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- Corresponding provision relating to civil procedure, § 9-10-8.
Juries, T. 15, C. 12.
- Former Code 1933, §§ 110-201 - 110-203 (see O.C.G.A. §§ 17-9-22 and17-9-23) nowhere say a judge was disqualified in a hearing on a motion for a new trial, but say that if the judge in the original trial does certain things prohibited therein, the judge was disqualified on a retrial of the case in the event a new trial was granted. Johnson v. State, 76 Ga. App. 494, 167 S.E. 900 (1933).
- Trial judge is not disqualified from passing upon the motion for a new trial when, after the verdict of guilty is returned into court, the judge states: "I think it is a proper verdict and one fully justified; I think the verdict is just." Johnson v. State, 46 Ga. App. 494, 167 S.E. 900 (1933).
- Judge's comments regarding sentencing options available in light of the convictions were not expressions of the judge's approval or disapproval of the verdict. Reynolds v. State, 231 Ga. App. 22, 497 S.E.2d 580 (1998).
- Whether the trial court's statement to the jury after the guilty verdict was returned amounted to an improper expression of approval of the verdict was immaterial to the defendant's appeal from the convictions since the remedy for such a remark was not a new trial, but to prohibit the offending judge from presiding over the new trial in the event a new trial was granted. Abernathy v. State, 278 Ga. App. 574, 630 S.E.2d 421 (2006).
Cited in Luke v. State, 131 Ga. App. 799, 207 S.E.2d 213 (1974); Lancette v. State, 151 Ga. App. 740, 261 S.E.2d 405 (1979); Mobley v. State, 162 Ga. App. 23, 288 S.E.2d 702 (1982); Magsby v. State, 169 Ga. App. 637, 314 S.E.2d 473 (1984); Smith v. State, 258 Ga. 676, 373 S.E.2d 200 (1988).
- 89 C.J.S. (Rev), Trial, § 610 et seq.
- Necessity of repeating definition of legal or technical term in different parts of instructions in which it is employed, 7 A.L.R. 135.
Threat to dismiss jury in criminal case for term, unless they could agree on verdict, as coercion, 10 A.L.R. 421.
Disqualification of judge who presided at trial or of juror as ground of habeas corpus, 124 A.L.R. 1079.
Statute providing for change of judge or venue on ground of bias or prejudice as applicable to proceeding for modification of decree of divorce, 143 A.L.R. 411.
Disqualification of judge in pending case as subject to revocation or removal, 162 A.L.R. 641.
Reviewability of action of judge in disqualifying himself, 162 A.L.R. 654.
What constitutes accused's consent to court's discharge of jury or to grant of state's motion for mistrial which will constitute waiver of former jeopardy plea, 63 A.L.R.2d 782.
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case commenting on weight of majority view or authorizing compromise, 41 A.L.R.3d 845.
Disqualification of original trial judge to sit on retrial after reversal or mistrial, 60 A.L.R.3d 176.
Total Results: 1
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1988-10-20
Citation: 373 S.E.2d 200, 258 Ga. 676, 1988 Ga. LEXIS 419
Snippet: disapproval of the jury verdict, contrary to OCGA § 17-9-22. The appellant was only sentenced to life for the