CopyCited 30 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 30, 2017 | 807 S.E.2d 324
...OCGA §
22-1-11 expressly authorizes a superior court in condemnation proceedings to decide, before title vests in the condemning authority, whether the condemnation is legally authorized,2 and it permits the superior court to stay condemnation proceedings pending that decision. OCGA §
22-1-12 allows a property owner to recoup attorney fees and other costs if a condemnation is abandoned or determined to be unauthorized....
...or a long period of time — it might effectively reset its opportunity to comply with the statute by obtaining a new appraisal and reinitiating negotiations, giving a summary of that appraisal to the landowner at the time negotiations recommence.
Section
22-1-12 provides additional remedies, including attorney fees, when “final judgment is that the condemning authority cannot acquire the real property by condemnation^]” Having concluded that the City’s condemnation petition must be dismissed, we leave it to the trial court to determine the appropriate costs and expenses to which Summerour may be entitled under Section
22-1-12.
CopyCited 12 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jul 11, 2014 | 761 S.E.2d 282
... The Court of Appeals then granted the County’s application for an
interlocutory appeal and reversed. See Fulton County v. Dillard Land Invs.,
LLC,
322 Ga. App. 344 (744 SE2d 880) (2013). The Court of Appeals began
its analysis by focusing on OCGA §
22-1-12, a statute enacted in 2006 as part
of the Landowner’s Bill of Rights and Private Property Protection Act, Ga....
...L.
2006, p. 39, which entitles property owners to recover their attorney fees and
other expenses when a condemnor abandons a condemnation action.4 See
Dillard,
322 Ga. App. at 345. The court then examined the only prior reported
decision citing §
22-1-12, Gramm v. City of Stockbridge,
297 Ga. App. 165
(676 SE2d 818) (2009).5 The court recognized that the condemnation action in
4
OCGA §
22-1-12 says:
In all actions where a condemning authority exercises the power of eminent domain,
the court having jurisdiction of a proceeding instituted by a condemnor to acquire
real property by condemnation shall award the...
...d that it no longer needed the property and filed a
notice of voluntary dismissal. See
297 Ga. App. at 165. The condemnee filed a motion to set aside
5
Gramm was filed prior to the effective date of §
22-1-12, making that statute
inapplicable to that case, but nevertheless found the decision in Gramm
“instructive” for this case....
...at 491-492 – and a special master’s value
award is more binding on the court than its own oral announcement of how it
expects to rule. See OCGA §
22-2-111.
(c) The Court of Appeals erred in deeming the assessors cases
inapposite and relying instead on OCGA §
22-1-12....
...As noted previously, the
precedents involving voluntary dismissal after assessors awards in
condemnation cases accord with the precedents on voluntary dismissal in
general, and the principle expressed in those cases applies equally to voluntary
dismissal after a special master award. OCGA §
22-1-12 does nothing to change
15
that principle; indeed, it would be surprising if §
22-1-12 did so, since it was
enacted as part of the 2006 “Landowner’s Bill of Rights and Private Property
Protection Act,” which expanded property owners’ protections against
condemnation rather than limiting those safeguards....
...on a
condemnation proceeding. See id. The General Assembly did not shorten or
lengthen the time for a condemnor to file a voluntary dismissal, which remains
governed by §
9-11-41 and this Court’s precedents. What the General Assembly
did with §
22-1-12 is to reallocate the costs imposed on the condemnor and the
condemnee if the condemnor abandons a condemnation action at any point....
...But unlike most plaintiffs, condemnors that abandon their
actions must now pay the property owner’s reasonable costs and expenses
actually incurred because of the condemnation proceedings, including attorney,
appraisal, and engineering fees. See OCGA §
22-1-12.
16
Moreover, Gramm is fully consistent with our decision today....
Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jul 11, 2014 | 761 S.E.2d 282
...The Court of Appeals then granted the County’s application for an
interlocutory appeal and reversed. See Fulton County v. Dillard Land
Investments, LLC,
322 Ga. App. 344 (744 SE2d 880) (2013). The Court of
Appeals began its analysis by focusing on OCGA §
22-1-12, a statute enacted
4
in 2006 as part of the Landowner’s Bill of Rights and Private Property
Protection Act, Ga....
...2006, p. 39, which entitles property owners to recover
their attorney fees and other expenses when a condemnor abandons a
condemnation action.4 See Dillard,
322 Ga. App. at 345. The court then
examined the only prior reported decision citing OCGA §
22-1-12, Gramm v.
City of Stockbridge,
297 Ga. App. 165 (676 SE2d 818) (2009).5 The court
recognized that the condemnation action in Gramm was filed prior to the
effective date of OCGA §
22-1-12, making that statute inapplicable to that case,
4
OCGA §
22-1-12 says:
In all actions where a condemning authority exercises the power of eminent
domain, the court having jurisdiction of a proceeding instituted by a condemnor to
acquire real property by condemnation shall aw...
...action” unilaterally. Dillard,
322
Ga. App. at 347. Finally, the court rebuffed the cases Dillard cited as
“inapposite,” since those cases were “decided under the assessor’s [sic] method
of condemnation, and they all preceded OCGA §
22-1-12,” adding that
“assessors’ rulings on condemnation cases [are] self-executing” whereas “the
legislature required that special masters’ awards be adopted by the trial judge.”
Dillard, 322 Ga....
...at 491-492 — and a special master’s value
award is more binding on the court than its own oral announcement of how it
expects to rule. See OCGA §
22-2-111.
(c) The Court of Appeals erred in deeming the assessors’ cases
inapposite and relying instead on OCGA §
22-1-12....
...As noted previously, the
precedents involving voluntary dismissal after assessors’ awards in
condemnation cases accord with the precedents on voluntary dismissal in
general, and the principle expressed in those cases applies equally to voluntary
dismissal after a special master award. OCGA §
22-1-12 does nothing to change
that principle; indeed, it would be surprising if OCGA §
22-1-12 did so, since
it was enacted as part of the 2006 “Landowner’s Bill of Rights and Private
Property Protection Act,” which expanded property owners’ protections against
condemnation rather than limiting those safeguards....
...condemnation proceeding. See id. The General Assembly did not shorten or
lengthen the time for a condemnor to file a voluntary dismissal, which remains
governed by OCGA §
9-11-41 and this Court’s precedents. What the General
Assembly did with OCGA §
22-1-12 is to reallocate the costs imposed on the
condemnor and the condemnee if the condemnor abandons a condemnation
action at any point....
...But unlike most plaintiffs,
condemnors that abandon their actions must now pay the property owner’s
reasonable costs and expenses actually incurred because of the condemnation
proceedings, including attorney, appraisal, and engineering fees. See OCGA §
22-1-12.
Moreover, Gramm is fully consistent with our decision today....
