O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 19-3-60 (2019)

Definition; marriage as valuable consideration

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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(a) As used in this article, the term “antenuptial agreement” means a contract entered into prior to a marriage that determines property rights or contemplates a future settlement to one spouse as to a future resolution of issues, including, but not limited to, year’s support, spousal support, and equitable division of property. (b) Marriage is a valuable consideration; and a spouse stands, as to property of the other spouse settled upon a spouse by marriage contract, as do other purchasers for value, provided that by the contract a spouse shall not incapacitate himself or herself from paying his or her existing just debts.

History

Orig. Code 1863, § 1731; Code 1868, § 1772; Code 1873, § 1782; Code 1882, § 1782; Civil Code 1895, § 2487; Civil Code 1910, § 3006; Code 1933, § 53-403; Ga. L. 2018, p. 155, § 1-1/HB 190.

Annotations

Cross references. Consideration generally, § 13-3-40 et seq. Law reviews. For annual survey on domestic relations, see 70 Mercer L. Rev. 81 (2018).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Marriage is valuable consideration and innocent purchaser on such consideration will be protected even against subsequent bona fide purchaser. Nally v. Nally, 74 Ga. 669, 1885 Ga. LEXIS 378 (1885). Marriage is sufficient consideration to support deed, and if the woman is

guilty of no fraud, and enters into the settlement without notice of a debt, due from the man to a third party, she will be protected in the property conveyed by the settlement, against that debt. Marshall v. Morris, 16 Ga. 368, 1854 Ga. LEXIS 194 (1854); Sheridan v. Sheridan, 153 Ga. 262, 111 S.E. 906, 1922 Ga. LEXIS 66 (1922).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. 41 Am. Jur. 2d, Husband and Wife, § 106. C.J.S. 41 C.J.S., Husband and Wife, §§ 93 et seq., 111. ALR. Promise to marry as consideration for note or other executory obligation made some time thereafter, 63 A.L.R. 1184.

What constitutes promise made in or upon consideration of marriage within statute of frauds, 75 A.L.R.2d 633. Action based upon reconveyance, upon promise of reconciliation, of property realized from divorce award or settlement, 99 A.L.R.3d 1248. Validity, construction, and enforcement of oral antenuptial agreements, 15 A.L.R.7th 2.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 2 cases, 2009–2009 · leading case: Dove v. Dove, 680 S.E.2d 839 (Ga. 2009).
Dove v. Dove, 680 S.E.2d 839 (Ga. 2009). · cites it 4× “Neither OCGA § 19-3-63 nor any other section of Article 3, OCGA § 19-3-60 et seq., limits its application to marriage contracts which involve a transfer of property.”
Sullivan v. Sullivan, 684 S.E.2d 861 (Ga. 2009). · cites it 2× “Neither OCGA § 19-3-63 nor any other section of Article 3, OCGA § 19-3-60 et seq., similarly links the attestation requirement to recordation of marriage contracts.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.