O.C.G.A.
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
When a garnishee is a financial institution and fails or refuses to file a garnishee answer by the fifteenth day after the date of service of the summons of garnishment, such garnishee shall automatically be in default. The default may be opened as a matter of right by the filing of a garnishee answer within 15 days of the day of default and payment of costs. If the case is still in default after the expiration of the period of 15 days, judgment by default may be entered at any time thereafter against such garnishee for the amount remaining due on the judgment obtained against the defendant as shown in the plaintiff’s affidavit of garnishment.
History
Code 1981, § 18-4-22, enacted by Ga. L. 2016, p. 8, § 1/SB 255.
Annotations
Law reviews. For note discussing default by the garnishee, see 12 Ga. L. Rev. 814 (1978).
JUDICIAL DECISIONS Editor’s notes. - In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions decided under former O.C.G.A. § 18-4-90 are included in the annotations for this Code section. When claim for default arises. - Claim arises against the garnishee at the time the garnishee falls into default by failing to file answers in a continuing garnishment proceeding, and is separate and distinct from any claim which may have existed prior to that time. Fazio v. Growth Dev. Corp. (In re Growth Dev. Corp.), 168 B.R. 1009, 1994 Bankr. LEXIS 1890 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 18-4-90). Garnishee failed to amend the defective answer as permitted by law and, pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 18-4-90, the garnishee was automatically in default. Because the garnishee failed to establish the presence of a nonamendable defect on the face of the record or pleadings, the court abused the court’s discretion by granting the motion to set aside the default judg-
ment. Oxmoor Portfolio, LLC v. Flooring & Tile Superstore of Conyers, Inc., 320 Ga. App. 640, 740 S.E.2d 363, 2013 Ga. App. LEXIS 250 (2013) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 18-4-90). Former O.C.G.A. § 18-4-91 only applicable to default judgments under former O.C.G.A. § 18-4-90. - Because a debtor’s principal had answered a garnishment action by a judgment creditor, denying that the principal held any money or assets of the debtor, and the trial court entered a final judgment in favor of the creditor after holding an evidentiary hearing on the merits, it was error for the trial court to have reduced the judgment pursuant to the principal’s motion under former O.C.G.A. § 18-4-91, as such was only applicable when a default judgment was obtained pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 18-4-90. United Maint., Inc. v. Wilson, 265 Ga. App. 683, 595 S.E.2d 376, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 227 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 18-4-90).
RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. 6 Am. Jur. 2d, Attachment and Garnishment, § 357.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
27
cases (
4 in the last 5 years), 1983–2024 · leading case:
In re McFarland, 481 B.R. 242 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2012).
In re McFarland, 481 B.R. 242 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2012).
· cites it 17× “Debtor’s schedules claim the IRA and Hartford Annuity exempt pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 18-4-22. Alternatively, Debt- or argues they are exempt pursuant to O.”
Goodman v. Bramlette (In Re Bramlette), 333 B.R. 911 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2005).
· cites it 6× “1994), but the Eleventh Circuit reversed on the ground that an IRA was excluded from property of the estate under § 541(c)(2) because it was not subject to creditor claims under O.C.G.A. § 18-4-22. 102 F.3d 1209 (11th Cir.”
Meehan v. Wallace (In Re Meehan), 102 F.3d 1209 (11th Cir. 1997).
· cites it 3× “2 Debtor argues that her IRA should be excluded from the estate under § 541(c)(2) because O.C.G.A. § 18-4-22(a) imposes a restriction on transfer by garnishment.”
Meehan v. Wallace (In Re Meehan), 173 B.R. 818 (S.D. Ga. 1994).
· cites it 6× “]” O.C.G.A. § 18-4-22(a). Meehan contends that protection from garnishment under state law constitutes a transfer restriction within the meaning of § 541(c)(2) and, hence, her IRA, though it contains no anti-alienation provisions, is excluded from her Chapter 7 bankruptcy estate.”
Boudreaux v. Sheffield (In re Sheffield), 507 B.R. 400 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2014).
· cites it 11× “Exemption Under Other Georgia Code Sections In her Amended Schedule C, Debtor also claims that the Annuity is exempt pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 18-4-22 and § 47-2-332. Trustee argues in his objection that Debtor cannot exempt the Annuity under O.”
Citizens Bank of Ashburn v. Shingler, 326 S.E.2d 861 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985).
· cites it 4× “Judgment debtor Martha Shingler traversed a garnishment proceeding instituted by the Citizens Bank of Ashburn against Great Southern Federal on the basis that the accounts in garnishee’s possession were individual retirement accounts exempt from garnishment pursuant to OCGA §…”
In re Jankauskas, 593 B.R. 1 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2018).
· cites it 2× “O.C.G.A. § 18-4-22. The defendant ( i.e. , debtor) may file a response to the trustee's answer.”
Segell v. Letlow (In Re Letlow), 385 B.R. 782 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2007).
· cites it 3× “00 pursuant to Ga.Code Ann. § 18-4-22, which exempts from garnishment “[f]unds or benefits from a pension or retirement program as defined in 29 U.”
In Re Hipple, 225 B.R. 808 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1996).
· cites it 2× “In the nonbankruptcy context, creditors cannot reach the SEP/IRA contributions since O.C.G.A. § 18-4-22 exempts § 408 trusts from garnishment.”
— 18-4-22(a) — 6 cases
Meehan v. Wallace (In Re Meehan), 102 F.3d 1209 (11th Cir. 1997).
“2 Debtor argues that her IRA should be excluded from the estate under § 541(c)(2) because O.C.G.A. § 18-4-22(a) imposes a restriction on transfer by garnishment.”
Goodman v. Bramlette (In Re Bramlette), 333 B.R. 911 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2005).
“1994), but the Eleventh Circuit reversed on the ground that an IRA was excluded from property of the estate under § 541(c)(2) because it was not subject to creditor claims under O.C.G.A. § 18-4-22. 102 F.3d 1209 (11th Cir.”
Meehan v. Wallace (In Re Meehan), 173 B.R. 818 (S.D. Ga. 1994).
“]” O.C.G.A. § 18-4-22(a). Meehan contends that protection from garnishment under state law constitutes a transfer restriction within the meaning of § 541(c)(2) and, hence, her IRA, though it contains no anti-alienation provisions, is excluded from her Chapter 7 bankruptcy estate.”
In re McFarland, 481 B.R. 242 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2012).
“Debtor’s schedules claim the IRA and Hartford Annuity exempt pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 18-4-22. Alternatively, Debt- or argues they are exempt pursuant to O.”
— 18-4-22(a)(2003) — 1 case
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