Construction with general verdict requirement.

- Verdict of guilty but mentally ill under O.C.G.A. § 17-7-131 does not conflict with the requirement of a general verdict as provided by O.C.G.A. § 17-9-2. Mitchell v. State, 187 Ga. App. 40, 369 S.E.2d 487, cert. denied, 187 Ga. App. 908, 369 S.E.2d 487 (1988).

O.C.G.A. § 19-10-1(i) is an exception to the use of a general verdict form in criminal cases as provided by O.C.G.A. § 17-9-2; the statute authorizes but does not require the trier of fact to return a special verdict as to the issue of paternity. Whitman v. State, 212 Ga. App. 523, 442 S.E.2d 313 (1994).

Duties of court and jury generally.

- It is the province of the court to construe the law applicable in the trial of a criminal case, and of the jury to apply the law so construed to the facts in evidence. Mims v. State, 188 Ga. 702, 4 S.E.2d 831 (1939); Harris v. State, 190 Ga. 258, 9 S.E.2d 183 (1940); Griffin v. State, 154 Ga. App. 261, 267 S.E.2d 867 (1980).

Court is responsible for the correct exposition of the law. It is the duty of the jury to take the law from the court, as it is their duty to take the evidence from the witnesses. Griffin v. State, 154 Ga. App. 261, 267 S.E.2d 867 (1980).

Trial court and jury issues.

- Whether a particular offense is a lesser included offense of another is an issue for the trial court to resolve, not the jury; whether an accused is guilty of a particular lesser included offense, based on the evidence and proper charge by the court, is the issue for the jury. Sanders v. State, 212 Ga. App. 832, 442 S.E.2d 923 (1994).

Jurors are judges of the law insofar as jurors are judges of the facts.

- Right of the jury to judge the law and the facts does not authorize the jury to get the law except through the court. There must be some channel through which the jury is to get the law. It is the jury's duty, the jury's necessary duty, to find out what the law is, and to come to a conclusion upon the matter, just as it is the jury's duty to find out what the facts are. Jurors have to judge both to come to a conclusion as to both. The judge is the channel through which the jurors are to get the law, just as the evidence introduced is the channel through which the jurors are to get the facts. Jurors have no right to go out of the evidence for the facts, nor to go away from the judge for the law. From these two courses the jurors are to get the material for their verdict, and the jurors are thus judges of the law and facts, and must find a general verdict, including law and fact. Edwards v. State, 53 Ga. 428 (1874).

While the jurors are made absolutely and exclusively judges of the facts in the case, the jurors are, in this sense only, judges of the law. Mims v. State, 188 Ga. 702, 4 S.E.2d 831 (1939); Harris v. State, 190 Ga. 258, 9 S.E.2d 183 (1940); Griffin v. State, 154 Ga. App. 261, 267 S.E.2d 867 (1980).

Jury are the judges of the law and the facts so as to enable the jury to apply the law to the facts, and bring in a general verdict, but jurors have no right to make law. The law is laid down in the Code and it is the province of the court to construe the law and give the law in the charge, and of the jury to take the law as given, apply the law to the facts as found by the jury, and bring in a general verdict. Harris v. State, 190 Ga. 258, 9 S.E.2d 183 (1940).

How verdicts to be construed generally.

- Verdicts are to be construed in the light of the pleadings, the issues made by the evidence, and the charge of the court. Reed v. State, 87 Ga. App. 154, 73 S.E.2d 223 (1952).

Supreme Court must assume judgment valid.

- It is the duty of the Supreme Court to construe the verdict of the jury and the judgment and sentence of the court as valid and binding. Owen v. White, 182 Ga. 67, 185 S.E. 97 (1936).

Verdict may be construed in the light of the issues actually submitted to the jury under the charge of the court. If, when so construed, it expresses with reasonable certainty a finding supported by the evidence, it is to be upheld as legal. Henson v. Scoggins, 203 Ga. 540, 47 S.E.2d 643 (1948).

In the construction of verdicts, the accusation must be considered. Arnold v. State, 51 Ga. 144 (1874); Dunbar v. State, 21 Ga. App. 502, 94 S.E. 587 (1917).

Construction of ambiguous verdict.

- Verdict is to be given a reasonable intendment and, when ambiguous, may be construed in the light of the issues actually submitted to the jury under the charge of the court. If, when so construed, the verdict expresses with reasonable certainty a finding supported by the evidence, the verdict is to be upheld as legal. Barbour v. State, 8 Ga. App. 27, 68 S.E. 458 (1910).

Use of preprinted jury verdict form.

- It is not error to use the preprinted jury verdict form: "We, the jury, find the defendant _ guilty." Dixon v. State, 154 Ga. App. 828, 269 S.E.2d 909 (1980).

Use of a printed verdict form which reads "We the jury find the defendant _ guilty" is not harmful error constituting reason for reversal. Chance v. State, 154 Ga. App. 543, 268 S.E.2d 737 (1980).

Failure of transcript to show either the verdict or sentence.

- Failure of the transcript of a criminal trial to show either the jury verdict or the sentence by the judge has no bearing on the validity of the conviction, especially when the punishment was written on the indictment by the jury foreman, and the judge published the verdict and sentence in open court. Maddox v. State, 131 Ga. App. 86, 205 S.E.2d 31 (1974).

Cited in Brown v. State, 40 Ga. 689 (1870); Dunbar v. State, 21 Ga. App. 502, 94 S.E. 587 (1917); Johnson v. State, 29 Ga. App. 659, 116 S.E. 226 (1923); B'Gos v. State, 43 Ga. App. 379, 159 S.E. 137 (1931), cert. dismissed, 175 Ga. 627, 165 S.E. 566 (1932); Arrington v. State, 48 Ga. App. 70, 171 S.E. 878 (1933); Meriwether v. State, 189 Ga. 746, 8 S.E.2d 72 (1940); Hopkins v. State, 190 Ga. 180, 8 S.E.2d 633 (1940); Griffin v. State, 195 Ga. 368, 24 S.E.2d 399 (1943); Central of Ga. R.R. v. Sellers, 129 Ga. App. 811, 201 S.E.2d 485 (1973); Johnson v. State, 134 Ga. App. 67, 213 S.E.2d 170 (1975); Willingham v. State, 134 Ga. App. 144, 213 S.E.2d 516 (1975); Rhodes v. State, 135 Ga. App. 484, 218 S.E.2d 159 (1975); Mealor v. State, 135 Ga. App. 682, 218 S.E.2d 683 (1975); Jones v. State, 235 Ga. 103, 218 S.E.2d 899 (1975); Stanley v. State, 136 Ga. App. 385, 221 S.E.2d 242 (1975); McNeese v. State, 236 Ga. 26, 222 S.E.2d 318 (1976); Atkins v. State, 236 Ga. 624, 225 S.E.2d 7 (1976); Partain v. State, 139 Ga. App. 325, 228 S.E.2d 292 (1976); Richardson v. State, 144 Ga. App. 416, 240 S.E.2d 917 (1977); Presnell v. State, 241 Ga. 49, 243 S.E.2d 496 (1978); Favors v. State, 145 Ga. App. 864, 244 S.E.2d 902 (1978); Legare v. State, 243 Ga. 744, 257 S.E.2d 247 (1979); Taylor v. State, 245 Ga. 501, 265 S.E.2d 803 (1980); State v. Wilkerson, 161 Ga. App. 185, 288 S.E.2d 137 (1982); Pender v. State, 249 Ga. 495, 292 S.E.2d 69 (1982); Bryant v. State, 163 Ga. App. 872, 296 S.E.2d 168 (1982); McGee v. State, 172 Ga. App. 208, 322 S.E.2d 500 (1984); Barnes v. State, 184 Ga. App. 513, 361 S.E.2d 876 (1987); Wilkes v. State, 210 Ga. App. 898, 437 S.E.2d 837 (1993); Carter v. State, 224 Ga. App. 445, 481 S.E.2d 238 (1997); Davis v. State, 225 Ga. App. 627, 484 S.E.2d 655 (1997); Stevenson v. State, 234 Ga. App. 103, 506 S.E.2d 226 (1998); Parker v. State, 270 Ga. 256, 507 S.E.2d 744 (1998), overruled on other grounds, 287 Ga. 881, 700 S.E.2d 394 (2010); Scott v. State, 243 Ga. App. 383, 532 S.E.2d 141 (2000).

Joint indictment for offense which does not require joint act.

- If two parties are jointly indicted for an offense which does not require in its commission the joint act of both, but may be separately committed by either, a verdict finding one of the defendants guilty, if supported by the evidence, would be authorized. Cruce v. State, 59 Ga. 83 (1877); Easterling v. State, 12 Ga. App. 690, 78 S.E. 140 (1913).

Requirements of jury communications after deliberations have started.

- In an exercise of the court's inherent power to maintain a court system capable of providing for the administration of justice in an orderly and efficient manner, trial courts should be required to have jurors' communications submitted to the court in writing; to mark the written communication as a court exhibit in the presence of counsel; to afford counsel a full opportunity to suggest an appropriate response; and to make counsel aware of the substance of the trial court's intended response in order that counsel may seek whatever modifications counsel deems appropriate before the jury is exposed to the instruction. Lowery v. State, 282 Ga. 68, 646 S.E.2d 67, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 999, 128 S. Ct. 508, 169 L. Ed. 2d 355 (2007).

When court may avoid jury verdict.

- Court is not privileged to invade the province of the jury and avoid the jury's verdicts unless from clear necessity, and the rule is to be applied only in cases in which such verdicts are in irreconcilable conflict. Jackson v. State, 230 Ga. 640, 198 S.E.2d 666 (1973).

Improper closing argument.

- When defendant was charged with, inter alia, child molestation, the prosecutor's remark, in closing argument, that if the jury found the defendant not guilty the jury would be calling the defendant's victims liars, was improper because it could be construed as improperly suggesting to the jurors that the jurors go beyond the jurors' role of reaching a verdict based solely on the law and the evidence, but, under the circumstances, the error was harmless. Hunt v. State, 268 Ga. App. 568, 602 S.E.2d 312 (2004).

Resequestration if verdict of involuntary manslaughter without due caution.

- Verdict of guilty of "involuntary manslaughter without due caution and circumspection," is so uncertain as to authorize the judge not to receive the verdict, and to send the jury back; and when the jury returns with a verdict of voluntary manslaughter, which is fully supported by the evidence, the presiding judge was right to receive the verdict, and no error was committed. Turbaville v. State, 58 Ga. 545 (1877).

Verdict which finds neither what is charged in the indictment nor a lesser grade.

- If the jury intends conviction and punishment of something, but the verdict returned is neither as to something charged in the indictment nor of a lesser grade of the crime actually charged against a defendant, the verdict returned is a mere nullity and has the legal effect of an acquittal. Cross v. State, 124 Ga. App. 152, 183 S.E.2d 93 (1971).

Acquittal if verdict does not find necessary facts for crime.

- If the verdict applies directly to the offense expressly charged, but stops short in the verdict's finding of the requisite facts to constitute that offense, the verdict is equivalent to an acquittal. Couch v. State, 28 Ga. 367 (1859); O'Connell v. State, 55 Ga. 191 (1875); Wells v. State, 116 Ga. 87, 42 S.E. 390 (1902); Lambert v. State, 17 Ga. App. 348, 86 S.E. 782 (1915).

Variance between offense as charged in indictment and form of jury verdict.

- If one is charged in an indictment with the offense of involuntary manslaughter in the commission of an unlawful act, a verdict of the jury that "We, the jury, find the defendant guilty of involuntary manslaughter by his negligence, and we recommend that he be punished as for a misdemeanor," is a verdict finding the defendant guilty of the offense as charged and is not rendered ambiguous by the words "by his negligence" or by the fact that the jury made a recommendation that the defendant be punished as for a misdemeanor when the jury did not have the power to do so. Cain v. State, 53 Ga. App. 331, 185 S.E. 615 (1936).

Involuntary manslaughter verdict not inconsistent with felony murder/cruelty to children verdict.

- In a shaken baby death, an involuntary manslaughter verdict was not mutually exclusive of a guilty verdict for felony murder/cruelty to children because, consistent with the jury's guilty verdict on the felony murder charge, an offense requiring criminal intent, the jury predicated the jury's involuntary manslaughter verdict on a misdemeanor involving criminal intent, battery, or simple battery under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-23(a) and16-5-23.1(a), although the jury was also instructed on reckless conduct, a misdemeanor committed by criminal negligence, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-60(b). Drake v. State, 288 Ga. 131, 702 S.E.2d 161 (2010).

Erroneous interchange of terms "maximum" and "minimum" in verdict.

- It is reasonable to construe a verdict finding the accused guilty and fixing a "maximum" penalty of one year, and a "minimum" penalty of one and one-half years as meaning a minimum of one year and a maximum of one and one-half years so as to uphold the validity of the verdict. Jordan v. State, 36 Ga. App. 648, 137 S.E. 798 (1927).

Reference to evidence or court's charge to interpret verdict impermissible.

- Though complaint of a verdict is made in a motion for a new trial and not by a motion in arrest of judgment, it is not legitimate to refer either to the evidence or the charge of the court for the purpose of ascertaining what the verdict really meant. English v. State, 105 Ga. 516, 31 S.E. 448 (1898).

There is no error in trial court, rather than jury, sentencing defendant. Daniel v. State, 248 Ga. 271, 282 S.E.2d 314 (1981).

In the defendant's trial for murder, the trial court properly exercised the court's discretion to sentence the defendant to life in prison with the possibility of parole under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-1(e)(1),17-9-2, and17-10-7(a), rather than life without the possibility of parole, because parole did not extend the duration of the sentence. Blackwell v. State, 302 Ga. 820, 809 S.E.2d 727 (2018).

Court of Appeals may recognize hypothesis supporting innocence of accused.

- Whether or not in a given case circumstances are sufficient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis save the guilt of the accused is primarily a question for determination by the jury; however, if there appears a hypothesis from the evidence pointing to the innocence of the accused, and which tested by all human experience is a reasonable one, the Court of Appeals may declare it to be true as a matter of law. Bogan v. State, 158 Ga. App. 1, 279 S.E.2d 229 (1981).

Verdict with recommendation regarding parole.

- Since there were two counts of murder and the jury reached a unanimous verdict on both counts that "we recommend mercy or that defendant's punishment be life imprisonment with the stipulation that it be life without parole," the jury's verdict was clear, and the jury's "stipulation" regarding parole was mere surplusage not affecting the jury's recommendation of mercy so that the trial court erred in not accepting the verdict. Westbrook v. State, 256 Ga. 776, 353 S.E.2d 504 (1987).

Affidavit regarding viewing crime scene.

- Juror's affidavit stated only that, after viewing the scene of the crime, some of the jurors had concluded, based upon the jurors' observations, that the defendant's testimony had been false in some respects, the affidavit showed only that the jurors acted as jurors after a judicially sanctioned scene view and did not show that any juror acted as an unsworn witness against the defendant as to any finding resulting from an unauthorized visit to the scene of the crime, and the trial court did not err in refusing to consider the affidavit. Harper v. State, 182 Ga. App. 760, 357 S.E.2d 117 (1987).

Instructing jurors that the jurors cannot abstain is not error.

- Telling a jury that the jury must vote one way or another, and that a juror cannot abstain from voting was not error. Thompson v. State, 166 Ga. App. 850, 305 S.E.2d 662 (1983).

It is clearly the law that the jury must vote either guilty or not guilty, and consequently the court likewise committed no error in advising the jury that the jury could not vote to "pass." Jordan v. State, 172 Ga. App. 496, 323 S.E.2d 657 (1984).

Determinative factor in deciding whether verdicts are repugnant is whether the acquittal of one charge necessarily includes a finding against a fact that is essential to conviction for the other charge. If so, the evidence is then insufficient to support a verdict of guilty in the convicted charge. Shehee v. State, 167 Ga. App. 542, 307 S.E.2d 54 (1983); Taylor v. State, 177 Ga. App. 624, 340 S.E.2d 263 (1986).

Erroneous but nonfatal instruction in civil case.

- It was erroneous in a civil case to charge the jury, "after you have ascertained the facts, then you will apply the facts to the law, and then you are the sole judges of the law and the facts in this case," but in the circumstances the error was not cause for a reversal. Higgins v. Trentham, 186 Ga. 264, 197 S.E. 862 (1938).

Since an accusation was drawn in the conjunctive, charging the defendant with being a less safe driver and with having a blood alcohol count over 0.10, providing a verdict form that listed separately each of the two methods by which the defendant was accused of violations and instructing the jury to indicate "guilty" or "not guilty" as to each method was not a request for a special verdict in violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-9-2. Dean v. State, 232 Ga. App. 390, 501 S.E.2d 895 (1998).

Instruction of jurors that jurors are judges of the law in applying the law to the facts.

- Mere use of the words "except that" in an instruction that "the charge of the court is the law of the case, and by it you are bound, except that you are the judges of the law in applying it to the facts as you find them to be," could not mislead the jury into conceiving that the jury would be free to reject the law charged by the court. Davis v. State, 190 Ga. 100, 8 S.E.2d 394 (1940).

It is not error to so instruct the jury.

- Court does not err in instructing the jury to take the law of the case from the court, apply the law to the facts as the jury might find the facts to be, and reach a verdict therefrom. Mims v. State, 188 Ga. 702, 4 S.E.2d 831 (1939).

Words "with leniency" in verdict.

- Because a jury was instructed not to concern itself with punishment and was never instructed that the jury could recommend leniency, the words "with leniency" in the verdict were mere surplusage and did not affect the validity of the jury's finding of guilt; consequently, the Court of Appeals erred by reversing the defendant's sentence as illegal. State v. Benton, 278 Ga. 503, 604 S.E.2d 169 (2004).

Failure to charge jury that the jury are judges of the law and facts.

- It is not ground for reversal that the judge failed to charge the jury, without a request, that the jury were judges of the law and the facts. Turk v. State, 55 Ga. App. 732, 191 S.E. 283 (1937).

In response to the following question from the jury: "If the jury disagrees with the law that we have been charged with applying to the facts of this case, can we find the defendant not guilty for that reason?", the trial court did not err in refusing to charge that "the jury shall be the judges of the law and the facts" and, instead, charging the jury in the language of the suggested pattern jury instructions promulgated by the Council of Superior Court Judges. Cornwell v. State, 246 Ga. App. 686, 541 S.E.2d 101 (2000).

Trial court did not err in refusing to charge the jury that "the jury shall be the judges of the law and the facts in the trial of all criminal cases," after the court charged on the applicable law and instructed the jurors to apply the law to the facts as found by the jury. Chiasson v. State, 250 Ga. App. 63, 549 S.E.2d 503 (2001).

Charge that jurors are also judges of the law.

- When the court instructs the jury that the jurors are judges of the facts, the jurors need not be instructed in the same connection that the jurors are also judges of the law, if in the general charge as a whole the jurors are correctly instructed as to the law. Webb v. State, 8 Ga. App. 430, 69 S.E. 601 (1910).

No need to instruct jury on prior sentencing procedure in noncapital felonies.

- With the existence of mandatory judge sentencing in felony cases, except cases in which the death penalty may be imposed, it is unnecessary and inappropriate for the jury to receive any instructions from the trial judge on the previously applicable bifurcated procedure. Harris v. State, 234 Ga. 871, 218 S.E.2d 583 (1975).

Definition of special verdict.

- Special verdict is rendered when the jury finds certain facts to exist, and leaves the court to determine whether or not, according to the law which controls these facts, the prisoner is guilty. McGuffie v. State, 17 Ga. 497 (1855); Isom v. State, 83 Ga. 378, 9 S.E. 1051 (1889).

Verdict on indictment which joins separate crimes as several counts.

- When separate crimes are joined in one indictment, former Code 1933, § 27-2301 (see O.C.G.A. § 17-9-2) should be construed as applying to each one of those counts as separate and independent cases. A general verdict should be rendered as to each one of the separate cases. Lee v. State, 66 Ga. App. 613, 18 S.E.2d 778 (1942).

Verdict on offense eliminated by legislature.

- When the offense charged in one count of the indictment was eliminated by the legislature prior to the defendant's trial and the trial court instructed the jury only with respect to a lesser included charge, but the jury nevertheless returned a verdict on the indicted offense, the court properly entered judgment on the lesser included charge. Blackstock v. State, 270 Ga. 117, 506 S.E.2d 130 (1998).

General verdict of guilty is a verdict on the highest offense charged.

- If offenses of different grades are joined in the same indictment, a general verdict of guilty means guilty of the highest offense. Dean v. State, 43 Ga. 218 (1871); Estes v. State, 55 Ga. 131 (1875).

If two felonies only in degree are charged as separate counts of the same indictment, general verdict of, "We, the jury, find the defendants guilty and recommend mercy," is by intention of the law, a finding that the defendants are guilty of the highest offense charged in either of the counts in the indictment. Miller v. State, 60 Ga. App. 682, 4 S.E.2d 729 (1939).

General verdict of guilty is by intendment of the law a verdict that the defendant is guilty of the highest offense charged in the indictment. Bissell v. State, 153 Ga. App. 564, 266 S.E.2d 238 (1980).

Unless judge submits only the lesser charge to the jury.

- When one is tried on an indictment charging the person with the offense of robbery by force and by intimidation, and after the evidence has been adduced the judge submits to the jury only the question whether the defendant is guilty of the offense of robbery by intimidation, a general verdict of guilty will be construed as convicting the accused only of the lesser offense of robbery by intimidation. If in such a case there is evidence authorizing the conviction of the defendant for robbery by intimidation, which is conceded by counsel for the defendant, a general verdict of guilty will not be disturbed as contrary to the evidence or to the law. Reed v. State, 87 Ga. App. 154, 73 S.E.2d 223 (1952).

Jury indicates guilt for similar lesser offense.

- Indictment was for assault with intent to murder. The verdict was that the defendant was "guilty of shooting another unlawfully." It is contended in behalf of the accused that there is no such offense as this, and that the verdict is void for uncertainty. There is no merit in this contention. Under an indictment containing a single count for assault with intent to murder, there may be a conviction of the statutory offense of shooting at another, that being a lesser offense of the same general character. Wostenholms v. State, 70 Ga. 720 (1883); Watson v. State, 116 Ga. 607, 43 S.E. 32, 21 L.R.A. (n.s.) 1 (1902); Rhinehart v. State, 7 Ga. App. 425, 66 S.E. 982 (1910).

General verdict on multiple count indictment when evidence sufficient for conviction on all counts.

- When several misdemeanors, which though of the same general character are separate and distinct offenses, are joined in different counts of the same indictment, such a verdict is to be construed as a conviction on all of the counts. Driver v. State, 112 Ga. 229, 37 S.E. 400 (1900).

If by the indictment the state is prosecuting not merely for one offense, but charges several different and distinct transactions, though of a kindred nature, in the respective counts of the indictment, a general verdict of guilty is not sustainable, and is contrary to the evidence, unless the proof is such as to uphold a conviction as to each and every offense alleged. Driver v. State, 112 Ga. 229, 37 S.E. 400 (1900).

Misdemeanors of a similar nature may be joined in the same indictment in any number of counts, and a general verdict as to each count should be returned. A general verdict of guilty as to such entire indictment will be set aside unless there is sufficient evidence to support each count of the indictment. If the evidence supports each count, such general verdict is a conviction on each count and the court may impose cumulative penalties. Lee v. State, 66 Ga. App. 613, 18 S.E.2d 778 (1942).

General verdict on multiple count indictment when evidence authorizes conviction on less than all counts.

- It is error to refuse a new trial on an indictment containing two counts, both charges growing out of the same transaction when the evidence authorizes a conviction on the second count only and the verdict is a general verdict of guilty. Davis v. State, 59 Ga. App. 343, 200 S.E. 808 (1939).

General verdict possible although acquittal on some counts.

- Verdict of guilty, specifying the particular counts to which the verdict relates, is nevertheless a general verdict, and there may be a conviction as to some of the counts and an acquittal as to the others. Roberts v. State, 14 Ga. 8, 58 Am. Dec. 528 (1853); Lynes v. State, 46 Ga. 208 (1873); Wilson v. State, 67 Ga. 658 (1881).

General verdict on multiple count indictment when all but one count withdrawn.

- State's counsel may abandon or the judge may withdraw from the consideration of the jury the unsupported counts, and in that event a general verdict of guilty will relate only to the counts submitted. Camp v. State, 91 Ga. 8, 16 S.E. 379 (1892); Waver v. State, 108 Ga. 775, 33 S.E. 423 (1899); Tooke v. State, 4 Ga. App. 495, 61 S.E. 917 (1908).

If there are two counts in the indictment, and during the trial of the case the state, through statement of the state's counsel made in open court, withdraws the second count of the indictment, a general verdict will be construed as meaning guilty on the first count only. Guthas v. State, 53 Ga. App. 362, 185 S.E. 837 (1936).

General verdict on indictment for offense which may be committed in various ways.

- As to indictments charging misdemeanors only, if the indictment as a whole relates to but one offense, to but one transaction, stated in different counts with variation of details so that the indictment, as pleading, may adapt itself to the different phases which may appear in the proof at the trial, a general verdict of guilty, without a specification as to the count on which it is rendered, is sustainable and proper, if any one of the counts is supported by sufficient proof. Stewart v. State, 58 Ga. 577 (1877); Dohme v. State, 68 Ga. 339 (1882); Williams v. State, 107 Ga. 693, 33 S.E. 641 (1899).

If a statute provides that a single offense may be committed in distinct and various ways, the different and various ways may be charged in the same count, or in as many counts as there are various ways of committing the offenses. A general verdict on such an indictment charging the commission of such offense will be sustained if any of the counts is supported by evidence, even though there may be no evidence to sustain the conviction under the other counts specified in the indictment. Lee v. State, 66 Ga. App. 613, 18 S.E.2d 778 (1942).

Verdict of stabbing after indictment charging assault with deadly intent by stabbing.

- Indictment for assault with intent to murder by stabbing includes the minor offense of stabbing, and a verdict finding this minor offense need not negative the exception in the statute by setting out that the stabbing was not done by the prisoner in the prisoner's own defense or other circumstances of justification; the meaning of the verdict, construed in light of the indictment, being that the accused was guilty of the offense, and not of the mere act of stabbing. Isom v. State, 83 Ga. 378, 9 S.E. 1051 (1889).

Jury need not deny mitigating circumstances for shooting.

- It was clearly the intention of the jury in this case to find the accused guilty of the offense of shooting another as to which the court had fully instructed the jury. It is not necessary for the verdict to negative the statutory exception by stating that the shooting was "not in his own defense or under circumstances of justification." Arnold v. State, 51 Ga. 144 (1874); Isom v. State, 83 Ga. 378, 9 S.E. 1051 (1889); Kidd v. State, 10 Ga. App. 147, 75 S.E. 266 (1911).

Verdict finding one defendant guilty as charged and the other of lesser offense.

- In a joint trial of two persons for murder, the jury returned a verdict finding one of the defendants guilty of murder, and finding the other guilty of manslaughter, it is error for the court to refuse to receive the verdict so far as the verdict related to the latter finding, and to require the jury to reconsider the case as to the latter accused under instruction that the latter cannot be convicted of voluntary manslaughter unless the codefendant also is guilty of that offense. Allen v. State, 164 Ga. 669, 139 S.E. 415 (1927).

Section as amended applies to offenses committed on or after July 1, 1974.

- This section, which authorized the jury to determine guilt or innocence and the judge to pass sentence, applied only to those defendants who allegedly committed criminal offenses on July 1, 1974, or thereafter. 1974 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U74-74. But see Henderson v. State, 134 Ga. App. 898, 216 S.E.2d 696 (1975), overruled on other grounds, Moran v. State, 139 Ga. App. 274, 228 S.E.2d 216 (1976).

General verdict is to be returned in both felony and misdemeanor verdicts. 1967 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 67-412.

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 21 Am. Jur. 2d, Criminal Law, §§ 736, 739, 742, 747.

C.J.S.

- 23 C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 1518 et seq. 24 C.J.S., Criminal Law, §§ 2036, 2063.

ALR.

- Right of court to accept verdict upon one or more counts of an indictment or information when jury is unable to reach a verdict on all counts or is silent as to part of counts, and effect of such acceptance, 114 A.L.R. 1406.

Power of trial court to dismiss defendant in criminal case for insufficiency of evidence after submitting case to jury or after verdict of guilty, 131 A.L.R. 187.

Imposition or enforcement of sentence which has been suspended without authority, 141 A.L.R. 1225.

Power to impose sentence with direction that after defendant shall have served part of time he be placed on probation for the remainder of term, 147 A.L.R. 656.

Validity and effect of verdict in civil action finding defendant "not guilty,", 7 A.L.R.2d 1341.

Withdrawal of waiver of right to jury trial in criminal case, 46 A.L.R.2d 919.

Right of accused to insist, over objection of prosecution or court, upon trial by court without a jury, 51 A.L.R.2d 1346; 37 A.L.R.4th 304.

Effect on verdict in criminal case of haste or shortness of time in which jury reached it, 91 A.L.R.2d 1238.

Inconsistency of criminal verdict with verdict on another indictment or information tried at the same time, 16 A.L.R.3d 866.

Inconsistency of criminal verdict as between different counts of indictment or information, 18 A.L.R.3d 259.

Juror's reluctant, equivocal, or conditional assent to verdict, on polling, as ground for mistrial or new trial in criminal case, 25 A.L.R.3d 1149.

Validity and efficacy of accused's waiver of unanimous verdict, 97 A.L.R.3d 1253.

Loss of jurisdiction by delay in imposing sentence, 98 A.L.R.3d 605.

Prejudicial effect of jury's procurement or use of book during deliberations in criminal cases, 35 A.L.R.4th 626.

Right of accused, in state criminal trial, to insist, over prosecutor's or court's objection, on trial by court without jury, 37 A.L.R.4th 304.

Requirement of jury unanimity as to mode of committing crime under statute setting forth the various modes by which offense may be committed, 75 A.L.R.4th 91.