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Call Now: 904-383-7448In cases of voluntary separation or in cases where one spouse, against the will of that spouse, is abandoned or driven off by the other spouse, a party voluntarily, by contract or other written agreement made with his spouse, may make an adequate provision for the support and maintenance of such spouse, consistent with the means of the party and the former circumstances of the spouse. Such an agreement shall be a bar to the right of the spouse to permanent alimony.
(Orig. Code 1863, § 1694; Code 1868, § 1737; Code 1873, § 1745; Code 1882, § 1745; Civil Code 1895, § 2465; Civil Code 1910, § 2984; Code 1933, § 30-211; Ga. L. 1979, p. 466, § 16.)
- For article, "Conflict of Laws Between Community Property and Common Law States in Division of Marital-Property on Divorce," see 12 Mercer L. Rev. 287 (1961). For note, "The Impact of the Revolution in Georgia's Divorce Law on Antenuptial Agreements," see 11 Ga. L. Rev. 406 (1977).
- Provisions of statute must not be confused with temporary alimony settlements. Finch v. Finch, 213 Ga. 199, 97 S.E.2d 576 (1957).
Statute had no application to cases after parties' agreement was made court's judgment of permanent alimony. Stanton v. Stanton, 223 Ga. 664, 157 S.E.2d 453 (1967).
Voluntary deed as bar to permanent alimony is limited to two instances, voluntary separation or when the wife, against her will, is abandoned or driven off by the husband, and it contemplates the release of the husband from the wife's claims for permanent alimony. Stanton v. Stanton, 223 Ga. 664, 157 S.E.2d 453 (1967).
Action by wife based solely upon contract for support is not action for alimony or an "alimony case" within the constitutional provision relating to jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Hayes v. Hayes, 191 Ga. 237, 11 S.E.2d 764 (1940).
- Valid agreement may be made between husband and wife, contemplating immediate separation, for a separate allowance to the wife for her support. Green v. Starling, 203 Ga. 10, 45 S.E.2d 188 (1947).
- Contract providing for the wife's support which is made after a separation has taken place, or immediately before a separation which has already been determined upon, is valid and enforceable. Richards v. Richards, 85 Ga. App. 605, 69 S.E.2d 911 (1952).
- Agreement pleaded by husband as a bar to the right of wife to be awarded alimony, containing provision that either party "may at any time bring his or her action for divorce, and the same will not be contested, provided the proceeding is based upon some other lawful ground than that which will involve the character or chastity of either party of this agreement," rendered the agreement void as tending to promote a dissolution of the marriage relation, and constituted no bar to the claim of the wife for alimony in a divorce proceeding subsequently instituted by the husband. Law v. Law, 186 Ga. 113, 197 S.E. 272 (1938).
- When one accepts benefits under separation agreement, one is estopped to set aside divorce decree which gave rise to the agreement. Sikes v. Sikes, 231 Ga. 105, 200 S.E.2d 259 (1973).
- Upon subsequent voluntary cohabitation, a separation support agreement shall be annulled and set aside. Powell v. Powell, 196 Ga. 694, 27 S.E.2d 393 (1943).
- It is not necessary for wife to return property received under agreement in order for the subsequent voluntary cohabitation to render the agreement a nullity. The husband effectually gave his consent to annulling the agreement by resuming the marital status. Powell v. Powell, 196 Ga. 694, 27 S.E.2d 393 (1943).
- When the husband promises to pay a lump sum for the wife's support, payable in installments, and the wife dies before all the installments are paid, her executor may sue for the unpaid installments as they severally mature. Melton v. Hubbard, 135 Ga. 128, 68 S.E. 1101 (1910).
Decree should accurately reflect a settlement reached by the parties; therefore, the trial court cannot be allowed to make substantive additions in voluntary agreements made before the court. Robinson v. Robinson, 261 Ga. 330, 404 S.E.2d 435 (1991).
- O.C.G.A. §§ 19-6-7 and19-6-8 did not apply to bar surviving husband's claim of year's support against wife's estate because they do not encompass oral agreements that fail to provide or otherwise address alimony or support issues. Bird v. Bishop, 207 Ga. App. 11, 427 S.E.2d 301 (1993).
Cited in Gore v. Plair, 173 Ga. 88, 159 S.E. 698 (1931); Craig v. Craig, 53 Ga. App. 632, 186 S.E. 755 (1936); Grimmett v. Barnwell, 184 Ga. 461, 192 S.E. 191 (1937); Evans v. Evans, 191 Ga. 752, 14 S.E.2d 95 (1941); Wren v. Wren, 199 Ga. 851, 36 S.E.2d 77 (1945); Ridgeway v. Ridgeway, 224 Ga. 310, 161 S.E.2d 866 (1968); Anderson v. Anderson, 237 Ga. 886, 230 S.E.2d 272 (1976); Worthington v. Worthington, 250 Ga. 730, 301 S.E.2d 44 (1983).
- 27B C.J.S., Divorce, §§ 516 et seq., 527 et seq., 610 et seq., 623 et seq.
- What amounts to a "final division and distribution" of estate within statute allowing such in lieu of alimony, 1 A.L.R. 1106.
Validity of separation agreement as affected by fraud, coercion, unfairness, or mistake, 5 A.L.R. 823.
Rights and remedies as between husband and wife in respect of separation agreement invalid as contrary to public policy, 109 A.L.R. 1174.
Validity of provision of separation agreement for cessation or diminution of payments for wife's support upon specified event, 4 A.L.R.2d 732.
Parol evidence to show duration of written contract for support or maintenance, 14 A.L.R.2d 897.
Construction and effect of provision in separation agreement that wife is to have portion of "income," "total income," "net income," and the like, 79 A.L.R.2d 609.
Divorce: power of court to modify decree for alimony or support of spouse which was based on agreement of parties, 61 A.L.R.3d 520.
Total Results: 1
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1983-03-17
Citation: 301 S.E.2d 44, 250 Ga. 730, 1983 Ga. LEXIS 624
Snippet: a comparison of § 1694 of the 1863 Code (OCGA § 19-6-8 (Code Ann. § 30-211) in its present form) to §