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Call Now: 904-383-7448In order to encourage and expedite the acquisition of real property by agreements with owners, to avoid litigation and relieve congestion in the courts, to assure consistent treatment for property owners, and to promote public confidence in land acquisition practices, all condemnations and potential condemnations shall, to the greatest extent practicable, be guided by the following policies and practices:
(Code 1981, §22-1-9, enacted by Ga. L. 2006, p. 39, § 5/HB 1313; Ga. L. 2013, p. 141, § 22/HB 79; Ga. L. 2018, p. 1112, § 22/SB 365.)
- This Code section became effective April 4, 2006.
The 2013 amendment, effective April 24, 2013, part of an Act to revise, modernize, and correct the Code, in paragraph (3), revised punctuation in the first sentence and substituted "it established" for "he or she established" in the third sentence.
The 2018 amendment, effective May 8, 2018, part of an Act to revise, modernize, and correct the Code, substituted "property as part of the compensation offered" for "property as of the compensation offered" at the end of the last sentence in paragraph (3).
- Ga. L. 2006, p. 39, § 1, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "This Act shall be known and may be cited as 'The Landowner's Bill of Rights and Private Property Protection Act.'"
Ga. L. 2006, p. 39, § 25, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that the amendment to this Code section shall only apply to petitions for condemnation filed on or after April 4, 2006.
- For article on 2006 enactment of this Code section, see 23 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 157 (2006). For annual survey on real property, see 69 Mercer L. Rev. 251 (2017).
§ 22-1-6 shown. - Trial court did not err in denying the property owners' motion to dismiss the condemnation petition, nor in overruling the owners' exception to the special master's award, because the evidence at the special master hearing showed that the telecommunications condemnor made an effort to agree on a purchase price for the property, but that those negotiations ultimately failed, which was sufficient to show that the condemnor could not procure the property by contract within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 22-1-6. White v. Ringgold Tel. Co., 334 Ga. App. 325, 779 S.E.2d 378 (2015), cert. denied, No. S16C0404, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 148 (Ga. 2016).
Compliance with O.C.G.A. § 22-1-9. - Summary envisioned by O.C.G.A. § 22-1-9(3) requires, at a minimum, information sufficient, as part of the prompt offer, required prior to the initiation of the negotiations, to provide the property owner with the ability to meaningfully evaluate the offer; simply informing the property owner that the property has been appraised and that the amount offered is the appraised amount, while certainly concise, fails to convey the sum and substance of the basis of the offer. Summerour v. City of Marietta, 338 Ga. App. 259, 788 S.E.2d 921 (2016).
Insufficient compliance with O.C.G.A. § 22-1-9. - In a condemnation action, the court vacated the trial court's order adopting the special master's return as to the property value because none of the city's offers prior to 2014 satisfied the dictates of O.C.G.A. § 22-1-9(3) and the city took several years to comply with § 22-1-9(3), which bore on the issue of whether the city acted in bad faith, which required further consideration by the trial court. Summerour v. City of Marietta, 338 Ga. App. 259, 788 S.E.2d 921 (2016).
City seeking to acquire a landowner's property violated O.C.G.A. § 22-1-9(3) because the city failed to disclose the appraisal summary to the owner in a timely manner as required by the statute, instead sending the summary 10 months after the summary was requested by the owner; the statute was mandatory, and dismissal of the condemnation petition was the proper remedy. City of Marietta v. Summerour, 302 Ga. 645, 807 S.E.2d 324 (2017).
Total Results: 1
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2017-10-30
Citation: 302 Ga. 645, 807 S.E.2d 324
Snippet: failed to fulfill its obligations under OCGA § 22-1-9, and the Court of Appeals directed that the case