Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1910, § 1551(172), which was subsequently repealed but was succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section.

County superintendent cannot contract debt on behalf of county board without previous authority from board. State Bd. of Educ. v. Elbert County Bd. of Educ., 112 Ga. App. 840, 146 S.E.2d 344 (1965).

County superintendent of schools has no authority to obligate the county board of education under a contract unless authorization has been previously obtained from the board. Knight v. Troup County Bd. of Educ., 144 Ga. App. 634, 242 S.E.2d 263 (1978).

Superintendent cannot contract debt nor dispose of uncollected funds without board's authority.

- County superintendent of schools cannot contract a debt on behalf of the county board of education without previous authority from the board, nor, in the absence of such authority, can the superintendent dispose of county funds before those funds are collected. American Ins. Co. v. Seminole County Bd. of Educ., 51 Ga. App. 808, 181 S.E. 783 (1935).

County superintendent is not authorized to disclaim title to property vested in board.

- Authority given to the superintendent by former Code 1933, §§ 32-912 and 32-1009 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 20-2-57,20-2-59,20-2-105, and20-2-109) to act as an agent for the county school board did not include any authority to disclaim title to property vested in the board as public trustees. Ingram v. Doss, 217 Ga. 645, 124 S.E.2d 87 (1962).

Superintendent as policymaker.

- No clearly established law barred firing a school superintendent, considered a policymaking or confidential employee under Georgia law and an executive on whom the school board relied to enforce policies, for speaking about inadequate property tax collections as such speech was about quintessential policy matters; individual school board officials had qualified immunity on claims of retaliatory termination under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Leslie v. Hancock County Bd. of Educ., 720 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 2013).

Failure to ensure compliance with regulations.

- Evidence supported a finding that a school superintendent knew of a change to the School District's dual enrollment policy and of the questions that had been raised about the validity of the policy change, which violated the clear and unambiguous language of the State's Dual Enrollment Regulation, Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. 160-4-2-.34(6)(b), 160-4-2-.34(2)(e), but the superintendent failed to ensure compliance and allowed the policy change for the benefit of the superintendent's own daughter. Quigg v. Ga. Prof'l Stds. Comm'n, 344 Ga. App. 142, 809 S.E.2d 267 (2017).

Testimony on fiscal affairs of board of education.

- County school superintendent acts as the chief fiscal officer of the board of education; in this capacity the superintendent qualifies to testify concerning the fiscal affairs of the board, and there is no error in the admission of testimony by the county school superintendent outlining the expenditure required of the board of education under the Quality Basic Education Act, O.C.G.A. § 20-2-130 et seq. Hicks v. Arnall, 258 Ga. 296, 368 S.E.2d 733 (1988).

Official immunity applied to superintendent.

- School superintendent did not have a ministerial duty to enforce an eye protection policy passed pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 20-2-109. Neither the policy, the statute, nor a regulation specified steps to be taken by the superintendent to enforce compliance with the policy; thus, the superintendent was entitled to official immunity in a lawsuit resulting from a student's injury during a science experiment. Dollar v. Grammens, 294 Ga. App. 888, 670 S.E.2d 555 (2008).

Mandamus is the proper and exclusive remedy to enforce performance of duties. Ferguson v. Smith, 27 Ga. App. 806, 110 S.E. 42 (1921) (decided under former Code 1910, § 1551 (172)).

Cited in Mathew v. Ellis, 214 Ga. 665, 107 S.E.2d 181 (1959); Gold v. DeKalb County Sch. Dist., 346 Ga. App. 108, 815 S.E.2d 259 (2018).

Duty to run system upon recall of board of education.

- County school superintendent is charged with the duty of continuing to effectuate and enforce the rules, regulations, and instructions of the county board of education and continuing to operate the county school system during the period of time between the successful recall of all or a majority of the county board of education and the filling of the vacancies on the county board of education by special election. 1985 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U85-43.

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 68 Am. Jur. 2d, Schools, §§ 28, 35, 66, 78, 83, 84, 116, 125 et seq., 321.

C.J.S.

- 78 C.J.S., Schools and School Districts, §§ 140 et seq., 399. 78A C.J.S., Schools and School Districts, § 726.

ALR.

- Validity of regulation by public school authorities as to clothes or personal appearance of pupils, 14 A.L.R.3d 1201.