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2018 Georgia Code 21-5-30.1 | Car Wreck Lawyer

Link to State of Georgia Official Statute 2018 Georgia Code Annotated (sourced from legal.resource.org)
O.C.G.A. 21-5-30.1 Case Law from Google Scholar Amendments to OCGA 21-5-30.1

TITLE 21 ELECTIONS

Section 5. Ethics in Government, 21-5-1 through 21-5-76.

ARTICLE 2 CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS

21-5-30.1. Contributions by regulated entities to elected executive officers or candidates.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, the definitions set forth in Code Section 21-5-3 shall be applicable to the provisions of this Code section. As used in this Code section, the term:
    1. "Campaign committee" means the candidate, person, or committee which accepts contributions to bring about the nomination for election or election of an individual to the office of an elected executive officer.
    2. "Contribution" means a gift, subscription, membership, loan, forgiveness of debt, advance or deposit of money, or anything of value conveyed or transferred for the purpose of influencing the nomination for election or election of an individual to the office of an elected executive officer or encouraging the holder of such office to seek reelection. The term "contribution" shall include the payment of a qualifying fee for and on behalf of a candidate for the office of an elected executive officer and any other payment or purchase made for and on behalf of the holder of the office of an elected executive officer or for or on behalf of a candidate for that office when such payment or purchase is made for the purpose of influencing the nomination for election or election of the candidate and is made pursuant to the request or authority of the holder of such office, the candidate, the campaign committee of the candidate, or any other agent of the holder of such office or the candidate. The term "contribution" shall not include the value of personal services performed by persons who serve on a voluntary basis without compensation from any source.
    3. "Elected executive officer" means the Secretary of State, Attorney General, State School Superintendent, Commissioner of Insurance, Commissioner of Agriculture, Commissioner of Labor, and members of the Public Service Commission.
    4. "Political action committee" means any committee, club, association, partnership, corporation, labor union, or other group of persons which receives donations aggregating in excess of $1,000.00 during a calendar year from persons who are members or supporters of the committee and which distributes these funds as contributions to one or more campaign committees of candidates for public office. Such term does not mean a campaign committee.
    5. "Regulated entity" means any person who is required by law to be licensed by an elected executive officer or a board under the jurisdiction of an elected executive officer, any person who leases property owned by or for a state department, any person who engages in a business or profession which is regulated by an elected executive officer or by a board under the jurisdiction of an elected executive officer, or any public utility corporation regulated by the Public Service Commission. For purposes of this paragraph, public utility corporation regulated by the Public Service Commission shall have the same meaning as provided by subsection (f) of Code Section 21-5-30.
  2. No regulated entity and no person or political action committee acting on behalf of a regulated entity shall make a contribution to or on behalf of a person holding office as an elected executive officer regulating such entity or to or on behalf of a candidate for the office of an elected executive officer regulating such entity or to or on behalf of a campaign committee of any such candidate.
  3. No person holding office as an elected executive officer and no candidate for the office of an elected executive officer and no campaign committee of a candidate for the office of an elected executive officer shall accept a contribution in violation of subsection (b) of this Code section.
  4. Nothing contained in this Code section shall be construed to prevent any person who may be employed by a regulated entity, including a person in whose name a license or lease is held, or who is an officer of a regulated entity from voluntarily making a campaign contribution from that person's personal funds to or on behalf of a person holding office as an elected executive officer regulating such entity or to or on behalf of a candidate for the office of an elected executive officer regulating such entity or to or on behalf of a campaign committee of any such candidate; provided, however, that:
    1. The elected executive officer or candidate receiving one or more campaign contributions described in this subsection shall in his or her disclosure report under Code Section 21-5-34 separately identify each contribution and the total of contributions which he or she knows or should have reason to know are described in this subsection; and
    2. It shall be unlawful for any regulated entity or elected executive officer to require another by coercive action to make any such contribution.

(Code 1981, §21-5-30.1, enacted by Ga. L. 1989, p. 784, § 1; Ga. L. 1992, p. 1075, § 4A; Ga. L. 2009, p. 620, § 2/SB 168; Ga. L. 2011, p. 569, § 2/SB 160.)

The 2009 amendment, effective May 4, 2009, in subsection (d), in the introductory paragraph, inserted "or who is an officer of a regulated entity" in the middle and added "; provided, however, that:" at the end, added paragraph (d)(1), added the paragraph (d)(2) designation, and, in paragraph (d)(2), deleted "and a violation of this Code section" preceding "for any" and substituted "elected executive officer" for "other person".

The 2011 amendment, effective May 12, 2011, in paragraph (a)(3), deleted "and" preceding "Commissioner of Labor" and added ", and members of the Public Service Commission" at the end; in paragraph (a)(5), in the first sentence, deleted "or" preceding "any person who engages" and added ", or any public utility corporation regulated by the Public Service Commission" at the end, and added the last sentence; and added "and" at the end of paragraph (d)(1).

Law reviews.

- For note on 1989 enactment of this Code section, see 6 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 240 (1989). For note on 1992 amendment of this Code section, see 9 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 247 (1992).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Section constitutional.

- O.C.G.A. § 21-5-30.1 is not an unconstitutional infringement upon freedom of speech as it is narrowly tailored to meet the legitimate interest of preserving the integrity of the democratic process, nor is it an unconstitutional deprivation of property rights without due process, since private citizens may contribute freely in their individual capacities. Gwinn v. State Ethics Comm'n, 262 Ga. 855, 426 S.E.2d 890 (1993).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Motor clubs providing indemnification services are not regulated entities for purposes of O.C.G.A. § 21-5-30.1. 1994 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 94-20.

Self-insurers deemed regulated entities.

- A company or group which has been issued a certificate of authority to operate a self-insurance program is a regulated entity for purposes of O.C.G.A. § 21-5-30.1. 1994 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 94-20.

Campaign contributions to the Commissioner of Insurance or to a candidate for that office.

- An employee of an "industrial loan licensee" or an "insurer" may contribute to the election campaign of the Commissioner of Insurance or a candidate for the Office of Commissioner of Insurance from the employee's own personal funds, and such employee may solicit contributions for such campaigns from third-parties and fellow employees as long as no coercion is utilized in making the solicitation. Solicitation by full time lobbyists employed by insurers or licensees may be construed as "contributions" by their employers. 1990 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U90-19.

Secretary of State.

- Corporations which are not otherwise engaged in business activities or professions regulated by the Secretary of State are not regulated entities under O.C.G.A. § 21-5-30.1. 1998 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 98-4.

Examining boards connected to the Secretary of State which issue professional and business licenses are under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of State for purposes of O.C.G.A. § 21-5-30.1. 1998 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 98-4.

Under O.C.G.A. § 21-5-30.1(d), individuals who hold licenses issued by examining boards under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of State are permitted to make campaign contributions from their personal funds to the Secretary of State or a candidate for that office. 1998 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 98-11.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

- Constitutional validity of state or local regulation of contributions by or to political action committees, 24 A.L.R.6th 179.

Construction and application of Supreme Court's holding in Citizens United v. Federal Election Com'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 175 L. Ed. 2d 753, 187 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2961, 159 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P 10166 (2010), that government may not prohibit independent and indirect corporate expenditures on political speech, 65 A.L.R.6th 503.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 21-5-30.1

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Gwinn v. State Ethics Comm'n, 426 S.E.2d 890 (Ga. 1993).

Cited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 15, 1993 | 262 Ga. 855, 93 Fulton County D. Rep. 1260

...Dunn, Assistant Attorney General, C. Theodore Lee, for appellees. HUNT, Presiding Justice. The State Ethics Commission determined that appellant Southern General Insurance Company and its president, appellant Gwinn, violated the "Ethics in Government Act," specifically OCGA § 21-5-30.1, [1] by placing a full-page newspaper ad supporting the candidacy of the incumbent insurance commissioner who was seeking re-election. [2] The State Ethics Commission concluded that the purchase of *856 the ad was a "contribution" under OCGA § 21-5-30.1 (a) (2), and that the phrasing of the ad, clearly indicating it was expressing the opinion of the insurance company, demonstrated the contribution was made on behalf of an insurer for the benefit of the campaign of a candidate for insurance commissioner, an act prohibited by OCGA § 21-5-30.1 (b)....
...l protection. We granted appellants' application for discretionary review to address the validity of the statute under the constitutions of the United States and Georgia. [3] 1. The use of funds to support a political candidate is "speech," and OCGA § 21-5-30.1 (b) limits "political expression `"at the core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment freedoms."' [Cits.]" Austin v....
...To decide whether the statute's restriction on Southern's political *857 expenditures is constitutionally permissible, we must determine whether the restriction burdens the exercise of political speech and, if so, whether the statute is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Id. 2. Since OCGA § 21-5-30.1 (b)'s prohibition against Southern making a campaign contribution to the Commissioner of Insurance or a candidate for that office does burden expressive activity, and is "intimately related to the process of governing," the State must justify the burden by establishing a compelling state interest....
...Prohibiting contributions by the regulated entity to anyone holding or seeking to hold that office eliminates the threat perceived by the legislature. Inasmuch as the regulated entity is free to contribute to all other political campaigns, we conclude that OCGA § 21-5-30.1 (b) is narrowly tailored to meet the threat to the democratic process perceived by the General Assembly. 4. Southern also contends that OCGA § 21-5-30.1 (b) permits an unconstitutional deprivation of property rights without due process....
...possess regarding the capabilities of a candidate for the office of insurance commissioner, they run the risk that the voters might elect an insurance commissioner who would initiate policies adversely affecting appellants' business interests. OCGA § 21-5-30.1 (b) does not prohibit a Southern employee, who is not acting on behalf of the corporation, from contributing to *858 the campaign of anyone seeking the office of insurance commissioner; [5] and OCGA § 21-5-30.1 (b) does not prevent the dissemination of information by Southern, as long as the dissemination is not done for the purpose of influencing the nomination or election of an individual to the office of insurance commissioner, or encouraging the current commissioner to seek reelection. Thus, enforcement of OCGA § 21-5-30.1 (b) does not work the danger to due process that appellants foresee. We conclude that OCGA § 21-5-30.1 (b) is not an unconstitutional infringement upon the freedom of speech as guaranteed by the constitutions of the United States and Georgia....
...Clarke, C. J., Fletcher, Sears-Collins, JJ., and Judge Frank C. Mills III concur; Benham and Hunstein, JJ., concur specially. BENHAM, Justice, concurring specially. While I agree with the majority's insightful analysis of the constitutionality of OCGA § 21-5-30.1, I write separately in order to closely scrutinize the statute and measure appellants' actions against it. Upon review of the statutory scheme, I conclude that appellants' actions did not violate OCGA § 21-5-30.1 (b). The State Ethics Commission was authorized to assess a fine for violation of OCGA § 21-5-30.1 (b) (see OCGA § 21-5-6 (14)), and did impose a fine of $250 on each appellant after finding they had violated the law....
...162 (6) (366 SE2d 293) (1988). There is no question that Gwinn was acting on behalf of Southern General, an insurer, when he placed the newspaper ad. The question is whether the placement of the ad constituted a forbidden "contribution," as that term is defined in OCGA § 21-5-30.1 (a) (2)....
...In construing the statute, I am mindful that the cardinal rule is to ascertain the legislative intent and purpose in enacting the statute, and then give that construction which will effectuate the legislative intent and purpose. City of Calhoun v. N. Ga. EMC, 233 Ga. 759 (1) (213 SE2d 596) (1975). The passage of OCGA § 21-5-30.1 and its subsequent amendment to include all elected constitutional officers in the executive branch (Ga. L. 1992, p. 1075; OCGA § 21-5-30.1 (a) (3)) evince a legislative intent to do away with the possibility that a regulated entity might make campaign contributions in an effort to have influence with the elected official by whom it is regulated....
...the first sentence since the insurer did not transfer or convey anything of value to the commissioner or his campaign committee. Since appellants' act of placing a newspaper ad urging the reelection of the insurance commissioner did not violate OCGA § 21-5-30.1 (b), I believe the State Ethics Commission erred when it concluded that appellants' act had violated OCGA § 21-5-30.1....
...Because appellants have never contested the finding that they were guilty of violating the statute, I concur with the majority's affirmance of the judgment of the superior court. I am authorized to state that Justice Hunstein joins in this special concurrence. NOTES [1] At the time of the incident involved herein, OCGA § 21-5-30.1 (b) stated: No ......
...[insurer] shall make a contribution to or on behalf of a person holding office as [Commissioner of Insurance] or to or on behalf of a candidate for the office of [Commissioner of Insurance] or to or on behalf of a campaign committee of any such candidate. OCGA § 21-5-30.1 (d) contained the proviso that the statute should not be construed to prevent any person employed by an industrial loan licensee or insurer from voluntarily making a campaign contribution from that person's private funds....
...way — by reducing costs. We support and hope you will vote for Warren Evans for Insurance Commissioner August 7th. SOUTHERN GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY [3] Because appellants have never argued that their conduct did not constitute a violation of OCGA § 21-5-30.1 (b) and admitted on appeal to the superior court that they were guilty of violating the statute, we assume, without deciding, that their conduct was violative of the statute....