Taking property for public use is legislative, not judicial, function.

- The necessity or expediency of appropriating particular property for public use is not a matter of judicial cognizance, but one for the determination of the legislative branch of the government, and this must obviously be so where the state takes for its own purposes. State Hwy. Dep't v. Smith, 219 Ga. 800, 136 S.E.2d 334 (1964).

And notice to owner not required before determination of necessity.

- Since the necessity for taking private property for a public use is a legislative and not a judicial function, due process does not require notice to the owner nor an opportunity to be heard by him before such determination can be made. State Hwy. Dep't v. Smith, 219 Ga. 800, 136 S.E.2d 334 (1964).

Eminent domain statutes to be strictly construed.

- Since the power to take private property for a public use or benefit is in derogation of the right of the citizen, statutes under which it is claimed must be strictly construed, and it is generally held that the power is not conferred unless an intention to that effect appears in clear and express terms, or by necessary implication. Botts v. Southeastern Pipe-Line Co., 190 Ga. 689, 10 S.E.2d 375 (1940), commented on in, see 3 Ga. B.J. 49 (1941).

The exercise of the right of eminent domain is a legislative function, and the powers delegated by the General Assembly thereunder must be exercised in strict conformity with the statute. DOT v. Worley, 150 Ga. App. 768, 258 S.E.2d 595, aff'd and modified on other grounds, 244 Ga. 783, 263 S.E.2d 436 (1979).

No right to take land for private use.

- The power of eminent domain may never be used to acquire property to be used by private individuals solely for private use and private gain. City of Atlanta v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 144 Ga. App. 157, 240 S.E.2d 730 (1977).

Right rests largely in discretion of exercising authority.

- In the absence of bad faith the exercise of the right of eminent domain rests largely in the discretion of the authority exercising such right, both as to necessity and amount. City of Atlanta v. First Nat'l Bank, 154 Ga. App. 658, 269 S.E.2d 878 (1980).

Substituted condemnation.

- Where property is condemned for exchange with another public utility, and the property will be used for a public purpose, this is called "substituted condemnation," and this is a valid exercise of the condemnor's power of eminent domain. City of Atlanta v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 144 Ga. App. 157, 240 S.E.2d 730 (1977).

A taking for redevelopment is a taking for a public purpose. Nations v. Downtown Dev. Auth., 225 Ga. 324, 338 S.E.2d 240 (1985).

Cessation of work on project after notifying property owner of possible condemnation.

- Where the Department of Transportation informed a corporation in the spring of 1981 that a building leased by it would be condemned for highway purposes, but later all work on the proposed highway, including all condemnation actions in progress, was halted, and the corporation sought to recover from the department its loss of an advantageous leasehold interest, as well as expenses involved in moving, since the corporation had been advised that no move was required before September 1982, and that written notification would precede a required removal, its decision to move in August 1982 was by voluntary choice, and could not be attributed to an interference by the department with its exclusive rights of ownership, use and enjoyment. Hence, whether the corporation's action was characterized as direct or inverse condemnation, the losses claimed did not result from an exercise of eminent domain. Josh Cabaret, Inc. v. DOT, 256 Ga. 749, 353 S.E.2d 346 (1987).

Cited in Felton v. State Hwy. Bd., 51 Ga. App. 930, 181 S.E. 506 (1935); Williamson v. Housing Auth., 186 Ga. 673, 199 S.E. 43 (1938); Housing Auth. v. Savannah Iron & Wire Works, Inc., 90 Ga. App. 150, 82 S.E.2d 244 (1954); Central of Ga. R.R. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 257 Ga. 217, 356 S.E.2d 865 (1987).

Legislature may authorize municipality's acquisition of land beyond its limits.

- The Legislature has power to authorize a municipal corporation to acquire lands beyond the municipal limits and for that purpose to exercise the power of eminent domain, where the proposed taking of private property is strictly for public use. 1965-66 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 66-65.

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 26 Am. Jur. 2d, Eminent Domain, §§ 1, 2, 13-16, 25-37.

Eminent Domain: Proof of Lack of Reasonable Necessity for Taking of Property, 71 POF3d 97.

C.J.S.

- 29A C.J.S., Eminent Domain, §§ 1-5, 19, 29-31.

ALR.

- Exercise of eminent domain for purpose of irrigating land of private owner, 9 A.L.R. 583, 27 A.L.R. 519.

Right to condemn property previously condemned or purchased for public use, but not actually so used, 12 A.L.R. 1502.

Exercise of eminent domain to control the use or improvement of property not taken, 23 A.L.R. 876.

Constitutionality of statute conferring power of eminent domain on private corporation or association for educational, religious, or recreational purpose, 50 A.L.R. 1530.

Constitutionality of statute or ordinance denying right of property owners to defeat a proposed street improvement by protest, 52 A.L.R. 883.

Public benefit or convenience as distinguished from use by the public as ground for the exercise of the power of eminent domain, 54 A.L.R. 7.

Right of public body to compensation where property held by it is taken for another public purpose, 56 A.L.R. 365.

Exercise of eminent domain to preserve places of historical interest, 59 A.L.R. 945.

Power to condemn, or authorize the condemnation of, capital stock of a public utility, 81 A.L.R. 1071.

Diversion of park property to other uses as taking or damaging neighboring property without compensation, 83 A.L.R. 1435.

State power of eminent domain as affected by interstate character of uses to which property taken is to be devoted, 90 A.L.R. 1032.

Obstruction or diversion of, or other interference with, flow of surface water as taking or damaging property within constitutional provision against taking or damaging without compensation, 128 A.L.R. 1195.

Retention, by building or other fixture, of its character as real property, for purposes of statute authorizing condemnation of real property, notwithstanding agreement treating it as personalty, 151 A.L.R. 1429.

Condemnation of public utility property for public utility purposes, 173 A.L.R. 1362.

Electric light or power line in street or highway as additional servitude, 58 A.L.R.2d 525.

Right to condemn property in excess of needs for a particular public purpose, 6 A.L.R.3d 297.

Substitute condemnation: power to condemn property or interest therein to replace other property taken for public use, 20 A.L.R.3d 862.

Eminent domain: right to enter land for preliminary survey or examination, 29 A.L.R.3d 1104.

Eminent domain: validity of appropriation of property for anticipated future use, 80 A.L.R.3d 1071.

Sufficiency of condemnor's negotiations required as preliminary to taking in eminent domain, 21 A.L.R.4th 765.

Eminent domain: possibility of overcoming specific obstacles to contemplated use as element in determining existence of necessary public use, 22 A.L.R.4th 840.

Eminent domain: Public taking of sports or entertainment franchise or organization as taking for public purpose, 30 A.L.R.4th 1226.

Eminent domain: industrial park or similar development as public use justifying condemnation of private property, 62 A.L.R.4th 1183.

Validity of extraterritorial condemnation by municipality, 44 A.L.R.6th 259.