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(Code 1981, §21-5-33, enacted by Ga. L. 1986, p. 957, § 1; Ga. L. 1987, p. 458, § 3; Ga. L. 1990, p. 1327, § 1; Ga. L. 1992, p. 1075, § 5.)
- Ga. L. 1990, p. 1327, § 2, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that nothing in that Act shall apply to or affect contributions lawfully converted to the personal use of a candidate or public officer prior to April 11, 1990.
- For note on 1992 amendment of this Code section, see 9 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 247 (1992).
- In a case in which the issue was whether the campaign funds of the debtor, a candidate for public office who filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy without incorporating the campaign, were the property of the bankruptcy estate, the limitation in O.C.G.A. § 21-5-33(c) that campaign funds shall not constitute personal assets was not a restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of the debtor in a trust as required by 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2). In re Chambers, 451 Bankr. 621 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2011).
In a case in which the issue was whether the campaign funds of the debtor, a candidate for public office who filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy without incorporating the campaign, were the property of the bankruptcy estate, although O.C.G.A. § 21-5-33(a)-(c) restricted use of the campaign funds, the anti-alienation provision in 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(1)(A) prevented the state law from excluding the funds from becoming property of the estate. In re Chambers, 451 Bankr. 621 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2011).
When creditor with general nonpriority unsecured claim for payment for campaign services which the creditor provided to the debtor sought priority status, the Georgia Ethics Act, O.C.G.A. § 21-5-1 et seq., did not provide the creditor with a lien on the campaign funds and, even if Georgia law purported to establish the priority of the claim over others, that state statute would be preempted by the Bankruptcy Code. Rosetta Stone Communs., LLC v. Gordon (In re Chambers), 500 Bankr. 221 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2013).
Cited in Georgia State Conference of NAACP Branches v. Cox, 183 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 1999); Oxendine v. Gov't Transparency & Campaign Fin. Comm'n, 341 Ga. App. 901, 802 S.E.2d 310 (2017).
- A campaign committee which is formed for the purpose of accepting contributions for, making contributions to, or making expenditures on behalf of a candidate, is subject to the requirements of O.C.G.A. § 21-5-33 relative to the disposition of excess contributions in the same manner as a candidate's campaign committee. 1987 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 87-26.
- A secretary who maintains the records of a political action committee may be compensated from committee funds under state law since the provisions of O.C.G.A. § 21-5-33 which limit the distribution of funds received by the candidate and campaign committees would not apply to political action committees and, even assuming that they did, the funds can be utilized to defray ordinary and necessary expenses involved in a campaign. 1987 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 87-18.
- Elected officials may distribute campaign contributions in excess of those necessary to defray expenses to a national, state, or local committee of their political party for use in future campaigns, as long as the transfer is not made for the purpose of avoiding the restrictions contained in O.C.G.A. § 21-5-33. 1992 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U92-18.
- There is no prohibition on the use of campaign contributions for political advertising in publications. 1992 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U92-18.
- Nonprofit organizations may receive those campaign contributions which are in excess of those necessary to defray expenses. 1992 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U92-18.
Total Results: 1
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2023-08-16
Snippet: fulfillment or retention of such office.” OCGA § 21-5-33 (a). The record shows that Judge Coomer did not