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2018 Georgia Code 19-6-26 | Car Wreck Lawyer

Link to State of Georgia Official Statute 2018 Georgia Code Annotated (sourced from legal.resource.org)
O.C.G.A. 19-6-26 Case Law from Google Scholar Amendments to OCGA 19-6-26

TITLE 19 DOMESTIC RELATIONS

Section 6. Alimony and Child Support, 19-6-1 through 19-6-53.

ARTICLE 1 GENERAL PROVISIONS

19-6-26. Jurisdiction.

  1. As used in this Code section, the term:
    1. "Child support order" means a judgment, decree, or order of a court or authorized administrative agency requiring the payment of child support in periodic amounts or in a lump sum and includes (A) a permanent or temporary order and (B) an initial order or a modification of an order.
    2. "Continuing, exclusive jurisdiction" means the authority and jurisdiction of a court to enter or modify a judgment, decree, or order for the payment of child support, as defined in the Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act, 28 U.S.C. Section 1738B, as amended.
    3. "Foreign child support order" means a judgment, decree, or order of a court or authorized administrative agency of another state requiring the payment of child support in periodic amounts or in a lump sum and includes (A) a permanent or temporary order and (B) an initial order or a modification of an order.
    4. "Modification" means a change in a child support order that affects the amount, scope, or duration of the order and modifies, replaces, supersedes, or otherwise is made subsequent to a child support order or foreign child support order.
    5. "Moving party" means the party initiating an action for the modification of a child support order or foreign child support order.
    6. "Nonmoving party" means the party not initiating an action for the modification of a child support order or foreign child support order.
    7. "State" means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the territories and possessions of the United States, and Indian Country as defined in 18 U.S.C. Section 1151.
  2. A court of this state may exercise continuing, exclusive jurisdiction for purposes of entering a child support order if the court has subject matter and personal jurisdiction to make such a child support order, and no previous support order has been entered by a court of competent jurisdiction with respect to the child or children named in the support order.
  3. A court of this state may exercise continuing, exclusive jurisdiction for purposes of entering a modification of a child support order issued by a court of this state if the child or children named in the child support order or any party to the action resides in this state.
  4. A court of this state may exercise continuing, exclusive jurisdiction for purposes of entering a modification of a foreign child support order if:
    1. The court has subject matter and personal jurisdiction over the nonmoving party; and
    2. The court of the state issuing the order sought to be modified no longer has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify said order as defined in the Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act, 28 U.S.C. Section 1738B, as amended.
    3. The parties file a written consent allowing the court to assume continuing, exclusive jurisdiction. This Code section shall be interpreted to effectuate the provisions of Article 3 of Chapter 11 of this title.
  5. Jurisdiction within this state to enforce, by a contempt proceeding or otherwise, a child support order entered by or registered with a court of this state shall be vested concurrently in the court issuing such order, in the court in the county where the person owing the duty of support may be found or is employed, and for in rem proceedings only, in the court in the county where property may be found which is subject to seizure, sale, foreclosure, or other process for application toward the support obligation.

(Ga. L. 1969, p. 98, § 1; Ga. L. 1979, p. 466, § 27; Ga. L. 1997, p. 1613, § 7; Ga. L. 2015, p. 617, § 1/HB 567.)

Cross references.

- Recognition of foreign money judgments generally, § 9-12-110 et seq.

Law reviews.

- For article surveying developments in Georgia domestic relations law from mid-1980 through mid-1981, see 33 Mercer L. Rev. 109 (1981). For survey article on domestic relations, see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 113 (1982). For article commenting on the 1997 amendment of this Code section, see 14 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 121 (1997). For comment on Connell v. Connell, 119 Ga. App. 485, 167 S.E.2d 686 (1969), as to enforcement of a foreign modification of a Georgia child support decree, see 21 Mercer L. Rev. 675 (1970).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Proper venue for former husband's proceeding to modify alimony provisions is former wife's county of residence, rather than where the original alimony judgment had been entered. Tiller v. Tiller, 245 Ga. 27, 262 S.E.2d 819 (1980).

Reason underlying enactment of former subsection (b).

- Former subsection (b) of Ga. L. 1969, p. 98, § 1 was passed to overrule the decision in Connell v. Connell, 119 Ga. App. 485, 167 S.E.2d 686 (1969) which honored a modification of a Georgia decree for child support by a Florida court under the full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution. McGuire v. McGuire, 228 Ga. 782, 187 S.E.2d 859 (1972).

Limitation upon prohibition against enforcement of foreign modification.

- Seemingly absolute prohibition against enforcement by Georgia courts of foreign judgments modifying Georgia permanent alimony judgments must be construed as being limited to those situations in which the party against whom the permanent alimony judgment was rendered remains domiciled in this state. Gilbert v. Gilbert, 245 Ga. 674, 266 S.E.2d 490 (1980).

Jurisdiction over contempt motion.

- Trial court erred by dismissing an ex-spouse's motion for contempt for failure to pay child support, which was filed along with her motion to modify the parties' divorce decree because when one court has rendered a divorce decree and a second court later acquires jurisdiction to modify the decree, the second court also has jurisdiction to entertain a motion for contempt of the original decree as a counterclaim to the petition to modify. Ford v. Hanna, 292 Ga. 500, 739 S.E.2d 309 (2013).

URESA action not barred by prior decree.

- O.C.G.A. § 19-6-26 does not require a trial court to dismiss proceedings under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, O.C.G.A. § 19-11-40 et seq., when a prior support decree is in effect. State ex rel. McKenna v. McKenna, 253 Ga. 6, 315 S.E.2d 885 (1984).

Agreement between the parents.

- Father could not voluntarily abandon his parental responsibility by contract. Diegel v. Diegel, 261 Ga. App. 660, 583 S.E.2d 520 (2003).

Counterclaim for revision of child support in change of custody proceeding.

- When plaintiff brings suit for change in custody in county other than county of plaintiff's residence, plaintiff submits to jurisdiction of court in which suit is filed for the purpose of allowing the defendant to file a counterclaim for revision of child support. Ledford v. Bowers, 248 Ga. 804, 286 S.E.2d 293 (1982).

"Continuing, exclusive jurisdiction" of foreign court.

- After a Florida court issued an original custody decree, subsequently issuing a modification, and after one of the "individual contestants" continued to live in Florida and did not consent to the Georgia court's jurisdiction, Florida exercised "continuing, exclusive" jurisdiction, a Georgia county court erred in entering an order domesticating the final divorce decree and increasing the amount of child support, and the superior court should have granted the plaintiff's motion to set aside the order. Connell v. Woodward, 235 Ga. App. 751, 509 S.E.2d 647 (1998).

Connecticut had continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the child support order at issue because the husband was still a resident of Connecticut and neither party provided written consent for a Georgia tribunal to exercise jurisdiction over the matter and, therefore, the trial court erred when the court held the court had jurisdiction to modify the parties' child support order. Ross v. Ross, 302 Ga. 39, 805 S.E.2d 7 (2017).

Declaratory judgment appropriate method to determine support obligations.

- As a former spouse planned to continue denying the second former spouse's claim of back child support based on the first spouse's understanding of an unclear divorce decree's formula for calculating biennial increases in the first spouse's support obligation, but doing so subjected the first spouse to contempt charges, the first spouse properly filed a declaratory judgment action. Acevedo v. Kim, 284 Ga. 629, 669 S.E.2d 127 (2008).

Cited in McGuire v. McGuire, 228 Ga. 782, 187 S.E.2d 859 (1972); Johnson v. Johnson, 232 Ga. 103, 205 S.E.2d 270 (1974); Spivey v. Schneider, 234 Ga. 687, 217 S.E.2d 251 (1975); Oliver v. Oliver, 244 Ga. 20, 257 S.E.2d 527 (1979); Konscol v. Konscol, 151 Ga. App. 696, 261 S.E.2d 438 (1979); Bisno v. Biloon, 161 Ga. App. 351, 291 S.E.2d 66 (1982); Frasca v. Frasca, 254 Ga. 532, 330 S.E.2d 889 (1985); Holler v. Holler, 257 Ga. 27, 354 S.E.2d 140 (1987); Kemp v. Sharp, 261 Ga. 600, 409 S.E.2d 204 (1991); Mullin v. Roy, 287 Ga. 810, 700 S.E.2d 370 (2010).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 24A Am. Jur. 2d, Divorce and Separation, §§ 751, 752.

C.J.S.

- 27B C.J.S., Divorce, §§ 503 et seq., 508 et seq.

ALR.

- Decree for alimony rendered in another state or country (or domestic decree based thereon) as subject to enforcement by equitable remedies or by contempt proceedings, 18 A.L.R.2d 862.

Validity, construction, and application of full faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act (FFCCSOA), 28 USCS § 1738B - state cases, 18 A.L.R.6th 97.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 19-6-26

Total Results: 9  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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Hendrix v. Stone, 412 S.E.2d 536 (Ga. 1992).

Cited 18 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 4, 1992 | 261 Ga. 874, 33 Fulton County D. Rep. 23

...The 1988 divorce decree remained a valid judgment, binding on the parties and enforceable according to its terms until modified by a separate proceeding instituted by a petition for modification. Lindwall v. Lindwall, 242 Ga. 13(3), 247 S.E.2d 752 (1978); OCGA § 19-6-26....
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Holler v. Holler, 354 S.E.2d 140 (Ga. 1987).

Cited 18 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Apr 9, 1987 | 257 Ga. 27

...751 (189 SE 903) (1937), and the statutory law in OCGA §§ 19-6-18 through 19-6-27 "provides the exclusive method by which the alimony provisions of a divorce decree may be revised and modified." Fuller v. Squires, 242 Ga. 475, 477 (2) (249 SE2d 261) (1978) and cit.; OCGA § 19-6-26 (a)....
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Kemp v. Sharp, 409 S.E.2d 204 (Ga. 1991).

Cited 16 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 18, 1991 | 261 Ga. 600

...[OCGA § 19-9-42(5).] The parties' child lived in Texas with Sharp for at least six consecutive months prior to the institution of Kemp's action. [3] Sharp's claim for modification of support was based on a Georgia judgment and had to be brought in the county of the defendant's residence. OCGA § 19-6-26.
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State of Ga. v. McKenna, 315 S.E.2d 885 (Ga. 1984).

Cited 15 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 22, 1984 | 253 Ga. 6

...s being paid under a foreign judgment the only remedy available to an out-of-state litigant is domestication of the decree followed by modification under OCGA § 19-6-18. In reaching its conclusion the Court of Appeals relied on the language of OCGA § 19-6-26 (a), as it also did in an earlier case on similar issues, Bisno v....
..."So long as a party against whom is rendered a permanent judgment remains in or is domiciled in this state, the exclusive procedure for the modification of the judgment shall be by a proceeding instituted for such purposes in the superior court of the county in which venue is proper." OCGA § 19-6-26 (a). Insofar as the opinions hold that a URESA action may not be brought to modify a Georgia or foreign *8 decree they are correct. However, we do not agree that OCGA § 19-6-26 (a) requires a trial court to dismiss URESA proceedings when a prior support decree is in effect....
...The Fulton court ordered child support in an amount higher than the child support ordered in the Clayton decree. The Court of Appeals reversed. The holding in that case that URESA may not be used to modify a prior Georgia award is correct. Ray, supra. The method of modification is set forth in OCGA § 19-6-26....
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Mullin v. Roy, 700 S.E.2d 370 (Ga. 2010).

Cited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 20, 2010 | 287 Ga. 810, 2010 Fulton County D. Rep. 3010

...the longstanding discretion of trial courts to order lump-sum payment under appropriate circumstances like those of this case. This interpretation is confirmed by related statutes which expressly recognize that lump-sum awards may occur. See OCGA §§ 19-6-26(a)(1) (defining a child support order as "a judgment, decree, or order of a court or authorized administrative agency requiring the payment of child support in periodic amounts or in a lump sum " (emphasis supplied)); 19-7-51 ("The decree...
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Frasca v. Frasca, 330 S.E.2d 889 (Ga. 1985).

Cited 5 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jul 2, 1985 | 254 Ga. 532

...ot in itself subject the nonresident to the in personam jurisdiction of Georgia courts in subsequent actions based on the judgment. Therefore, the trial court did not err in ruling that it lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant here. 5. OCGA § 19-6-26 (b) does provide that, "No judgment of any other state or foreign jurisdiction by which it is attempted to modify a judgment of this state awarding permanent alimony for the support of a party, a child or children, or both, will be recogni...
...the former wife, who remains a New York resident. The judgment of the Georgia court merely domesticated the New York decree so as to make it enforceable against the former husband in the courts of Georgia. Under these circumstances, we conclude that § 19-6-26 (b) is inapplicable....
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Ford v. Hanna, 292 Ga. 500 (Ga. 2013).

Cited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 4, 2013 | 739 S.E.2d 309, 2013 Fulton County D. Rep. 397

...When a petition to modify the original decree is filed in another court, that court and the court that rendered the original decree have concurrent jurisdiction to punish a contempt of the original decree. We note that our decision today is consistent with OCGA § 19-6-26 (e), which provides that “[¡Jurisdiction within this state to enforce a child support order entered by ......
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Ross v. Ross, 302 Ga. 39 (Ga. 2017).

Cited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 13, 2017 | 805 S.E.2d 7

...The law further prohibits a state from modifying another state’s child support order if that issuing state has “continuing, exclusive jurisdiction” over the matter. See 28 USC § 1738B (a) (2), (d), and (e).6 In 1997, Georgia codified the requirements of 28 USC § 1738B at OCGA § 19-6-26. See Connell v. Woodward, 235 Ga.App. 751, 753 (1) (509 SE2d 647) (1998) (“On July 1, 1997, OCGA § 19-6-26, which adopts the provisions of the FFCCSOA, became effective in Georgia.”). OCGA § 19-6-26 (a) (2) defines continuing, exclusive jurisdiction as “the authority and jurisdiction of a court to enter or modify a judgment, decree, or order for the payment of child support....
...See also Ga. Dept. of Human Resources v. Deason, 238 Ga. App. 853, 857 (1) (a) (520 SE2d 712) (1999) (one of the purposes of UIFSA was to legislate that “foreign support orders are unmodifiable, except by FFCCSOA, Ga. L. 1997, pp. 1613,1619-1620, § 7 (OCGA § 19-6-26)”).7 Accordingly, there are only a handful of circumstances in which a Georgia tribunal may modify another state’s child support order: (1) (a) neither of the parties nor the child live in the foreign state/issuing state; (b) the peti...
...l a resident of Connecticut and neither party has provided written consent for a Georgia tribunal to exercise jurisdiction over the matter. See 28 USC § 1738B (d); Connell v. Woodward, 235 Ga. App. at 754. See also 28 USC § 1738B (e) (2) (A); OCGA § 19-6-26 (d)....
...proved, and the effect thereof. (Footnotes omitted.) Morgan, supra, 24 J. Am. Acad. Matrim. Law. at 220-221. See OCGA § 19-11-170 (a) (1). See also 28 USC § 1738B (e) (2) (A). See OCGA § 19-11-170 (a) (2). See also 28 USC § 1738B (d); OCGA § 19-6-26 (d). See OCGA § 19-11-172 (a). We note, however, that a Georgia tribunal generally has authority to enforce a foreign child support order as a matter of comity....
...See 28 USC § 1738B (a) (1); OCGA §§ 19-11-104 (b); 19-11-110 (a) (1). It is only when modification is requested that more careful consideration must be had to determine a Georgia court’s authority to act. We find it disconcerting that counsel for the parties did not mention 28 USC § 1738Bor OCGA § 19-6-26 in the briefing to this Court or, apparently, to the trial court below. The UIFSA does provide that a Georgia tribunal may act as an “initiating tribunal” to forward proceedings to a foreign tribunal....
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Young v. Young, 315 S.E.2d 878 (Ga. 1984).

Cited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 16, 1984 | 252 Ga. 564

...630-631, which did not provide for temporary modification. Nevertheless, we disagree with the contention that the superior court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. See Art. VI, Sec. IV, Par. I of the 1983 Georgia Constitution (Code Ann. § 2-3001). See also OCGA § 19-6-26 (a) (Code Ann....