Constitutionality.

- This section is neither unduly burdensome nor irrational, and is valid under U.S. Const., amend. 14. Belluso v. Poythress, 485 F. Supp. 904 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (see O.C.G.A. § 21-2-193).

O.C.G.A. § 21-2-193, by identifying three logically representative members of each party to serve on the committee, and by providing a check against arbitrariness by allowing only one member of the party on the committee to override the unanimous decision of the committee, is narrowly tailored to advance the interests of the state in conducting orderly and efficient elections, and in allowing the parties to choose their candidates, and is not violative of the first and fourteenth amendments. Duke v. Cleland, 884 F. Supp. 511 (N.D. Ga. 1995), aff'd, 87 F.3d 1226 (11th Cir. 1996).

Primary candidate selection procedure not state action.

- The procedure for selecting primary candidates set forth in O.C.G.A. § 21-2-193 does not amount to state action since the state does not assist the party members in their decision; it does not join in the decision-making process with the party members; it does not delegate authority to the parties that the parties do not already have; and it does not mandate guidelines for the decision-making process. Duke v. Cleland, 783 F. Supp. 600 (N.D. Ga. 1992), aff'd, 954 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1992).

State interest in protecting rights of political parties.

- State interest in not interfering with (and possibly even facilitating) the rights of political parties to define their membership and their representatives is legitimate and compelling. Duke v. Cleland, 884 F. Supp. 511 (N.D. Ga. 1995), aff'd, 87 F.3d 1226 (11th Cir. 1996).

Preservation of party autonomy.

- The federal district court reads O.C.G.A. § 21-2-191 (only those parties which have cast greater than twenty percent of the votes in the last presidential election may participate in the presidential preference primary) and O.C.G.A. § 21-2-195 (parties are free to set out the rules by which delegates are bound) alongside O.C.G.A. § 21-2-193 (ballot decision-making) as a distinct attempt at preserving party autonomy in the nomination process. Duke v. Cleland, 783 F. Supp. 600 (N.D. Ga. 1992), aff'd, 954 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1992).

Exclusion of candidate from ballot.

- The Republican Party enjoys a constitutionally protected right of freedom of association, which encompasses its decision to exclude a candidate for the Republican nomination for President of the United States as a candidate on the Republican Primary ballot because the candidate's political beliefs are inconsistent with those of the Republican Party. Duke v. Cleland, 954 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1086, 112 S. Ct. 1152, 117 L. Ed. 2d 279 (1992).

Presidential selection candidate committee, acting as representatives of the Republican Party under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-193, did not heavily burden a candidate's first amendment and fourteenth amendment rights, nor voters' associational rights and their right to vote for a candidate of their choice, when it excluded the candidate from the Republican Party's presidential primary ballot. Duke v. Cleland, 87 F.3d 1226 (11th Cir. 1996).

Voter's rights not burdened.

- Voters have a right to vote for the candidate of their choice, but only the candidate of their choice on the ballot, and they cannot argue that, of the universe of candidates, the exclusion of their favorite candidate from the ballot necessarily "heavily burdens" their rights; to so hold would open the ballot to anyone who has some support in the electorate. Duke v. Cleland, 884 F. Supp. 511 (N.D. Ga. 1995), aff'd, 87 F.3d 1226 (11th Cir. 1996).

ALR.

- Constitutionality of statute relating to election ballots as regards place or number of appearances on the ballots of names of candidates, 78 A.L.R. 398.

Constitutionality of candidate participation provisions for primary elections, 121 A.L.R.5th 1.