Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the issues covered in the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1910, § 1551(102) and former Code 1933, § 32-1132, which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section.

Right and power to operate county schools.

- Right and power of the county boards of education and the county superintendents of education to operate the schools of the counties and to make contracts of employment with teachers is settled by the Constitution and laws of this state as construed by the Supreme Court. Jones v. Ellis, 182 Ga. 380, 185 S.E. 510 (1936) (decided under former Code 1933, § 32-1132).

County officers empowered to sell state warrants and collect money.

- When warrants are issued and delivered to the county superintendent, the county officers have express power to sell and assign the warrants and collect the money arising from the sale. Having such power, it is competent in making the sale to create a bailment of the money. Berrien v. State, 156 Ga. 380, 119 S.E. 300 (1923) (decided under former Code 1910, § 1551(102)).

State cannot exercise control over warrant or proceeds after delivery.

- State, after the delivery of a warrant to the county superintendent, cannot legally exercise any control over the warrant or the proceeds arising from discount. Berrien v. State, 158 Ga. 380, 119 S.E. 300 (1923) (decided under former Code 1910, § 1551(102)).

Prerequisite condition to right to borrow money.

- Neither the record on the minutes of the board of the board's resolution to borrow money, nor the signing of the minutes by the president (now the chair), is a mandatory or prerequisite condition to the right to borrow money and execute notes for school purposes. American Sur. Co. v. Citizens' Bank, 48 Ga. App. 448, 172 S.E. 801 (1934), aff'd, 180 Ga. 827, 180 S.E. 635 (1935) (decided under former Code 1910, § 1551(102)).

In action for money borrowed, demand for payment not condition precedent.

- In an action against a local school district for money borrowed, there is no condition precedent that a demand for payment be made and the statute of limitation begins to run from the time funds are on hand to discharge obligations. Jasper Sch. Dist. v. Gormley, 57 Ga. App. 537, 196 S.E. 232 (1938) (decided under former Code 1933, § 32-1132).

When payment of indebtedness not provided for in estimated budget.

- When payment of the indebtedness due to the petitioner by the county board of education was not provided for as an estimated expenditure from the funds included in the budget filed by the county board with the State Board of Education, the petitioner was not legally entitled to compel payment out of the funds included in the budget, and equity would not impound the funds for the purpose of compelling payment. Lewis v. Board of Educ., 183 Ga. 687, 189 S.E. 233 (1936) (decided under former Code 1933, § 32-1132).

Judgment and pay back salary award.

- Even though the majority of funds controlled by a school board emanates from the state, the board has sufficient sources of income to satisfy a judgment, or the ability to raise the funds, as well as the authority to pay an award of back salary without transgressing state law. Davis v. Griffin-Spalding County Bd. of Educ., 445 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D. Ga. 1975).

Cited in Hicks v. Groves, 177 Ga. 574, 170 S.E. 877 (1933); Nelms v. Stephens County Sch. Dist., 201 Ga. 274, 39 S.E.2d 651 (1946).

Restriction on temporary loans cannot include anticipated state revenues.

- Provision in Ga. Const 1945, Art. VII, Sec. VII, Para. IV (see now Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. V) that the aggregate amount of all temporary loans of a county board of education outstanding at any one time shall not exceed 75 percent of the total gross income of the county board of education from taxes collected by the county, means "local county taxes"; it cannot include anticipated revenues from the State Board of Education, which money is merely a grant from the state. 1958-59 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 97.

Unconstitutional not to discharge school obligations within year incurred.

- Neither Board of Educ. v. Thurmond, 162 Ga. 58, 132 S.E. 427 (1926), nor Board of Educ. v. Board of Trustees of Fort Valley Consol. School Dist., 170 Ga. 509, 153 S.E. 214 (1930), can properly be construed as upholding the constitutionality of school obligations not to be discharged within the year in which the obligations are incurred. 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-160.

County permitted to borrow for all necessary purposes.

- This section clearly expresses a legislative intent to permit the county boards to borrow for all purposes necessary for the operation of the public schools. 1948-49 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 108.

Right of county board to pledge state appropriations for an advance loan is impliedly recognized by law. 1948-49 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 105; 1948-49 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 106.

Board may mortgage school buses to retire county school debts.

- Inasmuch as the county boards of education are vested with the title and control of all school property and have been granted the power to borrow money, these plenary grants of authority are sufficient to authorize the board to use the school property as the board may see fit and, therefore, a county board of education may mortgage school buses to retire debts of the county school system. 1948-49 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 104.

Board not authorized to sell recently erected building and buy back same building.

- County board of education would not be authorized to sell a recently erected school building and at the same time buy back the same building, to be paid for over a period of years, to obtain funds with which to equip the building and other buildings in the school system. 1952-53 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 72.

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 63C Am. Jur. 2d, Public Officers and Employees, §§ 230 et seq., 258.

C.J.S.

- 78A C.J.S., Schools and School Districts, § 707 et seq.

ALR.

- Right of person advancing money for public school purposes to be reimbursed, 50 A.L.R. 1291.