O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 19-9-43 (2019)

Proceeding pertaining to Indian child exempted from article

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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(a) A child custody proceeding that pertains to an Indian child as defined in the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. Section 1901 et seq., is not subject to this article to the extent that it is governed by the Indian Child Welfare Act. (b) A court of this state shall treat a tribe as if it were a state of the United States for the purpose of applying this part and Part 2 of this article. (c) A child custody determination made by a tribe under factual circumstances in substantial conformity with the jurisdictional standards of this article must be recognized and enforced under Part 3 of this article.

History

Code 1981, § 19-9-43, enacted by Ga. L. 2001, p. 129, § 1.

Annotations

Cross references. Legitimate American Indian tribes, § 44-12-300 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES ALR. Construction and application of Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) (25 U.S.C.A. §§ 1901 et seq.) upon child custody determinations, 89 A.L.R.5th 195. Who are “qualified expert witnesses” under Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 U.S.C.A. § 1912(e), (f) and state ICWA

statutes, requiring certain testimony by such witnesses before foster care placement or termination of parental rights may be ordered, 38 A.L.R.7th Art. 1. Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act’s Application to Tribal Courts, 45 A.L.R.7th Art. 5.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 46 cases, 1983–2003 · leading case: Lightfoot v. Lightfoot, 436 S.E.2d 700 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993).
Lightfoot v. Lightfoot, 436 S.E.2d 700 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993). · cites it 20× “Nevertheless, the trial court found jurisdiction under OCGA § 19-9-43 (a) (2) and denied the motion to dismiss.”
Harper v. Landers, 348 S.E.2d 698 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986). · cites it 18× “" OCGA § 19-9-43 (1), (2). OCGA § 19-9-42 (5) defines "home state" as "the state in which the child, immediately preceding the time involved, lived with his parents, a parent, or a person acting as a parent for at least six consecutive months .”
Mulle v. Yount, 440 S.E.2d 210 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993). · cites it 16× “OCGA §§ 19-9-43 (a) (1) (A); 19-9-42 (5).”
Thompson v. Thompson, 526 S.E.2d 576 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999). · cites it 24× “It follows that the UCCJA and PKPA have the same effect, as the purpose of all three statutes is the avoidance of jurisdictional conflicts.”
Goldstein v. Goldstein, 494 S.E.2d 745 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997). · cites it 16× “On the other hand, OCGA § 19-9-43 of the UCCJA, as judicially construed, provides for personal jurisdiction over non-resident parents in petitions to modify custody and in contempt actions to enforce child custody orders where the provisions of that statute are met.”
Edwards v. Edwards, 563 S.E.2d 888 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002). · cites it 12× “Relying upon OCGA § 19-9-43 (a) (1) (B), the trial court found that Georgia was the “home state” of the minor child at the time that Edwards filed his complaint to change custody.”
Osgood v. Dent, 306 S.E.2d 698 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983). · cites it 8× “OCGA § 19-9-43 (a) (Code Ann. § 74-504) (UCCJA § 3) establishes the four bases for jurisdiction of child custody proceedings, whether initially or by modification: (1) the state is or has been within six months the child’s “home state,” as defined by the Act; (2) the child and…”
Dyer v. Surratt, 466 S.E.2d 584 (Ga. 1996). · cites it 4× “The appellate court determined that Dyer's petition was an interstate custody matter and, applying Section 3 of the UCCJA, OCGA § 19-9-43, concluded that the Georgia court "correctly declined to exercise jurisdiction over Dyer's request for modification of custody.”
Williams v. Goss, 438 S.E.2d 670 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993). · cites it 6× ““OCGA § 19-9-43 (a) . . . (UCCJA § 3) establishes the four bases for jurisdiction of child custody proceedings, whether initially or by modification: (1) the state is or has been within six months the child’s ‘home state,’ as defined by the Act; (2) the child and at least one…”
Early v. Early, 499 S.E.2d 329 (Ga. 1998). · cites it 4× “OCGA § 19-9-43 (a) (1), (2) (A). The trial court then recognized the jurisdictional distinctions between custody issues under the UCCJA and support issues under the FFCCSOA, as well as the absence of any language in the latter statute providing for discretion in the state with…”
Mulle v. Yount, 420 S.E.2d 776 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992). · cites it 10× “The Georgia court denied the father’s motion and assumed jurisdiction under OCGA § 19-9-43 (a) (1) and (2) of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) (OCGA § 19-9-40 et seq.”
Parke v. Fant, 578 S.E.2d 896 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003). · cites it 4× “Under former OCGA § 19-9-43 (a) (1) (B), Georgia courts retain jurisdiction to make child custody determinations if Georgia [h]ad been the child’s home state within six months before commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from this state because of [her] removal…”
— 19-9-43(a) — 2 cases
Goldstein v. Goldstein, 494 S.E.2d 745 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997). “On the other hand, OCGA § 19-9-43 of the UCCJA, as judicially construed, provides for personal jurisdiction over non-resident parents in petitions to modify custody and in contempt actions to enforce child custody orders where the provisions of that statute are met.”
Thompson v. Thompson, 526 S.E.2d 576 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999). “It follows that the UCCJA and PKPA have the same effect, as the purpose of all three statutes is the avoidance of jurisdictional conflicts.”
— 19-9-43(a)(1) — 2 cases
Early v. Early, 499 S.E.2d 329 (Ga. 1998). “OCGA § 19-9-43 (a) (1), (2) (A). The trial court then recognized the jurisdictional distinctions between custody issues under the UCCJA and support issues under the FFCCSOA, as well as the absence of any language in the latter statute providing for discretion in the state with…”
Thompson v. Thompson, 526 S.E.2d 576 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999). “It follows that the UCCJA and PKPA have the same effect, as the purpose of all three statutes is the avoidance of jurisdictional conflicts.”
— 19-9-43(a)(1)(A) — 1 case
Garrett v. Garrett, 477 S.E.2d 804 (Ga. 1996).
— 19-9-43(a)(1)(B) — 1 case
Goldstein v. Goldstein, 494 S.E.2d 745 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997). “On the other hand, OCGA § 19-9-43 of the UCCJA, as judicially construed, provides for personal jurisdiction over non-resident parents in petitions to modify custody and in contempt actions to enforce child custody orders where the provisions of that statute are met.”
— 19-9-43(a)(2) — 1 case
Thompson v. Thompson, 526 S.E.2d 576 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999). “It follows that the UCCJA and PKPA have the same effect, as the purpose of all three statutes is the avoidance of jurisdictional conflicts.”
— 19-9-43(a)(3) — 2 cases
Thompson v. Thompson, 526 S.E.2d 576 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999). “It follows that the UCCJA and PKPA have the same effect, as the purpose of all three statutes is the avoidance of jurisdictional conflicts.”
In Re Jsj, 558 S.E.2d 763 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002).
— 19-9-43(a)(3)(B) — 1 case
In Re Jsj, 558 S.E.2d 763 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002).
— 19-9-43(a)(4) — 2 cases
Thompson v. Thompson, 526 S.E.2d 576 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999). “It follows that the UCCJA and PKPA have the same effect, as the purpose of all three statutes is the avoidance of jurisdictional conflicts.”
In Re Bas, 563 S.E.2d 141 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002).
— 19-9-43(a)(4)(A) — 1 case
In Re Bas, 563 S.E.2d 141 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002).
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.