Applicability to accusations in city courts.

- Former Code 1933, § 27-701 and 27-702 (see O.C.G.A. §§ 17-7-53,17-7-54 and17-7-70) have no applicability to accusations in city courts when, under special legislation establishing the various city courts, it was provided that the accusation must be founded upon the affidavit of the prosecutor, and the affidavit was made a substitute for the formal finding of the grand jury as to the misdemeanors triable in the city courts in question. The affidavit which was the basis for the issuance of a warrant to arrest is not to be confused with the affidavit which forms the basis of the accusation in many of the city courts. Brown v. State, 82 Ga. App. 673, 62 S.E.2d 732 (1950).

Distinction between indictment and special presentment.

- Mere technical distinction between indictments and special presentments exists in that the indictments are presented by the prosecutor. Barlow v. State, 127 Ga. 58, 56 S.E. 131 (1906).

In this state the difference between an indictment and a special presentment has been abolished with respect to the requirements of law in regard to trials under them, a mere technical distinction remaining that in an indictment the accusation is presented by a prosecutor, and in a special presentment it is preferred by the grand jury without a prosecutor. Carmichael v. State, 228 Ga. 834, 188 S.E.2d 495 (1972).

Presentments and indictments as to misconduct in public office.

- Though in absence of specific statutory authority the grand jury had no right to return a report charging or casting reflections of misconduct in office upon public officials or impugning their character, except by presentment or indictment, the grand jury's presentment may be widely published under former Code 1933, § 59-317 (see O.C.G.A. § 15-12-80), and was treated as an indictment by former Code 1933, § 27-703. Sweeney v. Balkcom, 358 F.2d 415 (5th Cir. 1966).

Cited in Groves v. State, 73 Ga. 205 (1884); Belton v. State, 21 Ga. App. 792, 95 S.E. 299 (1918).