O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 19-11-163 (2019)

Governing law; statute of limitations; application of procedural and remedial law of Georgia; prospective application of law of other state or foreign country

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (d) of this Code section, the law of the issuing state or foreign country governs: (1) The nature, extent, amount, and duration of current payments under a registered support order; (2) The computation and payment of arrearages and accrual of interest on the arrearages under the support order; and (3) The existence and satisfaction of other obligations under the support order. (b) In a proceeding for arrears under a registered support order, the statute of limitation of Georgia or of the issuing state or foreign country, whichever is longer, applies. (c) A responding tribunal of Georgia shall apply the procedures and remedies of this state to enforce current support and collect arrears and interest due on a support order of another state or a foreign country registered in Georgia. (d) After a tribunal of Georgia or another state determines which is the controlling order and issues an order consolidating arrears, if any, a tribunal of Georgia shall prospectively apply the law of the state or foreign country issuing the controlling order, including its law on interest on arrears, on current and future support, and on consolidated arrears.

History

Code 1981, § 19-11-163, enacted by Ga.

L. 1997, p. 1613, § 33; Ga. L. 2013, p. 705, § 1/SB 193.

Annotations

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Law from another state properly applied. - Trial court properly applied Florida law in addressing respondent father’s defense of dormancy in an action by petitioner human resources department to collect arrearages under a Florida child support order when Florida was the issuing state within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 19-11-163(a) and had a shorter statute of limitation than Georgia for purposes of § 19-11-163(b). Owens v. Dep’t of Human Res., 255 Ga. App. 678, 566 S.E.2d 403, 2002 Ga. App. LEXIS 729 (2002). Filing of an Alabama child support order in a Georgia court was not viewed as a traditional action on a foreign judgment, but was more appropriately governed by the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), O.C.G.A. § 19-11-100 et seq.; in a Georgia arrearage proceeding under UIFSA, the statute of limitation under the laws of Georgia or of the issuing state, whichever was longer, and since the Alabama period for dormancy of judgments was longer than that of Georgia, Alabama law applied. Bodenhamer v. Wooten, 265 Ga. App. 733, 595 S.E.2d 592, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 249 (2004), cert. denied, No. S04C1167, 2004 Ga. LEXIS 561 (Ga. June 30, 2004). Law of foreign state should have been applied. - Trial court erred in

vacating the court’s prior order confirming a Massachusetts judgment that required a former husband to pay arrearages and in dismissing a former wife’s petition to register and enforce the judgment as a support order under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), O.C.G.A. § 19-11-100 et seq., on the ground that the Massachusetts judgment was dormant under Georgia law; under the choice of law provisions of UIFSA, Massachusetts law controlled, and the Massachusetts judgment remained enforceable under that state’s statute of limitation because the Massachusetts statute of limitation for the enforcement of judgments was 20 years, and less than 20 years had elapsed since the issuance of the Massachusetts judgment. The limitation period for the enforcement of judgments was longer in Massachusetts than in Georgia, and the trial court should have applied Massachusetts law to the dormancy issue in the case. Sussman v. Sussman, 301 Ga. App. 397, 687 S.E.2d 644, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 1392 (2009).

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 4 cases, 1999–2009 · leading case: Dep't of Human Resources v. Deason, 520 S.E.2d 712 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999).
Dep't of Human Resources v. Deason, 520 S.E.2d 712 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999). · cites it 4× “1613, 1674, § 33 (OCGA §§ 19-11-163; 19-11-166); and (6) many other statutory changes.”
Bodenhamer v. Wooten, 595 S.E.2d 592 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004). · cites it 6× “” OCGA § 19-11-163 (a). “In a proceeding for arrearages, the statute of limitation under the laws of Georgia or of the issuing state, whichever is longer, applies.”
Owens v. Dep't of Human Resources, 566 S.E.2d 403 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002). · cites it 2× “As provided in OCGA § 19-11-163 (a), the law of the issuing state, here Florida, “governs the nature, extent, amount, and duration of current payments and other obligations of support and the payment of arrearages under the order.”
Sussman v. Sussman, 687 S.E.2d 644 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009). · cites it 8× “Under the choice of law provisions of UIFSA, the law of the jurisdiction that issued the support order “governs the nature, extent, amount, and duration of current payments and other obligations of support and the payment of arrearages under the order.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.