O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 19-9-49 (2019)

Communication between court of this state and other states

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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(a) A court of this state may communicate with a court in another state concerning a proceeding arising under this article and concerning any proceeding or court order in another state relating to family violence. A court of this state may consult any state or national registry of court orders relating to family violence with regard to any party. (b) The court may allow the parties to participate in the communication. If the parties are not able to participate in the communication, they must be given the opportunity to present facts and legal arguments before a decision on jurisdiction is made. (c) Communication between courts on schedules, calendars, court records, and similar matters may occur without informing the parties. A record need not be made of the communication. (d) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c) of this Code section, a record must be made of any communication under this Code section. The parties must be informed promptly of the communication and granted access to the record. (e) For the purposes of this Code section, “record” means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form.

History

Code 1981, § 19-9-49, enacted by Ga. L. 2001, p. 129, § 1.

Annotations

Cross references. Electronic records and signatures, T. 10, C. 12.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Editor’s notes. - In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, annotations decided under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, former Code 1933, §§ 74-501 through 74-525, subsequently codified as §§ 19-9-40 through 19-9-64, are included in the annotations for this Code section. Informational requirements were necessary to effective functioning of former Code 1933, § 74-507. Youmans v. Youmans, 247 Ga. 529, 276 S.E.2d 837, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 716 (1981) (decided under former Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act). Communications with judge from another state. - Because the trial

court’s decision to relinquish jurisdiction of the child custody case was based in part on the trial court’s communications with a North Carolina judge, the trial court committed reversible error by failing to inform the parties of those communications contrary to the plain requirements of this provision of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, O.C.G.A. § 19 - 9 - 40 et seq., and by failing to allow the parties to present facts and arguments relating to the record of those communications. Alden v. Yarborough, 360 Ga. App. 850, 862 S.E.2d 148, 2021 Ga. App. LEXIS 405 (2021).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. 39 Am. Jur. 2d, Habeas Corpus, § 83 et seq. 59 Am. Jur. 2d, Parent and Child, § 10. C.J.S. 27C C.J.S., Divorce, § 1280 et seq. 39 C.J.S., Habeas Corpus, § 161 et seq. 67A C.J.S., Parent and Child, § 106 et seq.

U.L.A. Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (U.L.A.) § 9. ALR. Necessity of requiring presence in court of both parties in proceedings relating to custody or visitation of children, 15 A.L.R.4th 864.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 6 cases (3 in the last 5 years), 1983–2026 · leading case: Osgood v. Dent, 306 S.E.2d 698 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983).
Osgood v. Dent, 306 S.E.2d 698 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983). · cites it 3× “” Moreover, OCGA § 19-9-49 (Code Ann. § 74-510) *408 (UCCJA § 9) requires every party in a custody proceeding to state in his first pleading whether he knows of any pending custody proceeding in any state, and § 19-9-46 (Code Ann.”
Jackson v. Jackson, 328 S.E.2d 733 (Ga. 1985). · cites it 2× “We note, however, that failure to furnish the information required by OCGA § 19-9-49, including paragraph (d) thereof, could also result in the setting aside of a child custody award.”
Galvez v. Galvez, 472 S.E.2d 492 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996). · cites it 2× “Although the complaint fails to set out the places where the children have lived within the last five years as required by OCGA § 19-9-49 (a) (2), the mother’s verified motion to dismiss sets forth the states in which the children have resided.”
Christine Alden v. Dale Yarborough (Ga. Ct. App. 2021). · cites it 6× “) OCGA § 19-9-49. Georgia appears to lack precedent on the issue presented in this case, but courts in other states have found reversible error in cases where the trial court communicated with a court of another state and the parties were not informed of, and granted access to a…”
Kristen Jocelyn Hooper v. Travis Tyrone Townsend, Jr. (Ga. Ct. App. 2022). · cites it 2× “But after a telephone call with the Virginia court, see OCGA § 19-9-49, the trial court entered an order concluding that because Georgia had exclusive and continuing jurisdiction over the matter, it would retain the custody action.”
Shannon Newsome v. Ryan Hawkins (Ga. Ct. App. 2026). · cites it 2× “Instead, the Virginia court’s order shows that it relied solely on the Georgia court’s earlier order to transfer the case, and the Georgia court based its decision primarily on the parties’ agreement.”
— 19-9-49(b) — 1 case
Shannon Newsome v. Ryan Hawkins (Ga. Ct. App. 2026). “Instead, the Virginia court’s order shows that it relied solely on the Georgia court’s earlier order to transfer the case, and the Georgia court based its decision primarily on the parties’ agreement.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.