CopyCited 39 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 24, 2003 | 276 Ga. 343
...Thereafter, he was indicted on February 6, 2002. Following a bond hearing, on March 4, 2002, the trial court rejected English's assertion that because he was not indicted within 90 days of his arrest, he was entitled to bail as a matter of law under OCGA §
17-7-50, which provides in pertinent part: Any person who is arrested for a crime and who is refused bail shall, within 90 days after the date of confinement, be entitled to have the charge against him or her heard by a grand jury having jurisdiction over the accused persons. ... In the event no grand jury considers the charges against the accused person within the 90 day period of confinement ... the accused shall have bail set upon application to the court. (Emphasis supplied.) The trial court found that OCGA §
17-7-50 did not apply to English because even though he was without bail, he had never asked for bail and therefore had not been "refused bail." The court then declined to grant bail to English at that time because it was "unable to find that [English] [posed] no significant *418 threat or danger to any person, to the community or to any property in the community." However, the trial court erred in denying bail to English because of the mandate of OCGA §
17-7-50. The trial court refused to apply OCGA §
17-7-50 to English's petition for bond because of the language "refused bail" in the first sentence of the statute. But the trial court's reading of OCGA §
17-7-50 is at odds with the rules of statutory construction, prior decisions of this Court interpreting the statute, and the realities of English's situation....
...remained in jail is tantamount to his being "refused bail." More significantly, the rules of statutory construction prohibit the phrase "refused bail," from being considered in isolation, and consequently, to limit application of the mandate of OCGA §
17-7-50 to the circumstance in which a criminal defendant has made a request of the court for bond and bond has been refused....
...to make them consistent and harmonious. Id. Finally, "[c]riminal statutes must be construed strictly against the State and in favor of the accused. [Cit.]" Palmer v. State,
260 Ga. 330, 331,
393 S.E.2d 251 (1990). This Court has confirmed that OCGA §
17-7-50 applies to unindicted pre-trial detainees being held without bail, regardless of whether bail was earlier requested and refused. In Burke v. State,
234 Ga. 512, 516-517(5),
216 S.E.2d 812 (1975), this Court was asked to consider Code Ann. § 27-701.1 (Ga.L.1973, pp. 291, 292), the predecessor of OCGA §
17-7-50, which contained the same language as the current statute with regard to non-death penalty cases....
...As to the main appeal, I concur fully in the reversal of the order sustaining the special demurrers to the indictment. With regard to the cross appeal, however, I dissent to the reversal of the denial of English's application for mandatory bail. OCGA §
17-7-50 provides, in relevant part, that [a]ny person who is arrested for a crime and who is refused bail shall, within 90 days after the date of confinement, be entitled to have the charge against him or her heard by a grand jury having jurisdiction over the accused person.......
...109(1),
475 S.E.2d 609 (1996) (defendant twice sought bail, and it was refused both times). Thus, only an accused who actively sought and was "refused bail" within 90 days of his arrest is entitled to mandatory bail pursuant to the last sentence of OCGA §
17-7-50....
...Because he did not seek and was not "refused bail" in the 90 days following his arrest, he did not put the prosecution on notice of his insistence upon being indicted within that period. Consequently, he would not be entitled to mandatory bail under OCGA §
17-7-50 when the 90 days passed and no indictment was returned....
...The majority mistakenly relies on Burke v. State,
234 Ga. 512, 516(5),
216 S.E.2d 812 (1975) for a contrary construction of the statute. All Burke holds is that, "[a]fter ninety days of confinement without bail and without indictment, the mandate of [OCGA §
17-7-50] is that bail must be set by the trial judge." (Emphasis supplied.) Burke v....
...is not applicable to the crimes enumerated in [OCGA §
17-6-1], and that as to those enumerated crimes, the matter of granting bail is still in the discretion of the trial judge." Burke v. State, supra at 517(5),
216 S.E.2d 812. This Court rejected that contention, holding that OCGA §
17-7-50 " is applicable to all crimes after ninety days of confinement. After ninety days of confinement without bail and without indictment, the mandate of [OCGA §
17-7-50] is that bail must be set by the trial judge." (Emphasis supplied.) Burke v....
...While it could be argued that Burke represents implicit authority for the contrary proposition, Rawls, as the more recent decision, would necessarily control this case. Hall v. Hopper,
234 Ga. 625, 629(3),
216 S.E.2d 839 (1975). Under the majority's expansive construction of OCGA §
17-7-50, a defendant could be arrested for the most heinous crimes and, by simply remaining silent and allowing 90 days to pass without the State seeking an indictment, insist on his right to mandatory bail. According to the express terms of OCGA §
17-7-50, however, mandatory bail should be limited to those defendants who, having sought and been "refused bail," put the State on notice that it must obtain an indictment within 90 days of the arrest. Because English is not eligible for mandatory bail under OCGA §
17-7-50, the trial court correctly refused to grant his application seeking it....
..., when used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury; or (3) A person or persons without legal justification by discharging a firearm from within a motor vehicle toward a person or persons. [2] OCGA §
17-7-50 now provides for the request of an extension of the 90 day period when a person is arrested for a crime for which the death penalty is being sought.
CopyCited 18 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 31, 2016 | 793 S.E.2d 49
...nterests. As the parties acknowledged at oral argument, nothing in the statute limits the length ofan extension granted under OCGA §
15-11-521 (b), whereas as soon as the State files a new complaint, it willbe back on the 30-day clock. Compare OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (a) (limiting the extension of time that a superior court may grant to present a criminal charge against a detained juvenile to the grand jury to “one extension ....
...panel’s contrary decision, the D. V. H. panel persisted in ignoring our directly applicable and binding precedent. Instead, the D. V. H. panel cited only C.B. — a case that addresses not a time limitation within the Juvenile Code but rather OCGA §
17-7-50.1, a statute in the Criminal Procedure Code that deals with superior court jurisdiction over juveniles.
In any event, OCGA §
17-7-50.1 is textually different from OCGA §
15-11-521 in a pertinent way. OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (a) requires that a child who is charged with a crime that is within the jurisdiction of the superior court and is detained “shall within 180 days of the date of detention be entitled to have the charge against him or her presented to...
...S.’s conclusion is correct — a question we need not decide today — the statute at issue there provides an express consequence for the State’s failure to meet its 180-day deadline: the case is transferred to the juvenile court to proceed under the Juvenile *57Code. See OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (b)....
CopyCited 14 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Aug 19, 2019
...on
the same charges. After the State nolle prossed the April 2016
indictment, Coleman filed a motion to transfer his case to juvenile
court, arguing that, because the March 2018 indictment was
returned outside the 180-day time limit set by OCGA §
17-7-50.1,
the Superior Court no longer had jurisdiction.1
Relying on the Court of Appeals’ decisions in Edwards v....
...589, 591 (1) (774 SE2d 688)
(2015). When we construe such statutory authority on appeal, our
review is de novo. Hankla v. Postell,
293 Ga. 692, 693 (749 SE2d
726) (2013). With these principles in mind, we turn to the statutory
text in question.
OCGA §
17-7-50.12 provides:
(a) Any child who is charged with a crime that is
within the jurisdiction of the superior court, as provided
in Code Section
15-11-560 or
15-11-561, who is detained
shall within 180 days of the da...
...ile court and
shall proceed thereafter as provided in Chapter 11 of Title
15.
...
In granting Coleman’s motion to transfer, the trial court noted
that the phrase “who is detained” within OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (a) has
been interpreted by the Court of Appeals to mean that “the date of
detention is a specific point in time, rather than an ongoing
condition necessary for the running of the 180-day time limitation.”
Edwards, 323 Ga....
...at 866. Indeed, in Edwards, the Court of
Appeals determined that “nothing in the statute mandates that the
defendant continue to be detained for the entire 180-day period.” Id.
We respectfully disagree.
Turning to the language of OCGA §
17-7-50.1, the statute
entitles a child “who is detained” on criminal charges within the
jurisdiction of the superior court to have those criminal charges
presented to a grand jury within 180 days “of the date of detention.”
Id....
...Accordingly, pursuant to the plain language of the statute,
and contrary to the Court of Appeals’ decision in Edwards, a child
must be detained in order for the 180-day time limitation to run.
Further supporting this conclusion is our prior interpretation
5
of OCGA §
17-7-50.1’s companion statute, OCGA §
17-7-50,3 which
addresses the same issue of ensuring timely indictment of confined
adults. Indeed, we have said that OCGA §
17-7-50 applies only to
unindicted, pre-trial adult detainees who are held in custody for 90
days. See Tatis v. State,
289 Ga. 811 (716 SE2d 203) (2011) (“OCGA
§
17-7-50 ensures that a person ....
...State,
234 Ga. 512 (5) (216 SE2d 812)
(1975), overruled on other grounds by Hutchins v. State,
284 Ga. 395
(667 SE2d 589) (2008).
Reading the statute in its most natural and reasonable way,
we conclude that the 180-day time limitation in OCGA §
17-7-50.1
does not apply to a juvenile who is released and remains on bond
prior to the running of 180 days....
...Based on the foregoing, we overrule
Edwards, and further conclude that the trial court erred in
transferring Coleman’s case to the juvenile court.
Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur, except Peterson, J.,
not participating.
DECIDED AUGUST 19, 2019.
OCGA §
17-7-50.1; transfer order....
CopyCited 9 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 4, 2013 | 738 S.E.2d 86, 2013 Fulton County D. Rep. 180
...More than seven months later, on May 26, 2011, Johnson was indicted for murder in the Superior Court of Whitfield County.
In November 2011, Johnson filed a motion asking the superior court to transfer his case to the juvenile court pursuant to OCGA §
17-7-50.1, which says in relevant part:
(a) Any child who is charged with a crime that is within the jurisdiction of the superior court, as provided in Code Section
15-11-28 or 15-11-30.2, who is detained shall within 180 days of the date of dete...
...roceed thereafter as provided in Chapter 11 of Title 15.
Johnson claimed that both his time in the youth detention center and on bond under the home confinement and electronic monitoring program constituted “detention” within the meaning of OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (a). And because he was not indicted within 180 days of being so detained, Johnson argued, he was entitled to have his indictment dismissed and his case transferred to the juvenile court under OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (b)....
...On June 28, 2012, the trial court issued an order denying Johnson’s motion to dismiss the indictment but granting his motion to transfer the case to the juvenile court, ruling that the home confinement and electronic-monitoring program qualified as detention under OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (a).
The State then filed this direct appeal. At the Court’s request, the parties briefed the question of whether the State was authorized to appeal the trial court’s transfer order. We now hold that the State cannot appeal a transfer order entered under OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (b), and we therefore must dismiss this appeal.1
“The State does not have the right to appeal decisions in criminal cases unless there is a specific statutory provision granting the right.” State v. Caffee,
291 Ga. 31, 33 (728 SE2d 121) (2012). The types of trial *411court rulings that the State may appeal are listed in OCGA §
5-7-1 (a) . When the General Assembly enacted OCGA §
17-7-50.1 in 2006, see Ga. Laws 2006, p. 172, § 2, it did not amend or reference OCGA §
5-7-1 to specifically authorize the State to appeal transfer orders entered pursuant to OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (b). The State contends, however, that an order transferring a case from superior court to juvenile court under OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (b) amounts to “an order... setting aside or dismissing an[ ] indictment,” which the State may appeal under OCGA §
5-7-1 (a) (1). We disagree.
To begin with, OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (b) does not speak of “setting aside,” “dismissing,” or taking any other action regarding an indictment returned against a juvenile....
...ourt after indictment and “after investigation and for extraordinary cause.” Ga. Laws 1994atp. 1034;thenOCGA §
15-11-5 (b) (2) (B); now OCGA §
15-11-28 (b) (2) (B).2
In the same 1994 act, and in distinct contrast to the 2006 act creating OCGA §
17-7-50.1, the General Assembly amended OCGA §
5-7-1 to authorize the State to appeal this type of transfer order....
...fer order to be equivalent to an order dismissing or setting aside an indictment under OCGA §
5-7-1 (a) (1) but instead meant to extend the State’s appeal rights to such transfer orders.
Whether entered under OCGA §
15-11-28 (b) (2) (B) or OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (b), a transfer order has the same effect: it transfers the juvenile’s entire case from the superior court to the juvenile court. There is no reason to believe that a transfer order entered under OCGA §
15-11-28 (b) (2) (B) is not an order dismissing an indictment but a transfer order entered under OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (b) is....
... Walker v. State,
290 Ga. 696, 698 (723 SE2d 894) (2012).
OCGA §§
15-11-28 (b) (2) (B) and
5-7-1 (a) (6) demonstrate the General Assembly knows how to make transfer orders appealable by the State, yet despite referencing OCGA §
15-11-28 in OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (a), the legislature did not similarly authorize the State to appeal transfer orders entered under OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (b)....
...Evra, for appellee.
Having determined that the State was not authorized to bring this appeal, we lack jurisdiction to consider its merits and therefore express no opinion as to the trial court’s transfer order.
Appeal dismissed.
All the Justices concur.
By contrast, a juvenile defendant may appeal an OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (b) order under some circumstances....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 4, 2024 | 319 Ga. 665
...On November 21, 2023, at the
request of the State, the superior court issued an order of nolle
prosequi on the initial July 2023 indictment.
On December 1, 2023, Harris filed a motion to transfer his case
to the juvenile court pursuant to OCGA §
17-7-50.1, arguing that,
because he had been consistently detained since the date of his
arrest, the State was required to indict him within 180 days, and
because the November 2023 reindictment was returned outside that
180-day time period, the superior court no longer had jurisdiction
over his case....
...On appeal, the State argues that the superior court erred in
transferring this case to juvenile court because the grand jury
returned a true bill of indictment against Harris within 180 days of
his arrest and detention in accordance with OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (a),
and a transfer is only required where that deadline passes without
a true bill being returned. See OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (b) (“If the grand
jury does not return a true bill against the detained child within the
time limitations set forth in subsection (a) of this Code section, the
detained child’s case shall be transferred to the juvenile court[.]”).
The State further argues that the subsequent reindictment of Harris
is immaterial to OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (b), which does not purport to
alter the rules of reindictment. For these reasons, the State contends
that the superior court was not authorized by OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (b) to
3
transfer this case to the juvenile court, and its order doing so must
be reversed....
...When
we construe such statutory authority on appeal, our
review is de novo.
State v. Coleman,
306 Ga. 529, 530 (832 SE2d 389) (2019) (citations
and punctuation omitted). With these principles in mind, we turn to
the statutory text in question, OCGA §
17-7-50.1. See id.
In pertinent part, OCGA §
17-7-50.1 provides:
(a) Any child who is charged with a crime that is
within the jurisdiction of the superior court, as provided
in Code Section
15-11-560 or
15-11-561, who is detained
shall within 180 days of the date of...
... against the detained child within the time limitations set
forth in subsection (a) of this Code section, the detained
child’s case shall be transferred to the juvenile court and
shall proceed thereafter as provided in Chapter 11 of Title
15.
OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (a), (b).
In granting Harris’s motion to transfer, the superior court
focused on the term “the charge” found in OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (a)
(“Any child ....
...requires that ‘the charge’ be presented to the grand jury prior to the
180 day mark”; and (3) “while [Harris was] indicted twice for the
5
same incident, [he] was not indicted with the same charges prior to
the 180 day mark.” See OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (a)....
...that an out-
of-time reindictment represents “the state’s failure to obtain the
timely return of a true bill,” which “requires that the case then be
transferred back to juvenile court.” Armendariz,
316 Ga. App. at 396
(1) (citing OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (b)). But that holding is incorrect, is
inconsistent with the plain language of the statute, and therefore is
overruled. See OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (a), (b).
As we explained in Coleman, the text of this statute is clear:
[OCGA §
17-7-50.1] entitles a child “who is detained”
on criminal charges within the jurisdiction of the superior
court to have those criminal charges presented to a grand
jury within 180 days “of the date of detention.” Id....
...at (a).
If the grand jury does not return a true bill “against the
detained child” within 180 days, then the superior court
must transfer “the detained child’s case” to juvenile
court.
Coleman,
306 Ga. at 531 (citing OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (a), (b)).
Reading this language “in its most natural and reasonable
way,” Coleman, 306 Ga....
...at 530, subsection (a) requires that, where
a child defendant is detained on a criminal charge or charges within
the superior court’s jurisdiction, the State must present that
7
“charge” or charges to the grand jury “within 180 days of the date of
detention.” OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (a). And subsection (b) requires a
grand jury to return “a true bill” of indictment against a “detained
child” within 180 days. OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (b) (emphasis supplied).
See also OCGA §
15-12-74 (b) (addressing the procedure to be
followed when “a true bill is returned by the grand jury on any count
of an indictment”)....
...at 530, this
statute provides that, if a grand jury returns a true bill of indictment
against a “detained child” within 180 days of the date of the child’s
detention, that true bill is timely, and the case may proceed in the
superior court. OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (a), (b)....
...If, however, “the grand
jury does not return a true bill against the detained child within [180
8
days of the date of detention]” and the superior court did not
otherwise grant an extension as authorized by OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (a),
the true bill is not timely, and “the detained child’s case shall be
transferred to the juvenile court[.]” OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (b).
Moreover, the statute does not address reindictments at all, let
alone prohibit the return of a true bill on a subsequent indictment
outside the 180-day timeframe specified in OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (a).
Under Georgia law, the State is generally authorized to reindict a
defendant at any time prior to trial, which could include modifying
the charges in the initial indictment or adding additional charges to
the indictment, unless...
...396, 396-397 (1) (614
SE2d 79) (2005) (explaining that a superseding charging instrument
can be returned by a grand jury against a defendant as long as
9
jeopardy did not attach to the first indictment). Thus, while OCGA
§
17-7-50.1 explicitly requires a grand jury to return a true bill of
indictment against a detained child within 180 days of his or her
detention, the statute does not by its clear terms prohibit a
reindictment of that same defendant outside the...
...ires
the case to be transferred to juvenile court. See id.
In this case, Harris was arrested and detained on April 30,
2023, and the grand jury returned a true bill against him on July
28, 2023 — within 180 days of his detention. See OCGA §
17-7-50.1
(a)....
...by the grand jury on November 16, 2023, included charges over
which the superior court retained its exclusive jurisdiction under
OCGA §
15-11-560 (b) (1). Accordingly, given that the true bill of the
July 2023 indictment against Harris was timely returned under
OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (a), we conclude that OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (b) did not
authorize the superior court to transfer this case to juvenile court,
and that order must be reversed.
10
Judgment reversed....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 21, 2016 | 794 S.E.2d 49
Blackwell, Justice.
This case concerns the meaning of OCGA §
17-7-50.1, subsections (a) and (b)1 of which provide as follows:
(a) Any child who is charged with a crime that is within the jurisdiction of the superior court, as provided in Code Section
15-11-560 or
15-11-561, who is detained shall within 180...
..., and Baxter and the State filed the waiver with the superior court.2 In October 2014, however, Baxter filed a motion to transfer his case to juvenile court, asserting that his case had not been timely presented to the grand jury as required by OCGA §
17-7-50.1 and that his waiver was ineffective....
...diction upon a court that otherwise is without it. See
333 Ga. App. at 851-853. We issued a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, and we now reverse.
In our view, the Court of Appeals went astray when it understood OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (a) to absolutely require presentation to the grand jury within 180 days of detention (unless the time is extended by the superior court for good cause). As we have explained before, when we consider the meaning of a statute, “we presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant.” Jackson v. Sanders,
299 Ga. 332, 334 (788 SE2d 387) (2016). Here, OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (a) does not say that a charge “shall be presented” within 180 days....
...See Black’s Law Dictionary, p. 649 (10th ed. 2014) (“entitle” means “[t]o grant a legal right to”). But personal legal rights (even those guaranteed by the Constitution) generally can be relinquished. Even assuming that the right to prompt presentation under OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (a) is a right that can only be lost by way of an affirmative and intentional waiver (as opposed to a forfeiture), see, e.g., Hill v. State,
290 Ga. 493, 494-495 (2) (722 SE2d 708) (2012), there was an express waiver here.
That OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (a) permits the superior court to extend the time for presentation only once and for not more than 90 days does not alter our view of the statute....
..., see OCGA §
15-11-560 (b) (7), and it is divested of that jurisdiction (and must transfer the case to juvenile court) only “[i]f the grand jury does not return a true bill against the detained child within the time limitations set forth in [OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (a)].” OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (b)....
...unning, the child may agree to stop it.
Decided November 21, 2016.
Tom Durden, District Attorney, Sandra Dutton, Assistant District Attorney, for appellant.
Cheryl C. Quick, Catherine G. DeRoth, for appellee.
The Court of Appeals misunderstood OCGA §
17-7-50.1 when it concluded that the statute does not permit a detained child to waive presentation within 180 days of the date of detention....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 3, 2011 | 289 Ga. 811, 2011 Fulton County D. Rep. 3042
...Attys., Samuel S. Olens, Atty. Gen., Paula Khristian Smith, Senior Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee. BENHAM, Justice. We granted the interlocutory application of Brian Tatis to review the trial court's denial of a motion for bond Tatis filed pursuant to OCGA §
17-7-50....
...The Fulton County grand jury returned a true bill of indictment against appellant on February 22, 2011, 92 days after he was arrested and taken to the hospital and 90 days after he was booked into the county jail. [2] On February 23, appellant filed a motion for a reasonable bond to be set pursuant to OCGA §
17-7-50....
..."In all interpretations of statutes, the courts shall look diligently for the intention of the General Assembly" (OCGA §
1-3-1 (a)), giving "ordinary signification" to all words that are not terms of art. OCGA §
1-3-1 (b). In enacting the predecessor of OCGA §
17-7-50 in 1973, the legislature expressly stated the purpose of the law: one who is arrested for a crime and not released on bail is entitled to have the charge or accusation against him heard by a grand jury and is entitled to have bail set if the grand jury does not consider the charges against the accused "within the ninety-day period of confinement" and the accused seeks bail. Ga. L.1973, pp. 291-292. Thus, OCGA §
17-7-50 ensures that a person whose arrest was not precipitated by grand jury indictment, i.e., a person who was arrested on a prosecutor's information or, as in appellant's case, on an arrest warrant obtained by a law enforcement officer, and who...
...re the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, judicial construction is not only unnecessary but forbidden." (Punctuation and footnotes omitted.) Chase v. State,
285 Ga. 693(2),
681 S.E.2d 116 (2009). We believe "confinement" as used in OCGA §
17-7-50, is plain and unambiguous....
...In its fourth edition published in 1968, Black's Law Dictionary defined "confinement," in pertinent part, as "a moral or a physical restraint. . . of the person." The third edition of Webster's Third New International Dictionary, published in 1967, defined "confinement" as "restraint within limits." As far as OCGA §
17-7-50 is concerned, "confinement" is a situation in which the defendant may not leave official custody of his own volition ( State v....
...Lawrence, supra, it argues instead that appellant's period of confinement did not begin until he was incarcerated, i.e., restrained in a jail, prison, or penitentiary. In those cases, we stated that the defendants had been entitled to bond under OCGA §
17-7-50 for the crimes for which each had spent 90 days incarcerated without having the charges against him presented to the grand jury....
...ry for more than 90 days before the grand jury returned a true bill of indictment against him. Our use of the term to describe their individual status was not a holding that one had to be confined in a jail, prison, or penitentiary in order for OCGA §
17-7-50 to apply. Those cases and this case make clear that while one who is incarcerated is in confinement under OCGA §
17-7-50, one need not be incarcerated to be confined under OCGA §
17-7-50....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 24, 2007 | 651 S.E.2d 77, 2007 Fulton County D. Rep. 2929
...g trial and in custody in lieu of bond, Bryant is entitled to a direct appeal from the denial of habeas relief. Smith v. Nichols,
270 Ga. 550 (1) (512 SE2d 279) (1999).
The crux of this appeal is the charges to which the remediative portion of OCGA §
17-7-50 applies....
...The issue presented by this case is whether one who is arrested pursuant to a warrant and who remains incarcerated for 90 days *438without grand jury action is statutorily entitled to have bond set on only the crimes charged in the arrest warrant, or whether OCGA §
17-7-50 requires bond be set on all crimes that arise from the event charged in the arrest warrant....
...Bryant was arrested January 27, 2006, on two arrest warrants that each asserted he committed an act of aggravated child molestation against his stepsister, and he was denied bail in February 2006. On May 24, 2006, Bryant filed a motion for bail to be set pursuant to OCGA§
17-7-50 after he had been held for more than 90 days without any action taken by a grand jury on the charges....
...committed against the same child in the same period of time. Upon the return of the true bill of indictment, bench warrants for Bryant’s arrest were issued and served on him in the Tift County Jail. In June 2006, at the hearing on Bryant’s OCGA §
17-7-50 motion that bail be set, the trial court set bail at $200,000 for the two charges for which the arrest warrants had issued in January and denied bail on the remaining six counts, construing OCGA §
17-7-50 as requiring that bail be set only for the crimes on which an arrest warrant had been issued and executed, and not for all the crimes with which the arrested person could have been charged at the time of arrest....
...ryant, although the habeas court acknowledged the new *439charges arose out of the same transactions as the charges on which Bryant had been arrested. Bryant appealed the denial of habeas relief to this Court.
When the General Assembly enacted OCGA §
17-7-50 in 1973, the legislature’s stated purpose was
to provide that any person who is arrested for a crime and who is refused bail, shall within the ninety days after confinement, be entitled to have the charge or accusation against him heard...
...jury [and] to provide that in the event no grand jury considers the charges against the accused person within the ninety-day period of confinement, the accused shall have a bail set upon application to the court. . . .
Ga. L. 1973, pp. 291-292. OCGA §
17-7-50 is a legislative attempt to ensure that a person arrested based on a prosecutor’s information or on an arrest warrant obtained by a law enforcement officer is not incarcerated indefinitely without any review by the grand jury which, by l...
...109 (2).
While the language of the statute is unambiguous in its requirement that a grand jury hear the case against an arrestee within 90 days of the arrest or the trial court set bail for the arrestee upon motion (Rawls v. Hunter, supra,
267 Ga. 109), OCGA§
17-7-50 is not as clear with regard to the scope of the bail required to be set if the case is not presented to the grand jury within the requisite 90 days....
...gainst the accused. . . .”
*440Decided September 24, 2007.
John G. Wolinski, for appellant.
Paul Bowden, District Attorney, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, for appellee.
Since it is clear that the General Assembly’s intent in enacting OCGA §
17-7-50 was to entitle a person arrested and incarcerated for 90 days to grand jury review of the charge or to have bond set upon motion therefor, we conclude, as did the trial court, that the logical interpretation is that the arrestee is entitle...
...nce, where the indictee’s release on bail pending trial of the additional charges will be considered.
Since bond has been set on the two charges for which Bryant was arrested and held for 90 days without grand jury action, the requirements of OCGA§
17-7-50 have been met, and the habeas court did not err when it denied relief to Bryant.
Judgment affirmed.
All the Justices concur.
The indictment also included a charge of child molestation that was connected to one of the acts described in...
...child molestation not connected by description to either of the two acts for which Bryant had been arrested.
The judge to whom the habeas petition was assigned was the same judge who had denied Bryant’s motion for bond to be set pursuant to OCGA §
17-7-50.
While it would be a subversion of the legislative intent to subj ect an arrestee to continued incarceration by the service over time of a steady stream of “piece-meal” arrest warrants which charged, one at a time, a litany of offens...
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 22, 2003 | 587 S.E.2d 18, 2003 Fulton County D. Rep. 2834
...368 (5) (49 SE 319) (1904), upon which Rainwater relies, is inapposite. That case simply held that a bonding company is required to produce a defendant even if the crime named in the bond and the crime named in the indictment may have differed in varying degrees.
4. Relying upon OCGA §
17-7-50, Rainwater asserts that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief because he was incarcerated upon the underlying RICO charges without having bond set. This assertion is without merit.
Under OCGA §
17-7-50, bail must be set by the trial judge if a person is arrested and incarcerated for more than 90 days without bail and without indictment....
...Thereafter, he was re-arrested on additional warrants and he sought, and was denied, bond. Additionally, within 90 days of his re-arrest, Rainwater was indicted on the RICO charge. It cannot be said, therefore, that Rainwater was entitled to habeas corpus relief because bail was not set pursuant to OCGA §
17-7-50....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Apr 26, 2011 | 289 Ga. 149, 2011 Fulton County D. Rep. 1341
...On December 9, 2008, Richardson was arrested in New York for the murder of Carl Joyner in Chatham County. He was thereafter held in custody. Because this murder charge was not heard by a grand jury within *803 90 days of the arrest, the trial court was required to set a bond for Richardson. See OCGA §
17-7-50....
...On June 18, 2009, the trial court denied bond on those charges on the ground that Richardson was a flight risk and a significant danger to people in the community. A year later, on June 25, 2010, Richardson filed this habeas petition, contending that the bond granted under OCGA §
17-7-50 applied to the new charges contained in the indictment and that he therefore was entitled to be released pending trial. On July 2, 2010, after a hearing, the habeas court denied relief. Richardson then filed this appeal, raising the same contention. In Bryant v. Vowell,
282 Ga. 437,
651 S.E.2d 77 (2007), we held that §
17-7-50 requires a trial court to grant bail only on crimes for which the defendant has been incarcerated for 90 days without having those charges heard by a grand jury and not on other crimes with which the defendant is later charged, even though the additional crimes stem from the same events as those for which the defendant was originally incarcerated. See
282 Ga. at 438-440,
651 S.E.2d 77. Based on Bryant, the habeas court here properly ruled that OCGA §
17-7-50 did not require that Richardson be granted bond on the new charges contained in the indictment. Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur. NOTES [1] OCGA §
17-7-50 provides that: Any person who is arrested for a crime and who is refused bail shall, within 90 days after the date of confinement, be entitled to have the charge against him or her heard by a grand jury having jurisdiction over the accused person....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Georgia | Apr 8, 2025 | 321 Ga. 349
...with murder.
Shortly before trial, Appellant filed a plea in bar.2 Appellant
argued that the superior court lacked jurisdiction over the
superseding indictment because that indictment had not been
returned within the 180-day period prescribed by OCGA §
17-7-50.1,
2 As noted below, we need not decide whether the plea in bar was timely.
2
which provides in relevant part:
(a) Any child who is charged with a crime that is
within the jurisdiction of the superior court ....
...against the detained child within the time limitations set
forth in subsection (a) of this Code section, the detained
child’s case shall be transferred to the juvenile court and
shall proceed thereafter as provided in Chapter 11 of Title
15.
OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (a), (b)....
...ineffective for failing to timely file the plea in bar. The superior court
rejected both claims. As to Appellant’s challenge to the court’s denial
of his plea in bar, the court concluded that, under the plain language
3
of OCGA §
17-7-50.1, the court had jurisdiction over Appellant’s case
because the original indictment charging Appellant with murder
was filed within the time limitation imposed by OCGA §
17-7-50.1,
and it was irrelevant that the case was reindicted after the 180-day
period....
...Appellant’s plea in bar on the merits rather than rejecting it as
untimely.
2. On appeal, Appellant argues again that the superior court
erred in denying his plea in bar because he was reindicted more than
180 days after his arrest, in violation of OCGA §
17-7-50.1, and the
court therefore lacked jurisdiction over his superseding indictment.
This argument, however, is foreclosed by our decision in State v.
Harris,
319 Ga. 665 (906 SE2d 402) (2024), which issued the day
after Appellant filed his principal brief in this Court. In Harris, we
held, based on the plain language of OCGA §
17-7-50.1, that the
“statute only requires that a true bill be returned on at least one
4
charge that is within the jurisdiction of the superior court [within
180 days of the date of the child’s detention] for the court to retain
jurisdiction.” Harris, 319 Ga....
...We therefore affirm the trial court’s denial of
Appellant’s plea in bar.
3. Appellant also argues on appeal that trial counsel was
5
ineffective for failing to file the plea in bar challenging the court’s
jurisdiction under OCGA §
17-7-50.1 within ten days of his
arraignment or to seek an extension to file the plea in bar, in
accordance with OCGA §
17-7-110 (“All pretrial motions, including
demurrers and special pleas, shall be filed within ten days after the
date of arraignment, unless the time for filing is extended by the
court.”)....
