Legislative intent.

- Laws peculiar to divorce suits clearly indicate an intention upon the part of the lawmaking power to impede the facility for obtaining divorces; and such purpose can only be attributed to a zealous regard for the well-being of society. Haygood v. Haygood, 190 Ga. 445, 9 S.E.2d 834 (1940).

Former Code 1933, § 30-101 (see now O.C.G.A. § 19-5-1) was not violative of provisions of former Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VI, Sec. IV, Para. VII (see now Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para XI). Flournoy v. Flournoy, 228 Ga. 224, 184 S.E.2d 822 (1971).

"Issuable defense" within meaning of law may be made by pre-trial order or other pleadings filed as provided by law. Trulove v. Trulove, 233 Ga. 896, 213 S.E.2d 868 (1975).

Defending divorce action without filing answer cannot preclude "issuable defense."

- Spouse's right in divorce action to defend without filing answer cannot preclude existence of "issuable defense" and thereby defeat the right to jury trial. Trulove v. Trulove, 233 Ga. 896, 213 S.E.2d 868 (1975).

Divorce proceedings are governed by Civil Practice Act (see now O.C.G.A. T. 11, Ch. 9). Ivey v. Ivey, 233 Ga. 45, 209 S.E.2d 590 (1974).

Divorce proceedings equitable in nature.

- Proceedings for divorce and for alimony have always, under the practice of this state, been regarded as equitable. Early v. Early, 243 Ga. 125, 252 S.E.2d 618 (1979).

Superior court judge presiding over a divorce case exercises all of the traditional powers of a chancellor in equity, except as otherwise provided by law. Allen v. Allen, 260 Ga. 777, 400 S.E.2d 15 (1991).

Case involving the question of the enforceability of a settlement agreement was remanded to the trial court, pursuant to the rule holding that divorce proceedings are equitable in nature. Allen v. Allen, 260 Ga. 777, 400 S.E.2d 15 (1991).

City courts lack jurisdiction to entertain suit for alimony.

- Because exclusive jurisdiction of divorce and/or alimony questions is vested in superior courts, city courts are without jurisdiction to entertain a suit for alimony in a case in which a judgment has previously been rendered in the superior court. Tyson v. Tyson, 176 Ga. 137, 167 S.E. 172 (1932).

Cited in Gilbert v. Gilbert, 202 Ga. 752, 44 S.E.2d 485 (1947); Huguley v. Huguley, 204 Ga. 692, 51 S.E.2d 445 (1949); Allison v. Allison, 205 Ga. 233, 53 S.E.2d 114 (1949); Stebbins v. Stebbins, 206 Ga. 529, 57 S.E.2d 564 (1950); Gardner v. Gardner, 206 Ga. 669, 58 S.E.2d 416 (1950); Champion v. Champion, 207 Ga. 431, 61 S.E.2d 822 (1950); Thompson v. Thompson, 207 Ga. 376, 61 S.E.2d 834 (1950); Harrison v. Harrison, 207 Ga. 393, 61 S.E.2d 837 (1950); Robertson v. Robertson, 207 Ga. 686, 63 S.E.2d 876 (1951); Whaley v. Whaley, 208 Ga. 323, 66 S.E.2d 722 (1951); Crute v. Crute, 208 Ga. 724, 69 S.E.2d 225 (1952); Lloyd v. Lloyd, 208 Ga. 694, 69 S.E.2d 251 (1952); Neal v. Neal, 209 Ga. 199, 71 S.E.2d 229 (1952); Hilburn v. Hilburn, 210 Ga. 497, 81 S.E.2d 1 (1954); Bedingfield v. Bedingfield, 211 Ga. 310, 85 S.E.2d 756 (1955); Lott v. Lott, 212 Ga. 672, 94 S.E.2d 869 (1956); Bell v. Bell, 213 Ga. 176, 97 S.E.2d 571 (1957); Lott v. Lott, 213 Ga. 559, 100 S.E.2d 170 (1957); Perry v. Perry, 213 Ga. 847, 102 S.E.2d 534 (1958); Moseley v. Moseley, 214 Ga. 137, 103 S.E.2d 540 (1958); Dunn v. Dunn, 221 Ga. 368, 144 S.E.2d 758 (1965); McLarin v. McLarin, 224 Ga. 675, 163 S.E.2d 914 (1968); Smith v. Smith, 228 Ga. 311, 185 S.E.2d 78 (1971); Hatcher v. Hatcher, 229 Ga. 249, 190 S.E.2d 533 (1972); Worrell v. Worrell, 242 Ga. 44, 247 S.E.2d 847 (1978); Gordon v. Gordon, 244 Ga. 21, 257 S.E.2d 528 (1979); Osteen v. Osteen, 244 Ga. 445, 260 S.E.2d 321 (1979); Carmichael v. Carmichael, 248 Ga. 216, 282 S.E.2d 71 (1981); Hudson v. State, 248 Ga. 397, 283 S.E.2d 271 (1981).

Jury trial required upon proper demand.

- When one spouse made a proper demand for a jury trial which was not otherwise waived, it was reversible error for the court to enter a final judgment based upon the findings of an auditor, without a trial by jury. Franklin v. Franklin, 267 Ga. 82, 475 S.E.2d 890 (1996).

Parties waive their right to jury trial in a divorce case if the parties fail to make a written demand for a jury trial on or before the call of the case. Ivey v. Ivey, 264 Ga. 435, 445 S.E.2d 258 (1994).

Waiver of jury trial.

- Actions of a party who dismisses a petition for divorce and thereafter files a separation agreement with the court settling all issues as to alimony, property settlement, child custody, and child support must be construed as a waiver of jury trial as to all issues in the case. In these circumstances, the trial court has the power to grant the divorce without the intervention of a jury and adopt the settlement entered into between the parties. Slaughter v. Slaughter, 236 Ga. 353, 223 S.E.2d 714 (1976).

When jury verdict construed as in favor of petitioner.

- When both parties to a divorce action introduce evidence in support of their respective prayers for divorce, and the jury returns a verdict finding in favor of a total divorce between the parties, without stating whether the verdict is for the petitioner or the respondent, it will be construed to be for the petitioner. Carawan v. Carawan, 203 Ga. 325, 46 S.E.2d 588 (1948).

Absent fraud, client bound by decree as negotiated by attorney.

- When one employs counsel to represent one in a divorce action and such counsel agrees with counsel for the opposite party to a decree which is entered by the court, such decree will, in the absence of a violation of express directions by the client to counsel, known to the adverse party or counsel, or fraud, accident, or mistake, be binding upon the client. Dixon v. Dixon, 204 Ga. 363, 49 S.E.2d 818 (1948).

Adultery as defense.

- Alleged act of adultery, committed after date of separation and action, if proven, would be good defense against the grant of either total divorce or permanent alimony. Rowell v. Rowell, 209 Ga. 572, 74 S.E.2d 833 (1953).

Recriminatory charge of adultery committed by the plaintiff after the commencement of a divorce action is a valid defense and upon a proper application at any time before the final decree, if such application is made immediately after the discovery of the fact, the court should permit the defendant to put in a supplemental answer or file a plea for continuance for the purpose of setting up such matter as a new defense. Rowell v. Rowell, 209 Ga. 572, 74 S.E.2d 833 (1953).

Action for divorce instituted by guardian of person adjudicated insane cannot be maintained in this state; the right to bring and prosecute such an action being strictly personal, and not within the authority conferred by law upon a guardian. Phillips v. Phillips, 203 Ga. 106, 45 S.E.2d 621 (1947).

Allegations that an individual, before the individual was adjudged mentally incompetent, and at a time when the individual had mental capacity to show the nature of an action for divorce, expressed the individual's intention and desire to obtain a divorce from the defendant, that at the time of the filing of the action, and during a lucid interval, after such adjudication, the individual again expressed the same intention and desire, and that the suit was instituted pursuant to the individual's direction, desire, and will at the time of filing the suit, would nevertheless not show authority in the guardian to institute and maintain such action. Phillips v. Phillips, 203 Ga. 106, 45 S.E.2d 621 (1947).

Intervention by third party in divorce action.

- There is no provision of law which allows third party to intervene in divorce action. Girtman v. Girtman, 191 Ga. 173, 11 S.E.2d 782 (1940).

Collateral attack of valid divorce judgment.

- Judgment in divorce case not shown to be void could not be collaterally attacked in another case and different forum. Juneau v. Juneau, 98 Ga. App. 330, 105 S.E.2d 913 (1958).

Action to set aside fraudulent divorce can be maintained following death of party if it appears that the divorce decree or the subsequent action to set it aside involved some property right in which the surviving spouse is beneficially interested and the status and rights of the parties are retroactively affected. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Dunbar, 112 Ga. App. 102, 143 S.E.2d 663 (1965).

Decree properly set aside as fraudulent.

- Petition alleging that petitioner had no knowledge of the pendency of the divorce action against the petitioner, the petitioner not having been served with process of the suit, nor had the petitioner acknowledged service thereof, and that the defendant had concealed from petitioner and kept petitioner ignorant of the pending suit, was sufficient as grounds of fraud for setting aside the divorce decree. Robertson v. Robertson, 196 Ga. 517, 26 S.E.2d 922 (1943).

Motion to set aside decree properly denied when unsupported.

- When a judgment and decree sought to be set aside were rendered in one term, and the motion to set aside came at a subsequent term, was not based on any defect appearing on the face of the record or pleadings, and was not accompanied by any brief of the evidence adduced upon the trial which resulted in the judgment and decree, the trial judge did not err in dismissing the motion to set aside. Prewett v. Prewett, 215 Ga. 425, 110 S.E.2d 638 (1959).

Unadjudicated claim for divorce is purely personal and abates upon death. Segars v. Brooks, 248 Ga. 427, 284 S.E.2d 13 (1981).

Final judgment was prematurely entered at a temporary hearing in a divorce proceeding since 23 days remained during which defensive pleadings would have been required by law to be filed and both parties had filed timely demands for a jury trial. Henderson v. Henderson, 258 Ga. 205, 367 S.E.2d 40 (1988).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 24 Am. Jur. 2d, Divorce and Separation, § 1 et seq.

8B Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Dismissal, Discontinuance, and Nonsuit, § 145.

C.J.S.

- 27A C.J.S., Divorce, § 5 et seq.

ALR.

- Power of court to grant absolute divorce to both spouses upon showing of mutual fault, 13 A.L.R.3d 1364.

Power of court to award absolute divorce in favor of party who desires only limited decree, or vice versa, 14 A.L.R.3d 703.

Enforceability of agreement requiring spouse's cooperation in obtaining religious bill of divorce, 29 A.L.R.4th 746.

Validity, construction, and application of provision in separation agreement affecting distribution or payment of attorneys' fees, 47 A.L.R.5th 207.

Divorce and separation: Determination of whether proceeds from personal injury settlement or recovery constitute marital property, 109 A.L.R.5th 1.

Retirement of husband as change of circumstances warranting modification of divorce decree - Prospective retirement, 110 A.L.R.5th 237.

Division of lottery proceeds in divorce proceedings, 124 A.L.R.5th 537.