O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 21-2-6 (2019)

Qualifications of candidates for county and municipal office; determination of qualifications

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
Find cases: SyfertCases citing this section GA-LEGlegis.ga.gov (official) JustiaJustia CornellLII Search CasesGoogle Scholar

(a) Every candidate for county office who is certified by the county executive committee of a political party or who files a notice of

ELECTIONS & PRIMARIES

candidacy, and every candidate for municipal office who is certified by a municipal executive committee of a political party or who files a notice of candidacy, shall meet the constitutional and statutory qualifications for holding the office being sought. (b) The superintendent upon his or her own motion may challenge the qualifications of any candidate referred to in subsection (a) of this Code section at any time prior to the election of such candidate. Within two weeks after the deadline for qualifying, any elector who is eligible to vote for any such candidate may challenge the qualifications of the candidate by filing a written complaint with the superintendent giving the reasons why the elector believes the candidate is not qualified to seek and hold the public office for which the candidate is offering. Upon his or her own motion or upon a challenge being filed, the superintendent shall notify the candidate in writing that his or her qualifications are being challenged and the reasons therefor and shall advise the candidate that he or she is setting a hearing on the matter and shall inform the candidate of the date, time, and place of the hearing. (c) The superintendent shall determine if the candidate is qualified to seek and hold the public office for which such candidate is offering. If the superintendent determines that the candidate is not qualified, the superintendent shall withhold the name of the candidate from the ballot or strike such candidate’s name from the ballot if the ballots have been printed. If there is insufficient time to strike the candidate’s name or reprint the ballots, a prominent notice shall be placed at each affected polling place advising voters of the disqualification of the candidate and all votes cast for such candidate shall be void and shall not be counted. (d) In the event that a candidate pays his or her qualifying fee with a check that is subsequently returned for insufficient funds, the superintendent shall automatically find that such candidate has not met the qualifications for holding the office being sought, unless the bank, credit union, or other financial institution returning the check certifies in writing by an officer’s or director’s oath that the bank, credit union, or financial institution erred in returning the check. (e) The elector filing the challenge or the candidate challenged shall have the right to appeal the decision of the superintendent by filing a petition in the superior court of the county in which the candidate resides within ten days after the entry of the final decision by the superintendent. The filing of the petition shall not itself stay the decision of the superintendent; however, the reviewing court may order a stay upon appropriate terms for good cause shown. As soon as possible after service of the petition, the superintendent shall transmit the original or a certified copy of the entire record of the proceedings under review to the reviewing court. The review shall be conducted by the

court without a jury and shall be confined to the record. The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the superintendent as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision or remand the case for further proceedings. The court may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions of the superintendent are: (1) In violation of the Constitution or laws of this state; (2) In excess of the statutory authority of the superintendent; (3) Made upon unlawful procedures; (4) Affected by other error of law; (5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or (6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by an abuse of discretion or a clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion. An aggrieved party may obtain a review of any final judgment of the superior court by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, as provided by law.

History

Code 1933, § 34-406, enacted by Ga. L. 1980, p. 312, § 2; Ga. L. 1983, p. 884, § 6-3; Ga. L. 1986, p. 32, § 1; Ga. L. 1987, p. 1360, § 2; Ga. L. 1989, p. 900, § 2; Ga. L. 1993, p. 617, § 2; Ga. L. 1998, p. 295, § 1; Ga. L. 2001, p. 230, § 1.

Annotations

Cross references. Persons not eligible to hold office, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. II, Sec. II, Para. III. County officers, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. III. Appointment of school superintendents, § 20-2-101. Eligibility and qualifications of persons for public office generally, T. 45, C. 2.

Administrative rules and regulations. Qualification of candidates for office; time period during which bank, credit union, or other financial institution may certify error in returning check, Official Compilation of the Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia, Georgia Election Code, Nomination of Candidates, § 183-110-.01. Law reviews. For note on the 2001 amendment to this Code section, see 18 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 114 (2001). For article, “Local Government Law,” see 53 Mercer L. Rev. 389 (2001).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Reviewing court to consider factors before superintendent. - Superior court, by relying upon 10 U.S.C. § 973, exceeded its authority as a reviewing court, since that section is not part of the Hatch Act, 5 U.S.C. § 7324 et seq., which was one of the grounds for the complaint, and was not relied upon when the case was before the superintendent of elec-

tions. Jolley v. Grantham, 206 Ga. App. 100, 424 S.E.2d 362, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 1425 (1992), overruled in part, Hogan v. State, 316 Ga. App. 708, 730 S.E.2d 178, 2012 Ga. App. LEXIS 637 (2012). County residents’ challenge to a school board candidate’s residency qualification under O.C.G.A. § 45-2-1(1) and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. II, was

ELECTIONS & PRIMARIES

barred by res judicata because another challenger had raised the same challenge, and the challenge had been resolved against the challenger by the county’s board of elections. Lilly v. Heard, 295 Ga. 399, 761 S.E.2d 46, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 536 (2014). Substitute candidate not qualified to seek office. - In a dispute over who could run for Chief Magistrate Judge of Douglas County in the November 2022 election, the challenge by the incumbent’s husband, who was a registered voter eligible to vote in the election, that the substitution of a candidate was improper was allowed because “qualifications,” as that statutory term was used, included all of the prerequisites for seeking and holding office, including the procedural re-

quirements to seek office; and, the substitute candidate did not properly qualify to seek office as the original candidate had not secured the nomination. Thus, the Board of Elections and Registration lacked authority to put the substitute candidate on the ballot. Camp v. Williams, 314 Ga. 699, 879 S.E.2d 88, 2022 Ga. LEXIS 258 (2022). Appeal of election dispute moot. - Where a candidate did not protect the candidate’s rights and resolve an election dispute prior to an election and delayed in filing an appeal by an elections superintendent in favor of an incumbent until after the election was over, the candidate’s appeal was moot. Jordan v. Cook, 277 Ga. 155, 587 S.E.2d 52, 2003 Ga. LEXIS 835 (2003).

RESEARCH REFERENCES ALR. Constitutionality of candidate partici-

pation provisions for primary elections, 121 A.L.R.5th 1.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 13 cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1992–2024 · leading case: Scott K. Camp v. Ryan Christopher Williams, 314 Ga. 699 (Ga. 2022).
Scott K. Camp v. Ryan Christopher Williams, 314 Ga. 699 (Ga. 2022). · cites it 95× “The superior court agreed that the Douglas County Board of Elections and Registration (the “Board”) was not legally authorized to allow the substitution, but ruled that the statutory vehicle through which the challenge was asserted — OCGA § 21-2-6 — covers only 2 challenges to a…”
Lilly v. Heard, 761 S.E.2d 46 (Ga. 2014). · cites it 12× “Heard filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, contending that a qualified voter in Baker County, Mendell Cowart, had brought a pre-election challenge to her candidacy, see OCGA § 21-2-6, contending that she was ineligible to run for the local board of education because she had…”
Cook v. Bd. of Registrars of Randolph Cty., 727 S.E.2d 478 (Ga. 2012). · cites it 8× “§ 34-406, now OCGA § 21-2-6, expressly authorizing such pre-election challenges.”
Catoosa Cnty. Repub. Party v. Henry, 906 S.E.2d 750 (Ga. 2024). · cites it 8× “See OCGA § 21-2-6 (b), (e). This action is not an election contest under OCGA § 21-2-520 et seq.”
Jordan v. Cook, 587 S.E.2d 52 (Ga. 2003). · cites it 2× “At no time prior to the election did Jordan appeal the election superintendent’s decision or seek a stay of the election pursuant to OCGA § 21-2-6 (e) (reviewing court may order a stay in a challenge to a candidate’s qualifications upon appropriate terms for good cause shown).”
Allen v. Yost, 636 S.E.2d 517 (Ga. 2006). · cites it 2× “Because Jordan failed to appeal an adverse decision of the election superintendent to the superior court prior to the election, or to exercise his right under OCGA § 21-2-6 (e) to seek a stay of the election, we held that the appeal was rendered moot by the election.”
Johnson v. Randolph Cnty., 687 S.E.2d 223 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009). · cites it 4× “2 Pursuant to OCGA § 21-2-6 (b), the BOE scheduled a hearing on its challenge to occur a few days before the November 7 election.”
Jolley v. Grantham, 424 S.E.2d 362 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992). · cites it 4× “Elector Grantham then appealed to the superior court pursuant to OCGA § 21-2-6 (d), which provides that such decision may be appealed and that the “review shall be conducted by the court without a jury and shall be confined to the record.”
In Re Inquiry Concerning Judge Robertson, 596 S.E.2d 2 (Ga. 2004). · cites it 2× “) 1 The Judicial Qualifications Commission alleged violations of Article II, Section II, Paragraph III of the Georgia Constitution (eligibility for public office); OCGA §§ 21-2-6 and 21-2-8 (candidate eligibility and qualifications) and OCGA § 45-2-1 (eligibility of a public…”
Burgess v. Liberty Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 733 S.E.2d 774 (Ga. 2012). · cites it 4× “Pursuant to the election contest provisions of OCGA § 21-2-6 (b), several eligible fourth district voters filed written complaints with the Liberty County Board of Elections and Registration (“Board”), alleging that Appellant did not meet the *803 12-month district residency…”
Lilly v. Heard (Ga. 2014). · cites it 12× “Heard filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, contending that a qualified voter in Baker County, Mendell Cowart, had brought a pre-election challenge to her candidacy, see OCGA § 21-2-6, contending that she was ineligible to run for the local board of education because she had…”
William Thomas McFarland v. Michael S. Pemberton, 530 S.W.3d 76 (2017). · cites it 2× “, Ga. Code Ann. § 21-2-6 (providing that any eligible voter may file a written complaint challenging a candidate’s qualifications with the county superintendent, and the matter is to be decided by the superintendent); Miss.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.