When section not applicable.

- O.C.G.A. § 19-6-12 is not applicable to cohabitation of a former husband and wife. Upton v. Duck, 249 Ga. 267, 290 S.E.2d 92 (1982).

Voluntary cohabitation subsequent to entry of separate maintenance judgment.

- Court rejected the contention that, under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-12, the voluntary cohabitation of spouses, not divorced, subsequent to entry of a separate maintenance judgment, annuls and sets aside all provisions made by the deed or decree in the separate maintenance action (except as to the rights of any children). Goodman v. Goodman, 254 Ga. 703, 334 S.E.2d 179 (1985).

Statute is not applicable to situations involving total divorce and remarriage of the same parties. Travis v. Travis, 227 Ga. 406, 181 S.E.2d 61 (1971).

O.C.G.A. § 19-6-12 operates so as to annul provisions for permanent alimony only if there has been subsequent voluntary cohabitation of husband and wife during their first marriage. It does not annul permanent alimony provisions if parties obtain divorce and subsequently remarry and cohabit with each other. Moore v. Moore, 249 Ga. 27, 287 S.E.2d 185 (1982).

Property set aside as wife's separate property remains such.

- Property which, on granting of divorce, was set aside to wife and became her sole and separate property remains her separate estate, notwithstanding divorced parties are subsequently remarried to each other. Moore v. Moore, 249 Ga. 27, 287 S.E.2d 185 (1982).

Statute was applicable to temporary alimony, and the order for temporary alimony should be revoked on motion and proof of subsequent cohabitation. Weeks v. Weeks, 160 Ga. 369, 127 S.E. 772 (1925).

Subsequent voluntary cohabitation will render void a judgment for temporary alimony and attorney's fees for representing the wife in the alimony proceedings. Mosely v. Mosely, 181 Ga. 543, 182 S.E. 849 (1935).

"Cohabitation" means dwelling or being together as man and wife. Colvin v. Colvin, 211 Ga. 592, 87 S.E.2d 390 (1955).

Voluntary cohabitation without living in common place of abode.

- If there was reconciliation in good faith upon the part of the husband and wife, and it was their intention to cohabit as husband and wife, and acting upon that reconciliation and intention, they resumed their marital status and lived together as husband and wife, there was cohabitation within the meaning of the statute. Colvin v. Colvin, 211 Ga. 592, 87 S.E.2d 390 (1955).

"Deed" includes all contracts or agreements whereby wife (now spouse) has bona fide released her husband from her claims against him for permanent alimony which she acquired by virtue of the marriage relation. Powell v. Powell, 196 Ga. 694, 27 S.E.2d 393 (1943).

Upon subsequent voluntary cohabitation of the husband and wife all provisions made for permanent alimony, whether by deed as used in the strict sense of a land conveyance, or in its broader sense of any written instrument under seal, simple contract, or decree of court, shall be annulled and set aside. Powell v. Powell, 196 Ga. 694, 27 S.E.2d 393 (1943).

Effect of subsequent voluntary cohabitation on permanent alimony.

- Subsequent voluntary cohabitation annuls and sets aside all provisions made for permanent alimony for the wife (now either spouse). Brown v. Brown, 210 Ga. 233, 78 S.E.2d 516 (1953).

When estranged spouses reconcile and voluntarily resume cohabitation, they have restored their original marital status as fully as if the separation had not occurred, and with it they assume all the duties, obligations, and liabilities imposed by law incidental to the relation including the husband's obligation to support and maintain his wife. Powell v. Powell, 196 Ga. 694, 27 S.E.2d 393 (1943).

Voluntary cohabitation insufficient to annul earlier property settlement.

- Voluntary cohabitation was insufficient to annul an earlier separation agreement since there was no evidence showing that such settlement was in the nature of alimony, and the separation agreement itself foreclosed any award of alimony to the parties; O.C.G.A. § 19-6-12 provided authority to set aside a provision made in a separation agreement for permanent alimony alone upon cohabitation after the execution of the agreement and before total divorce. Adcock v. Adcock, 259 Ga. App. 514, 577 S.E.2d 842 (2003).

Good faith required for cohabitation to annul separation agreement.

- To annul separation agreement, cohabitation relied upon must have been entered into in good faith and not as a scheme merely to avoid payment of alimony. Hill v. Guest, 216 Ga. 679, 119 S.E.2d 19 (1961).

Effect of cohabitation upon award of attorney's fees.

- Cohabitation will annul decree, not only as to alimony, but also as to attorney's fees. In this respect there is no difference between permanent and temporary alimony and incidental allowance of attorney's fees. Hamby v. Pye, 195 Ga. 366, 24 S.E.2d 201 (1943).

Property need not be returned for cohabitation to render agreement void.

- It is not necessary to return property received under agreement for voluntary cohabitation to render it null. The husband effectually gave his consent to annulling the agreement by resuming the marital status. Powell v. Powell, 196 Ga. 694, 27 S.E.2d 393 (1943).

Deed made in consideration of wife's agreement to resume marital relations was not rendered void by the subsequent cohabitation of the husband and wife, under the provisions of the statute. Lemon v. Lemon, 141 Ga. 448, 81 S.E. 118 (1914); Young v. Young, 150 Ga. 515, 104 S.E. 149 (1920); McClain v. McClain, 237 Ga. 80, 227 S.E.2d 5 (1976).

Cases when spouses adjust alimony, without resuming marital relation, do not fall within the statute since those cases do not involve the same principle of public policy. Hamby v. Pye, 195 Ga. 366, 24 S.E.2d 201 (1943).

Illicit relation between former spouses after divorce will not invalidate decree for alimony. Hamby v. Pye, 195 Ga. 366, 24 S.E.2d 201 (1943).

Transfer of property not annulled when not alimony.

- Since there was no evidence appearing in the record that husband transferred the residence as alimony, the parties' subsequent reconciliation would not annul the conveyance. McKissick v. McKissick, 244 Ga. 425, 260 S.E.2d 334 (1979).

Trust created without revocation right in separation agreement.

- When the husband and wife entered into a separation agreement that created a trust for the minor children of the parties without any right to revoke retained, this created an executory trust irrevocable without the beneficiaries' consent, and the subsequent cohabitation of husband and wife cannot affect the rights of the children. Watkins v. Watkins, 64 Ga. App. 344, 13 S.E.2d 100 (1941).

Effect of subsequent cohabitation of spouses upon rights of children.

- Subsequent cohabitation of spouses does not affect rights of children under any deed of separation or voluntary provisions for alimony. Kiser v. Kiser, 214 Ga. 402, 105 S.E.2d 220 (1958).

Deed cannot be canceled as a conveyance for support of the children, even though the alleged subsequent cohabitation of the grantor and grantee annulled and set aside the deed as to the alimony arrangement for the wife. Kiser v. Kiser, 214 Ga. 402, 105 S.E.2d 220 (1958).

Remainder interest vested in children not affected by reconciliation.

- When a man who has separated from his wife executes a deed conveying land to her for her life, with remainder over to their children, in consideration of the wife's agreement to make no further claim for alimony, and such deed is duly recorded, the remainder estate is vested, and the rights of the children as remaindermen are not affected by subsequent resumption of the marital relations between the husband and the wife. Nor is such remainder affected by subsequent possession of the land by the husband for a number of years exceeding the statutory prescriptive period. Clary v. Thornton, 177 Ga. 833, 171 S.E. 704 (1933).

Proceeding to set aside alimony judgment after cohabitation resumed.

- Proceeding to avoid and set aside a verdict and decree for permanent alimony upon the ground that the married pair have resumed cohabitation and are not living in a state of bona fide separation is properly instituted by a petition addressed to the superior court in which such verdict and decree was rendered. Henderson v. Henderson, 170 Ga. 457, 153 S.E. 182 (1930).

Separate maintenance orders superseded by divorce decree.

- Trial court's order setting aside prior separate maintenance orders on the basis of husband's concession as to cohabitation with wife was superfluous since the orders that were entered in connection with the prior separate maintenance action were superseded by a final divorce decree. Southworth v. Southworth, 265 Ga. 671, 461 S.E.2d 215 (1995).

Cited in Mosely v. Mosely, 181 Ga. 543, 182 S.E. 849 (1935); Thomas v. Smith, 185 Ga. 243, 194 S.E. 502 (1937); Smith v. Smith, 187 Ga. 743, 2 S.E.2d 417 (1939); Eskew v. Eskew, 192 Ga. 104, 14 S.E.2d 750 (1941); Moss v. Moss, 200 Ga. 8, 36 S.E.2d 431 (1945); Levine v. Levine, 204 Ga. 313, 49 S.E.2d 814 (1948); Wright v. Wright, 205 Ga. 524, 54 S.E.2d 596 (1949); Hall v. First Nat'l Bank, 89 Ga. App. 853, 81 S.E.2d 522 (1954); Mylius v. Mylius, 91 Ga. App. 1, 84 S.E.2d 679 (1954); Kiser v. Georgia Power Co., 126 Ga. App. 551, 191 S.E.2d 311 (1972).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 24A Am. Jur. 2d, Divorce and Separation, § 705.

C.J.S.

- 27A C.J.S., Divorce, § 21 et seq.

ALR.

- Effect of remarriage of spouses to each other on permanent alimony provisions in final divorce decree, 52 A.L.R.3d 1334.