CopyCited 18 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 7, 2012 | 291 Ga. 67, 2012 Fulton County D. Rep. 1578
...or election, where the ground for contest is that the nominee is ineligible for nomination or office under Code Ann. § 34-1703[(2)]"). In 1980, the General Assembly enacted Code Ann. § 34-304, now OCGA §
21-2-5, and Code Ann. § 34-406, now OCGA §
21-2-6, expressly authorizing such pre-election challenges....
...1980, pp. 312, 312-314. OCGA §
21-2-5 permits the Secretary of State or an eligible voter to file a pre-election challenge to the qualifications of a candidate who has filed to run in an upcoming election for a state or federal office. Similarly, OCGA §
21-2-6 permits local boards of election *482 and other election "superintendents," see OCGA §
21-2-2(35)(A)-(D), or eligible voters to file pre-election challenges to the qualifications of a candidate who has filed to run in a pending election for a county or municipal office....
...of education who is not a resident of the school district in which that person seeks election and of the election district which such person seeks to represent."); he might thus have been susceptible to a pre-election candidacy challenge under OCGA §
21-2-6....
...NOTES [1] No documents related only to the elections board case are in the record on appeal here. [2] Thus, the Court of Appeals improperly decided, albeit without mention of jurisdiction, an appeal of a challenge to a candidate's qualifications to run for county sheriff brought under OCGA §
21-2-6....
CopyCited 12 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 30, 2014 | 761 S.E.2d 46
...to represent.”).
Heard filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, contending that a qualified
voter in Baker County, Mendell Cowart, had brought a pre-election challenge
2
to her candidacy, see OCGA §
21-2-6, contending that she was ineligible to run
for the local board of education because she had not resided in Baker County for
12 months preceding the election; that the Baker County Board of Elections had
resolved that challenge in Heard...
...ismiss, Heard introduced the
minutes of the June 18, 2012 hearing held by the Baker County Board of
Elections on Cowart’s pre-election complaint that Heard was not qualified to run
for the school board at the November 6, 2012 election. See OCGA §
21-2-6 (b)
(saying that “any elector who is eligible to vote” for a candidate for county
office may file a pre-election “challenge [to] the qualifications of the candidate
by filing a written complaint with the superintendent giving the r...
...ction as
required by OCGA §
45-2-1 and is qualified to offer as a candidate for said
office.” Although Cowart had a right to appeal the board’s decision to superior
4
court, she did not do so. See OCGA §
21-2-6 (e).
On October 24, 2013, the trial court issued an order dismissing
Appellants’ complaint....
....
Restatement of the Law, Second, Judgments, § 83, comment (b).
Here, the General Assembly has specifically authorized local boards of
elections to resolve factual disputes regarding a candidate’s eligibility to run for
office, see OCGA §
21-2-6 (b), (c), making them the finders of fact and
weighers of the credibility of evidence....
...Furthermore, with regard to challenges based on a
candidate’s residency, the General Assembly has formulated rules to guide local
boards of elections, see OCGA §
21-2-217, and has prescribed basic procedural
7
requirements for adjudication of such challenges. See OCGA §
21-2-6 (b)
(notice requirements); id....
...As residents and voters of Baker County, they have a common
interest in having the public offices in their community held by legally qualified
persons, and the relevant statutes give them standing to bring challenges to
enforce that interest. See OCGA §
21-2-6 (b) (“any elector who is eligible to
vote for any such candidate may challenge the qualifications of the candidate by
filing a written complaint with the [board of election] giving the reasons why the
elector believes the candidate is...
CopyCited 11 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 30, 2022
...The
superior court agreed that the Douglas County Board of Elections
and Registration (the “Board”) was not legally authorized to allow
the substitution, but ruled that the statutory vehicle through which
the challenge was asserted — OCGA §
21-2-6 — covers only
challenges to a candidate’s qualifications to hold office (like age,
residence, and bar membership), not whether the candidate fulfilled
the necessary prerequisites to seek office (like a proper
substitution).
We granted an application for discretionary appeal, expedited
consideration in the light of the rapidly approaching election, and
now reverse. Code Section §
21-2-6 allows the challenge here
because “qualifications,” as that term is used in the statute, includes
all of the prerequisites for seeking and holding office....
...cratic
candidates for the chief magistrate seat. See OCGA §
21-2-154 (b).
The Board announced that Williams would appear on the general
election ballot as the Democratic nominee for Chief Magistrate
Judge. Camp sought judicial review under OCGA §
21-2-6, naming
Williams, the Board, the Board’s members, and its director, Milton
3
Kidd, as respondents.
The superior court agreed that the Board should not have
replaced Baker with Williams, but refused to reverse the Board’s
decision. The challenge allowed by OCGA §
21-2-6, the court said,
“does not encompass the process by which [a candidate is] placed on
the ballot — it is limited to challenges upon his qualifications to hold
the office.” (Emphasis in original.) The court reasoned that
subsection (a) of the statute refers to “the constitutional and
statutory qualifications for holding the office being sought,” which
the court took to mean personal characteristics like residence, age,
citizenship, voter registration, and education. See OCGA §
21-2-6
(a); see also OCGA §
15-10-22 (identifying the “Qualifications of
magistrates”)....
...Following that decision, Camp sought and obtained
discretionary review from this Court. We directed the parties to
address one question: “[d]id the Superior Court err in concluding
4
that OCGA §
21-2-6 did not authorize the court to reverse the
decision of the Superintendent and the Douglas County Board of
Elections?”
2. The answer to that question is yes. Code Section §
21-2-6
does authorize voters to challenge a candidate who has not satisfied
the procedural prerequisites to appearing on the ballot....
...e to satisfy
one particular procedural prerequisite — payment with a valid
check — requires an automatic finding of failure to meet the
“qualifications” (albeit for “holding” the office) even without any
challenge.
Code Section §
21-2-6 provides that “[e]very candidate for
county office who is certified by the county executive committee of a
5
political party or who files a notice of candidacy . . . shall meet the
constitutional and statutory qualifications for holding the office
being sought.” OCGA §
21-2-6 (a)....
...“[A]ny elector who is eligible to
vote for any such candidate may challenge the qualifications of the
candidate . . . giving the reasons why the elector believes the
candidate is not qualified to seek and hold the public office for which
the candidate is offering.” OCGA §
21-2-6 (b). And if that happens,
“[t]he superintendent shall determine if the candidate is qualified to
seek and hold the public office for which the candidate is offering.”
OCGA §
21-2-6 (c).
“When we consider the meaning of a statute, ‘we must presume
that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it
meant.’” Deal v....
...International Dictionary, supra at 1858.
8
As a matter of ordinary meaning, therefore, there is no reason
to believe that the General Assembly’s use of the words
“qualifications” or “qualified” compels the conclusion that OCGA §
21-2-6 allows challenges only to attributes like age, residency, and
bar status.
(b) Moreover, “[a]s we have said many times before when
interpreting legal text, ‘we do not read words in isolation, but rather
in context.’” City of Guyton v....
...Indeed, “’[a]ll statutes
relating to the same subject matter are to be construed together, and
harmonized wherever possible.’” Langley,
313 Ga. at 143 (2) (quoting
Hartley v. Agnes Scott College,
295 Ga. 458, 462 (2) (b) (759 SE2d
857) (2014)).
(i) Beginning with immediate context, two features of OCGA §
21-2-6 show that “qualifications” are best understood to include (and
“qualified” is best understood to mean that a person has satisfied)
the prerequisites for seeking and holding office — including any
necessary procedural steps....
...tion of them
surplusage or meaningless”).
Take OCGA §
15-10-22: that section defines the
“[q]ualifications of magistrates” upon “taking office.” Those are
requirements for “hold[ing]” the office. See OCGA §
21-2-6 (b)-(c). So
if that was all OCGA §
21-2-6 was concerned with, then there would
be no need to specify that voters may challenge whether the
candidate is eligible to “seek” the office....
...Williams and the Board disagree. They point out that
subsection (b) points back to the qualifications of any candidate
“referred to in subsection (a)” — and they conclude that this means
“qualifications” refers only to the requirements for holding the office.
OCGA §
21-2-6 (b).
But even that misreads the statute. Subsection (b) does not
simply refer to the “qualifications” mentioned in subsection (a), it
makes clear that one may challenge “the qualifications of any
candidate referred to in subsection (a).” OCGA §
21-2-6 (b)
(emphasis supplied). Thus, the cross-reference limits which
candidates can be challenged under Code Section §
21-2-6; it does
not limit or modify the operative language of subsections (b) and (c).
Second, subsection (d) uses the word “qualifications” to refer to
a procedural prerequisite: if a candidate pays his qualifying fee with
a check that is returned for insufficient funds, “the superintendent
12
shall automatically find that such candidate has not met the
qualifications for holding the office being sought[.]” OCGA §
21-2-6
(d)....
...qualifications” — i.e., no challenge under (b) or (c) is necessary, and
the superintendent has no discretion to overlook the failure. See id.
(emphasis supplied).
Thus, like the ordinary meaning of the words themselves, the
context of OCGA §
21-2-6 confirms that a candidate meets the
“qualifications” to seek and hold office only if he has satisfied all of
the prerequisites, including procedural requirements.
(ii) Turning to broader statutory context, this understanding
al...
...See OCGA §
21-2-221.2 (b) (5).
16
On this score, the Board argues that many of these examples
use “qualification” in isolation, rather than in the context of “holding
the office being sought.” OCGA §
21-2-6 (a)....
...That is true, so far as it goes, but (for the
reasons just discussed) it does not show that procedural hurdles are
not qualifications necessary “to seek and hold” office, OCGA § 21-2-
6 (b)-(c).
In short, our conclusion — that the “qualifications” referenced
in OCGA §
21-2-6 include both the legally specified prerequisites for
holding office and the procedural requirements necessary to seek
office — fits comfortably with the overall usage of that and related
terms throughout the Election Code.
(c) Thus, OCGA §
21-2-6’s reference to the qualifications for
seeking and holding office is best read to include all prerequisites —
17
including the procedural requirements to seek office — not just the
traits required to hold it.
That conclusion is enough to resolve this case....
...Unfettered substitution
of candidates is not one of those powers.
Thus, Williams did not “qualify for [the] election” under OCGA
§
21-2-130, and he is not “qualified to seek and hold the public office”
of Chief Magistrate of Douglas County. See OCGA §
21-2-6 (b)-(c).
The superior court erred in holding otherwise.
3....
...Williams and the Board also urge us to affirm the judgment
below under the “right for any reason” rule, arguing that Camp has
not shown that his “substantial rights” were prejudiced within the
meaning of the statute’s remedial section. See OCGA §
21-2-6 (e).
Camp responds that his substantial rights have been prejudiced
because the Superior Court’s mistaken reading of the statute made
a difference in the outcome of his challenge. We agree.
Code Section §
21-2-6 (e) provides that “[t]he [reviewing] court
may reverse or modify the decision [of the county elections and
registration board] if substantial rights of the appellant have been
prejudiced because the findings, inferences, conclusions, o...
...No
one doubts that a candidate has a substantial interest in running for
20
office, but electors have a substantial interest, too. The Election
Code requires that candidates be duly qualified to run for office, and
OCGA §
21-2-6 is an express vehicle to vindicate voters’ interest in
ensuring that is so. Any other conclusion would flatly contradict the
General Assembly’s decision to give “any elector who is eligible to
vote” for a candidate the power to “challenge the qualifications of
[that] candidate[.]” OCGA §
21-2-6 (b).
Williams and the Board argue that we have described interests
like the one Camp attempts to vindicate here as a “public ....
Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 30, 2014
...that person seeks election and of the election district which such person seeks
to represent.”).
Heard filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, contending that a qualified
voter in Baker County, Mendell Cowart, had brought a pre-election challenge
to her candidacy, see OCGA §
21-2-6, contending that she was ineligible to run
for the local board of education because she had not resided in Baker County for
2
12 months preceding the election; that the Baker County Board of Electio...
...ismiss, Heard introduced the
minutes of the June 18, 2012 hearing held by the Baker County Board of
Elections on Cowart’s pre-election complaint that Heard was not qualified to run
for the school board at the November 6, 2012 election. See OCGA §
21-2-6 (b)
(saying that “any elector who is eligible to vote” for a candidate for county
office may file a pre-election “challenge [to] the qualifications of the candidate
by filing a written complaint with the superintendent giving the r...
...Heard “was a resident of Baker County for 12 months prior to the election as
required by OCGA §
45-2-1 and is qualified to offer as a candidate for said
office.” Although Cowart had a right to appeal the board’s decision to superior
court, she did not do so. See OCGA §
21-2-6 (e).
On October 24, 2013, the trial court issued an order dismissing
4
Appellants’ complaint....
...ts.
Restatement of the Law, Second, Judgments, § 83, comment b.
Here, the General Assembly has specifically authorized local boards of
elections to resolve factual disputes regarding a candidate’s eligibility to run for
office, see OCGA §
21-2-6 (b), (c), making them the finders of fact and
weighers of the credibility of evidence....
...Furthermore, with regard to challenges based on a
candidate’s residency, the General Assembly has formulated rules to guide local
boards of elections, see OCGA §
21-2-217, and has prescribed basic procedural
requirements for adjudication of such challenges. See OCGA §
21-2-6 (b)
(notice requirements); id....
...As residents and voters of Baker County, they have a common interest
in having the public offices in their community held by legally qualified
persons, and the relevant statutes give them standing to bring challenges to
enforce that interest. See OCGA §
21-2-6 (b) (“any elector who is eligible to
vote for any such candidate may challenge the qualifications of the candidate by
filing a written complaint with the [board of election] giving the reasons why the
elector believes the candidate is...
