O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 21-2-193 (2019)

List of names of candidates to appear on ballot; publication of list

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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On a date set by the Secretary of State, but not later than 60 days preceding the date on which a presidential preference primary is to be held, the state executive committee of each party which is to conduct a presidential preference primary shall submit to the Secretary of State a list of the names of the candidates of such party to appear on the presidential preference primary ballot. Such lists shall be published on the website of the Secretary of State during the fourth week immediately preceding the date on which the presidential preference primary is to be held.

History

Code 1933, § 34-1003A, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 221, § 1; Ga. L. 1980, p. 5, § 1; Ga. L. 1987, p. 1360, § 10; Ga. L. 1993, p.

118, § 1; Ga. L. 1994, p. 1406, § 7; Ga. L. 1997, p. 590, § 19; Ga. L. 2007, p. 544, § 3/SB 194; Ga. L. 2011, p. 630, § 2/HB 454.

Annotations

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Constitutionality. - This section is neither unduly burdensome nor irrational, and is valid under U.S. Const., amend. 14. Belluso v. Poythress, 485 F. Supp. 904, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11805 (N.D. Ga. 1980). O.C.G.A. § 21-2-193, by identifying three logically representative members of each party to serve on the committee, and by providing a check against arbitrariness by allowing only one member of the party on the committee to override the unanimous decision of the committee, is narrowly tailored to advance the interests of the state in conducting orderly and efficient elections, and in allowing the parties to choose their candidates, and is not violative of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Duke v. Cleland, 884 F. Supp. 511, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3852 (N.D. Ga. 1995), aff’d, 87 F.3d 1226, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 16632 (11th Cir. 1996). Primary candidate selection procedure not state action. - The procedure for selecting primary candidates set forth in O.C.G.A. § 21-2-193 does not amount to state action since the state does not assist the party members in their decision; it does not join in the decision-making process with the party members; it

does not delegate authority to the parties that the parties do not already have; and it does not mandate guidelines for the decision-making process. Duke v. Cleland, 783 F. Supp. 600, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6771 (N.D. Ga.), aff’d, 954 F.2d 1526, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 1957 (11th Cir. 1992). State interest in protecting rights of political parties. - State interest in not interfering with (and possibly even facilitating) the rights of political parties to define their membership and their representatives is legitimate and compelling. Duke v. Cleland, 884 F. Supp. 511, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3852 (N.D. Ga. 1995), aff’d, 87 F.3d 1226, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 16632 (11th Cir. 1996). Preservation of party autonomy. - The federal district court reads O.C.G.A. § 21-2-191 (only those parties which have cast greater than twenty percent of the votes in the last presidential election may participate in the presidential preference primary) and O.C.G.A. § 21-2-195 (parties are free to set out the rules by which delegates are bound) alongside O.C.G.A. § 21-2-193 (ballot decision-making) as a distinct attempt at preserving party autonomy in the nomination process. Duke v. Cleland, 783 F. Supp. 600, 1992 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 6771 (N.D. Ga.), aff’d, 954 F.2d 1526, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 1957 (11th Cir. 1992). Exclusion of candidate from ballot. - The Republican Party enjoys a constitutionally protected right of freedom of association, which encompasses its decision to exclude a candidate for the Republican nomination for President of the United States as a candidate on the Republican Primary ballot because the candidate’s political beliefs are inconsistent with those of the Republican Party. Duke v. Cleland, 954 F.2d 1526, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 1957 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1086, 112 S. Ct. 1152, 117 L. Ed. 2d 279, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 1283 (1992). Presidential selection candidate committee, acting as representatives of the Republican Party under O.C.G.A. § 21-2193, did not heavily burden a candidate’s

First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights, nor voters’ associational rights and their right to vote for a candidate of their choice, when it excluded the candidate from the Republican Party’s presidential primary ballot. Duke v. Cleland, 87 F.3d 1226, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 16632 (11th Cir. 1996). Voter’s rights not burdened. - Voters have a right to vote for the candidate of their choice, but only the candidate of their choice on the ballot, and they cannot argue that, of the universe of candidates, the exclusion of their favorite candidate from the ballot necessarily “heavily burdens” their rights; to so hold would open the ballot to anyone who has some support in the electorate. Duke v. Cleland, 884 F. Supp. 511, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3852 (N.D. Ga. 1995), aff’d, 87 F.3d 1226, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 16632 (11th Cir. 1996).

RESEARCH REFERENCES ALR. Constitutionality of statute relating to election ballots as regards place or number of appearances on the ballots of names of candidates, 78 A.L.R. 398.

Constitutionality of candidate participation provisions for primary elections, 121 A.L.R.5th 1.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 6 cases, 1992–1996 · leading case: Duke v. Massey, 87 F.3d 1226 (11th Cir. 1996).
Duke v. Massey, 87 F.3d 1226 (11th Cir. 1996). · cites it 19× “This court remanded the case to the district court to determine the state interest purportedly advanced through O.C.G.A. § 21-2-193 and to weigh those interests against the purported burdens on the appellants’ constitutional rights.”
Duke v. Cleland, 884 F. Supp. 511 (N.D. Ga. 1995). · cites it 10× “§ 21-2-193(a), and consists of the Georgia Secretary of State, a non-voting member who at the time was defendant Cleland, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the majority leader of the Senate, the minority leaders of both the House and Senate, and the chairpersons of…”
Duke v. Cleland, 954 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1992). · cites it 4× “”, O.C.G.A. § 21-2-193, thereby exercising a direct and substantive role in the candidate selection process itself.”
Duke v. Cleland, 783 F. Supp. 600 (N.D. Ga. 1992). · cites it 12× “See O.C.G.A. § 21-2-193. Plaintiffs further argue that the party members who voted to exclude Mr.”
Duke v. Cleland, 5 F.3d 1399 (11th Cir. 1993). “§ 21-2-193 (1987) states in full: (a) The name of any candidate fpr a political party or body nomination for the office of President of the United States shall be printed upon the ballot used in such primaiy upon the direction of a presidential candidate selection committee…”
Duke v. Connell, 790 F. Supp. 50 (D.R.I. 1992). “, Ga. Code Ann. § 21-2-193 (a) (Michie 1987); Mass.”
— 21-2-193(a) — 3 cases
Duke v. Cleland, 884 F. Supp. 511 (N.D. Ga. 1995). “§ 21-2-193(a), and consists of the Georgia Secretary of State, a non-voting member who at the time was defendant Cleland, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the majority leader of the Senate, the minority leaders of both the House and Senate, and the chairpersons of…”
Duke v. Massey, 87 F.3d 1226 (11th Cir. 1996). “This court remanded the case to the district court to determine the state interest purportedly advanced through O.C.G.A. § 21-2-193 and to weigh those interests against the purported burdens on the appellants’ constitutional rights.”
Duke v. Cleland, 954 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1992). “”, O.C.G.A. § 21-2-193, thereby exercising a direct and substantive role in the candidate selection process itself.”
— 21-2-193(b) — 3 cases
Duke v. Cleland, 884 F. Supp. 511 (N.D. Ga. 1995). “§ 21-2-193(a), and consists of the Georgia Secretary of State, a non-voting member who at the time was defendant Cleland, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the majority leader of the Senate, the minority leaders of both the House and Senate, and the chairpersons of…”
Duke v. Massey, 87 F.3d 1226 (11th Cir. 1996). “This court remanded the case to the district court to determine the state interest purportedly advanced through O.C.G.A. § 21-2-193 and to weigh those interests against the purported burdens on the appellants’ constitutional rights.”
Duke v. Cleland, 954 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1992). “”, O.C.G.A. § 21-2-193, thereby exercising a direct and substantive role in the candidate selection process itself.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.