O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 19-6-26 (2019)

Jurisdiction

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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(a) As used in this Code section, the term: (1) “Child support order” means a judgment, decree, or order of a court or authorized administrative agency requiring the payment of child support in periodic amounts or in a lump sum and includes (A) a permanent or temporary order and (B) an initial order or a modification of an order. (2) “Continuing, exclusive jurisdiction” means the authority and jurisdiction of a court to enter or modify a judgment, decree, or order for the payment of child support, as defined in the Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act, 28 U.S.C. Section 1738B, as amended. (3) “Foreign child support order” means a judgment, decree, or order of a court or authorized administrative agency of another state requiring the payment of child support in periodic amounts or in a lump sum and includes (A) a permanent or temporary order and (B) an initial order or a modification of an order. (4) “Modification” means a change in a child support order that affects the amount, scope, or duration of the order and modifies, replaces, supersedes, or otherwise is made subsequent to a child support order or foreign child support order. (5) “Moving party” means the party initiating an action for the modification of a child support order or foreign child support order. (6) “Nonmoving party” means the party not initiating an action for the modification of a child support order or foreign child support order.

(7) “State” means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the territories and possessions of the United States, and Indian Country as defined in 18 U.S.C. Section 1151. (b) A court of this state may exercise continuing, exclusive jurisdiction for purposes of entering a child support order if the court has subject matter and personal jurisdiction to make such a child support order, and no previous support order has been entered by a court of competent jurisdiction with respect to the child or children named in the support order. (c) A court of this state may exercise continuing, exclusive jurisdiction for purposes of entering a modification of a child support order issued by a court of this state if the child or children named in the child support order or any party to the action resides in this state. (d) A court of this state may exercise continuing, exclusive jurisdiction for purposes of entering a modification of a foreign child support order if: (1) The court has subject matter and personal jurisdiction over the nonmoving party; and (2) The court of the state issuing the order sought to be modified no longer has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify said order as defined in the Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act, 28 U.S.C. Section 1738B, as amended. (3) The parties file a written consent allowing the court to assume continuing, exclusive jurisdiction. This Code section shall be interpreted to effectuate the provisions of Article 3 of Chapter 11 of this title. (e) Jurisdiction within this state to enforce, by a contempt proceeding or otherwise, a child support order entered by or registered with a court of this state shall be vested concurrently in the court issuing such order, in the court in the county where the person owing the duty of support may be found or is employed, and for in rem proceedings only, in the court in the county where property may be found which is subject to seizure, sale, foreclosure, or other process for application toward the support obligation.

History

Ga. L. 1969, p. 98, § 1; Ga. L. 1979, p. 466, § 27; Ga. L. 1997, p. 1613, § 7; Ga. L. 2015, p. 617, § 1/HB 567.

Annotations

Cross references. Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act, § 9-12-110 et seq.

Law reviews. For comment on Connell v. Connell, 119 Ga. App. 485, 167 S.E.2d 686 (1969), as to enforcement of a foreign modification of a Georgia child support decree, see 21 Mercer L. Rev. 675 (1970). For article surveying developments in

Georgia domestic relations law from mid1980 through mid-1981, see 33 Mercer L. Rev. 109 (1981). For survey article on domestic relations, see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 113 (1982).

For article commenting on the 1997 amendment of this Code section, see 14 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 121 (1997).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Proper venue for former husband’s proceeding to modify alimony provisions is former wife’s county of residence, rather than where the original alimony judgment had been entered. Tiller v. Tiller, 245 Ga. 27, 262 S.E.2d 819, 1980 Ga. LEXIS 673 (1980). Reason underlying enactment of former subsection (b). - Former subsection (b) of Ga. L. 1969, p. 98, § 1 was passed to overrule the decision in Connell v. Connell, 119 Ga. App. 485, 167 S.E.2d 686 (1969) which honored a modification of a Georgia decree for child support by a Florida court under the full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution. McGuire v. McGuire, 228 Ga. 782, 187 S.E.2d 859, 1972 Ga. LEXIS 907 (1972). Limitation upon prohibition against enforcement of foreign modification. - Seemingly absolute prohibition against enforcement by Georgia courts of foreign judgments modifying Georgia permanent alimony judgments must be construed as being limited to those situations in which the party against whom the permanent alimony judgment was rendered remains domiciled in this state. Gilbert v. Gilbert, 245 Ga. 674, 266 S.E.2d 490, 1980 Ga. LEXIS 887 (1980). Jurisdiction over contempt motion. - Trial court erred by dismissing an exspouse’s motion for contempt for failure to pay child support, which was filed along with her motion to modify the parties’ divorce decree because when one court has rendered a divorce decree and a second court later acquires jurisdiction to modify the decree, the second court also has jurisdiction to entertain a motion for contempt of the original decree as a counterclaim to the petition to modify. Ford v. Hanna, 292 Ga. 500, 739 S.E.2d 309, 2013 Ga. LEXIS 192 (2013). URESA action not barred by prior decree. - O.C.G.A. § 19-6-26 does not

require a trial court to dismiss proceedings under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, O.C.G.A. § 1911-40 et seq., when a prior support decree is in effect. State ex rel. McKenna v. McKenna, 253 Ga. 6, 315 S.E.2d 885, 1984 Ga. LEXIS 781 (1984). Agreement between the parents. - Father could not voluntarily abandon his parental responsibility by contract. Diegel v. Diegel, 261 Ga. App. 660, 583 S.E.2d 520, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 740 (2003). Counterclaim for revision of child support in change of custody proceeding. - When plaintiff brings suit for change in custody in county other than county of plaintiff’s residence, plaintiff submits to jurisdiction of court in which suit is filed for the purpose of allowing the defendant to file a counterclaim for revision of child support. Ledford v. Bowers, 248 Ga. 804, 286 S.E.2d 293, 1982 Ga. LEXIS 665 (1982). “Continuing, exclusive jurisdiction” of foreign court. - After a Florida court issued an original custody decree, subsequently issuing a modification, and after one of the “individual contestants” continued to live in Florida and did not consent to the Georgia court’s jurisdiction, Florida exercised “continuing, exclusive” jurisdiction, a Georgia county court erred in entering an order domesticating the final divorce decree and increasing the amount of child support, and the superior court should have granted the plaintiff’s motion to set aside the order. Connell v. Woodward, 235 Ga. App. 751, 509 S.E.2d 647, 1998 Ga. App. LEXIS 1505 (1998), cert. denied, No. S99C0522, 1999 Ga. LEXIS 340 (Ga. Apr. 9, 1999). Connecticut had continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the child support order at issue because the husband was still a resident of Connecticut and neither party provided written consent for a Georgia tribunal to exercise jurisdiction over the

matter and, therefore, the trial court erred when the court held the court had jurisdiction to modify the parties’ child support order. Ross v. Ross, 302 Ga. 39, 805 S.E.2d 7, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 766 (2017). Declaratory judgment appropriate method to determine support obligations. - As a former spouse planned to continue denying the second former spouse’s claim of back child support based

on the first spouse’s understanding of an unclear divorce decree’s formula for calculating biennial increases in the first spouse’s support obligation, but doing so subjected the first spouse to contempt charges, the first spouse properly filed a declaratory judgment action. Acevedo v. Kim, 284 Ga. 629, 669 S.E.2d 127, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 870 (2008).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. 24A Am. Jur. 2d, Divorce and Separation, §§ 751, 752. C.J.S. 27B C.J.S., Divorce, §§ 503 et seq., 508 et seq. ALR. Decree for alimony rendered in another

state or country (or domestic decree based thereon) as subject to enforcement by equitable remedies or by contempt proceedings, 18 A.L.R.2d 862. Validity, construction, and application of full faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act (FFCCSOA), 28 USCS § 1738B - state cases, 18 A.L.R.6th 97.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 16 cases, 1983–2017 · leading case: Ross v. Ross, 805 S.E.2d 7 (Ga. 2017).
Ross v. Ross, 805 S.E.2d 7 (Ga. 2017). · cites it 14× “The law further prohibits a state from modifying another state’s child support order if that issuing state has “continuing, exclusive jurisdiction” over the matter.”
State of Ga. v. McKenna, 315 S.E.2d 885 (Ga. 1984). · cites it 8× “The Court of Appeals ruled that the URESA petition should have been dismissed, holding that where support was being paid under a foreign judgment the only remedy available to an out-of-state litigant is domestication of the decree followed by modification under OCGA § 19-6-18.”
Holler v. Holler, 354 S.E.2d 140 (Ga. 1987). · cites it 2× “; OCGA § 19-6-26 (a). Similarly, it was held in Stokes v.”
Hendrix v. Stone, 412 S.E.2d 536 (Ga. 1992). · cites it 2× “13 (3) ( 247 SE2d 752 ) (1978); OCGA § 19-6-26. See also OCGA § 9-12-40. OCGA § 19-6-19, the statutory vehicle for modification, does not expressly authorize a court to modify retroactively a judgment for periodic payment of permanent alimony, and it appears that the appellate…”
Dep't of Human Resources v. Deason, 520 S.E.2d 712 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999). · cites it 2× “1613, 1619-1620, § 7 (OCGA § 19-6-26); (5) the choice of law is determined, Ga.”
Kemp v. Sharp, 409 S.E.2d 204 (Ga. 1991). · cites it 2× “…of support was based on a Georgia judgment and had to be brought in the county of the defendant’s residence. OCGA § 19-6-26.”
Mullin v. Roy, 700 S.E.2d 370 (Ga. 2010). · cites it 2× “See OCGA §§ 19-6-26 (a) (1) (defining a child support order as “a judgment, decree, or order of a court or authorized administrative agency requiring the payment of child support in periodic amounts or in a lump sum” (emphasis supplied)); 19-7-51 (“The decree or order may…”
Frasca v. Frasca, 330 S.E.2d 889 (Ga. 1985). · cites it 3× “OCGA § 19-6-26 (b) does provide that, “No judgment of any other state or foreign jurisdiction by which it is attempted to modify a judgment of this state awarding permanent alimony for the support of a party, a child or children, or both, will be recognized or enforced by the…”
Connell v. Woodward, 509 S.E.2d 647 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998). · cites it 4× “In subsection (e) the statute provides that in the absence of the parties’ written consent, a court of one state “may make a modification of a child support order with respect to a child that is made by a court of another State if — (1) the court has jurisdiction to make such a…”
Ford v. Hanna, 739 S.E.2d 309 (Ga. 2013). · cites it 2× “We note that our decision today is consistent with OCGA § 19-6-26 (e), which provides that “[¡Jurisdiction within this state to enforce a child support order entered by .”
Dep't of Human Resources v. Morton, 420 S.E.2d 89 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992). · cites it 4× “Moreover, appellee’s duty to support the child was established pursuant to the pre-existing divorce decree and OCGA § 19-6-26 (a) provides that, so long as appellee remains in or is domiciled in this state, the “exclusive procedure” for modifying his child support obligations…”
Thomas v. Whaley, 430 S.E.2d 655 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993). · cites it 2× “See also for example OCGA § 19-6-26, which provides that our courts will not recognize or enforce a judgment from another state that modifies a judgment of this state awarding child support.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.