Procedure when violations of state law and municipal ordinance are both charged.

- When a motorist is charged with a state offense and with violation of a municipal ordinance, both charges based on a single act, and the motorist appears before a municipal court judge, that judge is a judicial officer of the municipality of which the judge is a public servant, and it is within the judge's power to determine whether the act alleged to have been committed by the motorist constitutes a state offense for which the judge should be bound over to the grand jury, in the judge's capacity as committing magistrate of this state, or whether such act constituted a violation of an ordinance of the city, in the capacity as judge of the municipal court. The single act cannot be both. When the municipal court judge finds that there is probable cause to believe that the state offense of involuntary manslaughter has been committed and binds the motorist over to the grand jury, the judge loses jurisdiction of the case. Trowbridge v. Dominy, 92 Ga. App. 177, 88 S.E.2d 161 (1955).

Municipal judge does not lose absolute judicial immunity, for purposes of a federal civil rights action, by directing the entry of criminal charges against a witness appearing before the judge in a pending case, based upon evidence before the judge. Harris v. Deveaux, 780 F.2d 911 (11th Cir. 1986).

Waiver of investigation established probable cause.

- Waiver of a preliminary hearing by the defendant in a criminal prosecution for shoplifting was tantamount to a finding by the magistrate that there was a sufficient cause to believe the defendant guilty, thereby giving rise to a prima facie establishment of probable cause for defendant's arrest and prosecution, voiding the defendant's suit for malicious prosecution and false imprisonment. Garmon v. Warehouse Groceries Food Ctr., Inc., 207 Ga. App. 89, 427 S.E.2d 308 (1993).

Cited in Manor v. Donahoo, 117 Ga. 304, 43 S.E. 719 (1903); Webb v. Ethridge, 849 F.2d 546 (11th Cir. 1988).

Limits on authority.

- Mayors and recorders have only commitment jurisdiction as to violations of state statutes, such as that prohibiting possession of liquor on which taxes have not been paid. Mayors and recorders have no jurisdiction to levy fines or otherwise punish such violations. 1970 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U70-124.