E.2d 308 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993). · cites it 4× “The unrefuted evidence of record establishes that in appellant’s appearance before the city court (see generally OCGA §§ 17-7-22; 17-7-23), appellant’s counsel requested *93 appellant be bound over for a Cobb County jury trial.”
Stephanie Harris v. Clint Deveaux, 780 F.2d 911 (11th Cir. 1986). “O.C.G.A. § 17-7-22. Accordingly, Judge Deveaux clearly had subject matter jurisdiction over the charges against Harris.”
Gerald Fred Webb v. William P. Ethridge & Charles Gay, 849 F.2d 546 (11th Cir. 1988). · cites it 2× “See O.C.G.A. § 17-7-22. Our examination of the rather incomplete transcript of the Recorder’s Court hearing does not permit us to conclude that the issue of probable cause was “actually litigated and determined.”
City of Marietta v. Kelly, 315 S.E.2d 659 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984). · cites it 2× “OCGA § 17-7-22 (Code Ann. § 27-423). We thereby refuse to limit the ordinance’s application to warrants involving only municipal offenses but hold that the ordinance also authorized the Marietta City Council members to issue arrest warrants for state criminal offenses as long as…”
David Butler v. State of Georgia (Ga. Ct. App. 2025). · cites it 4× “Appellee also argues that OCGA §§ 17-7-22;11 17-7-23 (a);12 and 36-32-1 (g)13 — all of which concern a municipal court’s role as a court of inquiry to make probable 11 OCGA § 17-7-22: “Any mayor, recorder, or other proper officer presiding in any court of a municipal corporation…”
Deaunte Paris v. City of Atlanta (Ga. Ct. App. 2023). · cites it 2× “Here, however, the municipal court never acted as a court of inquiry with regard to the accusation alleging state law offenses because it was never presented with any evidence from which it could make a determination of probable cause or a determination to bind over the case to…”
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