O.C.G.A.
O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 17-9-22 (2019)

Expression of approval or disapproval of verdict of jury by judge

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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(a) No judge of any court shall either directly or indirectly express in open court his approval or disapproval of the verdict of any jury in any case tried before him, except as provided in subsection (c) of this Code section; nor may any judge discharge any jury upon the ground that the verdict rendered in any case does not meet with his approval. (b) If any judge of any court either directly or indirectly expresses in open court his approval or disapproval of the verdict of the jury in any case tried before him, he shall be disqualified from presiding in the case in the event a new trial is granted. (c) Nothing in this Code section shall have the effect of prohibiting a judge of any court from approving or disapproving the verdict of a jury in any case tried before him in hearing a motion for a new trial that comes on before him; but the approval or disapproval on the hearing of a motion for new trial shall be expressed in the formal order of the judge in granting or overruling the motion and not otherwise.

History

Ga. L. 1918, p. 168, §§ 1, 2; Code 1933, §§ 110-201, 110-202.

Annotations

Cross references. - Corresponding

provision relating to civil procedure, § 9-10-8. Juries, T. 15, C. 12.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Judge not disqualified from hearing motion for new trial. - Former Code 1933, §§ 110-201 - 110-203 (see O.C.G.A. §§ 17-9-22 and 17-9-23) nowhere say a judge was disqualified in a hearing on a motion for a new trial, but say that if the judge in the original trial does certain things prohibited therein, the judge was disqualified on a retrial of the case in the event a new trial was granted. Johnson v. State, 76 Ga. App. 494, 167 S.E. 900 (1933). Comment that verdict is proper and just. - Trial judge is not disqualified from passing upon the motion for a new trial when, after the verdict of guilty is returned into court, the judge states: ‘‘I

think it is a proper verdict and one fully justified; I think the verdict is just.’’ Johnson v. State, 46 Ga. App. 494, 167 S.E. 900 (1933). Comments regarding sentencing options. - Judge’s comments regarding sentencing options available in light of the convictions were not expressions of the judge’s approval or disapproval of the verdict. Reynolds v. State, 231 Ga. App. 33, 497 S.E.2d 580 (1998). Remedy for improper remark was not new trial. - Whether the trial court’s statement to the jury after the guilty verdict was returned amounted to an improper expression of approval of the verdict was immaterial to the defendant’s

appeal from the convictions since the remedy for such a remark was not a new trial, but to prohibit the offending judge from presiding over the new trial in the event a new trial was granted. Abernathy v. State, 278 Ga. App. 574, 630 S.E.2d 421 (2006). Cited in Luke v. State, 131 Ga. App.

799, 207 S.E.2d 213 (1974); Lancette v. State, 151 Ga. App. 740, 261 S.E.2d 405 (1979); Mobley v. State, 162 Ga. App. 23, 288 S.E.2d 702 (1982); Magsby v. State, 169 Ga. App. 637, 314 S.E.2d 473 (1984); Smith v. State, 258 Ga. 676, 373 S.E.2d 200 (1988).

RESEARCH REFERENCES C.J.S. - 89 C.J.S. (Rev), Trial, § 610 et seq. ALR. - Necessity of repeating definition of legal or technical term in different parts of instructions in which it is employed, 7 A.L.R. 135. Threat to dismiss jury in criminal case for term, unless they could agree on verdict, as coercion, 10 A.L.R. 421. Disqualification of judge who presided at trial or of juror as ground of habeas corpus, 124 A.L.R. 1079. Statute providing for change of judge or venue on ground of bias or prejudice as applicable to proceeding for modification of decree of divorce, 143 A.L.R. 411.

Disqualification of judge in pending case as subject to revocation or removal, 162 A.L.R. 641. Reviewability of action of judge in disqualifying himself, 162 A.L.R. 654. What constitutes accused’s consent to court’s discharge of jury or to grant of state’s motion for mistrial which will constitute waiver of former jeopardy plea, 63 A.L.R.2d 782. Verdict-urging instructions in civil case commenting on weight of majority view or authorizing compromise, 41 A.L.R.3d 845. Disqualification of original trial judge to sit on retrial after reversal or mistrial, 60 A.L.R.3d 176.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 5 cases, 1984–2006 · leading case: Reynolds v. State, 497 S.E.2d 580 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998).
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Reynolds v. State, 497 S.E.2d 580 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998). · cites it 6× “The trial judge stated during sentencing that he wanted to give Reynolds the maximum sentence, but was concerned that the state pardons and parole board would release Reynolds early.”
Abernathy v. State, 630 S.E.2d 421 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006). · cites it 2× ““Whether that statement amounted to an improper expression of approval of the jury’s verdict is immaterial since the remedy for such a remark is not a new trial, but to prohibit the offending judge from presiding over the new trial [in the event a new trial is granted].”
Magsby v. State, 314 S.E.2d 473 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984). · cites it 4× “Appellant also argues that the trial court violated OCGA § 17-9-22 (Code Ann. § 110-201) (expressing approval of the jury’s verdict) by saying, during the sentencing phase of the trial, “I believe the evidence in the case.”
Smith v. State, 373 S.E.2d 200 (Ga. 1988). · cites it 2× “He contends that the charge as given instructed the jury to find the appellant guilty, alerted them to the possible sentences which could be imposed if he was found guilty, and was an expression of disapproval of the jury verdict, contrary to OCGA § 17-9-22.”
Donelson v. State, 469 S.E.2d 861 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996). · cites it 2× “Second, there is no indication that the trial court expressed its opinion as to the guilt of Donelson or that it expressed in open court its approval or disapproval of the jury’s verdict in violation of OCGA § 17-8-57 or OCGA § 17-9-22. Further, no evidence shows that the jury…”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.